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It is a big claim to call the multilateral development bank that I have had 
the honour to lead for eight years “indispensable”. I usually recoil when I 
hear words like “indispensable” or “unique” or “exceptional”. But this vol-
ume, the first of two, a history of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, written by my former EBRD colleague, Andrew Kilpat-
rick, will, I trust, convince readers that this is not a fanciful claim.
The book is not an official history. It contains Andrew’s views on the 
events and themes in the life of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD or the Bank) that, from my vantage point, show clear-
ly how the Bank was a pioneer in the world of international development.
The book is timely. On 29 May 1990, only months after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development was signed by its then 42 shareholders from 
around the world. As we mark the 30th anniversary of that historic day, it is 
worth reflecting on what made the EBRD so instrumental for the transfor-
mation of so many emerging markets, and what makes it vital for tackling 
today’s global challenges. 
This volume charts the history of the Bank from its very beginnings to 
the days before the global financial crisis, when it briefly seemed that EBRD’s 
work was nearly done, at least in Central Europe. The second volume, cover-
ing the period from the crisis of 2007–2008 to more recent days, will be pub-
lished ahead of the Bank’s 30th anniversary since the start of operations in 
1991—only one year after the international community agreed to its creation. 
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In this foreword, I give my personal take on why I believe the EBRD has 
been and continues to be the indispensable institution in the multilateral 
development bank (MDB) system. At its heart is a story of an MDB that 
seeks to move with the times, to climb the next peak and not just admire the 
one it scaled earlier. In short, to use its business model to be relevant to to-
day’s and tomorrow’s challenges.
System Change
All other MDBs have the noble purpose of supporting the economic devel-
opment of poorer nations. The EBRD, born at the end of the Cold War, has 
the unique mandate to foster system change: to support the transition of 
centrally planned countries to market economies, and to apply this purpose 
in countries that are committed to multi-party democracy and political plu-
ralism. This is the most ideological statement in the founding articles of any 
MDB, a clear commitment by its owners that the EBRD should help bring 
about system change in the countries where it operates.
What did this transition to market economies mean? It meant, and still 
does mean, using the EBRD’s investments to grow the private sector, which 
had been suppressed under central planning. It meant a focus on ensuring 
the Bank’s investments helped make those economies more competitive.
Over time, the Bank realised that the narrow definition of the econom-
ic transition journey needed to change. Citizens now want much more from 
their markets than mere competitiveness. And the EBRD moved with the 
times. Today, the EBRD defines successful market economies as having six 
qualities: competitive, green, well-governed, inclusive, integrated and resil-
ient. Each EBRD investment today must feature two of those six transition 
qualities. This modernisation of the concept of a market economy has im-
pacted the debate and approach in the MDB system.
Because of its mandate, the Bank is about more than a change in an eco-
nomic system. The commitment to pursue its purpose in countries commit-
ted to multi-party democracy and political pluralism required attention to 
the political trajectory in each of those nations. Assessments of how far each 
of the Bank’s countries of operation have reached on that journey remain to 
this day a feature of the EBRD’s work.
But, as with economics, so with politics, there has been a modernisa-
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tion of the Bank’s approach in four ways in recent years. First, there is now 
a more systematic approach to that assessment with the use of fourteen cri-
teria to gauge where a country has reached on its democratic political jour-
ney. Second, the Bank has moved away from the binary and, frankly, incon-
sistent judgements of the past about whether a country passed the test of its 
commitment to the Bank’s political mandate to a more honest and trans-
parent description of what exactly is happening within the political system 
of each nation. Third, the Bank has placed much more emphasis in recent 
years on not just politics, but also on questions of political economy; for ex-
ample, where does power reside and how do major decisions get made? And 
fourth, it has used this modernised political analysis to help shape its invest-
ments and policy work, at regional and national levels, and in its engage-
ment with the leaders of the Bank’s countries of operations. These consider-
ations around a political system have sometimes led the Bank to modulate 
the volume and focus of its lending in some countries. 
Such political analysis is invaluable to the work of the EBRD. It should 
be taken up by other MDBs to inform their work beyond the safe haven of 
economic governance.
System Change for What Purpose?
Over time, the EBRD recognised that economic system change alone—how-
ever important and historic—is not an outcome that is regarded by citizens 
today as valuable in its own right. So the EBRD recast the concept of a mod-
ern market economy at the time when many of the Bank’s shareholders, in re-
cipient and non-recipient countries, were questioning the utility of free mar-
kets and the associated globalisation of the world economy. To paraphrase 
the Monty Python joke about the Romans, many citizens asked: what has 
the market economy ever done for us? Governments increasingly realised: 
the modern market must deliver outcomes that are valuable to people today.
Cue the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the COP21 agreement 
on climate change, and the 2030 Agenda for Development. The SDGs are, 
in my view, the best description of the outcomes that people of all nations 
want to see their economic and political systems deliver for them. In sharp 
contrast to the old Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), they go be-
yond a narrow set of outcomes to encompass the near totality of the charac-
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teristics of the development condition. And they define in each area the out-
comes we should aim to achieve by 2030.
That is why the EBRD increasingly and more explicitly says that the 
modern market economies the Bank is seeking to create in its countries of 
operations should be geared to delivering the SDGs. In the language of the 
technician, the market economy is the output that must deliver the SDG 
outcomes if it is a system change that is to retain the support of the citizens 
of the Bank’s countries of operations.
The What and the How
The clearest expression of what the EBRD does to achieve its mission is the 
investment project, whether through a loan or an equity stake. The invest-
ment operation has been the institution’s successful unit of exchange for 
nearly thirty years. Each project has been assessed from the Bank’s early days 
for its additionality (to be undertaken only if the market would not finance 
the same investment), its bankability (that the operation is structured in a 
way that is financially sound), and its impact on the transition to the market 
economy (now measured against the six transition qualities). Some things 
are eternal in the EBRD, even if the arguments continue to rage over the ap-
plication of these concepts at project, sector, and regional levels.
But some very important aspects have changed over the years, or are be-
ginning to do so, around the core investment operations of the Bank.
First, while the EBRD continues to aim for a market-based approach to 
loan pricing, the range of themes and countries with which the Bank is now 
involved means that grant financing is increasingly required alongside the 
loan. The grant-intensity of the EBRD’s business model has increased. And 
the organisation has become very successful at attracting donor funds, in-
cluding from some of its countries of operations, to provide more “blended” 
financing of its investments, and to support its growing policy work. This 
shift in themes and countries and the associated increase in donor funds has 
made the EBRD more of a “development” bank, albeit one that continues 
to focus on the private sector.
Second, the EBRD has emerged as the leading promoter among MDBs 
of local currency financing and the building of local capital markets. It un-
derstood early on that clients, particularly SMEs, needed local currency 
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 financing and the removal of foreign exchange risks in these vulnerable mar-
kets. And the Bank understood also the importance of building local capi-
tal markets, e.g. through the issuing of local currency bonds. Other MDBs 
know the importance of this, but the degree to which EBRD has followed 
through and increased its efforts in this area is striking, both in absolute and 
comparative terms, an indicator of its high risk appetite.
Third, there has been recognition in the Bank that operating through 
its vertical sectors—financial institutions, infrastructure, energy, natural re-
sources, industry, commerce and agribusiness—alone and through clients of 
all sizes (from SMEs to corporate and state behemoths, as well as municipal-
ities) would not cut it. The sectoral approach needed an overlay of increas-
ingly important cross-cutting themes to be relevant in today’s world.
The most well-known cross-cutting theme is the EBRD’s contribution 
to the greening of its countries of operations, starting with the Sustainable 
Energy Initiative in 2006, which grew into the Sustainable Resource Initia-
tive, and in 2015 became the ground-breaking Green Economy Transition 
(GET) approach. The GET approach established a target to invest 40 per 
cent of the Bank’s annual business in the green economy by 2020. With 46 
per cent of EBRD’s investments in 2019 already in the green economy area, 
the EBRD has emerged as the leading player among the MDBs on delivery 
of the climate change agenda, most especially so in the private sector. The 
Bank is now gearing up to roll out a further modernised GET approach for 
the 2021–2025 period. 
The Bank has also taken up other cross-cutting themes within its in-
vestment operations in recent years—gender, economic inclusion, support 
for refugees—although there is much further to go on these fronts. In each 
case, the EBRD has proved wrong those who doubted that these classic de-
velopment themes could fit with its business model.
Fourth, the Bank has been a hothouse of product innovation over the 
years. Because of its client facing nature, the EBRD is a more demand-driv-
en MDB than others. The EBRD is not a blue skies innovator; rather, it cre-
ates products that are useful for its clients but also meet its mandate. Some 
examples include credit lines to local banks to be on-lent to SMEs, includ-
ing for energy efficiency improvements, small-scale renewables and wom-
en entrepreneurs; the long-standing and very successful Trade Facilitation 
Programme; the Bank’s work on green, sustainability and climate resilience 
bonds; innovative risk products; sub-sovereign loans to municipalities and 
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commercial finance to improve utilities and local services, including in more 
remote regions, and the increasingly acclaimed Green Cities programme; or 
the Equity Participation Fund, where institutional investors can co-invest 
alongside the EBRD. The Bank also has a unique expertise and mandate in 
nuclear safety and remediation, managing the Chernobyl New Safe Con-
finement on behalf of international community and helping decommission 
nuclear plants in other countries.
Fifth, a major development in recent years, has been the scaling up of the 
Bank’s policy work. Until recently, the EBRD tended to make forays into 
policy making with its countries of operations based primarily on its invest-
ment operations needs.
That has now changed. The EBRD today has a more systematic approach 
to policy work at strategic levels (country, sectors, themes), based rightly on the 
knowledge gained from its many clusters of projects and from its clients. The 
Bank now actively pursues policy reform in its dialogue with leaders of coun-
tries of operations. And it has its own policy products, ranging from country 
diagnostic studies that precede country strategies to practical investment coun-
cils that bring governments together with the private sector to help create the 
right enabling environment for more investment. Of course, there is more to 
do on this front: in the best cases, a virtuous circle has been created between 
more reform leading to more investment, which then begets more reform. 
And sixth, while the EBRD was an early believer in a matrix between 
an HQ (that contains sector teams, risk analysts, economists, and lawyers, 
among others) and Resident Offices in countries of operation, there has been 
a clear shift over recent years towards more senior boots on the ground. Some 
senior management posts and certain skills (such as economists, lawyers, port-
folio managers) are now more prevalent in the Resident Offices than, say, a de-
cade ago. This represents the growing need to be closer to the clients—private 
sector and sovereign—and the greater stress placed on policy dialogue.
Moreover, the EBRD is unusual among the MDBs in having offices in 
secondary cities as well as in the capitals. These offices outside capitals are fo-
cused on providing advisory services to SMEs and have grown very rapidly 
in number in recent years. They have proved their worth in good times and 
have been invaluable during the Covid-19 crisis in providing information 
about the impact on clients and how best to support them.
In short, the business model of the EBRD retains the original pillar of 
the investment operation at its heart but the foundations have been strength-
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ened over the years to ensure the edifice is even more responsive to today’s 
development challenges.
The All-Weather Bank
And the Bank has shown it can respond rapidly and successfully to changes 
of geo-political, financial, economic and pandemic storms.
As I write this, the EBRD is delivering its operational response to the 
economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic that has led to govern-
ment mandated lock downs and a contraction of economic output. The lat-
est economic forecasts for the Bank’s countries of operations make depress-
ing reading. Sharp recoveries are possible, provided lock downs are eased 
soon and economies (some of which are dependent on tourism and remit-
tances, some on global value chains, and some on commodity prices) can re-
turn to some sense of a normalcy. For the EBRD, it has been imperative to 
deliver liquidity to clients, arrange payment deferrals and restructurings, in-
crease trade finance, and ensure vital infrastructure and services are not dis-
rupted. In short, the Bank’s response is to help ensure a liquidity crisis does 
not become one of solvency for its clients. In true EBRD fashion, it was the 
first MDB to have its “Solidarity Package” approved by its shareholders and 
investment levels so far this year have outstripped all previous years. And it 
has done all this with staff working from home and managing their lock-
down lives (such as providing home schooling and looking after elderly fam-
ily members) alongside work.
That the EBRD has done so well in today’s crisis—the most difficult 
the EBRD has ever had to face—is almost certainly because the Bank is 
no stranger to having to respond to crises over its thirty years. It responded 
fast and decisively to the break-up of countries (the USSR and Yugoslavia), 
geo-political tensions (for example, between Russia and Georgia and Rus-
sia and Ukraine), financial and economic crises (in Russia in the late 1990s), 
across its regions in 2007–2008 (which led the Bank to support the recovery 
of Greece and Cyprus), major regional political convulsions (following the 
Arab Spring), and after the refugee crisis caused by the war in Syria.
In all of these cases, the Bank has been able to flex its business model and 
make use of its matrix to respond rapidly and—very importantly—in a tai-
lored way to the problem at hand. Rightly, the EBRD receives many plaudits 
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from its countries of operations (that are of course best able to make com-
parisons with other MDBs) for its commitment, whatever the weather, and 
its ability to turn promises into reality very fast.
The Where 
This adaptive, all-weather, successful business model has made the EBRD 
an attractive club. There has been growth of membership and of geograph-
ic scope in its operations. The EBRD is the only MDB today—other than 
the newest kid on the block, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank—
that has a growing membership of both recipients and non-recipients. The 
EBRD started life with 42 shareholders, and the break-up of some of the 
original members added to this number, but more recently it has been its 
successful operational delivery that has attracted new members and turned 
some existing ones from non-recipients into recipients.
The EBRD is known as one of the four regional development banks. But 
it is the only one that has members that are countries of operations in Europe, 
Asia and Africa, so it is already pan-regional. And while the original intention 
of the Bank’s shareholders was a temporary institution that would regard its 
job as done as soon as the former communist countries became market econo-
mies, the task has proven more long lasting and the business model relevant to 
nations that never had centrally planned economies. And the Bank has man-
aged this operational expansion to new geographies with great success.
Today’s EBRD attracts big new players as well as smaller countries. In re-
cent years, China and India became non-recipient members of the EBRD, 
adding to the G20 contingent of the Bank. So, with the G7 and EU mem-
ber states retaining a majority of the shareholding, the EBRD today—with 
71 shareholders and more expected soon—can truly be called a “global in-
stitution with a European heart”.
Future Opportunities and Challenges
That is my case for claiming the EBRD is the indispensable MDB for to-
day and tomorrow. Indeed, the importance of the private sector focused 
business model to transition and economic development in different geog-
xxiii
A Personal Foreword
raphies, the shift from the narrow MDGs to the wider SDGs in the inter-
national system, and the acknowledged fact that the SDGs cannot be met 
without a ramping up of private finance and delivery, has led the EBRD to 
the centre stage in the MDB system.
How to keep it there? What makes an institution stay indispensable?
The first task of the future leadership of the EBRD must be to avoid 
any tendency to wallow in nostalgia. Indeed, put positively, it must be to 
seek out the opportunities where the EBRD can make a difference and seize 
them. And it must also identify challenges honestly and tackle them. That 
balance between seizing opportunities and tackling challenges gets hard-
er as an organisation grows, when it moves from insurgent to establishment 
status. The Bank must retain its radical, innovative and agenda-setting char-
acter. This is the mind-set opportunity and challenge.
The second is to spot the coming issues and be ready with an EBRD rel-
evant response. That means building on key strengths like the Bank’s work 
on the green economy. It also means making a much improved offer on 
equality of opportunity, an area where the operational regions could easi-
ly go backwards after Covid-19. And it means tackling new areas which will 
impact the prospects of our countries of operations, such as the opportuni-
ties offered up by digital technology. All three of these themes will, I trust, 
be at the forefront of EBRD’s 2021–2025 strategy. This is the thematic op-
portunity and challenge.
There is also the geographic opportunity and challenge. The EBRD has 
a lot more to offer in the neighbourhood regions of the EU and in Central 
Asia, and in the poorest EU countries of operations, all the markets where 
the “marginal euro” of investment and policy advice has the greatest impact. 
The Bank must scale up further in these countries. At the same time, the 
EBRD is now much less additional in the advanced EU countries of oper-
ations, for which there is plenty of finance available from the local banking 
systems, domestic public budgets, and from the European Investment Bank 
and the EU. The Bank’s shareholders need to come together and accept this 
economic truth and work with management to create an approach and tra-
jectory to graduation of these advanced countries of operations.
There is also a huge geographic opportunity for the EBRD beyond our 
current region of operations for all the right reasons: not because of the cap-
ital available, but to make a real difference to the creation of modern market 
economies to deliver the SDGs. Every one of EBRD’s geographic expansions 
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has been successful. It is no secret that I believe the Bank would be just as 
successful with its private sector model in sub-Saharan Africa. And all the 
analysis that has been done shows that too. Remember the SDGs will not 
be achieved without sharp progress in sub-Saharan Africa. It is high time 
to move from procrastination to decision on geographical expansion in the 
Bank’s coming five-year strategy.
This is not a zero-sum game. The EBRD has the capital to achieve more 
than a limited and incremental expansion to sub-Saharan Africa and still 
scale up in its existing countries of operations. But it would also be good 
for the Bank, either alone or with other MDBs, to look now—five years on 
from the Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa, perhaps at 
an “Addis 2”—how it can leverage its balance sheet to create additional fire-
power without requesting a capital increase. I believe in the next couple of 
decades that further expansion of the Bank’s activities beyond even what is 
contemplated today will be inevitable and the right thing to pursue. Adding 
to the Bank’s financing capacity over the next year would therefore be good 
to put on the table in the coming months.
This is a rich agenda for the future based on the EBRD’s achievements 
over thirty years. But, in my claim for the EBRD’s indispensability, I skated 
over one overarching issue: the role of shareholders.
Shareholders of MDBs can either accelerate or be a brake on change. The 
experience of the EBRD is instructive: the countries of operations, espe-
cially those outside the EU, have little voice in terms of shareholding but 
have consistently been the advocates of the Bank moving with the times; 
and the non-recipients have oscillated between periods of strong support for 
moving forward fast (for example, in founding the institution and provid-
ing the bulk of its capital, in pursuing four geographical operational expan-
sions, and on the green agenda) and a reluctance in more recent times to face 
up squarely to and be decisive about compelling questions about the future.
If the EBRD is to move forward and retain the status of being an indis-
pensable MDB, then thoroughgoing governance reform will have to come, 
to give greater voice to those who best understand today’s problems of tran-
sition and development—the countries of operations themselves—and so 
can help the immensely talented management and staff ensure that the 
Bank remains match-fit for the future.
It has been a privilege to lead the EBRD for eight years. I leave the Bank 
knowing that it is a great institution. It has done so much to shape the tran-
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A Personal Foreword
sition and development landscape, to invest in supporting people to have 
better lives than would have been possible without the work of the Bank. 
And it is capable—with the right support from its shareholders—of doing 
so much more in the years ahead.
 
Sir Suma Chakrabarti
President of the EBRD,




Just before midnight on 9 November 1989 the wall that had separated West 
and East Berlin for 28 years was breached. The fall of the Berlin Wall came 
to symbolise the end of the Cold War and the era of Soviet-inspired com-
munism. 
Nine days later, at a special European Council, French President Fran-
çois Mitterrand persuaded his European Community (EC) colleagues to 
consider the creation of a “Modernisation and Development Bank for Eu-
rope”, aimed at encouraging and supporting the nascent movement towards 
democracy and market economics that was flowing through central and 
eastern Europe.
Within 17 months of that Council meeting, the world would witness the 
birth of a brand new multilateral institution that was unique in the arena of 
international development. Owned by 42 shareholders from across five con-
tinents, and now named the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD), this new institution opened its doors on 15 April 1991 in 
London.
The EBRD offered countries emerging from the wreckage of communist 
mismanagement and economic neglect a credible path towards sustainable 
prosperity as they embraced a democratic future. The new bank would be a pi-
oneer in the promotion of sustainable market economies, putting a primary fo-
cus on private-sector development and bringing the skills of the private sector 
to the delivery of public services that improved the lives of millions across its 
regions. It would break new ground in the delivery of environmentally sustain-
able development in countries where energy waste and pollution were endemic.
The EBRD would be a partner in a journey of remarkable progress, even 
though that journey would last much longer than originally envisaged. 
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A robust balance between Anglo-Saxon and continental European per-
spectives would allow the EBRD to prosper through the many difficult 
times ahead. The success of its hands-on approach, and experience in tran-
sitioning countries towards well-functioning market democracies, would 
later take it well beyond its original geography of communist eastern Eu-
rope. The EBRD’s business model would help it leverage the private sector 
to promote global public goods, such as more sustainable energy solutions 
to mitigate climate change, including in its original countries of opera-
tions. That development forms the subject of the second volume of this his-
tory of the EBRD. In this volume we look at how the new international 
institution emerged and used its public capital to support private-sector de-
velopment in the former socialist countries of eastern Europe.





A New International 
Development Institution
Introduction
Mitterrand’s original proposal for a new institution, the EBRD, to support 
the integration of central and eastern Europe into the European and glob-
al economy was endorsed in early December 1989 at the Strasbourg Europe-
an Council by all 12 EC countries. The speed with which leaders decided to 
create a new international financial institution was unprecedented in Euro-
pean Council history and reflected the urgency of the situation. There was 
no doubt in the minds of the key actors about the potentially grave conse-
quences for Europe of failing to support their eastern neighbours.
A variety of forces lay behind these events. The old certainties of the 
Cold War had begun to falter with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as 
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in the mid-1980s and his 
adoption of a reformist stance through perestroika and glasnost in the So-
viet Union. This was followed by the visible abandonment of the Brezhnev 
doctrine and a new-found willingness to allow Soviet satellite states more 
independence, quickly built upon by populations eager to catch up with 
the West, as well as a more open approach to detente and relations with 
western leaders.
In western Europe too it was a moment of internal change. As envis-
aged under the Treaty of Rome, the EC was embarking on the next stage 
of integration and had begun to set out concrete steps to achieve econom-
ic and monetary union. Political union was also on the table, under which 
lay a schism with the United Kingdom which was to fester and undermine 
European unity. Despite this, there was full agreement that the adoption 
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of sound market practices and democratic values was the right way forward 
and that the East should be encouraged to follow this path.
For Frenchman Jacques Attali, who was to become the first President 
of the EBRD, the circumstances offered a unique opportunity to create a 
unified Europe, which could include the Soviet Union and in which the 
common values of the different parts of the continent could be pooled and 
strengthened. If successful, the enlarged marketplace would provide a re-
gion to match the major global players of the day, the USA and Japan. At its 
centre could be a “Bank for Europe” with a remit to invest in projects that 
could bring benefits to both East and West. For other observers, the situa-
tion offered the possibility to instil ideas of market economics, the rule of 
law and multiparty democracy in a region where these qualities were ab-
sent and to populations brought up under communist rule. An internation-
al bank offered a convenient mechanism to achieve these goals.
The idea of the EBRD emerged at a time of momentous transforma-
tion and the pace of change would not slow over the coming months and 
years. Of the eight original beneficiary countries identified by the EBRD—
Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR), the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia (SFRY)—East Germany would be absorbed into a unified Germa-
ny even before the EBRD’s inauguration in 1991. The following years would 
see the division of the CSFR into two states, the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the violent breakup of Yugoslavia.
It would not be long before the EBRD was investing in more than 20 
countries. But before all that could happen, and before the Bank could even 
take shape, there were to be many complex and sometimes tough negotiations. 
This chapter looks at the background to the emergence of the EBRD, its 
establishment and early development and, in particular, the debates and ar-
guments behind the work that led to the signing of the Agreement Establish-
ing the Bank (AEB) on 29 May 1990.
1. The Historical Context: The 1980s in the West
During much of the 1980s, most advanced western countries enjoyed a peri-
od of steady economic expansion. This was in marked contrast to the previ-
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ous decade, which had seen interrupted growth and high inflation. Once the 
shock therapy of the interest-rate hikes deployed by Federal Reserve Chair-
man Paul Volcker at the start of the decade had worked its way through the 
system, the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) saw a strong expansion of output. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew at an annual average rate of 3.75 per cent between 1982 
and 1989. The USA experienced its strongest period of growth for two de-
cades, with GDP increases averaging almost 4.5 per cent per annum. Stock 
markets around the world reached peaks as the decade drew to a close.
These years represented the culmination of several trends that had 
emerged over the previous decade, including the relative decline of indus-
try and the rise of services in western economies, a rebalancing of the state 
towards private enterprise, and in several countries a shift away from collec-
tive decision-making towards individual responsibility. The practical appli-
cation of technological innovation dramatically reduced the cost of com-
munications and shipping, increasing the ability of more mature economies 
to access cheap foreign labour and other resources. Meanwhile, the steady 
growth in incomes that these advances produced allowed citizens in the 
West to access an ever-expanding choice of consumer goods and services.
The decade had also seen fundamental developments towards market re-
form and the espousal of liberal democracy. In the USA the election of Ronald 
Reagan as President in 1980, a year after his British comrade-in-arms, Marga-
ret Thatcher, was elected as prime minister of the UK, resulted in an ideolog-
ical shift towards an anti-state, pro-enterprise culture. The “Reagan-Thatcher 
era”, as it became known, marked a clear break with the immediate past.
The “Thatcher revolution” in the UK led to the privatisation of major 
state enterprises, a general rolling back of the state and significant labour-
market reform, most notably in a reduction of trade-union power. 
In the USA Ronald Reagan’s presidency ushered in a period of radical 
deregulation, especially in the financial sector, which led to a spurt of re-
structuring and financial innovation. The rapid increases in lending and 
other financial products fuelled growth. This was echoed by the “Big Bang” 
financial reforms in the UK from the mid-1980s. The changes also helped 
to accelerate the global integration of financial markets and confirmed Lon-
don and New York as the pre-eminent international financial centres. By 
the late 1980s, the Anglo-Saxon competitive financially-driven model ap-
peared to reign supreme.
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Developments in continental Europe were different, mainly focusing 
on intra-European trade and integration, but growth was also strong. Here, 
too, a path of opening up the state sector could be seen, with privatisations 
in France, Germany and later Italy. A steady low-inflation growth path also 
seemed to be universally in place in Europe, a welcome contrast compared 
with the 1970s.
The liberal market-based model seemed to be working well. By the end of 
the decade there had been no serious negative macroeconomic shock for sev-
eral years. Indeed, there had even been a positive oil shock in the middle of 
the period. Oil prices dropped sharply in 1986, boosting growth.
By the end of the 1980s, the “Reagan-Thatcher era” had effectively come 
to a close. Reagan’s presidency ended in January 1989 and Thatcher was 
ousted from the leadership of the Conservative Party, and as prime minis-
ter, in November of the following year. By the end of 1989, the political and 
economic ideas they had spawned were in many ways at their zenith in sev-
eral leading western nations, but rapidly spreading across the globe—just as 
the EBRD was being conceived.
2. The Historical Context: The 1980s in the East
For countries behind the Iron Curtain in the East, and in Yugoslavia and Al-
bania, life was nothing like as rosy, in either absolute or relative terms, dur-
ing the 1980s. Direct comparisons between East and West were hampered 
by missing or unreliable data. However, most analysts of the Soviet economy 
conclude that growth rates were falling over time. One estimate puts the av-
erage gross national product (GNP) growth rate during the 1980s at 1.4 per 
cent, versus 2.7 per cent in the period 1971–80 and 5.1 per cent in 1961–70.1 
By the second half of the 1980s it was obvious that the centrally planned econ-
omies were failing to deliver rising living standards on any significant scale.
While the trends seen in the west in the 1980s were far more muted be-
hind the Iron Curtain, some parts of eastern Europe2 and Yugoslavia at least 
1  G. Turley and P. J. Luke, Transition Economics: Two Decades On, London: Routledge, 2011, Chapter 1.
2  During this period ‘eastern Europe’ or ‘central and eastern Europe’ usually referred to the GDR, the CSFR, 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia (although Yugoslavia was treated separately on occasion). 
The USSR was also sometimes included in these groupings. When the EBRD started, the use of ‘central and 
eastern European countries’, as in the AEB, referred to the countries it sought to help, i.e. its ‘countries of oper-
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were not immune from these influences. Trade links with the West were im-
proving and a number of joint ventures had been established involving west-
ern companies in countries such as Hungary and even in the Soviet Union. 
But if some of the advantages of market economics were being glimpsed in 
the Eastern Bloc, and enjoyed by some of its citizens, the same could not be 
said of political freedoms.
Political pressure was, however, building in the East. The vast majority of 
the population, whether silently or more vocally, sought a more open fran-
chise and were demanding the right to strike, freedom of the media, free-
dom of movement and the formation of political parties. Above all, there 
was a desire to break away from what was increasingly seen as a failed polit-
ical and economic system, whose leaders seemed increasingly remote from 
the realities of everyday life and who remained immune from the hardships 
facing the wider population.
Despite some earlier attempts to bring about reform behind the Iron Cur-
tain and the emergence of Solidarity in Poland in 1980, relatively little prog-
ress had been made until Gorbachev took over as leader of the Soviet Union 
in 1985. He introduced policies of perestroika and glasnost in an effort to im-
prove the situation while maintaining control through the Communist Par-
ty apparatus. Economic reforms were also introduced, mirroring to an extent 
the New Economic Policy adopted by Lenin in the early 1920s and the re-
forms of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s in the People’s Republic of China.
Gorbachev also followed a more outward-looking approach in Soviet 
relations with the West, embarking on tours of western capitals and forg-
ing good relations with Reagan and Thatcher, in particular. Of great signif-
icance was his prominent rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine, which had al-
ready fallen into abeyance. Soviet satellite states were no longer required to 
bend unerringly to the will of Moscow and were allowed a greater degree of 
independence in relation to political reform.
As a result, domestic pressures for change grew, particularly among 
countries closest to western Europe. By 1989, real change was underway in 
central Europe, while difficulties at home meant Gorbachev became heav-
ily focused on trying to manage internal strains within the Soviet Union. 
ations’. Initially, these were the full set of countries mentioned above. The GDR disappeared with German re-
unification, while Albania became included (as a country of operations) by the end of 1991. Later nomenclature 
identified CEB (Central Europe and the Baltics) and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). 
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As people began to realise the new situation in the Eastern Bloc, momen-
tum for reform built up throughout the year.
Among the first notable developments was Solidarity’s landslide victory 
in the first round of Polish elections on 4 June 1989. The party won 92 out 
of 100 Senate seats and 160 out of 161 seats in the Sejm. 
The election coincided with the events in Tiananmen Square in Beijing 
where the Chinese authorities, facing similar growing public restlessness 
over the lack of political freedoms, had decided to exert firm political con-
trol to prevent further sedition, resulting in many deaths. 
There were serious concerns that a similar response by the Polish author-
ities might ensue. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Polish head of state, had 
imposed martial law in 1981 in response to the rise of Solidarity. This time, 
however, he accepted the situation, not least because Moscow was no lon-
ger ready to support a crackdown as it had in the past. The second-round 
election on 18 June confirmed Solidarity’s success and the resulting govern-
ment introduced a package of radical economic reforms early in the follow-
ing year, known as the Balcerowicz Plan.
Poland was not alone in seeing an acceleration in demands for reform. 
On 16 June 1989, 200,000 people assembled in Heroes’ Square in Budapest3 
to commemorate the reburial of Imre Nagy, a Hungarian reformer who had 
been executed for leading the uprising in 1956. On 23 October, a huge crowd 
heard the proclamation of a new Hungarian Republic outside parliament. 
In September 1989 Miklos Nemeth,4 the Prime Minister of Hungary, 
decided to open the border with Austria. This allowed citizens from the 
GDR to transit through the CSFR via Austria to West Germany, and by the 
end of October some 50,000 had left by this route. Separately, the West Ger-
man Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, negotiated with Moscow 
and East Berlin the transfer of thousands of GDR citizens, many of whom 
had taken refuge in West German embassies in central European countries, 
by train to the Federal Republic.
In the GDR itself, demonstrations grew during the year, albeit slowly, 
with numbers reaching around 70,000 by October. With the feared securi-
ty service, the Stasi, still fully operational and the Communist Party leaders 
supportive of the Chinese authorities’ response to the Tiananmen Square 
3  Viktor Orban, the current Prime Minister of Hungary, was last to speak.
4  Miklos Nemeth became a Vice President of the EBRD in 1990, the first from a country of operations.
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protests, a showdown was expected. However, when news emerged from 
Moscow that there should be no bloodshed, protesters came out in force, 
with some half a million gathering in Alexanderplatz in East Berlin on 4 
November.
The decisive change came on 9 November when the regime announced, 
at a confused and sometimes rambling news conference, that GDR citizens 
could now travel to West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. When 
East German official Guenter Schabowski explained that the new measures 
would take place with immediate effect, the response was electric. Spontane-
ous and euphoric celebrations began on both sides of the Berlin Wall.
East Germans arrived in their thousands to cross that most concrete 
symbol of the Iron Curtain dividing East and West. Border guards gave up 
all attempts to check documents, which were still needed even under the 
new rules. Crossing points opened. West Berliners were waiting with a wel-
come of flowers and sparkling wine. 
West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told a midnight news confer-
ence: “This is an historic moment. There is no doubt that world history is be-
ing written now. We Germans will rise to the challenge.”5 
In other Soviet satellites the change was less readily accepted by the 
communist authorities. In the CSFR, police attacked protesting students 
on 17 November. Nevertheless, the demonstrations continued and grew 
in strength. One week later, three-quarters of a million people gathered in 
Prague’s Wenceslas Square. This was followed by a well-supported, two-day 
general strike. Government attempts to keep control by reshuffling the cab-
inet were unsuccessful. Members of the Civic Forum, a new party formed 
by dissident playwright Vaclav Havel, were appointed to the cabinet on 10 
December. Less than three weeks later, the Federal Assembly voted unani-
mously to appoint Havel as president of the CSFR. 
In Bulgaria, change was more gradual. Petar Mladenov, who in Novem-
ber 1989 succeeded long-standing leader Todor Zhivkov as Chairman of the 
State Council, was a Communist Party member. Nonetheless, Mladenov 
supported Gorbachev’s reform programme. He implemented the separation 
of Party and state, and gave workers the right to strike. Following wide-
spread protests, the State Council in December also announced plans to 
hold free elections. 
5  Reuters Report, by Mark Heinrich. 10 November 1989.
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Opposition to the communist authorities had built up in Romania too, 
but a particularly brutal and repressive regime held it back until late in 
1989. Protests escalated after a blockade to prevent the deportation of a 
priest, and on 17 December several protesters were killed by shots fired 
into the crowd by the authorities. Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian lead-
er, attempted to restore order by addressing a rally on 21 December but was 
booed by the crowd, which was again attacked by the army. A second ad-
dress given from Communist Party headquarters the next day was so badly 
received that Ceausescu and his wife fled by helicopter. A short time later 
they were located and court-martialled, before being executed on Christ-
mas Day. 
The death of Ceaucescu marked the end to a tumultuous year. It would 
be another two years before the Soviet Union was dissolved but the tide was 
turning. In the words of Ian Kershaw, one of Britain’s most eminent histori-
ans: “What happened between 1989 and 1991 was no less than a European 
revolution—and, amazingly, unlike earlier revolutions it was (largely) free 
of bloodshed.”6 
It now became the task of the EBRD to battle with the consequences of 
this revolution.
3. Ideological Issues: Market Economics and Liberal Democracy
The idea of the EBRD thus emerged against a backdrop of fundamental 
change. Before looking at the institution itself, it is useful to review briefly 
the ideological debates that prevailed at the time. Two were of direct impor-
tance to the formation of the EBRD: one concerned markets, the so-called 
“Washington Consensus”; and the other concerned democracy, the debate 
epitomised by the “End of History”.
The economist John Williamson, who developed the concept of the 
Washington Consensus in the second half of 1989, defined it7 as a 10-point 
list of policies then widely supported by policy actors such as US govern-
ment agencies, notably US Treasury officials, and think-tanks. 
6  I. Kershaw, Roller-Coaster: Europe, 1950–2017, Allen Lane, 2018, Chapter 9, ‘Power of the People’.
7  J. Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in John Williamson (ed.), Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Institute for International Economics, 1990, Chapter 2.
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Several of the policy prescriptions, which were primarily aimed at devel-
opment in Latin America, were macroeconomic ideas such as fiscal disci-
pline, a competitive exchange rate, and tax and public-expenditure reform 
(for example, the introduction of a broad tax base, moderate marginal in-
come-tax rates and a reduction in subsidies). Other suggestions concerned 
market liberalisation, such as trade and interest-rate liberalisation, privatisa-
tion, deregulation and openness to inward investment. 
Williamson’s list neatly summarised mainstream economic thinking in 
the USA and UK at the time. It chimed well with the views of supply-side 
adherents and the successful period of privatisation and deregulation that 
had been witnessed in the preceding period. 
For senior officials dealing with international economic issues it provid-
ed a convenient template against which to assess policy. As such, it was a nat-
ural point of reference for those charged with establishing a new internation-
al financial institution (IFI), particularly one focused on transforming former 
state-controlled economies. As we will see, the precepts behind the Washing-
ton Consensus approach were influential in the design and operations of the 
EBRD.
Meanwhile, also in mid-1989, a little-known official in the policy-plan-
ning department of the US State Department published an article entitled 
“The End of History?” in a relatively obscure foreign policy journal.8 The 
author, Francis Fukuyama, set out a Hegel-inspired assessment that histo-
ry, viewed in terms of a dialectical ideological struggle for freedom, had 
reached a certain finality now that free elections were being held in for-
mer totalitarian states and their populations were embracing the ideolo-
gy of the West.
Fukuyama summarised his argument as follows: “What we may be wit-
nessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular 
period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: the end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government.”9 
This thesis proved hugely popular, to the extent that Fukuyama appeared 
in Time magazine within weeks of its publication. It appeared to validate 
the liberal market-democracy model as the victor in the battle of ideologi-
8  F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ The National Interest, no. 16, 1989.
9  Ibid.
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cal ideas that had dominated political discourse since the Russian Revolu-
tion 72 years earlier. 
Ironically, perhaps the most significant counter-argument to Fukuyama’s 
thesis occurred at almost exactly the same moment he published it: the reas-
sertion of political control by the China’s Communist Party Politburo. His-
tory took a radical turn in 1989 but it clearly did not end. 
These underlying themes influenced the design of the EBRD and lay be-
hind a clash with those who did not readily or fully buy into the new liberal 
world order. Nonetheless, belief in the power of markets and liberal democ-
racy was sufficiently widespread to support the emergence of central and 
eastern Europe from its Cold War hibernation and help these countries em-
brace the western model of political and economic development.
4. Central and Eastern Europe Reaches the International Stage:  
the 1989 Paris Summit
For the G7 and the 12 EC members, the events of 1989 posed significant 
challenges and uncertainties. How should the West respond to events? Who 
should lead and who should do what in this fast-moving game? Where was 
assistance best deployed? How could the Soviet Union be supported on a re-
form path when it remained a nuclear-armed adversary? 
The key western actors in this drama—the USA, France, the UK and 
Germany—each had their own historical perspective and interpretation of 
the situation and how to deal with it. Many aspects of the complex geopolit-
ical negotiations that were involved as the world order became reset spilled 
over into the debate on the creation of the EBRD.
Not only was 1989 a critical moment in central and eastern Europe, it 
was also a crucial point in the history of the European Union (EU). France 
was a key driving force trying to piece these elements together. The EBRD 
provided one piece of the jigsaw, while at the heart of both developments 
was the reunification of Germany. This was to be a key factor in what sub-
sequently transpired. 
That year, France was Chair of the G7 and preparing for the Heads of 
State Summit scheduled to be held in Paris on 15–16 July. These gatherings 
had become an annual showcase of multilateral solidarity and coordination 
among the leading nations, with each holder of the rotating Presidency keen 
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to project an image of the world and its future as they would like to see it. 
The bicentenary of the French Revolution also fell in 1989, and to mark the 
occasion a huge celebration was arranged alongside the Summit. 
For this Summit, Attali, a personal adviser to and confidant of Mitter-
rand, was the French Sherpa, one of the senior government officials who 
prepare for summits on behalf of the heads of state or government. It fell to 
Attali to send invitations to representatives of the EC to attend the celebra-
tions, as well as to heads of state from developing countries, such as Egypt 
and India, so that a North-South element could be added to the G7 event.
As usual, the Sherpas had prepared the Heads’ agenda a long way in ad-
vance. For that summer’s Summit, this was shaping up to be a by-now tradi-
tional mix of international economic and global issues: the state of the world 
economy; increased coordination and surveillance, especially on exchange 
rates; trade (the next steps in the Uruguay Round); debt strategy towards the 
most highly indebted countries; combating drugs; tackling environmental 
issues, notably chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and the depletion of the ozone 
layer; and, following earlier devastating floods, assistance to Bangladesh. 
Events in the communist countries could not, however, be ignored. 
Preparations therefore turned to the question of statements on Tiananmen 
Square and, by way of counterpoint, welcoming words and potential assis-
tance for central and eastern Europe.
Shortly before the Summit George Bush, who had replaced Reagan as 
US President in January, had visited Poland and Hungary to show support 
for market reform and the steps being taken towards multiparty democra-
cy. He was also under pressure from these countries’ US diaspora to provide 
material assistance. Bush proposed a “consortium of the seven” to coordi-
nate aid to Poland, reduce its external debt and initiate a publicly endowed 
US$ 100 million enterprise fund.10
Meanwhile Kohl, realising that funds for central and eastern Europe 
would be discussed at the Summit and wanting support that went beyond 
what the Federal Republic was already providing, had written to suggest 
that the G7 set up a mechanism to coordinate aid to Poland and Hungary.
As the main coordinator of the event, Attali was unhappy that the pro-
posed consortium would in effect be under the control of the USA. He be-
lieved that it should be open to other European states to contribute and 
10 G. W. Bush and B. Scowcroft, A World Transformed, Alfred A. Knopf, 1998, pp. 113–115.
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should not be set up in a manner that appeared to be directly confrontation-
al to the interests of the Soviet Union.11 Furthermore, as host of the Par-
is Club, the group of creditor nations which dealt with official debt, France 
would have wanted any discussion of debt relief to be considered by the 
Club rather than the G7. 
Gorbachev also saw an opportunity in the Summit. A few days before 
it began, he wrote to Mitterrand pushing for the involvement of the Soviet 
Union in these discussions to create a “multilateral economic partnership” 
and reach a “true equilibrium”, rather than surging ahead with a West-cen-
tric solution and excluding the East from the decision-making process. He 
noted: “Multilateral East-West cooperation on global economic problems 
finds itself manifestly behind in comparison to the development of bilater-
al and regional ties … which does not seem justified … considering ... the re-
sponsibility [our States] have for the good of each country’s citizens and of 
the world community in general.”12
A G7 communiqué, entitled “Declaration on East-West relations”, wel-
comed the move towards freedom and democracy in central and eastern Eu-
rope and encouraged the process of reform. It also pledged support to Po-
land and Hungary. Rather than placing the coordination of this support 
with the G7, the European Commission under its President, Jacques Delo-
rs, was invited to bring together “all interested countries”—thus not ruling 
out the Soviet Union—to develop an assistance package. The group of par-
ticipants asked to assist was subsequently enlarged to include OECD mem-
ber countries and became known as the G24.13
Requesting the Commission to coordinate activities was an unprecedent-
ed step for the G7. It appears that US Secretary of State James Baker had con-
cluded, to no objections from others, that it would be advantageous to put 
the Commission in charge of this exercise, partly with a view to making the 
Commission more outward-looking in its general approach, but also to lock 
in European financial assistance should agreement be found to go ahead.14 
 
11 Attali telephoned Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national security adviser, on 8 July to register his objections. 
 Attali, Verbatim III, Fayard, 1995, p. 278.
12 Letter from Gorbachev to Mitterrand, 14 July 1989, G7/8 Summits, Munk School, University of Toronto
13 ‘Declaration on East-West Relations’, 15 July 1989, G7/8 Summits, Munk School, University of Toronto
14 J. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New 
York, 1995; and S. Weber, ‘Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’, Interna-
tional Organisation, Vol 48, No 1, Winter 1994, MIT Press, p.10 and p.12.
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Bush had also recently met Delors and knew that he had good contacts 
within the Catholic Church and with Solidarity.15
Attali was nonplussed that the Commission should be given this role, as 
this would normally fall to the relevant Presidency, in this case France. He 
protested to Mitterrand, urging him to intervene to reclaim the coordinat-
ing role, but was rebuffed. “The US prefers the Brussels imp to the French 
devil! A novel choice, more divisive than constructive. The President, to 
whom I speak to suggest, as host country, we reclaim the secretariat, refuses 
firmly: ‘One can’t have everything’.”16 
Mitterrand clearly did not want a row to cloud a successful summit or get 
in the way of the celebrations of two centuries of the French Republic. Atta-
li, however, was determined not to be outmanoeuvred by the Commission.
5. The Looming Issue of German Reunification
The first follow-up aid coordination meeting took place the following 
month (August), with members of the OECD in attendance, and began to 
prepare a substantial programme of assistance. Significantly, this was to be 
made conditional on commitment to democratic reforms and liberalised 
markets. In parallel, the EC’s own aid programme, PHARE (Poland/Hun-
gary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economies), emerged from the dis-
cussions. This amounted in due course to billions of dollars in financial and 
other assistance.
Meanwhile in Germany events were moving quickly. With the exodus of 
people from the GDR growing by the day there was an increasing awareness 
of the possibility of German reunification. While this was still not expect-
ed in the short term, the key players nonetheless exchanged views in bilater-
al discussions on the potential consequences of such a development.
Kohl saw reunification as an historic opportunity for Germany. Gor-
bachev, Mitterrand and Thatcher were less enthusiastic. Gorbachev was 
worried about how Soviet troops stationed in the GDR might react if the 
desire for unity overwhelmed political control. Bush was more relaxed with 
the idea, seeing reunification as primarily a matter for German self-determi-
15 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 261. 
16 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 284.
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nation. He was more concerned with the consequences for NATO and US 
troops stationed in the Federal Republic.
Thatcher was uneasy at the prospect of a resurgent Germany dominat-
ing Europe and irritated by the approach adopted by Kohl, which she saw as 
overly eager. She believed it was vital to engage the Four Powers, the archi-
tects of post-war Germany, who still controlled Berlin and the eastern Ger-
man border: the Soviet Union, the UK, the USA and France.17 In her view, 
if care was not taken, “… all the fixed points in Europe would collapse: the 
NATO front line; the structure of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; Mr Gor-
bachev’s hopes for reform.”18
As part of the preparations for the December European Council, Mit-
terrand visited Thatcher at Chequers on 1 September. While politically they 
were poles apart, the meeting generated a rapport between them, notably 
through their common view on German reunification and NATO’s stance. 
They shared an annoyance with Kohl’s approach and were both concerned 
over Gorbachev’s likely reaction.
Mitterrand, like Thatcher, was nervous at the prospect of a strong Ger-
many.19 He feared it could upset the balance in Europe and impact prog-
ress towards economic and political union. In due course, Kohl was able 
to allay these fears by committing fully to the single currency and the EU. 
But in 1989 the future of Germany, the EU, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, 
the Soviet Union and, more generally, the outlook for peace and stabili-
ty in Europe was far from clear. Those most closely involved were acute-
ly aware of this and of the need to ensure the continuity of the successful 
post-war period.
6. Attali’s—and France’s—Vision for Europe, Including the East
The summer of 1989 was also formative for Attali. Valuable though the 
OECD contribution to financing improvements in the East might prove to 
be, Attali felt it was insufficient. He believed what was needed was an insti-
tution that could provide a link between the “two halves of Europe”, while 
17 M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 796–799.
18 C. Powell to S. Wall, 8 December 1989, National Archives, Kew, London.
19 C. Powell to S. Wall, 8 December 1989; Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 368–371.
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ensuring no deflection from the course towards ever-closer union on which 
the EC was embarked. 
Attali put his idea to Mitterrand at the beginning of September: “Why 
not create an institution which brings together all European countries, 
both East and West, including the USSR? … This institution, to be credi-
ble, should not be solely an assembly or forum, but must be equipped with 
real resources. France … could propose the creation of a bank which would 
finance projects of common interest. We could call it a ‘Bank for Europe’.”20 
Mitterrand, seeing potential in the idea, asked Attali to develop it further. 
Initially, the proposal was greeted with scepticism, even in the French 
administration.21 Many of Attali’s colleagues believed that the World Bank, 
which was already active in Poland and Hungary, should remain the pri-
mary vehicle for development support. They also noted that Europe already 
had its own IFI, in the form of the European Investment Bank (EIB). Why 
create another institution which would inevitably be criticised as adding to 
the development bureaucracy and which in the end might not reflect fully 
the interests of the countries to be helped?
Attali’s response was to position his proposal in a global context. He 
viewed the world at the time22 as being dominated by the USA and Japan, 
then the major powerhouses of growth, productivity and innovation. He 
saw a need for Europe to improve its economic performance, along with its 
geopolitical standing. Integrating the two halves of Europe to create a mar-
ket of more than 500 million people would, he argued, allow the region to 
match the major players in the global arena. 
This perspective was not new. The French establishment had a long-held 
aversion to US dominance in many spheres: economic, political and cultur-
al. Since the end of the Second World War they had seen the value of Eu-
ropean unity, not only in keeping the peace and creating a large, protected 
market but also in giving ample room for French influence over the conti-
nent’s future shape and direction. 
An opportunity to strengthen France’s position over Europe had arisen 
in April 1989 with the publication of a report by the Delors Commission on 
the measures required for the establishment of the Economic and Monetary 
20 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 298.
21 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 315; Jacques Attali, Europe(s), Fayard, 1994, p. 33.
22 Illustrated in a series of essays published in Lignes d’Horizon (1990).
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Union (EMU). Discussion on how to deliver the three stages of EMU fol-
lowed, with the Madrid European Council in late June affirming the EC’s 
“determination to achieve EMU progressively”. 
The 12 European Community member states thus formally embarked 
on the final path towards one of the ultimate goals set out in the Treaty of 
Rome: establishing an economic and monetary union as part of an “ever 
closer union”. The plan for EMU—a single currency and the creation of a 
European Central Bank—pooled sovereignty over monetary-policy deci-
sions and thereby diluted the power of the Bundesbank, potentially increas-
ing French influence.23
As part of the debate on EMU, a number of participants brought up 
the question of political union. Under Delors’ leadership, there was pressure 
from Brussels to accelerate this discussion, although it only emerged formal-
ly at the Council level under the Irish Presidency in the first half of 1990.
7. The Launch of the Idea of a Bank for Europe
Behind the scenes, Mitterrand had lamented earlier that France lagged be-
hind Germany on commercial ties with the East. He believed that promot-
ing the “Bank for Europe” with a French imprimatur could benefit French 
companies wishing to exploit new opportunities in central and eastern Eu-
ropean markets, including the Soviet Union.
With France holding the Presidency of the EC for the second half of 1989, 
there were further good reasons for launching a bold new French initiative. 
The central objective for the Strasbourg European Council (scheduled for 
8–9 December) was to agree the timing of the Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) for EMU. But as the autumn progressed, it was clear that the EC’s re-
sponse to events in the East would have to feature. The launch of a “Bank for 
Europe” would be a political triumph for France, while if the proposal was re-
jected, it would still demonstrate commitment to the East, including the Sovi-
et Union, and emphasise the French establishment’s belief in European unity.
During September, Attali began to work up the idea more seriously, 
looking into the statutes of various international organisations and prepar-
23 The Bundesbank ultimately accepted the proposal but only, at the insistence of its President, on the basis 
that the future European Central Bank would be independent.
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ing draft articles for the new institution. His efforts, which he discussed 
with Mitterrand towards the end of that month, were mainly based on le-
gal texts that applied to the World Bank, the International Finance Corpo-
ration (IFC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was supported 
in his endeavours by Jean-Claude Trichet, then director of the Trésor, but 
found few other advocates.24 
Events in eastern Europe by now were gaining momentum. Every day 
seemed to bring a new step on the escape route from communism and 
new proposals to help the liberated economies. At the Annual Meeting 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Wash-
ington DC in September 1989, former French president Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing proposed the establishment of a Euro-Polish bank (and a simi-
lar one for Hungary). At the same meeting Alfred Herrhausen, president 
of Deutsche Bank, argued in favour of an institute for the modernisation 
of Poland.25 Then on 9 October European finance ministers agreed that 
the EIB should make loan finance available to Poland and Hungary from 
its own resources.26 
None of these ideas met Attali’s vision for the future financial archi-
tecture of a wider Europe. He remained sceptical of any solution based on 
the EIB, believing that would require bringing countries in the East into 
the Common Market—which at that point seemed a remote possibility.27 
Moreover, the EIB focused on public infrastructure rather than the private 
sector, where there was clearly a major need for support across the Commu-
nist Bloc. Mitterrand, speaking to the European Parliament later, was simi-
larly dismissive of a role for the EIB.28 
24 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 315.
25 Alfred Herrhausen was assassinated two months later on his way to work by a bomb detonated remotely by 
the Red Army Faction in Bad Homburg, outside Frankfurt.
26 It was agreed that the EC would guarantee the EIB against losses under loans for projects in Hungary and 
Poland. The EIB Board of Governors subsequently authorised loans of up to ECU 1 billion to these two 
countries, with the first loans made in July 1990: ECU 20 million to the Polish railways and ECU 15 mil-
lion for power grid improvement in Hungary. Source: EIB Annual Reports, 1989, 1990.
27 Attali, Europe(s), p. 35. The EIB was an EC institution and provided funds on a large scale primarily to its 
members, who needed to be EC member states.
28 Mitterrand said “Simply this is not a role for the EIB. The task of the EIB is basically linked to the structural 
funds, it is oriented to another part of Europe; the EIB consists of only the twelve Community countries.” 
Debates in the European Parliament, 22 November 1989, Bulletin, No 3-383/154. P. Menkveld in Origin of 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Springer, 1991, p. 38) argues ulterior motives may 
have been to secure assistance for the Soviet Union and to encourage a coming together of European states.
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Nor did bilateral initiatives promise enough for Attali. Such arrange-
ments had been in place during Cold War times and seemed too piecemeal 
to have much bite. Many of these arrangements took the form of export 
credits linked to western companies, with limited impact in the importing 
countries. Other ideas such as a parliament assembly seemed no advance on 
the Council of Europe, for which these countries were not yet ready given 
the democratic requirements of membership. 
Attali believed any solution should be political as well as economic, in-
volving genuine partnership and mutual commitments to development and 
democratic reform. He continued to think a new bank was the best vehicle 
to anchor western Europe with central and eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. His view that the bank should invest in projects of common interest 
harked back to Robert Schumann’s call in 1951 for the creation of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community: a view that multilateral ownership more 
than national sovereignty can achieve a common good more productively 
than on an individual basis, and one that lasts.
Without prior consultation with his EC counterparts, Mitterrand float-
ed the development bank idea in an address to the European Parliament on 
25 October, ahead of the Strasbourg Summit. 
For my country I have been thinking of a Franco-Polish investment pro-
motion centre … What can Europe do? So much more! Why not set up a 
Bank for Europe which, like the EIB, would finance major projects and 
have on its board of directors the twelve European countries. Not to men-
tion the others, such as Poland and Hungary, and why not the Soviet 
Union and yet others? … The creation of a Bank for Europe is a highly po-
litical decision.29
Marc Boudier, the adviser in charge of international economic issues at 
the Elysée, having received lukewarm reactions from other ministries to this 
section of Mitterrand’s speech, had decided to cut out the section on the 
Bank for Europe and replace it with a vague reference to the Euro-Poland 
bank proposal. He told Attali: “No one in the administration believes in 
your idea!” Attali stood his ground and convinced Mitterrand to present his 
29 Address by President Mitterrand on the ‘Upheavals in Eastern Europe’, 25 October 1989, Strasbourg. Bul-
letin of the European Community, 10–89, November 1989, pp. 79–86 and reproduced at cvce.org 
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suggestion noting: “for me, it will act as a bank for all Europeans, including 
the Soviets. And only Europeans.”30 
But there was a rationale for designing a multilateral institution, rath-
er than a solely European one or one dominated by any single country. In 
terms of geography the problem being addressed was indeed primarily a Eu-
ropean matter. Three EC members (Germany, Italy and Greece) and three 
other European nations (Austria, Finland and Norway) shared borders with 
Eastern Bloc countries. Moreover, while historical, ethnic, religious and cul-
tural ties between these countries had been dormant or fractured over the 
decades of the Cold War, they remained close beneath the surface. 
The gap between West and East, however, was not just a European 
problem, nor even simply an economic one. There were fundamental and 
ideological differences between western capitalist societies and eastern 
communist ones. Even more important from a global security perspective 
was the nuclear dimension of the Cold War. Collapse in the East could 
lead to unforeseen consequences for all countries, should the handling of 
nuclear weapons and the materials needed to manufacture them become 
uncontrolled. As proponents of a policy of containment, and with some 
300,000 troops deployed in the Federal Republic, the USA had a direct in-
terest in the situation in Europe and the future of nuclear weapons in par-
ticular. From the US administration’s perspective, all options to influence 
outcomes in the East, especially when it came to the Soviet Union, were 
worth pursuing. Thus, despite Attali’s vision of a European bank to deal 
with wider Europe’s problems, the continent was never going to be able to 
“go it alone”. 
Finding a post-Cold War accommodation of East and West to ensure 
peace, growth and security required a global multi-dimensional effort, in-
cluding in the political-economy sphere. Europe had the biggest econom-
ic interests in central and eastern Europe, but the USA still dominated the 
global financial architecture and was reluctant to cede or dilute this influ-
ence. A united front was also consistent with post-war cooperation in rela-
tion to the Eastern Bloc and through NATO. And all had a political inter-
est in supporting markets and democracy. So aligning the political-economy 
approach to changes in the East through a multilateral, not just European, 
development bank made sense for both the West and the East. 
30 Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 325; Attali, Europe(s), p. 36.
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8. Preparations for Strasbourg
With the idea of a Bank for Europe now formally in the public domain, 
time was of the essence to get wider buy-in to the idea before the European 
Council in six weeks’ time. There had been passing interest in some capitals, 
but the general reaction to the new bank proposal was mostly lukewarm. 
Fortunately for Attali and Mitterrand events came to their assistance.
Two weeks after Mitterrand’s speech to the European Parliament, the 
Berlin Wall fell. German reunification was no longer a distant prospect but 
an imminent possibility. Moreover, the Soviet economy, already in bad shape, 
continued to stagnate. Visible economic and political support to the East was 
looking essential to stave off outright collapse or the reversal of reforms. 
As President of the EC, France called European leaders to a special Euro-
pean Council on 18 November to assess the situation. The meeting was de-
signed to allow an early reflection on the momentous events taking place on 
western Europe’s doorstep, ahead of what promised to be a heavy and diffi-
cult Council agenda dealing with the timing of the IGC for EMU.
Proceedings began with a dinner for Heads of State (plus Commission 
President Delors and French Foreign Minister Michel Rocard), hosted by Mit-
terrand at the Elysée. The French president outlined the situation in eastern 
Europe. Kohl followed with a 20-minute briefing on the German situation, 
which provoked a lengthy discussion on the question of German reunification. 
At a parallel dinner for foreign ministers, Sherpas and lead foreign af-
fairs, officials also considered the implications of German reunification. 
When discussion turned to the European Bank idea, it was not received 
with enthusiasm.31 The rapidly evolving situation in the East and the lack of 
convincing alternatives, however, left sceptics with little room for manoeu-
vre. To publicly refuse the French President’s initiative would have been po-
litically and diplomatically embarrassing, as well as raising questions as to 
whether there were any viable alternatives to support communist countries 
seeking to tread a democratic path.
At the Elysée, Mitterrand introduced the subject of the Bank, now called 
the “Modernisation and Development Bank for Eastern Europe”,32 towards 
31 Attali, Europe(s), p. 40.
32 It had been renamed after German objections to the “Bank for Europe” as being reserved for the European 
Central Bank.
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the end of dinner. After some initial mild support, Dutch Prime Minis-
ter Ruud Lubbers was the first to express opposition, arguing that plenty 
of institutions—including the Council of Europe—were available already. 
Thatcher echoed his objections. “It will be one more bureaucracy,” she said.33
Nevertheless, Mitterrand wound up proceedings by suggesting that the 
Troika—the previous, current and future Presidencies (in this case Spain, 
France and Ireland)—plus the Commission, study the idea and report their 
findings to the Strasbourg Council in December. There were no formal ob-
jections but Thatcher stated pointedly that the Bank might be “something 
for the long term”.34 
In firming up the proposal ahead of the Strasbourg Council, there was a 
growing consensus that any such bank should focus on facilitating the tran-
sition of Eastern Bloc countries towards a market-oriented economy and ac-
celerating the necessary structural adjustments. At this stage the sharehold-
ing of the institution was expected to comprise the 12 EC member states, the 
Commission, the EIB, other European countries including those in central 
and eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. The supposition was that the EC 
12, together with the Commission and the EIB, would hold a majority stake.
9. The 1989 Strasbourg European Council 
The Strasbourg European Council took place on 8 and 9 December 1989. 
From the French point of view, the key goal was to set a firm date for the 
IGC and thus expedite preparations for stages two and three of EMU. The 
UK had the opposite objective and was keen to delay the decision on dates. 
The German position was uncertain, with the Bundesbank—and many 
Germans—unwilling to see an early end to its control of domestic mone-
tary policy and the Deutsche Mark. Kohl was also preoccupied with reuni-
fication, on which he had wrong-footed everyone by announcing a 10-point 
plan a week or so earlier. 
In the run-up to the meeting, Mitterrand had conducted a number of bi-
lateral visits to capitals. His most recent journey, two days before the Stras-
33 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 344; Attali, Europe(s), p. 39. 
34 Her briefing indicated that the project could be emasculated by remitting the idea to the EC’s Monetary 
Committee where officials could ‘grind it to death’. 
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bourg Council, had been to Kyiv where he met Gorbachev. The Soviet lead-
er had spoken harshly of Germany and Kohl’s rapid pursuit of reunification. 
On the first day of the Council, Mitterrand held two bilateral discussions in 
the margins of the meeting with Thatcher and conveyed his concerns. 
Thatcher was similarly worried about recent developments and stressed 
that under the post-war arrangements, the Four Powers—the USA, the UK, 
France and the Soviet Union—needed to be part of the decision on Ger-
many’s future. Taking a map from her handbag, she emphasised the impor-
tance of maintaining the post-war borders, notably the Oder-Neisse line un-
der which some areas in the east, which used to be part of Germany, had 
been allocated to Poland. Mitterrand agreed that the reunification of Ger-
many could not happen by diktat. “At moments of great danger in the past 
France had always established a special relationship with Britain. Such a 
time has come again,” he said.35
That afternoon the G7 Heads discussed the draft paragraph on the 
Bank, prepared as a result of the Troika work. It did not start particularly 
well. Lubbers remained against and Thatcher sceptical, while Kohl was un-
committed. According to Attali, Mitterrand was preparing to concede de-
feat when Thatcher agreed to consent to the proposal, provided the com-
muniqué stated that all OECD countries, not just the Europeans, could be 
admitted as shareholders.36 Since all were ready to support the revised pro-
posal, Mitterrand had little choice but to agree.37 
It was Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlüter who suggested that the new 
institution should be called the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, using the model of the World Bank’s original name, the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).38 The follow-
ing day the Council conclusions were settled and published without further 
ado. The final communiqué of 9 December read: 
“The European Council approved the creation of a European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development [whose] aim will be to promote … pro-
ductive and competitive investment in the States of Central and Eastern 
Europe, to reduce … any risks to financing their economies, to assist the 
35 C. Powell to S. Wall, 8 December 1989, record of the Strasbourg European Council; Attali, Verbatim III, 
pp. 369–370; Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 796.
36 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 370; Attali, Europe(s), pp. 45–46.
37 At this point there was no specific mention of the Soviet Union as a member.
38 At present, the IBRD is an institution which forms part of the World Bank Group. 
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transition towards a more market-oriented economy and to speed up the 
necessary structural adjustments. The States of Central and Eastern Europe 
concerned will be able to participate in the capital and management of this 
Bank, in which the Member States, the Community and the European In-
vestment Bank will have a majority holding. Other countries, and in partic-
ular the other members of the OECD, will be invited to participate.”39
10.  An International Institution and Not a Solely European One
The concept of a development bank to support the transition of socialist 
countries to market-oriented democracies was thus on the way to becoming 
a reality. Nonetheless, it was not altogether to Attali’s liking, since the insti-
tution endorsed by the Council was no longer a purely European construct. 
Somewhat disheartened at the outcome he wrote in his diary: “the end of 
our dream of a strictly European institution. Under American influence the 
European Bank will become a development bank like the others.”40
The collapse of communism in eastern Europe and the evolution of a new 
world order was not, however, just an issue for Europe. The Soviet Union had 
not yet disappeared and, although it was under strain, few were expecting its 
imminent dissolution. The USA still had a significant number of troops sta-
tioned in West Germany, as well as strategic concerns over the USSR’s nuclear 
weapons. Bush’s earlier economic initiative had also shown US desire to sup-
port the region, notably Poland and Hungary. Other non-EC countries such 
as Japan and South Korea were geographically far removed from central Eu-
rope, but close to the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence (and missiles). 
Attali stated later that he had never been certain whether the outcome at 
Strasbourg was the result of a carefully planned coup by the British or sim-
ply a last-minute decision.41 British diplomatic telegraphic traffic in advance 
of Strasbourg, however, records that Mitterrand was looking for agreement 
to the Bank for political reasons and that there would be no French objec-
tion to participation by the USA and Japan should it be raised.42
39 European Council, SN 441/2/89.
40 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 372.
41 Attali, Europe(s), p. 46.
42 UK Ambassador to France, E. Fergusson, reporting telegram of an Elysée briefing by Mme Guigou and Msr 
Hennikine, 1 December 1989.
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What is also evident from British records is that Thatcher was briefed by 
the Foreign Office and advised by the UK Treasury to resist the proposal but, 
if necessary, to ensure it included OECD countries.43 The reporting note of the 
Council meeting by her private secretary, Charles Powell, on 9 December stated: 
There was some quite brief discussion of the Development Bank for East-
ern Europe, with the emphasis on extending it beyond Europe, to draw on 
capital from Japan, South Korea and the US. Hence the need to have an in-
stitution in addition to the EIB. There was a general disposition to agree to 
it in principle, while remitting the details to ECOFIN [the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council] to ensure that it was operated soundly and ef-
fectively. The Prime Minister did not contest this conclusion (having had 
to contest many others during the day).44 
The communiqué did not however refer directly to any next steps.
In her memoirs, Thatcher notes in relation to the earlier meeting and 
Strasbourg:
at the Special European Council [in November] … Mitterrand was press-
ing hard for the creation of an [EBRD] in order to channel investment and 
assistance to the emerging democracies. I was sceptical about whether such 
an institution was really necessary. The case had not been made that aid of 
this dimension had to go through a European institution, as opposed to 
national or wider international ones. I conceded the point in Strasbourg; 
but my wishes were eventually met because the EBRD now sensibly in-
volves the Americans and Japanese, not just the Europeans.45
While Attali may have been disappointed with the outcome, it was none-
theless an extraordinary feat to have garnered support to create a new mul-
tilateral development bank in a mere three months. To a great extent it re-
flected the times: the rapid and accelerating pace of change in the East, the 
great uncertainties ahead, the high stakes and the pressure on all to act. It 
would not have happened without the strong French strategic perspective, 
43 FCO briefing paper, Charles Powell’s handwritten comments.
44 C. Powell to S. Wall, 9 December 1989. 
45 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 759.
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their good fortune in holding both the G7 and EC Presidencies at the right 
moment, the timing of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the unexpected reali-
sation that German reunification was just around the corner. 
When push came to shove the key actors knew they had to do something 
visible to match the needs of the moment and signal a longer-term commitment 
to help rebuild central and eastern Europe. The EBRD fulfilled this purpose.
11.  The Preparatory Conference Negotiations
With the EC 12 having signed up to establishing the EBRD, the next task 
was to seek agreement on its articles and modus operandi. Since the Bank 
was no longer a purely European body, this meant inviting all other interest-
ed parties to the table to negotiate its charter. 
Before the year was over, Lubbers wrote to Mitterrand to suggest that his 
Finance Minister, Onno Ruding, should coordinate and lead the process of 
preparing the Agreement Establishing the Bank (AEB). His letter appears 
to have crossed with Mitterrand’s invitation to ministers to a conference in 
Paris in January to start the negotiations.46 Mitterrand’s letter had been si-
lent as to who would lead the discussions and coordinate the results. But 
the intention was clear that this would be in French hands and that Attali 
would hold the reins. 
The G7’s approach to the negotiations was one of the items on the agen-
da of the first Sherpas’ meeting of the year in Key West in early January 
1990. This marked the beginning of the US presidency and was a prepa-
ratory meeting for that year’s Heads’ meeting in Houston. Believing that 
negotiations on the EBRD’s arrangements would get bogged down if all 
countries became fully involved, the G7 had expected to negotiate the main 
parameters among themselves first. According to Attali’s account, they were 
shocked to learn not only that other European countries had already been 
invited to Paris but also that the Soviet Union had been included.47
Thirty-six delegations, headed by ministers or top officials, gathered at 
the Kleber Centre in Paris on the weekend of 15 January 1990. This was the 
first of what would become a series of high-level meetings over the follow-
46 According to Attali’s account. See Europe(s), pp. 51–52; Verbatim III, p. 379.
47 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 392.
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ing months. The proceedings were introduced by Mitterrand and around 
the table for the first time were a large number of ministers and officials 
from West and East, including Soviet Central Bank Governor Viktor Ger-
ashchenko, Polish Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, and Vaclav Klaus, 
minister of finance for the CSFR. The atmosphere was one of excitement 
and curiosity, partly because the two sides of the Iron Curtain were meeting 
with the aim of working together to design a mechanism of mutual support 
rather than trying to undermine one another, but also simply because the 
information gap was so great that no one knew what to expect.48 
The meeting itself focused on the proposed Articles of the AEB, taking 
them one by one. But behind the detail of the legal texts were fundamen-
tal questions about how the Bank should operate, including: the amount 
of initial capital that should be provided; the relative size of shareholdings; 
the number of Board Directors and their role; the place of qualified major-
ity voting; currency concerns; and whether the Bank should finance only 
the private sector or include some public-sector investments as part of its 
operations. 
One of the most difficult matters to resolve from the start was the sta-
tus of the Soviet Union. The US delegation was led by the Treasury under-
secretary for international affairs, the mid-western David Mulford, who 
strode purposefully ahead of his team into the room wearing his Stetson. 
He made it clear that Congress would not allow a nuclear-armed enemy 
of the USA to become a member of, and borrow from, a new internation-
al institution that was financed with US capital.49 Gerashchenko was un-
fazed and referred to the rapid changes underway in the Soviet Union un-
der Gorbachev’s reforms. He advised the USA not to be “too hasty”. The 
situation nonetheless became deadlocked and the atmosphere tense. In re-
sponse, Mulford suggested that the Soviet Union might be admitted as an 
observer. The two-day negotiations concluded without agreement, howev-
er, with a follow-up meeting set for 10 and 11 March.
Another key item on the agenda was political conditionality. The man-
date for the EBRD given by the European Council had been exclusively eco-
nomic in nature. There had been no explicit reference to democracy or other 
48 The intense experience was clearly cathartic in the case of one Hungarian delegation member and his Dutch 
counterpart. They married before the AEB was signed!
49 The Soviet Union, unlike Poland and Hungary, was not a member of the IMF or World Bank at the time.
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political elements such as the rule of law or human rights, and to that point 
IFIs had avoided explicitly conflating economic and political objectives. 
Moreover, the 12 EC countries were long-standing members of the Coun-
cil of Europe, which had dealt with such political concerns since the Second 
World War. However, the USA, Canada and Japan were neither members 
nor observers in the Council of Europe at that point.50 Furthermore, the 
earlier G24 aid effort had linked funds to reform efforts. In this context, in 
which there was a desire to see political as well as economic change in cen-
tral and eastern Europe, there was wide agreement that the EBRD mandate 
should include a political dimension.
For the US administration, an explicit reference to the pursuit of de-
mocracy helped persuade a sceptical Congress that the Bank could add 
value. Some EC member states also shared US concerns over the poten-
tial role of the Soviet Union as a borrower in the Bank51 and it was by no 
means certain that the USSR would clear the political hurdle for member-
ship. Importantly, in principle a reference to democracy in the mandate 
could provide a lever to hold back finance or even expel a member should 
they backtrack on their commitments to uphold democratic values, human 
rights or the rule of law. 
Another topic that proved controversial at the January meeting was the 
amount of the EBRD’s initial capital. France and Germany had suggested 
ECU 15 billion, whereas the USA argued for ECU 5 billion. A settlement 
was reached later on ECU 10 billion, a capital base considerably smaller 
than that of the World Bank and other regional development banks, and 
with a very conservative gearing ratio of 1:1. The Bank’s lending capaci-
ty was a long way short of the “Marshall Plan” effort of which Attali had 
once dreamed. 
Relative shareholdings and voting procedures were easier to reach prelim-
inary agreements on, largely by following the rules and procedures of other 
multilateral development banks. With the prerequisite that the EC 12 plus 
the Commission and EIB should hold a majority, shares were allocated equal-
ly to the main players. France, the UK, Germany, the USA and Japan were 
each assigned 8.5 per cent, as were the Commission and the EIB. The remain-
50 The USA became an observer in 1995, and Canada and Japan in 1996. 
51 For example, it was noted that the USSR was an ‘AAA-rated’ borrower and it was questioned whether it was 
appropriate for a development bank to lend to such a country. Italy made this point forcefully at EC coor-
dinating meetings. The USA was concerned about lending to a long-standing military adversary.
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ing shares were distributed roughly on the basis of GDP. The method allocat-
ed at the first stage 53 per cent to the EC blocking majority and 13 per cent to 
the borrowing community. The Soviet Union was pencilled in to receive half 
of the latter amount. Double-majority voting procedures52 were agreed for 
the most serious matters, such as the admission of new members, an increase 
in capital or suspension of lending. Decisions in such cases would require the 
approval of two-thirds of Governors representing not less than three-quar-
ters of total voting power. In the case of eligibility to borrow, three-quarters 
of Governors and 85 per cent of total voting power was required. 
In the weeks following the conference events surrounding German re-
unification continued to develop. Gorbachev now acknowledged that reuni-
fication was inevitable and was prepared to accept it on the basis of the old 
Soviet ideal of a unified but neutral Germany.53 However, at a meeting with 
Gorbachev in Moscow on 10 February, Kohl made it clear that neutrality was 
unacceptable. The impasse was critical. The Soviet economy was spiralling 
downwards, making western economic aid all the more attractive, and Gor-
bachev’s control over the Soviet system was becoming more tenuous.54
This enhanced the appeal of the EBRD for the USSR. Membership of an 
international financial institution, for the first time in Soviet history since 
their withdrawal from the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1940s, could 
help pave the way towards membership of the IMF, which could bring with 
it potentially billions of dollars of essential support. 
During February, various bilateral and multilateral discussions on the 
EBRD took place behind the scenes, although even among the EC 12 con-
sensus could not be reached on many of the big issues. Despite their earlier 
scepticism, it was becoming clearer that the USA was more willing to par-
ticipate actively.
The US team began to accept the inevitability of Soviet membership.55 
With support from the UK, Japan and some others, however, they insisted 
that the EBRD should not provide finance to the USSR beyond what it con-
tributed to the Bank as a shareholder. 
52 These procedures, which consist of a combination of simple-majority and weighted voting (according to cap-
ital contributions), are used in multilateral development banks, but not in the United Nations for example.
53 ‘Historical events in the European integration process (1945–2014)’, University of Luxembourg, cvce.eu 
database.
54 According to the first EBRD Transition Report (2000). GDP in the Russian Federation (as an approxima-
tion for the Soviet Union) fell by an estimated 4 per cent in 1990.
55 Weber, ‘Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’, p. 18.
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This was an extraordinary condition, but in order to make headway the 
head of the Soviet delegation agreed that the USSR would borrow no more 
than its capital contribution in the first few years. Moscow would also limit 
its overall borrowing capacity to no more than 20 per cent of the institution-
al total so as not to crowd out smaller central European countries. The “Ger-
ashchenko letter” outlining these commitments was annexed to the Treaty 
in due course.
Eleven of the 12 EC countries were prepared to accept this arrangement. 
But at a meeting in London in late February, the US, UK and Japanese rep-
resentatives decided to reject the Soviet offer and demand instead that bor-
rowing by the USSR be limited initially to its paid-in capital, then 20 per 
cent of the total (approximately US$ 150 million).56 They also insisted that 
any move from one stage to another should require a supermajority of 85 per 
cent of voting power. In effect, this gave the USA with Japan, or with the 
UK, a veto on any borrowing by the Soviet Union. 
As the date of the second conference approached, a number of new coun-
tries declared an interest in joining the EBRD. At Japan’s request, South Ko-
rea applied for membership, while Morocco, Israel, Albania, Egypt, Mexico 
and Liechtenstein also expressed interest. With more countries involved than 
originally envisaged, the share calculations had to be reworked. Importantly, 
the USA now insisted that they should have a greater share (10 per cent) than 
any other member in recognition of their economic position. This reflected an 
about-turn in the US stance towards the EBRD, which was aired publicly by 
Secretary of State James Baker III. He told the Senate on 1 March: “the Euro-
peans absolutely want us in this institution; and we want to show leadership.”57
The Paris Conference in March, which was now made up of 42 delega-
tions, once again involved a line-by-line negotiation of the draft Articles of 
the AEB. This time much quicker progress was made and by the end of the 
weekend 50 out of 58 Articles had been agreed in principle. Nevertheless, 
several points remained unresolved. 
The Soviet Union took issue with the use of the term “multiparty de-
mocracy” in the preamble to the AEB58 and “applying the principles” of the 
56 The proportion of paid-in capital later became 30 per cent.
57 Testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1 March 1990.
58 EBRD archives. “Committed to the fundamental principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, re-
spect for human rights and market economics”, Preamble to the Articles of Agreement Establishing the 
Bank, EBRD.
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same in Article 1.59 Issues also arose over the currency denomination of the 
Bank’s finances. The European side wanted to use the ECU. This would be a 
symbol of the European character of the institution and a means of building 
support for the single currency. The USA argued for the use of the dollar, on 
the basis of it being the most widely traded international currency, but also 
because use of the ECU would mean the value of their dollar contribution 
would fluctuate with exchange-rate movements. Similarly, Japan wanted to 
use Yen denomination.
There were also still disagreements over how to characterise the role of 
the USSR. These often turned on the debating point of whether or not the 
Soviet Union was a part of Europe, but more substantively on the question 
of its commitment to democracy. Under pressure to respond, the Soviets 
withdrew their objection to the preamble and Article 1 language on mul-
tiparty democracy. Three days later, changes in Moscow rendered the point 
moot. On 14 March, Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which assigned 
the “leading and guiding force of Soviet society” to the Communist Par-
ty, was amended, effectively removing the Party’s absolute right to rule and 
opening the door to multiparty democracy. The last remaining impediment 
to full Soviet participation was now its borrowing capacity.
As part of the effort to resolve issues surrounding the USSR, the French 
hosts organised a private dinner with the US and Soviet delegations on the 
Saturday night of the two-day meeting. It was an unusual moment. Top fi-
nance officials from the three countries had not had much experience deal-
ing with each other during the Cold War, let alone in an informal setting. 
According to Attali, who was present, the atmosphere was initially very 
tense. He recounts the following anecdote which helped to break the ice:
The Soviet Central Bank Governor describes how they are about to de-
cide in the coming days whether to privatise parts of their economy. Mul-
ford in a deadpan manner aims to put Gerashchenko on the spot over his 
claim that the USSR has changed, and asks:
‘Suppose you privatise your oil sector tomorrow, what would happen? ’ 
Gerashchenko exclaims: ‘Ah no, that’s impossible.’
‘There, you see! ’, says Mulford triumphantly, ‘You’ ll achieve nothing if you 
won’t privatise the oil industry.’
59 “...committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics”, 
Article 1.
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‘No,‘ responded Gerashchenko with a big smile. ‘No, it’s not possible be-
cause tomorrow, it’s Sunday! ’60 
Nevertheless, it was not until May that the borrowing issue was final-
ly resolved.
One of the major decisions remaining concerned the type of activities that 
the EBRD should pursue. The USA, Japan and the UK wanted to limit the 
Bank to supporting the private sector and privatisation. There was a strong 
aversion on their side to financing any state entities of former communist 
countries.61 While the operational template for the EBRD envisaged invest-
ment in the private sector as a central feature, many of the Europeans present 
were concerned that establishing viable private enterprises would take time 
and would limit the amount of investment that could be undertaken initial-
ly. Equally important, they saw an urgent need to put in place the necessary 
infrastructure to allow the private sector to function effectively. They thus 
pushed for a role for the Bank in investing in public infrastructure.
The Europeans also wanted to provide balance-of-payments support and 
export finance, but this was rejected by the USA and others, again on the 
grounds of limiting the EBRD’s involvement with the state. This ensured 
the Bank would not provide budgetary support or programme lending, un-
like the World Bank and other regional development banks.
After very long discussions, a compromise was reached which would de-
fine the Bank’s operational approach throughout its history. It was decid-
ed that investments in the state sector, in other words those involving pub-
lic-sector entities and state infrastructure, should take up no more than 40 
per cent of the EBRD’s total business volume, initially over a two-year peri-
od and each year thereafter.62 In other words, the Bank would be a private 
sector-led institution, but would not exclude some public-sector activities. 
In another first for an IFI, it was also agreed that the EBRD would be 
able to offer a full range of financial instruments, including loans based on 
market rates, guarantees, and equity participations covering both private 
60 “Everyone laughs and relaxes. The ice is broken.” Attali, Europe(s), p. 62, Attali, Verbatim III, p. 443.
61 An ODI Briefing Paper on the EBRD, published in September 1990, commmented: “the Bush administra-
tion initially opposed any EBRD funds going to the public sector, arguing this would amount to subsidis-
ing failed socialism.” Thatcher’s objections to state activities were well known, epitomised by her ‘Bruges 
speech’ in September 1988: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only 
to see them reimposed at the European level.” EBRD, ODI Briefing Paper, September 1990, p. 2.
62 Provision was also made that for any country no more than 40 per cent of commitments should be provid-
ed to the state sector over a period of five consecutive years.
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and public sectors. In essence, it would combine the competences of a com-
mercial bank with those of a development bank.
The primary objective of the EBRD, as expressed in the draft of Arti-
cle 1, was mostly agreed. In its final form it would read: “the purpose of the 
Bank shall be to foster the transition towards open market-oriented econ-
omies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central 
and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles 
of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics.”63
The Bank was also given a prominent role in protecting the environ-
ment. This featured in Article 2: “To promote in the full range of its activ-
ities environmentally sound and sustainable development.” Concern over 
the environment was beginning to appear more frequently in G7 and oth-
er international agendas so it made sense to embed it as a permanent feature 
of this new institution. 
There were other disagreements, mainly between the US and Europe-
an participants.64 The USA, for example, objected to the European Com-
mission and the EIB becoming members, on the grounds that they were not 
sovereign states. They also wanted a resident Board of Directors, paid for by 
the Bank, to exercise control over management. This reflected the structure 
of institutions such as the World Bank over which the USA held consider-
able sway, including veto power. By contrast, most Europeans were happy 
with a non-resident Board, in line with the practice at the EIB, and agreed 
that it should be limited to 12 members. Despite the presence of the Com-
mission representing the interests of the 12 EC member states, however, it 
was not possible to limit the number of European constituencies. After try-
ing out many permutations for constituencies, the final number of resident 
Directors was settled at 23—one of the largest among IFIs—with single-
constituency offices for the largest shareholders, namely the G7 countries, 
the EC and the EIB.
63 At this point the relevant section read: “To promote the transition towards open market-oriented econo-
mies and private initiative in Central and Eastern Economies engaged in applying the principles of multi-
party democracy and market economics.” Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 462–3.
64 Weber, ‘Origins’, pp. 16–19; Menkveld, Origin, pp. 63–65. Predictably one of the most fraught minor is-
sues was over the official language for the internal documents of the Bank. It had already been agreed there 
would be four official languages: English, French, German and Russian. All the delegates apart from those 
from France and Germany, however, agreed that working documents should be distributed only in English. 
France tried to argue that using all four languages would be fair, but efficiency and economy won the day. 
Source: author interview with a senior Hungarian participant.
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12.  Sensitive Matters: The Location of the Bank  
 and the Choice of its First President
The third constitutive conference, which was expected to be the last, was 
held on 8 and 9 April 1990. By now most elements were in place and thoughts 
were turning to a signing date for the AEB. To simplify matters, it was de-
cided to aim for an OECD ministerial meeting in Paris on 29 May. Two im-
portant issues, however, had not yet been formally tabled: where the Bank’s 
headquarters should be located and who should become its first President.
Many cities had offered to host the EBRD: Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenha-
gen, Dublin, London, Luxembourg, Milan, Prague, Vienna and Warsaw. In 
February, the UK had even produced a glossy brochure in three languages ex-
tolling the virtues of the City of London, which it claimed hosted more east-
ern European banks than any other western capital. Attali scouted a number 
of possible venues in Paris, alighting on an office in Boulevard Haussmann. 
As with many such high-profile and politically sensitive decisions, the 
choice of the Bank’s location would not be made in isolation. There were 
several other new institutions to locate at the time, including the European 
Trade Marks Office,65 the European Environment Agency and the future 
European Central Bank (ECB).66 Competition to become a winning city 
was fierce. Much later, Attali would describe the behind-the-scenes negotia-
tions in a book of memoirs. 
At the same time, among the international finance issues exercising the 
minds of senior officials was a long-running battle over IMF quotas. The 
ninth review of these quotas was long overdue and coming to a head for the 
IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings in late April 1990. The Japanese were ar-
guing for a special quota increase to reflect the rise in their country’s GDP. 
An adjustment on this basis would mean the UK’s demotion from second 
to fourth place, behind both Japan and Germany. France was also insisting 
that, based on the size of its economy, it should be ahead of the UK.
There had been intense discussions for several months on how to resolve 
the impasse. British officials had put forward various solutions67 but failed 
65 This became the European Union Intellectual Property Office, located in Alicante, Spain. 
66 The European Environment Agency went to Copenhagen and the ECB to Frankfurt. 
67 J. M. Boughton, ‘Tearing Down Walls: The International Monetary Fund 1990–1999’, IMF, Washington 
DC, 2012, pp. 870–875. The key official at the time designing the possible solutions was Jeremy Heywood, 
later Lord Heywood of Whitehall and Cabinet Secretary to the UK government for many years.
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to achieve consensus. The G7 finance deputies finally managed to agree 
a formula which they would try to sell to ministers in time for the IMF/
World Bank Spring Meetings. 
The proposal was that Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany 
should become second equal in the IMF, with the UK and France sharing 
equal fourth place through an unprecedented quota leaseback scheme.68 In 
addition, the G7 would support London as the location for the headquar-
ters of the EBRD, with a French President for a single non-renewable term 
and an American as First Vice President, or deputy to the President.69
Ahead of the final constitutive conference establishing the EBRD, the 
USA and the USSR also agreed the text limiting Soviet borrowing to ECU 
180 million over three years before an increase could be considered.70 The 
stage now seemed set for the signing ceremony of the AEB71 to take place 
on 29 May. 
However, despite the preliminary agreement achieved by the G7, pro-
posals from other member countries—including a Dutch candidacy for 
President—remained in play. Typically, such agreements in the world of in-
ternational affairs are reached by consensus, but at the constitutive confer-
ence between 9 and 10 May, no consensus emerged on either the location for 
the Bank or the nationality of its President. With less than three weeks be-
fore the signing ceremony, there was little option left other than to put it to 
a vote. The Secretariat duly informed the member countries that this would 
take place on 19 May, the last meeting to be held before the signing of the 
Treaty on 29 May. 
In the end, the original G7 proposal was supported, despite concerns 
from smaller EC countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands that the 
powerful G7 nations—including other Europeans—had effectively called 
the shots. Attali was elected President with 32 votes out of 40. (The Com-
mission and EIB abstained for reasons of conflict of interest, not wishing to 
68 As the relative GDPs of France and the UK fluctuated, a lend-and-leaseback scheme of around 0.5 per cent of 
quota would ensure the quotas could remain equal in any subsequent review. Although the positions of France 
and the UK fell to fifth equal following quota reform and the rise of China, the agreement remains in place.
69 Confidential note from the UK Chancellor’s Principal Private Secretary to Charles Powell, Thatcher’s Foreign 
Affairs Private Secretary, dated 7 May 1990. National Archives; Bank of England Archives.
70 At the time an increase required a decision of not less than three-fourths of Governors representing at least 
85 per cent of voting power. It was enshrined in Article 8, paragraph 4 and was linked to the “Gerashchen-
ko letter” on the Soviet Union to the Chair of the Conference. 
71 www.ebrd.com/news/publications/institutional-documents/basic-documents-of-the-ebrd.html.
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choose sides between member states.) London was selected as the location. 
The tidying up of the rest of the AEB was done overnight. 
It had been a momentous week, and not only for the Bank. On 18 May, 
the treaty bringing about monetary, economic and social union between 
West and East Germany was signed in Bonn. One week later, Gorbachev 
agreed that the enlarged Germany could join NATO in exchange for west-
ern financial assistance, including ECU 3 billion from the Federal Republic 
to pay for the repatriation of the 365,000 Soviet troops stationed in the GDR. 
13.  The Signing of the Agreement Establishing the Bank in Paris
The Treaty establishing the EBRD was signed on 29 May 1990 at the Ely-
sée by the finance and foreign ministers of all 42 members. Ratification by 
national parliaments, two-thirds of which were required before the Bank 
could begin operations, was expected to take up to a year.
The signing ceremony had fired the starting gun for the creation of an in-
stitution that delivered a truly multinational response to a global challenge. 
Its shareholders comprised the entire EC and two European organisations, 
as well as other European states, including the eight prospective recipients of 
EBRD finance. Crucially, there was a hefty non-European presence includ-
ing the G7 powerhouses of the USA (the largest individual shareholder), Ja-
pan and Canada, as well as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and also 
Mexico, Morocco and Egypt.
Reflecting on the result, Attali concluded that the EBRD at its birth was 
more Anglo-Saxon than European in its philosophy and design, but that 
the Americans and British had had to accept the membership of the Sovi-
et Union and a French President. It was not the beginning which he had 
envisaged. For most other officials involved, it had been a remarkable feat 
to achieve consensus and to have built the core of a new institution to sup-
port central and eastern Europe inside six months. Politically at least it was 
a great success. Practically, there was a lot to do before the Bank could be-
come operational.
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Table 1.1.
The 42 signatories to the AEB included the eight recipient countries, the 12 EC members plus the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the EIB, as well as 11 “other” European and nine non-
European countries.
 Number of shares Capital subscription 
(in million ECU)
A – European Communities 
(a) 
Belgium 22,800 228.00 
Denmark 12,000 120.00 
France 85,175 851.75 
Germany, Federal Republic of 85,175 851.75 
Greece 6,500 65.00 
Ireland 3,000 30.00 
Italy 85,175 851.75 
Luxembourg 2,000 20.00 
Netherlands 24,800 248.00 
Portugal 4,200 42.00 
Spain 34,000 340.00 
United Kingdom 85,175 851.75 
(b) 
European Economic Community 30,000 300.00 
European Investment Bank 30,000 300.00 
B ‑ Other European countries 
Austria 22,800 228.00 
Cyprus 1,000 10.00 
Finland 12,500 125.00 
Iceland 1,000 10.00 
Israel 6,500 65.00 
Liechtenstein 200 2.00 
Malta 100 1.00 
Norway 12,500 125.00 
Sweden 22,800 228.00 
Switzerland 22,800 228.00 
Turkey 11,500 115.00
C – Recipient countries 
Bulgaria 7,900 79.00 
Czechoslovakia 12,800 128.00 
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German Democratic Republic 15,500 155.00 
Hungary 7,900 79.00 
Poland 12,800 128.00 
Romania 4,800 48.00 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 60,000 600.00 
Yugoslavia 12,800 128.00 
D – Non‑European countries 
Australia 10,000 100.00 
Canada 34,000 340.00 
Egypt 1,000 10.00 
Japan 85,175 851.75 
Korea, Republic of 6,500 65.00 
Mexico 3,000 30.00 
Morocco 1,000 10.00 
New Zealand 1,000 10.00 
United States of America 100,000 1,000.00 
E - Non allocated shares 125 1.25 
Total 1,000,000 10,000.00 




Creating the EBRD’s DNA
1. Balancing the Governance of the New Institution
Against the odds and in record time for an international institution the 
EBRD had been established. This was the institution that would reach out 
to address the global challenge of a whole system that was disintegrating 
across a vast geographical area. 
The challenge was global because the collapse of communist rule had im-
mediate economic and social consequences, and was of a geopolitical rele-
vance that spread far beyond the borders of its western European neighbours. 
The response was also global. This was to be a bank whose shareholders 
stretched across five continents and whose owners included the countries it 
was created to support. It would have a unique business model that put a pri-
mary focus on the development of the private sector, while allowing for in-
vestment to flow to the public sector to help with immediate infrastructure 
demands and provide quality public services to improve the lives of millions 
across eastern Europe.
The EBRD would ultimately be designed to invest according to three 
criteria: i) it would support “transition”, the transformation to functioning 
market economies; ii) it would be “additional” by investing only when the 
private sector either would not or could not; and iii) its investments would 
be “bankable”, allowing it to make a profit and to continue investing on 
the basis of its income. It would also put a strong emphasis on environmen-
tal sustainability, a focus that would become even more significant in the 
EBRD’s later years.
When the EBRD was being set up, Attali suggested it might take 20 years 
for the eastern European nations to catch up with their more prosperous 
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western neighbours. While many of these countries indeed made remarkable 
progress over the next 20 years, that timetable turned out to be optimistic.
In 1990, however, the immediate challenge was to make the Bank oper-
ational as soon as possible. The key to successfully addressing this challenge 
lay in forging compromise and consensus among its broad sweep of more 
than 40 disparate shareholders. 
Translating the common interests of the EBRD’s founding members 
into operational reality was, of course, not straightforward. The West was in 
principle capitalist, with institutions based on the rule of law, but differenc-
es of interpretation existed, for example over the extent and role of the state, 
or between common law and civil law. However, debate among the members 
led to effective compromise. 
Indeed, the fact that the creation of the Bank and its rules of operation 
was not dominated by any one country or institution meant that the par-
ties had to work together. While the EC held a majority and, acting in con-
cert, could exert an effective veto, this was not the same as the power vested 
in the USA at the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, or 
in Japan at the ADB. 
Many differences in approach existed between EC member states. As 
with Brussels’ European committees, compromises among individual coun-
try positions had to be found throughout the process. This contributed to 
a greater balance of interests across a wide spectrum of views—something 
that continued throughout the EBRD’s history and became a unique insti-
tutional strength. 
Common positions also had to be forged between shareholder countries 
and the new management of the EBRD. As a public institution, ultimate-
ly funded by taxpayers, the Bank needed to be accountable to the senior of-
ficials representing the shareholder countries. These officials were the ap-
pointed Governors of the institution, most of whom were finance ministers 
or central bank governors. 
This was a time of vocal civil-society criticism of existing IFIs. The Gov-
ernors were therefore keen to ensure that the new institution would have 
adequate oversight to prevent risky or unjustified decisions. Other devel-
opment banks at the time were geared towards development impact, such 
as poverty reduction and lower mortality rates. A development bank which 
aimed to invest in and do business with the private sector was thus a very un-
usual creature.
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At the same time, the EBRD was designed by its creators to make an ad-
equate return on capital, meaning that the shareholder countries expected 
to see profitable operations. Hence, it needed to operate in many ways sim-
ilar to a private bank. The management wanted the new institution to em-
body a private-sector ethos, have maximum flexibility and make investment 
decisions based on the fast-changing needs of the market, rather than seek-
ing formal approvals for each move. 
This chapter details the ways in which compromise was sought and 
achieved. 
2. Maintaining Momentum and Developing an Ambitious Agenda
In setting up the EBRD there were many aspects to consider, from office 
location, staffing and administrative arrangements to the organisation-
al structure, business plans and financing of operations. Moreover, while 
agreement on the AEB had set the key parameters defining the Bank, there 
was still a need to agree by-laws, rules of procedure for the Board of Gover-
nors and Board of Directors, and staff regulations. Not only would these 
texts need to meet formal legal requirements, they would also have to cov-
er sensitive issues such as salaries, retirement plans, and the expenses and tax 
arrangements of Board Directors, the costs of which would be borne by the 
Bank’s administrative budget. Then there was a Headquarters Agreement to 
be negotiated with the UK authorities to cement the EBRD’s status as an in-
ternational organisation under the United Nations (UN) system. In short, 
there was a daunting set of tasks ahead before the EBRD could be formally 
inaugurated and its operations begin.
In one respect, however, the EBRD was fortunate. It was not the first IFI 
to face many of these tasks. While none on this scale had been created since 
the ADB1 more than 20 years earlier, and none with a mandate like that 
of the EBRD, there was much to glean from the legal documentation sur-
rounding these institutions, as well as from the practices that had evolved 
over time to support their operability. Good use was made of these materi-
als in marshalling the relevant building blocks quickly.
1  The ADB was inaugurated in 1966.
After the Berlin Wall
46
Creating a new IFI from scratch would present a major challenge, even for 
a President with a strong administrative and executive background. It was a 
particularly formidable task for Attali, an intellectual and adviser with no 
banking or managerial experience.
Undaunted, he approached the matter with characteristic energy and en-
thusiasm. He was particularly keen to ensure that the EBRD did not meekly 
slot in among the existing main multilateral players or become a means for 
the EC or Washington to pursue their own ends. He wanted the EBRD to 
push boundaries and develop an independent voice.
“I deliberately chose to make the European Bank [EBRD] a political 
as well as an economic institution, a spokesperson for the East, refusing to 
make it an annex of the Commission, as with the EIB, or of the World Bank 
as with the other regional development banks. I was aware that in doing so 
I would create an enemy a day.”2
The major shareholders agreed that the EBRD was indeed something 
new and different from its predecessors. A multilateral public-sector organ-
isation, it was to focus primarily on private-sector development. It would 
use innovative financial instruments to achieve its transformative mission 
of helping the newly democratising countries of central and eastern Europe 
on the difficult reform path forward. 
From the operational perspective, however, there was an enormous 
amount of work to be done, barely any staff to do it and more than 40 coun-
tries and institutions to manage in the process. 
3.  Early Preparations and a Transitional Team
One of the first tasks was ensuring that all members ratified the Treaty 
signed in May so that the EBRD could begin investing in its target coun-
tries. Potential members had to submit legal documents confirming that 
they had completed the steps required by their domestic legislation to give 
legal effect to the immunities and privileges of the Bank. Ratification re-
quired the submission of these so-called instruments of approval by signa-
tories representing two-thirds of total subscriptions, including at least two 
countries from central and eastern Europe. 
2  Attali, Europe(s), p. 82.
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Since each tier of national government would be involved, it was clear 
that ratification would take time. This was reflected in the deadline of 31 
March 1991 set in Article 62. 
France was first off the mark, obtaining the necessary approvals in 
the National Assembly and the Senate by the end of June. After deposit-
ing the relevant instruments, it ratified before the summer break. The UK 
was next, meeting the requirements on 10 August, followed at the end of 
November with ratification by the two European institutions. Elsewhere 
progress was slow, but by the year-end nine members—including Germa-
ny, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania—had ratified. Notably, it was a unit-
ed Germany that had ratified, following the unification of East and West 
Germany on 3 October 1990. The USA made slower progress, partly be-
cause of a reluctance by Congress to countenance financial support for the 
Soviet Union. 
At the same time, prospective shareholders were eager to finalise de-
tails concerning the governance of the institution, including a definition of 
the respective roles of the Board and management. This was a priority now 
the AEB had been signed. Everything had to be in place by the time of the 
EBRD’s inauguration. Shareholders had also flagged the need for the Board 
of Directors to oversee the Bank’s operational policies and procedures, in-
cluding its structure and staffing. 
Consideration of the principles guiding the Bank sought by sharehold-
ers did not stand in the way of Attali preparing the Bank for the start of its 
operations. 
Under the AEB, the election of the President could only be made by 
the Board of Governors so formal confirmation of Attali’s appointment 
had to wait until the Treaty was ratified. As President-designate, however, 
he began to assemble a small team. On 1 June 1990, he announced the ap-
pointment of Pierre Pissaloux3 from the Trésor as his Directeur du Cabi-
net and Sylvia Jay4 from the UK’s Overseas Development Administration 
as Directeur du Cabinet Adjoint. Both had served as part of the Secretar-
3  Pissaloux, like Attali, was a pied noir, in his case born in Tunis (Attali was born in Algiers). He later became 
global head of MENA at HSBC private bank, manager of wealth management at Emirates NBD bank and 
founded Elyseum Capital Partners, based in Dubai. 
4  After becoming director-general of the Food and Drink Federation of the UK, Lady Jay became chairman 
of L’Oreal UK, a director of Lazard Group and held director positions at Alcatel-Lucent and Saint-Gobain. 
She is currently High Sheriff of Oxford.
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iat for the preparatory conferences. Pissaloux was the key point man for 
Attali,5 while Jay served as the main link on the political mandate and with 
the British authorities.
At this stage, the embryonic Bank was being financed by the French and 
British governments. The EIB had also agreed to extend an ECU 10 million 
start-up loan for recruitment, rent and other initial expenses. A small office 
at 28 Avenue Hoche in Paris was made available by the French government. 
In London, the Bank of England provided space for EBRD staff before ar-
rangements for temporary offices at 6 Broadgate in the City of London were 
in place. The team was thus split between Paris and London for a while. 
Despite the high-level legal requirements of some of the agreements with 
shareholders, a large part of the work to be carried out in the near term 
was practical and administrative. There was a need for staff of all kinds, fi-
nancial and operational arrangements, further temporary office space (since 
staff numbers were expected to outgrow the premises at 6 Broadgate before 
long), and forging contacts with governments and enterprises in the recip-
ient countries. 
The core work was put in the hands of the capable small team that had 
been assembled. They were to prepare papers describing the way forward, 
go on missions to the region and draft legal documents, while Attali fo-
cused on broader strategic questions and relationships with key players in 
the region. The President-designate continued to reside in Paris and re-
mained Mitterrand’s economic adviser. However, he became increasingly 
involved in the work of the EBRD, especially in the recruitment of senior 
staff. He also made a series of trips to central and eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union.
Attali visited Gorbachev in Moscow in September. According to John 
Flemming, who was present at the meeting: “[Attali] spoke of the role of the 
Bank of Europe as an institution of which the USSR was a member—the 
first realisation perhaps of Mr Gorbachev’s idea of a joint common Europe-
an ‘house’.” Attali also offered to help in the training of Soviet specialists. 
“This seemed to strike a chord,” Flemming commented. 
Discussing the scope for the EBRD to participate in joint ventures, the 
President-designate asked Gorbachev: “What kind of projects would cap-
5  He had wanted Anne Le Lorier, an official from the Trésor who had acted as secretary to the preparatory 
conferences, but she turned him down. 
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ture the popular imagination? A TGV link from the West to Moscow? 
A communication satellite?” The Soviet leadership’s demands were appar-
ently more modest, as Flemming’s summary records: 
The people had had their fill of grandiose schemes. What was needed was 
something to make the market mechanism, and its potential, intelligible 
to ordinary people, e.g. something to ensure regularity in the supply of 
meat. The area of distribution emerged as the most pressing…6 
A little later, Attali toured Hungary, the CSFR and Poland to hold ex-
ploratory talks on the EBRD’s role in helping eastern European countries 
make the transition from central planning to free-market economies. At a 
news conference in Budapest, he made clear that the job of bringing east-
ern Europe’s economies up to the level of their western neighbours would 
require trillions of dollars in investment: 
If we want to see all the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet 
Union, reach the level of France or Germany, you have to invest 2,000 bil-
lion ECUs (2,700 billion dollars). This will give you an idea of the task that 
has to be undertaken.7
4. The Soviet Study
The first Post-Signature Conference of prospective members was scheduled 
for mid-July 1990, six weeks after the signing of the AEB. However, just 
ahead of this was the annual G7 Heads meeting, which would mark the 
EBRD-in-waiting’s first appearance on the international stage alongside the 
IMF, the World Bank and the OECD.
Throughout the first half of 1990, concerns over the future of the Soviet 
Union had been mounting. Its economy was not yet in freefall, but it was de-
teriorating rapidly. Export and tax revenues were weakening, as was produc-
tion. The budget deficit, already at an estimated 8 per cent of GDP, was in-
6  Preliminary minutes of the meeting on 19 September 1990 between the President of the USSR and the 
President-designate of the Bank of Europe (EBRD), recorded by John Flemming, 20 September 1990.
7  ‘Trillions seen needed for East Europe investment’. Reuters News, 9 October 1990, Budapest. 
After the Berlin Wall
50
creasing, and deteriorating supplies of goods and a huge monetary overhang 
meant that only rigid price controls were holding back inflation. Moves to 
switch to payments in hard currency among the members of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) were also beginning to take their 
toll. Gorbachev was in even greater need of financial assistance. At home he 
was facing challenges to his programme from both hard-liners and the new 
Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, who was advocating faster reform.
Under the US Presidency, the G7 Summit was scheduled for early July 
in Houston. Gorbachev had indicated earlier to Bush his need for finan-
cial support, first at their meeting on the Soviet cruise ship Maxim Gorky 
off Malta towards the end of 1989, and then in his US visit in May 1990. 
Despite his plea, the USA remained reluctant to provide finance, citing the 
need to see reforms first. Bush was cautious about the chances of compre-
hensive reform given the uncertain Soviet political and economic outlook. 
While his Secretary of State James Baker was moderately optimistic, Secre-
tary of Defence Dick Cheney and Deputy National Security Adviser Bob 
Gates were more hawkish.8
Most other G7 members were equally wary, not least as they perceived 
little clarity on how funds would be spent in delivering reform.9 Like the 
USA, Japan and the UK were not prepared to go beyond technical assis-
tance and pre-existing bilateral programmes for the Soviet Union. The 
EBRD was not in a position to offer funding, not only because it was not 
yet operational but also because of the restrictions that had been placed on 
lending to the USSR. Significant financial aid was therefore not forthcom-
ing. Instead, the G7 decided to commission a study of the Soviet Union to 
assess its reform needs and make recommendations, including criteria for 
economic assistance in support of reform.10 
The remit was handed to the IMF, in conjunction with the World Bank, 
the OECD and the EBRD. Being asked to be involved was a feather in the cap 
8  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 44, p. 154.
9  Kohl had offered to help Gorbachev (although specific amounts were not forthcoming until the following 
year), and Mitterrand was also urging colleagues to stump up large sums, without success. See Bush and 
Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 270; M. R. Beschloss and S. Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside 
Story of the End of the Cold War, Little Brown, 1994, p.188, pp. 236–238; and W. Taubman, Gorbachev: His 
Life and Times, Simon & Schuster, 2017, pp. 569–570. 
10 Asked at a press conference following the Houston Summit whether the study was a way of delaying a po-
litical decision on aid, Bush replied: “… it’s not an effort to forestall anything, it’s an effort to move forward 
… and be helpful to the Soviet Union in terms of reform.” 11 July 1990, G7/8 Summits, Munk School, Uni-
versity of Toronto.
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of a new institution that had not even formally come into being. At the time, 
however, the Bank did not have the internal resources to cope with the task.11
Attali therefore recruited a team of external specialists, starting with 
Jean-Paul Fitoussi, a long-time friend and professor of economics at Scienc-
es Po in Paris, and Philippe Aghion, back in Paris after a stint at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as assistant professor of economics. 
Fitoussi had been working closely with US economist Edmund Phelps on 
unemployment issues and brought him into the fold, along with Nobel lau-
reate Kenneth Arrow from Stanford.12 
As well as a team of economists, the head of each organisation involved 
in the Soviet Union study was asked to appoint a personal representative 
to manage the coordination process. Attali’s first choice, Larry Summers, 
was about to take over as chief economist at the World Bank and was not 
interested. 
Attali next turned to John Flemming, at the time the chief economist at 
the Bank of England, who was on holiday in the Pyrenees by the time At-
tali contacted him towards the end of July. After a series of messages left at 
a local post office, Flemming agreed to take on the role. The Bank of Eng-
land was already providing administrative help to set up the EBRD and, as 
a guardian of the UK financial system, had an interest in ensuring the new 
Bank was a success. 
The EBRD subsequently hired more consultants, including Paul Hare of 
Heriot-Watt University and Jacques Le Cacheux, an economist at the Ob-
servatoire Français des Conjectures Économiques and Sciences Po, as well 
as drawing on members of the expanding transitional team. The Bank was 
asked to lead the sectoral work, covering transportation, telecommunica-
tions, distribution and mining. In addition, the group led on the role of eco-
nomic information and market behaviour and, with the OECD, foreign di-
rect investment. A small team involving Hare was also associated with the 
World Bank’s work on price reform, market structures, privatisation, decen-
tralisation and financial markets.
11 A lack of staff did not prevent Attali from pushing for a more prominent role at the first coordination meet-
ing of the four heads of institutions. His suggestion that the EBRD lead the study resulted in a clash with 
Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF. 
12 Arrow received his Nobel Prize (with John Hicks) for contributions to general equilibrium economics and 
welfare theory in 1972. Edmund Phelps would also receive a Nobel Prize in 2006 for his analysis of inter-
temporal trade-offs in macroeconomic policy.
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The Soviet Study was substantial. It took up three volumes, amounting 
to well over 1,000 pages in total. The authors delved as deeply as they could 
into the state of the Soviet economy, travelling to Moscow to meet represen-
tatives of institutions including Gosplan, Gosbank, the ministry of finance, 
Vnesheconombank (Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs) and many others. 
Phelps described the trip as “a wonderful experience”. 
Our signature … was the assortment of beat-up taxis from which six or sev-
en of us would spill out in front of the ministry we were visiting, in the 
style of the old circus shtick, while the more venerable international agen-
cies favoured their black limousines.13
He was also inspired by the “energy and zeal” of reformist Soviet policy-
makers: 
After you have met some of them you cannot but help feel confident—
maybe unreasonably—that the drive for individual liberty and free mar-
kets is quite strong in Russia.
The study provided a comprehensive picture of the dire state of the Soviet 
system and concluded by noting the enormous challenge facing the author-
ities, including a need to decide on a division of responsibilities between the 
Union and the republics and the expectation that output and employment 
would fall as adjustment towards a market economy progressed. The four in-
stitutions urged the authorities to pursue a rapid path towards comprehen-
sive price and trade liberalisation and to tackle the rapidly increasing general 
government deficit. The study described the need for the absorption of excess 
money holdings and, in the short run, for an incomes policy and social safety 
net. It advised unification of the exchange rate for current account transac-
tions within a year. Establishment of private-ownership rights and elimina-
tion of controls was advocated along with the privatisation of smaller firms. 
For larger state-owned enterprises, commercialisation was seen as the first 
step, to be accompanied by the imposition of hard budget constraints.
13 E.S. Phelps, A Life in Economics, Columbia Education Press, 1993. Phelps and Arrow’s assessment was sub-
sequently published as ‘Proposed reforms of the economic system of information and decision in the USSR: 
Commentary and Advice’, Rivista di Politica Economica, 81, November 1991.
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The Soviet Study did not put a figure on the appropriate degree of financial 
support for the reform process or what the West should provide, but recom-
mended that funding should focus on technical assistance, along with some 
humanitarian aid. On the macro side, balance-of-payments finance was seen 
as useful, but only once “a comprehensive program of systemic reforms has 
begun to be implemented”.14 Some of the detailed analysis provided by the 
EBRD team, for example on sectoral needs, price signals and privatisation, 
was to provide a useful basis for operational considerations at a later stage.
The study was submitted to the G7 in early December and was well re-
ceived. In its first task the EBRD had demonstrated that the organisation 
was up to the standards of leading global institutions and a significant player, 
intellectually at least, in the business of transition. The academic economists 
who had worked with the EBRD were to play a role in the Economics Ad-
visory Committee which was set up shortly before the Bank’s inauguration 
in 1991, helping to build its image as a thought leader on transition matters. 
5. Deciding the Organisational Structure
One of the priorities ahead of the first Post-Signature Conference was the 
development of an organisational structure for the Bank. Emerging ideas 
were reflected in a draft paper of 23 June, which described the organisation 
and its context for members attending the conference. The aim was to de-
cide on a structure that would best support the needs of the Bank’s coun-
tries of operations and build linkages with investors interested in exploring 
opportunities in the new markets of the East, while at the same time devel-
oping an internal culture focused on transition and sound banking.
The paper noted the organisational implications of the fast-changing and 
unpredictable region in which the Bank would be operating: “a special char-
acter [of the] institution [will be] that [it] will have to adapt permanently to 
change” in order to “play a leading role in helping to establish the salient features 
of a market economy as well as changes in attitudes and institution building”.
The need for a compact, unbureaucratic and flexible institution was em-
phasised. To support this, an adequate degree of delegation of authority 
was recommended, including from the Board. 
14 ‘A Study of the Soviet Economy’, IMF et al., 1991, p.2.
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Management should have the authority to approve investments and loans 
up to a certain financial threshold provided that the Board of Directors is 
informed of all agreements … in order to ensure flexibility, efficiency and, 
where necessary, speed in Bank operations.
Emphasis was also laid on the catalytic role that the EBRD was expect-
ed to play by focusing on the private sector and putting less emphasis on sov-
ereign-guaranteed lending to the state and other public institutions. This 
would mean mobilising domestic and foreign capital, as well as supplying 
management experience to a region that was sorely lacking such skills. The 
paper’s authors also highlighted the need to develop well-functioning cap-
ital markets in the Bank’s countries of operations and to provide advice on 
financial restructuring, privatisation, project preparation and policy frame-
works affecting the private sector.
Within this context, the EBRD was expected to operate largely on a pri-
vate-sector basis, supported by high-quality staff drawn from that sector. In 
order to attract top talent, the Bank introduced incentive systems similar to 
those used by investment banks and venture capital firms, including bonus-
es geared towards results. This was an innovative model and one which was 
more or less unheard of in the public sector at the time.
The suggested organisational structure, as depicted in a draft EBRD or-
ganigram, was nonetheless broadly conventional for a regional development 
bank. The main exception was the proposal for two Vice Presidents in the 
operational area. The Vice President in charge of Project Lending and Pro-
grammes was expected to formulate lending policy, develop country pro-
grammes, prepare economic and sector work, and oversee project lending. 
The Vice President for Corporate Finance, Privatisation and Investments 
was to be in charge of equity financing (including joint ventures), invest-
ments in state-owned companies slated for privatisation, and the provision 
of advice on financial techniques, especially restructuring and privatisation. 
This division of areas of responsibility reflected the dual nature of the 
EBRD’s remit. As well as private-sector investments, the Bank was permit-
ted to make infrastructure and energy sector loans to public entities under 
the agreed 40:60 public-to-private ratio. As the Soviet Study had indicat-
ed, investment in basic infrastructure—including power, transport and tele-
communications systems—was urgently needed to support the creation of a 
functioning private sector in the EBRD’s countries of operations. 
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Such activities would require a high degree of interaction with the au-
thorities on policy and regulatory issues, and would therefore be largely 
country-led. They would also involve relatively large sums of money and the 
use of sovereign guarantees where these were justified. Attali wanted a de-
partment that dealt with this area to sit alongside an investment banking 
unit covering the private sector, restructuring and privatisation. 
Attali was also keen to separate the lending and equity investment func-
tions of the Bank. He expected finance for public-sector projects to be pre-
dominantly sovereign and debt-based, whereas by contrast the private sector 
would involve equity as well as debt. Equity was also seen as a more complex 
product requiring specialist commercial expertise, particularly in relation to 
privatisations, while treating it separately from debt provided room (at least 
in theory) to avoid potential conflicts of interest. 
A key reason for Attali’s insistence on two Vice Presidents in Opera-
tions was political. During the establishment of the Bank, he had to accept 
a US citizen as his second-in-command. By creating a second Vice Presiden-
cy, and ensuring it was filled by a European, he hoped to limit US influence 
within the organisation.15
A wide range of skills was certainly needed to cover the broad variety of 
activities the EBRD planned to undertake. Furthermore, with programme 
lending to governments prohibited by shareholders, the focus was inevitably 
on bespoke deals in specific sectors, which placed more emphasis on the in-
vestment banking side. Sector knowledge was therefore essential.
At the top of this structure sat the Executive Committee, involving all 
senior management.16 Its remit was clear: to deal with policy and institu-
tional issues, plans and budgets, as well as be the final arbiter of difficult 
investment decisions. However, the responsibilities of the two other se-
nior committees that were initially proposed, each chaired by the respective 
banking Vice President, were less well-defined. An Investment Commit-
tee, chaired by the Vice President Corporate Finance, had the task of de-
ciding new investments and policy on equity participations, while a Lend-
ing Committee, chaired by the Vice President for Project Lending, was to 
be the forum for lending policy and operations. The overlap between the 
15 Attali, Europe(s), p. 86.
16 Attali’s control of the organisation was nonetheless maintained effectively through his ‘cabinet’, especially 
via Pissaloux. A number of counsellors were also hired to advise the President on political matters and were 
managed by Jay.
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two committees’ responsibilities for the operational work of the Bank cre-
ated confusion. 
To add to the confusion, separate working groups were proposed to deal 
with the preparation of country assistance strategies, which would then be 
examined by one of the three committees depending on their relevance.
An attempt to marry two radically different cultures—development fi-
nance and investment banking—was never going to be straightforward. 
Many staff had worked at the World Bank, an institution known at the time 
for its bureaucratic procedures, while others had cut their teeth in deal-driv-
en investment banks. 
More positively, having analysed the experience of other development banks 
(particularly the IFC) and several large corporations, the EBRD’s management 
foresaw clearly from the outset that a local presence would be essential to the 
success of the Bank. They recommended the establishment of branch offices 
in order to create efficient and effective ways of identifying investment oppor-
tunities and working closely with recipient countries in an advisory capacity.
The early organisational structure of the EBRD also envisaged the cre-
ation of a Business Advisory Panel, to be chaired by the President, which 
was expected to meet three times a year.17 The aim was to bring together the 
chief executives of some 15 major industrial and banking firms to help the 
EBRD develop close relations with western investors interested in the mar-
kets opening up in central and eastern Europe. This could help the Bank 
learn about the pitfalls of investing in the region, as well as provide oppor-
tunities for co-investment and other forms of support, such as trade finance.
6. Efforts on High-Level Appointments 
In the run-up to the first Post-Signature Conference in July, prospective 
members were naturally expecting to hear about progress in attracting se-
nior staff. The US administration had proposed Ernie Stern18, a Senior Vice 
17 A parallel Economic Advisory Panel was established later. This comprised a number of leading academ-
ic economists and aimed to meet twice a year to discuss major topics of interest facing the transition econ-
omies. It spawned Economics of Transition, an academic journal co-managed by the EBRD’s Office of the 
Chief Economist, but with an independent editorial board.
18 This was first put forward by Bush at a bilateral meeting with Mitterrand in Key Largo on 19 April, 1990. 
Attali, Europe(s), p. 75.
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President at the World Bank, for the number two position, which had been 
relabelled as the Vice President for Country Programmes and Lending. 
From July of that year, he began advising the EBRD from Washington DC 
while still at the World Bank.
As head of operations, Stern had effectively been number two at the 
World Bank for seven years before moving to the finance division in 1987. 
He was therefore ideally suited to help prepare operational and budget plans 
and financial projections for the EBRD, as well as to suggest knowledgeable 
consultants to do the hard graft. His involvement underlined the EBRD’s 
status as a serious newcomer to the multilateral fold. Attali announced to 
members at the July Conference that an American would be the first of five 
Vice Presidents, although his intention to appoint Stern was not mentioned 
formally until the autumn. 
Stern’s credentials placed him firmly on the development side of oper-
ations. To complete the picture, a senior banker—or, in the City parlance 
of the time, a merchant banker—was required. Attali wanted a European 
to fill the role, “an Italian if possible”.19 Giulio Andreotti, the Italian Prime 
Minister, recommended Giuseppe Garofano. As president of Montedison 
and managing director of the Italian food and chemicals conglomerate Fer-
ruzzi, Garofano was an industrialist rather than a banker. Nonetheless, At-
tali was keen to sign him up, impressed by his role in taking control of En-
imont, a joint venture between Ferruzzi-Montedison and ENI, the Italian 
state energy company. Garofano did not take the job, however, and the posi-
tion remained vacant for another year.20 
7. The First Post-Signature Conference
 
Procedural issues were still being discussed as large delegations represent-
ing each of the EBRD’s 42 prospective shareholders gathered for the Bank’s 
first conference after the signing of the AEB. Many details still had to be 
thrashed out on diverse topics, ranging from the establishment of branch 
offices and arrangements for committee meetings to conditions of service 
for Governors and Directors and senior management. One key outstand-
19 Ibid., p. 86.
20 Garofano became embroiled in the ‘Mani Puliti’ affair.
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ing element was the balance of responsibility between management and 
shareholders, whose interests would be represented by a London-based res-
ident board. 
The initial plans drawn up by the transitional team described fairly accu-
rately the broad outlines under which the Bank subsequently operated. At 
the first Post-Signature Conference, however, concerns arose not only about 
Attali’s style but also more importantly about the balance of power between 
the Bank’s management and the Board of Directors who would represent 
the shareholders. The plans met with a hostile reception.
Attali turned up an hour late for this first meeting in London, keep-
ing delegates waiting at the Queen Elizabeth II Centre next to Parliament 
Square. A lengthy speech focusing on how he intended to run the organisa-
tion raised the spectre of a presidential administration that would leave lit-
tle scope for the Board to exert any influence. 
A certain unease about how the EBRD was developing was reflected in a 
number of media reports at the time. 
A report in The Economist magazine (28 July 1990) said:
…it is more than just the Attali style that bothered some of the people at 
the London meeting. They worry about what they see as his grab for pow-
er: too much of it for himself as president, too little for the board of di-
rectors. True, the bank’s constitution ensures that any loans have to be 
approved by the board. But within such constraints, say the worriers, Mr 
Attali seems to want to make the bank as ‘presidential’ as possible; they see 
a risk of creating a monster that will be hard to control.
The US delegation was also irked that no precedence seemed to have 
been accorded to the American second-in-command.
On 30 July, a Reuters report21 quoted US officials as saying Attali was be-
ing urged to revise his proposals to centralise power within the Presidency 
and set up an extensive branch network. Unless those changes were made, 
they said the Bush administration could have trouble winning congressional 
approval for US participation in the US$ 13 billion bank.
There remained discernible differences in expectations over how the Bank 
should be run. Most members had assumed that the EBRD would follow the 
21 ‘U.S. seeks changes in East European Bank’, Reuters News, 30 July 1990.
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standard regional development model. In this set-up, a group of Vice Presi-
dents from a range of (mostly major) countries would effectively run the key 
parts of the organisation—operations, policies and finance—and would re-
port to the Board of Directors via the President. All policies, projects and ma-
jor decisions would be discussed and signed off by the Board. When Attali’s 
remarks suggested a different set-up, some shareholders saw in it a rejection 
of the established approach and a ploy to grab power by centralising control. 
Three main areas of contention arose in the ensuing discussions: the use 
and extent of presidential powers; the proposed creation of resident offices; 
and the extent to which a resident Board was needed during the first phase 
and subsequently.
On the first issue, several shareholders felt the draft proposals22 placed 
too much power in the hands of the President.23
A proposal to open branches of the EBRD in each borrowing country also 
proved controversial. Some delegates were wary of the potential cost of the ini-
tiative, given that seconding headquarters staff typically required generous al-
lowances on top of already high salaries. There were also concerns that local of-
fices would be able to agree financing with less oversight. The critics wanted 
to see a concrete, costed business plan before agreeing to the proposal.24
On the question of the resident board, US officials especially rejected any 
suggestion that it was not needed or that its creation could be put off for two 
years until the EBRD was properly up and running. 
After turning up late for his own conference, Attali left shortly after 
the lunch break, a move not necessarily designed to bring the sharehold-
ers around to his way of thinking. Many delegates were less than happy. 
Nonetheless, in his absence during the rest of the meeting some progress 
was made, helped by effective management by a team led by Anne Le Lori-
er, the high-ranking official from the French Trésor, which formed the sec-
retariat to the conference. This included a redressing of the balance in favour 
of the Board Directors. 
22 In particular, there had been concerns over Section 8(b) of the By-Laws where an early draft had proposed: 
“The President shall have full authority to take all steps as may in his or her opinion be necessary or expe-
dient for the efficient conduct of the business of the Bank.” This subsequently became: “The President shall 
conduct, under the direction of the Board of Directors, the current business of the Bank. The Board of Di-
rectors shall establish conditions … pursuant to which the President may submit various types of matters to 
it for consideration under an expedited procedure.” By-Laws of the EBRD, Section 8(b).
23 Institutional Investor, September 1990.
24 Financial Times, 30 July, 1990.
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8. Between Conferences: Gearing Up
The summer break allowed time to reassess the situation ahead of the next 
conference, which had been scheduled for October, and to renew efforts to 
put in place the building blocks for the EBRD to function effectively. Fol-
lowing a call to the EBRD’s members for recommendations on potential 
recruits, the Bank’s staff grew with progress made in the appointment of 
bankers and experts. Officials from Ireland and the UK provided person-
nel and administration support, while Guy de Selliers,25 a Belgian banker 
from Lehman Brothers with earlier World Bank experience in metals and 
mining, led the banking side. He was soon joined by Thierry Baudon,26 an 
infrastructure specialist from the World Bank, among others. Legal advice 
was provided by Dick Goodman, a senior counsel at the US Treasury, and 
externally by Adrian Montague27 from Linklaters & Paines. The bankers 
were initially based in Paris while the London staff focused primarily on 
administrative aspects, including recruitment. They were helped by the ac-
celerating availability of commercial bankers in the City as the UK econ-
omy entered recession. In August, the transitional team transferred fully 
to premises at 6 Broadgate. By the end of October, the team had grown to 
around 45 from less than 20 in July.
Two more Vice Presidents were lined up. Anders Ljungh, a Swedish 
banker at Svenska Handelsbanken, was put in charge of Finance. A little 
later the services of Miklos Nemeth, the former Hungarian prime minis-
ter who had played a pivotal role in the previous year’s momentous events, 
were secured. Nemeth took charge of Administration, but the appoint-
ment was more significant than the title suggested. Not only did he rep-
resent a recipient country, becoming one of the first senior officials from 
the former Communist Bloc to hold a senior position in an IFI, but he 
also subsequently played an important role in opening doors for the EBRD 
in its countries of operations. Bart le Blanc, a Dutch former civil servant 
who had moved to the private sector as deputy chairman of F. van Lan-
25 Guy de Selliers de Moranville became a board member of Robert Fleming & Co, director of Ivanhoe Mines 
and president of corporate advisory firm HCF International Advisers.
26 Baudon became founder and chairman of Mid Europa, a private equity company specialising in central and 
eastern Europe.
27 Sir Adrian Montague became chief executive of the PFI Taskforce, chairman of British Energy and chair-
man of Aviva.
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schot Bankiers, also joined. He would later become the Bank’s first Sec-
retary General. It was not until December that the Bank’s first General 
Counsel, Andre Newburg, a New York attorney at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen 
and Hamilton joined the Bank. Newburg, a German émigré from Berlin 
who had arrived in the US in 1939, was fluent in Russian, German, Dutch, 
French and English.
During this period thoughts turned to the image of the EBRD. A com-
petition was launched to design a logo for the new organisation. Designers 
from the Bank’s member states were invited to submit ideas on how best 
to visually depict the new institution. The judging panel included the Irish 
President Mary Robinson, CSFR President Havel, and Karl Otto Pöhl, 
President of the Bundesbank. The competition was won by a New Zealand 
designer, Bret de Their, whose symbol of two interlocking white flamingo-
like shapes28 against a blue background, one reflected by the other, symbol-
ises the EBRD’s role in bringing together West and East. 
The search for a permanent headquarters building also got underway, 
with property consultants Frank Knight and Rutley winning a competitive 
tender to conduct the process and handle negotiations. The UK authorities 
wanted the EBRD to locate in Canary Wharf, a rundown former docklands 
area that had been redeveloped, but which had sunk into the doldrums with 
the downturn in activity in the financial sector. Attali had very different 
ideas. His first preference was Grand Buildings in Trafalgar Square, close to 
Parliament and the West End, but the deal fell through. 
A number of other sites, including Billingsgate and the Midland Bank 
premises in Poultry, were considered before the final choice of One Ex-
change Square, where the Bank remains today.29 
With the lease on 6 Broadgate due to run out towards the end of the year, 
another temporary location was sought. The EBRD moved to 122 Leaden-
hall Street in February 1991, sharing a building leased from stockbrokers 
Phillips and Drew (later part of UBS). It was here that the first Board meet-
ings took place.
28 In some versions, thin metallic scythe-like shapes would be an alternative description.
29 In May 2019, the EBRD announced plans to relocate to Canary Wharf in 2022.
After the Berlin Wall
62
9. Developing a Business Plan and Operational Policies
As the team settled into the London offices, significant progress was made be-
hind the scenes on more technical matters. In September, however, Attali again 
ruffled feathers at the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington. 
There was a long-standing convention that observers other than the Eu-
ropean Commission were not admitted to IMF ministerial meetings. How-
ever, in what appears to have been a breach of protocol, Attali used his at-
tendance as a member of the French delegation to present the outlines of 
the EBRD to a broad international audience and to promote the new insti-
tution he would ultimately lead. To make things worse he made continu-
al reference to the “Bank of Europe” and “European Bank” rather than the 
EBRD.30 This particularly annoyed the Germans, especially Bundesbank 
President Pöhl, who was concerned it would cause confusion with the soon-
to-be-created ECB.
In an article from Washington entitled “Controversy over ‘Bank of Eu-
rope’ name”, British newspaper The Independent wrote: 
Welcoming Jacques Attali, the new bank’s president, to the British Em-
bassy party, the UK Chancellor [of the Exchequer John Major] referred 
to the institution as “the European Bank”. Perhaps he was merely shorten-
ing a cumbersome name, but it may be remembered that Theo Waigel, the 
German finance minister, and Karl Otto Pöhl, the Bundesbank president, 
were highly critical of Mr Attali’s attempt to rename his bank. They fear it 
would come to be confused with Eurofed—the European central bank—
which the Germans want located in Frankfurt. Whatever the Chancellor’s 
motives, Mr Attali won’t mind. He has instructed all his staff to answer 
their phones saying: “Bank of Europe”.31
Despite these hiccups, the team at the EBRD pressed ahead with deci-
sions on several substantive issues. Stern, as a First Vice President in-waiting, 
became increasingly engaged in discussions, feeding in ideas from Wash-
ington and helping to steer positions on a wide range of operational areas. 
With his input, papers were drawn up for the October conference covering, 
30 Internal EBRD document, ‘Annual Meeting News’, September 1990.
31 The Independent, 1 October, 1990.
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among other things, a business plan and possible EBRD activities, financial 
projections, initial policy guidelines for treasury activities and operations, 
and documents on compensation, benefits and information systems. Work 
was also undertaken on negotiations for a Headquarters Agreement, cover-
ing areas including tax and residency status for Directors and staff.
The proposed business plan32 was ambitious. It began by noting the 
EBRD’s aim of playing a leading role in the region to establish market-ori-
ented economies and their integration into the international community. 
This was to be achieved by promoting a competitive private sector, especial-
ly through small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and privatisations, 
as well as by facilitating a sound business climate, strengthened institutions 
and effective financial regulation. 
In order to achieve this, the Bank would use “all the tools of modern fi-
nance”, including equity and hybrid instruments as well as loans. It would 
also seek to develop a “unique niche” in its products and approach, and avoid 
duplication of efforts with other market players. Above all, an acknowl-
edged need to be responsive to changes in the marketplace fitted well with 
the hope for the EBRD to become “a small, flexible, agile institution”.
The business plan noted the challenges ahead, particularly the severe 
contraction likely to arise in former communist countries from stabilisa-
tion efforts and the closure of inefficient enterprises, the limited absorption 
capacity of corporates in the face of weak legal and accounting systems and 
inadequate financial intermediaries, the dearth of equity finance, non-ex-
istent capital markets and heavy external indebtedness. The tiny size of the 
private sector in central and eastern Europe—it was estimated that only 5 
per cent of industrial value added in Poland was produced in the private sec-
tor, accounting for 2.5 per cent of the workforce—also drew attention to the 
time it would take to build up Bank business, especially given the require-
ment that at least 60 per cent of activity should be in the private sector. The 
paper’s authors warned: “Progress is likely to be slow and jerky.”
On the other hand, they noted the Bank’s “comparative advantage rel-
ative to other multilateral institutions [and] private sector lenders and in-
vestors”. It could respond quickly to market demand with tailored financial 
instruments to support growth. There were technical skills and entrepre-
32 Progress Report on Developing the Business Plan, staff paper for the Second Post-Signature Conference, 3 
September 1990. 
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neurial potential in the region to draw on and, in the right environment, 
plenty of investment opportunities. Unlike the World Bank or IFC, the 
EBRD was well-positioned to act as both adviser and investor. It possessed 
sector expertise and would soon have strong and reliable country knowl-
edge. As compared with private-sector investors, the Bank could take a lon-
ger-term perspective and, with its strong capital base and backing from the 
most advanced economies in the world, it could take on greater risk. Its pre-
ferred-creditor status and close links to relevant authorities were expected to 
increase investors’ confidence in working alongside the Bank.33 
The economic soundness of investments, and profit in the corporate sec-
tor in particular, was cited as a primary criterion for operations. The princi-
ple of sound banking, voiced for the first time here in the operational con-
text, has remained one of the three key principles of the EBRD to this day. 
In terms of activities that the Bank was expected to undertake, infrastruc-
ture development, environmental rehabilitation, joint ventures, privatisa-
tion, venture capital and capital markets development were highlighted. 
Separately from investing in equity on its own account, the EBRD could 
also play a role as an advisor to private investors during privatisations of 
state-owned enterprises. 
The institutional culture was regarded as an important factor in setting 
the tone for the EBRD. Management wanted the Bank not only to be sensi-
tive to the broader, political nature of its mission but also to adopt a client-
driven, flexible and responsive approach. A leading idea was to help bring 
foreign capital and expertise into the region by leveraging the Bank’s unique 
characteristics and to combine this with a strong local presence based in re-
gional offices. To do this effectively, the EBRD would be required to speak 
the same “banking language” as its partners, placing an emphasis on sector 
knowledge and expertise in the use of financial instruments and financial 
engineering. 
Although a formal risk department had not yet been suggested, the 
high risks associated with the region were clear, necessitating close risk as-
sessment of proposed investments. The legacy of state-run systems meant 
that most enterprises in central and eastern Europe were in poor financial 
33 Preferred-creditor status means that the Bank is excluded from sovereign debt reschedulings where the bor-
rower’s inability to service their debt is due to a general foreign exchange shortage in their country. These 
legal privileges are also extended to other banks participating in EBRD loans, incentivising local investors 
to co-finance projects.
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shape and needed substantial reorganisation before they could become via-
ble banking propositions. Legal systems underpinning private-sector activi-
ty were also weak and capital markets rudimentary or non-existent. 
The value of working with financial intermediaries, particularly to 
reach a wide range of smaller businesses quickly, was noted but there were 
some concerns. While acknowledging the efficiency of channelling funds 
through domestic financial intermediaries, significant dangers could be as-
sociated with lending to weak institutions in a distorted financial system. 
As well as seeking investment opportunities and working with coun-
tries to establish a suitable policy framework to foster the growth of the pri-
vate sector, the priorities identified included developing a well-functioning 
financial infrastructure, integrating central and eastern Europe and the So-
viet Union into the world economy, supporting interregional initiatives re-
lated to transportation, telecommunications and environmental clean-up 
projects, and transferring resources from the military to civilian sector. An 
important emphasis was placed especially on urban renewal and improving 
the level of services in order to have an immediate impact on people’s lives.
It was acknowledged that, in the first phase, reliance on co-financing 
opportunities with the World Bank and IFC would likely be necessary 
while an independent project pipeline was being built up, and that this 
might put pressure on meeting the private-public sector ratio within the re-
quired timeframe.
Overall, the Bank foresaw business volume of ECU 1½ –2¼ billion in its 
first two years of operations. Noting that this looked modest, especially in 
relation to the enormous needs of the region, the authors cited multiplier ef-
fects from co-financing and stimulatory impacts on local economies and 
supply chains. Using a multiplier of six, an estimated project value of ECU 
9–14 billion was obtained.
A further paper for the October conference set out the operational chal-
lenges and priorities in more detail. This depicted the practical realities fac-
ing the Bank in starting up operations and made clear to delegates the 
magnitude of the tasks ahead. Meanwhile, a paper on operational policies34 
elaborated the criteria for Bank financing. Within an overall framework of 
country strategies and prudent risk management, all types of projects were 
34 A more complete version of the Bank’s Operations Policies, based on discussions with members, was circu-
lated on 15 March, 1991 ahead of the first shadow Board meeting.
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contemplated and in any sector. However, financing was not to be provid-
ed where participation would crowd out other investors or lenders willing 
to provide financing on suitable terms and conditions and at the same stan-
dards of quality. This was the additionality principle, the second key tenet 
of EBRD operations. The third tenet, “transition impact”, was not adopt-
ed until much later. 
Local costs of projects were assumed to be met by clients and profit po-
tential was expected to be commensurate with the inherent risk. It was made 
clear that the EBRD would carry out a full economic and financial analysis 
of projects (including alternative designs and management or organisational 
needs), as well as assessments of their environmental impact. Procurement 
of goods and services financed by the Bank were to be on an arm’s-length 
basis and subject (in general) to competitive bidding, open to both mem-
bers and non-members of the Bank so as to achieve efficiency and value for 
money. The importance of monitoring projects was noted, as was their later 
evaluation, and loan agreements were expected to stipulate that borrowers 
should prepare an evaluation within a reasonable period. Projects designed 
to optimise balance sheets, support management reorganisations and seek 
board representation in equity cases were considered positively, as were recy-
cling of equity funds and selling participations in loans.
Encouragement was given to co-financing as a means of providing addi-
tional sources of finance for clients as well as reducing the EBRD’s exposure 
to obligors. Mobilisation of finance through the use of guarantees was also 
envisaged. In short, the paper provided prospective members with a compre-
hensive look at how the Bank intended to execute its operational activities 
once given the green light to do so.
In their preparations, the transitional team had drawn on long-estab-
lished arrangements in other international financial institutions, especial-
ly the World Bank, ADB and IFC. There had been good collaboration with 
other international institutions, especially the EIB, Commission and the 
Nordic Investment Bank (NIB). The more novel aspects in the EBRD’s ver-
sion of activities concerned the private-sector focus35 and the desire to oper-
ate as a fast and responsive client-oriented institution.
35 In this respect the EBRD was most like the IFC, something a number of shareholders had been keen to em-
ulate when discussing the origin of the Bank. The EBRD, however, had a regional focus rather than a glob-
al reach and a very specific mandate. 
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10. The Second Post-Signature Conference
The second Post-Signature Conference took place in late October 1990 at 
Lancaster House, an impressive venue close to St James’s Palace. The UK 
overseas development minister, Lynda Chalker, opened the proceedings. 
The main thrust of the EBRD’s approach papers, along with the texts of 
the four draft regulations—the By-Laws, rules of procedure for the Board of 
Governors and Board of Directors, and the staff regulations—were broad-
ly agreed by members. Some tension remained over the business plan. The 
USA was adamant that negotiations on potential projects should not take 
place until the Board had endorsed the operational approach. Many other 
members focused on the terms and conditions of service of Directors, their 
alternates and staff. 
Attali announced to the conference that he had offered Stern the posi-
tion of First Vice President in charge of Country Programmes. However, by 
the end of the year, Stern had turned the offer down. According to the Fi-
nancial Times: “No reasons were given for his decision not to accept Mr At-
tali’s job offer.”36 
No replacement had been found for Garofano, so the decision by Stern 
to turn down the other Vice President position meant the search for opera-
tional leadership became an urgent issue. Fortunately Mario Sarcinelli, the 
head of the Italian Tesoro, who had been involved in the original conference 
meetings, was willing to take on a vice presidency role. Sarcinelli’s back-
ground as a finance ministry official was best suited to the development side, 
so he was appointed Vice President of Country Programmes. This meant 
Attali would have to find an American to head Merchant Banking to meet 
the requirements for a US “number two”.
The leadership gap in Merchant Banking continued to be filled by de 
Selliers, who was making good progress in recruiting bankers to build up 
that department. Despite the involvement of executive search firms, the role 
of First Vice President was not filled until the appointment of Ron Freeman 
from Salomon Brothers in the summer of 1991.
36 ‘World Bank executive turns down EBRD’, Financial Times, 6 December, 1990.
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11.  Tying Things Up: The Final Post-Signature Conference  
 and Shadow Board Meetings
By the turn of the year the EBRD’s inauguration, now set for April, was 
looming and concluding the ratification process became a matter of urgen-
cy. Barely one-quarter of prospective members had completed the formal-
ities by the time of the final Post-Signature Conference held at Lancaster 
House between 28 and 30 January 1991, where a further call for action was 
made. Delegates considered the substantive agenda for the first Board of 
Directors meeting, to be held after the inaugural ceremony, which would 
cover the action programme, technical assistance, operational and finan-
cial policies, the Bank’s policies on human rights and the environment, its 
organisation, the Headquarters Agreement, and personnel issues such as 
housing allowances. 
At this conference, members ruled that the Board would decide the 
EBRD’s borrowing transactions in the start-up phase and emphasised the 
importance of evaluation, suggesting the establishment of an independent 
in-house capability to serve this function. Remaining details were conclud-
ed without much difficulty, although there was general pressure to hold 
back on negotiations with potential borrowers until the various policies, 
including individual country strategies, had been approved. The principal 
concern was over possible duplication of efforts with the World Bank—al-
though this mainly related to policy advice rather than project operations—
and private investors. There was a residual desire on the part of members to 
ensure a strong role for the Board of Directors and cost-efficiency in the es-
tablishment of field offices. Here management had provided a more detailed 
explanation of what was intended and offered reassurance that each case 
would be presented to the Board on its merits.
A report by McKinsey on the organisational structure, commissioned by 
the EBRD following the previous conference, was also presented. This sim-
plified and clarified the earlier structure, particularly with regard to the two 
operational vice presidencies. The renamed Merchant Banking Vice Pres-
idency was geared towards dealing with the bulk of operations, while the 
focus of the Country Programmes—now called Development Banking—
Vice Presidency was to be country strategies, reform and the enhancement 
of public infrastructure and operations support, including the administra-
tion of technical assistance.
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The number of internal committees was reduced to two: the Executive 
Committee, comprising the heads of departments, which would manage 
the EBRD as a whole; and an Operations Committee (OpsCom) responsi-
ble for country strategy execution and project management. 
A shadow Board of Directors meeting was held on 25–26 March 1991 to 
sign off on the 14 Resolutions to be put to Governors at the Inaugural Meet-
ing, as well as on the final drafts of the rules of procedure of the Board of Di-
rectors and staff regulations. The group was informed that more than two-
thirds of members would have ratified the Agreement by the end of March. 
In addition, three members—the Republic of Korea, Malta and Romania—
wanted to increase their shares, and Brazil, India and Venezuela had applied 
to become members of the Bank. (India in fact only joined the EBRD as a 
non-recipient member many years later—in 2018. Brazil and Venezuela nev-
er joined the Bank.)
Albania also expressed interest in membership and its representatives 
were invited to attend the Inaugural Meeting as guests of the Bank. Final-
ly, it was announced that External Affairs would no longer be a separate vice 
presidency, but Evaluation would become a vice presidency.37 
12.  The Bank’s Inauguration
The EBRD’s inauguration was set for 15 April 1991, marking the successful 
launch of this brand new institution after months of sometimes painstaking 
preparation and the challenge of forging a common goal for more than 40 
shareholders with sometimes very diverse views. 
Crucially, it had brought the countries of eastern Europe into the inter-
national community, not only by reaching out to them with financial sup-
port but also by making them shareholders in the Bank that had been creat-
ed to serve their interests. 
It was all the more important now that the EBRD was moving towards 
its operational phase. West and East Germany had reunited, but the So-
viet Union was on the brink of disintegration. An institution designed to 
bring former communist countries and western democracies together was 
37 Dr Manfred Abelein, the chosen candidate for External Affairs, became Vice President in charge of Evalu-
ation while External Affairs was effectively absorbed into the President’s Office.
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urgently needed. Finance and expertise was required to help drive through 
the economic reforms in eastern European countries that would underpin 
their path towards democracy.
The political and international importance of the endeavour was reflect-
ed in the high-level turnout for the 15 April inauguration. At the opening 
ceremony at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO),38 UK Prime 
Minister John Major stood on the podium alongside Mitterrand and At-
tali, in front of more than two dozen heads of state and finance ministers. 
Also present were a large number of City grandees, international financiers 
including Salomon Brothers chief executive John Gutfreund, industrial-
ists such as Gianni Agnelli of Fiat, several heads of IFIs—in particular the 
IMF’s managing director Michel Camdessus—and top economists, includ-
ing Phelps, Arrow and Janos Kornai. The ceremony concluded with a recital 
by Russian cellist Mstislav Rostropovich.
Major, opening the meeting, described the EBRD as “a unique institu-
tion … special because it symbolises a new beginning for the countries of 
Eastern Europe”. In his inaugural address, Mitterrand hailed it as “the first 
institution of the new Europe, the first concrete proof … of the solidarity 
that unites us”.39 
In keynote speeches over the next two days, Governors reiterated their 
belief in the values and purpose of the EBRD: to support a well-function-
ing private sector, promote enterprise and innovation, and encourage dem-
ocratic institutions in recipient countries. Wim Kok, deputy prime min-
ister of the Netherlands and Chair of the Board of Governors, said: “The 
EBRD is distinctive in its private-sector focus, its commitment to envi-
ronmental protection and its political orientation … and … eminently suit-
ed for its task” given that the “political transformation to achieve politi-
cal and democratic institutions … and the economic conversion towards a 
market-oriented system … are closely linked … and will have to take place 
simultaneously.” 
Among prominent statements by other Governors, Nicholas Brady, the 
US Treasury Secretary, emphasised the role of the private sector. “We be-
lieve strongly that the EBRD focus should be private sector development 
38 This venue was chosen as it was the only UN-connected presence in London.
39 Governors speeches quoted here were published in Summary Proceedings of the Inaugural Meeting of the 
Board of Governors, EBRD, 1991.
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and financing of infrastructure which directly supports private sector 
activity.”40 
His German and Italian counterparts, while agreeing with the impor-
tance of the private sector, also pointed to the political dimension of the 
new bank. “Not only must funds be raised … but conditions must be created 
[for] the productive forces in the recipient countries themselves [to] devel-
op. This is not a technocratic but a deeply political task,” said Waigel. Guido 
Carli observed: “The Bank certainly has an important political role as a fo-
rum for East-West cooperation.” 
Havel summarised views from recipient countries: “We are glad to see 
that [the advanced countries of the world] understand how important it is 
for the political stability of the whole European continent to help our coun-
tries in their reforms in every possible way. The founding of the EBRD is 
proof of that understanding.”
The following day, Attali was formally elected as first President of the 
EBRD, along with the Board of Directors. The Bank was now authorised 
and ready to begin operations.
The newly-elected Board of 23 Directors and 18 Alternates—who are 
empowered to act on a Director’s behalf in their absence—began their 
tasks promptly on 18 April, starting with the appointment of Vice Presi-
dents and the ratification of various administrative rules and procedures 
that had been discussed over the previous months. As well as an initial dis-
cussion of operational challenges, priorities and guidelines, the meeting set 
a budget for the Bank for the rest of the year of ECU 56.7 million and 
approved a paper on its financial policies. There was a general consensus 
that the operational papers were working documents to be improved as the 
EBRD’s understanding of its countries of operations developed. It was also 
agreed to submit the relevant papers to rating agencies, since a triple-A rat-
ing would be essential to any future borrowing programme; and, in the 
case of the operational challenges and priorities paper, for it to be sent to 
the Economic Advisory Council. 
One other significant move at the first Board meeting was the approv-
al of a paper describing the EBRD’s policy on environmental management. 
40 Brady also made clear his view of the role of the Board: “The Directors, as personal representatives of the 
Governors must play a key role … [in] guiding policy and approving operations. … We do not view the ac-
tivity of the Board as an advisory one, but instead a critical element of the Bank’s operations.” 
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This confirmed the Bank’s intention to adopt sound environmental prac-
tices in all its activities. Its prominence reflected growing international con-
cerns over environmental issues, and in particular the amendment to Arti-
cle 130 of the Treaty of Rome under the Single European Act of 1987, which 
added a section on the environment.
Conclusion
 
In just under 18 months, the EBRD had gone from an idea tentatively put 
forward by Mitterrand to its first resident Board of Directors meeting. For 
a multilateral investment bank serving the interests of shareholders from 39 
countries41 and two European institutions this was unprecedented.
Also ground-breaking was the inclusion of the countries of central and 
eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in an IFI as equal members, in terms 
of voice and debate (and in certain votes). More generally, the Bank’s pro-
spective shareholders provided a robust check on the proposals of manage-
ment, as well as on budget and financial projections. The official commu-
nity helped to improve policy ideas and the drafting of relevant legal texts.
 Given the differences between the public and private sector-oriented ap-
proaches, what is notable is that an accommodation of different interests 
was reached by all parties by the time of the inauguration and that the re-
sulting structure has broadly held for nearly 30 years. Achieving this was at 
times a difficult, even painful, process. But because the different parties had 
to find a way to realise a goal that all agreed was significant and appropriate 
within a tight timeframe—where, as each day passed, the consequences of 
failure to find ways to support central and eastern European countries in the 
face of their collapsing systems became clearer—a compromise was reached. 
Now operational with a full Board of resident Directors in situ and a 
growing staff, the EBRD was ready to find companies to support, make in-
vestments in central and eastern Europe and deliver on its mandate.
41 The number of shareholding countries was reduced by one after the Bank’s inauguration with the dissolu-
tion of the GDR following the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990. For more details on the evo-
lution of EBRD’s shareholding membership, from 1991 to the present day, see the Appendix.
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Difficult Early Years 
Introduction
When the EBRD began operations in April 1991, it had 41 shareholders, 
seven countries of operations and the capacity to lend up to ECU 7 billion 
annually. At the same time, it had very few staff to do the lending and its re-
gion of operations was in a downward spiral of economic crisis. Three de-
cades later, the number of shareholders has increased to more than 70 and 
the Bank operates in 38 markets. It has a portfolio of €44 billion, has sup-
ported hundreds of thousands of businesses and hundreds of municipalities, 
brought in foreign direct investment (FDI) from all corners of the world 
and invested more than €145 billion into the economies of its regions. To-
day, as a result of capital increases and reserve accumulation, the Bank’s ca-
pacity to lend is up to €12 billion a year. 
Turning a good idea into a thriving business takes time, a strong team, 
continuous support from sponsors, and a good dose of luck. In its challeng-
ing first few years of operations, the EBRD needed all of the above. Indeed, 
without strong shareholder commitment, a significant internal reorganisa-
tion and a fortuitous recovery in investment conditions, the EBRD could 
have withered before it had really got going. This chapter looks at the chal-
lenges, both internal and external, that the Bank had to overcome to find 
its feet.
The EBRD quickly established itself as an institution capable of develop-
ing robust policies and handling rapid change. Most policy questions con-
cerning operations and financial requirements were resolved within six to 
nine months from the inception of the Bank, although these would be re-
fined over time in the light of experience. Following the dissolution of the 
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Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the number of countries of operations ex-
panded from seven to 22 within the space of a year. 
By the end of 1993, this number had risen to 25, as parts of the former 
Yugoslavia came on board and Czechoslovakia split into the Czech and Slo-
vak Republics. By then there were 12 EBRD regional offices, while staff 
numbers had increased to close to 700. Membership of the Bank had also in-
creased from 40 to 59 countries (along with the two European institutions).1 
The EBRD had also established itself at the forefront of intellectual de-
bate on the transition from planned to market-based economies. It had done 
valuable work on complex issues such as trade, payments systems and curren-
cy convertibility, and had taken the lead in helping countries of operations 
improve their legal systems through a model law on secured transactions and 
advice on bankruptcy.2 The Bank also promoted strongly the cause of envi-
ronmental improvements and better management of energy and other natu-
ral resources, and had secured a prominent role in the field of nuclear safety.
In terms of business volume and profitability, the first years were chal-
lenging. By the end of 1992, 36 projects had been signed amounting to just 
under ECU 1 billion, although only ECU 0.1 billion had actually been dis-
bursed. The EBRD made a small net loss in both its first two years. For a 
start-up operation working in a new and unpredictable environment this 
was not altogether surprising. While this was accepted by those who under-
stood the situation, it gave ammunition to critics of the Bank’s internal ex-
penditure, particularly in relation to the fitting-out of its new headquarters.
Although relatively small, the EBRD had serious potential as a new IFI. 
It had a clear mandate: to help central and eastern Europe integrate with 
the western world and transition towards market-based economies. Its tar-
get countries were keenly looking for advice and financial help, its statutes 
were robust, it was located in a major financial centre, and its membership 
constituted a large part of the world economy. 
There were nonetheless three major challenges. Successful business devel-
opment needs skilled personnel, a predictable environment and conducive 
economic conditions. None of these was yet present. The EBRD had few 
1  As stated at the end of Chapter 2, membership numbered 40 countries when the AEB was signed in 1991, 
and then became 39 once the reunification of Germany had taken place. Membership then expanded to-
wards the end of 1991 and early 1992 with the inclusion of Albania and the three Baltic states. For more de-
tail on the evolution of EBRD’s membership from 1991 to the present day, see Appendix.
2  A dedicated legal transition team was created to extend this type of work in 1995. 
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staff and all were based in London. There were many uncertainties about the 
economic, political and institutional functioning of the countries the Bank 
was charged with operating in and even greater unknowns about the com-
panies it was expected to invest in and support. Finally, the macroeconomic 
situation in emerging Europe was deteriorating rapidly. 
At the start of operations, the EBRD had around 55 professional staff. 
Just over 20 were bankers, with the vast majority in the Development Bank-
ing department.3 Total staff numbers were projected to more than treble by 
the end of the year and more than double again in the following year, with 
the sharpest acceleration expected on the Merchant Banking side. Man-
aging such rapid growth, while at the same time developing a cohesive ap-
proach to the new business, was never going to be easy. 
1. The Business Challenges of Central and Eastern Europe
At the start of business, the EBRD had seven countries of operations, re-
duced from the original eight following the reunification of East and West 
Germany in 1990.4 These were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Central and eastern European countries were emerging from a long pe-
riod of state control. The absence of a market history and patterns of mar-
ket pricing meant commercial and other project risks could not be easily as-
sessed. A constantly changing and often opaque political scene added to the 
challenges. Lawyers regarded the legal basis for any transaction in the East 
as insecure. The EBRD’s economists were also all too aware of the potential 
impact of macroeconomic risks on any transaction, which were especially 
large in relation to currency convertibility and trade arrangements. 
The setting for the EBRD’s activities was discussed at the first meeting of 
the Board. Those present saw four broad challenges to the Bank’s business 
development: the “formidable array of complex problems in Central and 
Eastern European countries which need urgently to be tackled but which 
3  De Selliers and a couple of other merchant bankers comprised the Merchant Banking department in April 
1991.
4  The GDR was united with the Federal Republic on 3 October, 1990. Agreement was reached to transfer the 
GDR’s shares to unallocated shares and that the EBRD would not invest in former East Germany (leaving 
this primarily to Germany itself and the EIB). 
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will take many years to overcome fully”; the immense scale of the problems 
facing enterprises; significant difficulties arising from poor infrastructure; 
and a legacy of environmental degradation and misuse of energy.
The EBRD’s 1991 Annual Report described the year as “one of econom-
ic disappointment, or at least of hopes deferred”. This was perhaps some-
thing of an understatement, given that GDP in central and eastern Euro-
pean countries (including the Baltic states) fell in 1991 by an average of 10.7 
per cent.5
Exports to the West had exceeded expectations (although not univer-
sally). However, the timetables for new legislative programmes had slipped, 
and problems of property restitution were a particular challenge, with im-
portant implications for the timing of planned privatisations. Even when 
laws had been passed, for example on bankruptcy, this had not always led to 
implementation, partly reflecting understandable reluctance due to the po-
tential for serious social implications. 
Some progress had been made with smaller privatisations. The larger sales 
had been delayed because fewer businesses than expected were in fact profit-
able. Economic output and demand across the region had been affected by 
the introduction of stabilisation programmes. Output had fallen between 10 
and 20 per cent from its previous peaks, and in most cases further falls of 25 
per cent were expected before there was any recovery. Unemployment had 
started to rise towards levels typical of western Europe and showed no sign of 
stopping. An important factor contributing to the fall in output throughout 
the region in 1991 was the collapse in trade between the former Soviet Union 
and its erstwhile eastern European (Comecon) trading partners. 
Management defined the challenge as: “… [creating] a new economic 
framework, whilst also changing the political system, behaviour, and even 
the attitudes of the people involved, without creating intolerable social con-
ditions which would completely destroy their societies and endanger those 
nearby. There is no historical precedent for such restructuring.”6 
At the social and political level, there was a need for fundamental con-
stitutional changes to prepare for a democratic future, including the recog-
nition and exercise of basic civil and political rights and the protection of 
private property. At the economic level, the requirements included: price 
5  EBRD. Transition Report 1999.
6  “Operational Challenges and Priorities”; the Initial Action Programme, April 1991.
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liberalisation to clear the way for the elimination of shortages; currency con-
vertibility and liberalisation of trade and payments regimes to reallocate re-
sources and raise productivity and growth; stabilisation measures, notably 
tax reforms and the introduction of social safety nets, and steps to absorb 
excess liquidity and other measures to contain inflationary pressures; and a 
well-functioning banking and payments system which could mobilise sav-
ings and allocate investment funds efficiently. (In most of central and east-
ern Europe the financial sector lacked diversity and depth, notwithstanding 
the large number of banks in some countries, because under communism 
banks were mainly concerned with implementing and tabulating central-
ised decision-making rather than operating as genuine commercially orient-
ed financial intermediaries.)
On the business side, privatisation and restructuring were at the core of 
enterprise reform. Privatisation would mean direct accountability, forcing 
companies to tackle deep-rooted problems and look to the longer-term. Re-
structuring was often expected to be a precursor to privatisation, not least 
since investors would be wary of getting involved until enterprises were on a 
sounder financial footing.
The magnitude of the problem at the enterprise level was huge. Esti-
mates indicated there were 8,700 large state enterprises in Poland, 2,500 in 
the CSFR and 2,000 in Hungary. As in the West, the politics of privatisa-
tion was complicated. There was pressure to move quickly but also to avoid 
accusations of selling assets too cheaply, doing so without sufficient trans-
parency, or concentrating their allocation in a few or foreign hands. Han-
dling transactions was likely to be all the more difficult given the absence of 
the relevant skills and expertise to manage the process, as well as the poor 
management and financial skills of those running the enterprises.
These entities were in urgent need of modernisation and productivity im-
provements, implying a loss of jobs (and the associated political risks) in the 
short term. Many had accumulated significant debts, while workers’ councils 
with ownership-like rights often complicated the picture, as did restitution 
issues. The absence of proper accounts made valuation of assets difficult and 
comparisons with competitors were equally problematic. With input and 
output prices changing rapidly, forecasting future revenues and making pro-
jections for business plans was similarly a “shot in the dark”. A lack of under-
writing capacity, a shortage of domestic institutional investors and poor li-
quidity undermined the ability of capital markets to operate effectively.
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Restructuring allowed more time to deal with underlying problems but 
was no less daunting. Abolition of central planning meant management had 
to decentralise operational controls, organise debt and equity financing, un-
derstand effective balance-sheet management, and develop the notion of a cost 
of capital, in order to be able to judge the viability of investments. Other el-
ements to grapple with included dealing with overcapacity in several sectors, 
making redundancies and incentivising remaining staff. At the government 
level, the removal of subsidies and the introduction of hard budget constraints, 
social safety nets and tax changes were needed to promote investment.
SMEs lacked associations of private entrepreneurs to lobby on their be-
half and local banks were incapable of dealing with their needs. Entrepre-
neurship was not lacking, but few business owners had relevant expertise in 
areas such as finance, marketing or planning. 
Two further limitations on operations in central and eastern Europe 
were the lack of modern communications and the need for more energy-effi-
cient and environmentally sustainable economies. As the paper on challeng-
es and priorities put it: “Roads, trains or air services; telephone or television 
services; the distribution of goods and services and the modern means of cir-
culating money through bank transfers, credit cards or even cheques are ei-
ther gravely insufficient or completely lacking … Yet despite this, the region 
uses a comparatively large amount of energy … in a way that is neither effi-
cient or environmentally sound.”7
Central and eastern Europe needed considerable capital to rehabilitate, 
modernise and expand its infrastructure. Traditional approaches would be 
hampered, however, by “several countries of operations suffering from lim-
ited sovereign borrowing capacity and severe budgetary restraints”. This 
implied the need for “a massive input of technical assistance and advisory 
services [to help with] institutional strengthening, policy reforms and man-
agerial support … in addition to direct financing … [and] innovative ap-
proaches to foster public/private partnerships in infrastructure financing 
and management”. This would bring in “capital and managerial expertise 
from private operators on a long-term basis”.8
On the environment side, the degradation of natural resources in the re-
gion was of such alarming proportions that access to uncontaminated water, 
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid. 
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land and air could not be taken for granted. Pollution-related diseases, es-
pecially respiratory problems, and heavy-metal poisoning from food grown 
in contaminated areas impacted labour supply and economic growth. The 
EBRD’s position was clear: “Major environmental policy improvements and 
direct restorative investments are prerequisites for the successful transition 
to a market-oriented economy. The Bank will therefore place environmental 
issues at the forefront of its efforts to promote sustainable economic growth 
in the region.”
At the time, however, economic growth seemed a distant prospect. The 
countries of central and eastern Europe were seeing some of the worst eco-
nomic indicators since just after the Second World War. Output had fall-
en sharply, while unemployment and inflation had risen. Bulgaria and the 
Soviet Union had introduced rationing in response to severe shortages of 
food and essential goods. Rising international interest rates and oil price 
increases put pressure on the already considerable costs of external debt 
service, while hard currency current account deficits increased in a num-
ber of countries. And in much of the region the situation was about to de-
teriorate still further.
2. The Banking Teams’ Early Responses
The operational issues discussed with the Board were supplemented by a set 
of guidelines covering issues such as the types of eligible projects, the uses 
of Bank financing, criteria for lending and the project cycle, as well as pro-
cedures for the evaluation of projects and co-financing. In due course, the 
banking and legal departments refined the guidelines to produce an Oper-
Table 3.1  GDP Growth (% pa) in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–1992
GDP growth CEB CIS of which Russia
1989 0.1 0.6 0.0
1990 - 6.6 - 3.7 - 4.0
1991 - 10.7 - 6.0 - 5.0
1992 - 3.2 - 14.1 - 14.5
Source: Transition Report 2000, p. 65. 
CEB: Central Europe and the Baltics. CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States.
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ations Manual which became an indispensable resource for the OpsCom 
secretariat.
The EBRD’s remit permitted participation in more or less any sector that 
was of importance to a country’s economic development. Even projects that 
involved the conversion of military complexes to industrial uses were not 
ruled out. 
However, certain investments were prohibited, including defence-relat-
ed activities, the tobacco industry, standalone gambling facilities, and select-
ed alcoholic products (beer and wine were not included in the taboo list and 
support for Turkish breweries as they expanded especially into Central Asia 
was an early feature of the Bank’s work). The EBRD would also not invest 
in products banned either by individual countries or by international con-
vention, for example asbestos and other harmful substances.
It was clear that account needed to be taken of the activities of other or-
ganisations helping central and eastern Europe, most obviously in major in-
frastructure developments where the bulk of public funding was focused, 
and to avoid crowding out private finance. Given the scale of the needs in 
the region and the limited appetite of private investors, there was little risk 
that EBRD projects would deter or crowd out others. Co-financing with 
other entities was an option, for example with the World Bank or the ADB 
for infrastructure, or with foreign investors setting up new plants in the re-
gion (for example, in the automotive or agribusiness industries). 
An initial emphasis was put on activities that would support the infrastruc-
ture necessary for private-sector development (notably energy, telecommuni-
cations and transport), as well as privatisation, the restructuring of industrial 
enterprises and banks, the development of SMEs, the creation of new finan-
cial institutions, the promotion of FDI and environmental rehabilitation. Mu-
nicipal services were also identified as an area where the EBRD might take an 
active role since it attracted less support from other multilateral organisations 
and bilateral funding. Within this, urban development was seen a priority. 
Teams were formed within the two banking departments to cover the 
ground and the number of employees to support operations expanded quick-
ly. The pipeline began to grow more slowly. This reflected the newness of the 
organisation and the poor economic conditions in its countries of operations. 
Bankers, particularly those from the private sector used to a perfor-
mance-driven reward culture, were eager to make their mark by clinching 
deals. However, many were shocked at the situation they found when trav-
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elling to the region—not just the lack of viable enterprises but the difficul-
ties in getting around to see prospective clients beyond capital cities, the in-
adequate telecommunications systems and the rudimentary state of hotels. 
Health and safety arrangements on visits to companies in the region were 
also very limited, particularly outside the main cities.
The EBRD teams also quickly discovered that the absence of a func-
tioning private sector meant first and foremost dealing with the authori-
ties. However, they were not the only parties making such visits. A number 
of western investors were familiar with the more advanced countries in the 
region and many of the most promising opportunities had already been tar-
geted by others. 
In addition, having a development banking department and a parallel 
merchant banking one pursuing similar goals did not make for internal co-
hesion and presented a difficult management challenge, as well as confusion 
on the ground. 
What marked the EBRD out at that time though was the entrepreneur-
ial spirit that ran through the whole organisation and was part of its attrac-
tion. At this stage almost any project was in some way novel, so closing a deal 
was particularly satisfying, especially if it had a demonstration effect on the 
sector as many early transactions did. 
The crop of bankers who arrived on the EBRD’s doorstep at the begin-
ning was also strongly motivated by a desire to help the former communist 
countries in their struggle for freedom and a better way of life. One senior 
banker remembers: “We worked from eight in the morning until 10 or 11 at 
night to get things moving.” Many at the EBRD at the time recall the sense 
of being part of history in the making. 
Baudon was one of the first members of a working group established 
when ideas about the creation of a financial institution to support the sys-
temic transition in central and eastern Europe were first floated. Joining the 
EBRD after its creation, he brought years of experience at the World Bank 
to address a very specific challenge. “Our objective was to apply the skillset 
of a development institution to foster the growth and strengthening of the 
private sector.” It was a task that he and his colleagues took on with relish: 
“It was the only time in my professional life that I had a bed in my office.”9
9  Axel Reiserer, ‘1989 and the aftermath: the role of the EBRD’. EBRD Press Release, 8 November 2019. 
https://www.ebrd.com/news/2019/1989-and-the-aftermath-the-role-of-the-ebrd.html
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3. The Bank’s First Operations in Central Europe and the Soviet Union
The first project to reach the Board for approval arrived on 25 June, less than 
two months after the EBRD’s inauguration. This was a public-sector opera-
tion in Poland involving a US $50 million loan to Bank of Poznań (WBK), 
guaranteed by the Polish state, for a heat-supply restructuring and conser-
vation project. The EBRD funds were to be used by WBK for on-lending to 
several heating enterprises and other enterprises with privatisation potential 
involved in the production and sale of heat and steam.
Although there was as yet no country strategy for Poland, which was 
seen as a prerequisite for framing the EBRD’s activities in a country, the 
Board was prepared to make an exception given the early stage of operations.
This project aimed to support a comprehensive restructuring of the dis-
trict-heating sector, extending the life of existing assets and encouraging 
energy conservation and reduced pollution. The credit line was to be co-fi-
nanced by the World Bank, which was expected to implement five separate 
loans amounting to US$ 165 million to district-heating enterprises (DHEs) 
in major Polish cities, along with a US$ 75 million fast-disbursing balance-
of-payments loan to cover increased energy costs. 
The environmental benefits were clear but private-sector involvement in 
this sector was largely missing at the time, and the Board questioned the 
Bank’s additionality. No doubt anticipating such criticism, the team pro-
posed an innovative route for private investment by making room in the fi-
nancing for an investment in a waste-to-energy incinerator in Gdynia and 
by suggesting a build-operate-transfer (BOT) model. 
The credit line was slow to disburse mainly because the enterprises con-
cerned were in very poor financial condition and undergoing restructuring 
and ownership changes which prevented them from borrowing. Conditions 
imposed on sub-project selection, such as the development of masterplans, 
cost-benefit analyses, procurement requirements, also proved onerous, giv-
en the clients’ lack of experience in dealing with rigorous project appraisals. 
The legal system also gave insufficient security for lenders. As a result of the 
slow utilisation of the funds most of the line was cancelled in 1996. 
Nevertheless, in its implementation report, the World Bank noted: 
“WBK indicated that their association with the EBRD and IBRD under 
this project provided their staff with an understanding of the modus ope-
randi of the two institutions …WBK trained a team in project appraisal and 
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evaluation, and actively marketed the line of credit to DHEs. Project pro-
posals were received from about twelve DHEs and about US $19 million of 
the EBRD funds were committed … This training was later utilised in im-
plementing projects in association with EBRD including, inter alia, the pri-
vatisation of their own bank, financing small and medium enterprises, and 
financing of the dairy industry.”10 
While the EBRD component of the project had not developed as well as 
had been hoped, working alongside the World Bank offered important in-
sights on the policy dimensions of engaging with the municipal sector and 
instilled a better understanding of lending to the sub-sovereign sector.
The loan would mark the start of a relationship between WBK and the 
EBRD that lasts to this day, and included the merger with Bank Zachodni 
and then the integration of the bank into Banco Santander. Under the name 
Santander Bank Polska, it is the second-largest bank in Poland.11
Paweł Kołodziński, one-time Head of EBRD’s Corporate Development, 
remembers: “The 1990s were the breakthrough period for the Polish finan-
cial sector. At that time, the development of modern and mass banking was 
getting into full swing. It was 25 years ago that we issued our first payment 
card. The 1990s were times of great opportunities and great challenges. Af-
ter the years of shortages inherited from the communist era, the demand on 
the Polish market was immense, and so was the potential for the develop-
ment of new services and products.”
The EBRD had relied heavily on the World Bank for its first operation 
but its second project involved private-sector players. A loan of DM 10 mil-
lion to Petőfi Nyomda Rt., a recently privatised Hungarian packaging com-
pany, was proposed to the Board at the end of September. A Hungarian 
holding company majority-owned by Italy’s De Benedetti Group owned 50 
per cent of the firm, with 36 per cent held by three private Hungarian funds. 
The finance was part of an investment programme to improve quality and 
expand capacity in its fast-growing and competitive business. The company 
had made good progress post-privatisation (for example, by bringing in west-
ern-educated management) in a declining domestic market and was ready to 
build links to new western European clients by improving its product range 
and quality and exploiting lower labour costs relative to its western competi-
10 World Bank, ‘WBK Implementation Report’, 2000, pp. 6–7, 18
11 As of March 2020.
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tors. With western multinationals increasing their investments in Hungary, 
the company was well-placed to capitalise on their packaging needs.
The two further investments approved at the Board in September also 
involved the private sector. One was a US$ 10 million equity investment 
in the Czechoslovakia Investment Corporation (CIC), a closed-end off-
shore investment fund to be listed on the London Stock Exchange which 
was being organised by British merchant bank Robert Fleming & Co. The 
Prague-based fund was set to invest in SMEs in the CSFR, helped by Flem-
ing’s strong relationship with Investiční Banka, the country’s third-larg-
est commercial bank. From the EBRD’s point of view, this offered an effi-
cient way to meet its mandate of supporting SMEs while managing risks 
(through working with quality investment managers) and earning an ac-
ceptable return.
The other project also focused on SMEs and joint ventures. This was a 
US$ 100 million Central Europe Agency Line with NMB, part of leading 
Dutch bank ING, which had recently moved into Poland and was open-
ing branches and subsidiaries elsewhere in the region. The EBRD would be 
the lender of record and supply up to US$ 40 million, while NMB (and af-
filiates) would provide at least US$ 60 million. The project was facilitat-
ed by a Dutch central bank ruling that NMB participations would count 
as loans to a multilateral financial institution, thereby obviating the need 
for special provisions that were otherwise required for lending in central 
and eastern Europe.12 The NMB was to act as the EBRD’s local agent in 
loan screening, structuring, appraisal, execution and supervision, as well as 
conducting environmental audits. Loans would be jointly approved by the 
Bank and NMB.13
Within the first few months, the EBRD had set out its stall: a public-
sector project focused on the municipal sector; a loan to a newly privatised 
manufacturing company; teaming up with a private equity fund to buy 
stakes in SMEs; and on-lending through a commercial bank to the small-
business segment. A common aspect of all four projects was the attention to 
environmental issues, clearly articulated in each Board document. For ex-
ample, in the case of the equity fund, agreement on environment guidelines 
12 A similar structure was signed with IFC in December 1989 covering countries in south-east Asia and Lat-
in America. Poland was added subsequently.
13 The Board welcomed the collaboration with an institution with a strong local presence. It was also interest-
ed in approving each loan but the decision was deferred to a later discussion on lending policy in general. 
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to be applied to its investments had been negotiated as a condition of dis-
bursement of the EBRD’s funds. Similar care was taken towards procure-
ment arrangements. Moreover, the Board in its deliberations paid attention 
to the question of additionality.14 
The EBRD’s first projects in the USSR were approved in late November. 
Ironically, given earlier US misgivings about lending to the Soviet Union, 
both projects involved US sponsors. One was to finance the installation 
and operation of an enhanced international digital telecommunications 
system in the Moscow area by a joint venture between the Soviet govern-
ment and Sovinet, a partnership between two US corporations.15 It would 
mean a major advance in communications in Moscow’s hotels and business 
centres, increasing the capacity of the system to allow up to 240 simultane-
ous conversations. 
The other Soviet project was meant to be a first foray into the Russian 
oil and gas sector. The EBRD proposed to finance Parker Siberia, a whol-
ly-owned subsidiary of Parker Drilling Company, to construct and oper-
ate three rigs under contract for a joint venture, White Nights. The latter 
was formed by Varyeganneftegaz, an independent enterprise established by 
the oil and gas ministry, which owned 50 per cent; Phibro Energy Inc, a 
leader in energy-related commodity trading; and Anglo-Suisse, a Houston-
based oil and gas exploration company. The aim was to supply technologi-
cally up-to-date drilling rigs and training expertise, in order to increase oil 
production in western Siberia from 25,000 barrels per day to 150,000 bar-
rels per day. The project also introduced to the Soviet Union the concept 
of a modern contract drilling industry, which (through the leasing arrange-
ments) would free additional capital for the sponsor to make additional in-
vestments in future drilling projects in the country. 
The impact was potentially significant in view of the very poor state 
of the Soviet oil and gas sector. Oil provided more than 60 per cent of the 
USSR’s hard-currency earnings, yet the industry was being run on equip-
ment similar to that used in the West in the early 1960s. Due to techni-
cal failures, almost half of Soviet-made rigs were not operational during the 
winter months. Moreover, due to a breakdown in ties between some ex-So-
viet Republics and Russia, the supplies of oil-field equipment had been in-
14 Minutes on Petőfi and CIC record references to Article 13 (vii), for example.
15 An EBRD Evaluation Department study in February 1996 classified the operation as “Successful”. 
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terrupted. Oil production in the USSR had fallen from 12.5 million barrels 
a day in 1988 to around 10.5 million in 1991. 
As often happened, however, even with the most promising projects, the 
Parker Siberia transaction was interrupted by an unexpected event which 
impacted the economics of the project when the Russian government im-
posed an ECU 26 per tonne tax on the export of oil. The deal was cancelled 
less than six months later when the sponsors withdrew from the operation.
In terms of types and experiences, these first projects featured many times 
over in the EBRD’s future operations. Although not all turned out to be 
successful, the selection was a promising start. They had come out of inten-
sive discussions with market participants by bankers. In presenting the proj-
ects to the Board, there was limited clarity on financial remuneration (and 
even less on risks) and nothing at all on economic returns or, as required lat-
er, their “transition impact”. Additionality, however, featured strongly in the 
Board’s early deliberations. The overall approach towards the project work 
began to be driven during this period through a series of steering discussions 
between management and the Board around operational challenges and the 
development of operational guidelines, which subsequently became estab-
lished in the Bank’s Operations Manual.
4. Additional Operational Policy Issues
During its first year, the Board was preoccupied with formulating the 
EBRD’s policies on a number of fronts. As well as the types of projects and 
the instruments to execute them, these policies also covered the Bank’s ap-
proach to risk and environmental issues, and the interpretation of its polit-
ical mandate.
Risk
Risk affected both sides of the EBRD’s balance sheet: its ability to borrow 
and the limits on lending. Financial policies were agreed establishing the 
Bank’s policy on interest-rate and foreign-exchange risk, liquidity manage-
ment, eligible counterparties, financial reporting and accounting proce-
dures. By adopting a robust and conservative approach, the EBRD was able 
to obtain a triple-A credit rating from Standard and Poor’s in June 1991—
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the Bank’s first ever credit rating. This facilitated the placement of an inau-
gural ECU 500 million bond issue in October.16
A more detailed analysis was made of portfolio risk management and 
lending policies, which included exposure limits, terms of loans and equity 
investments, and guidelines on co-financing and the use of financial inter-
mediaries. This provoked some debate among Board Directors. Key issues 
were the extent of exposure the Bank could take in any one country or sec-
tor or to individual borrowers.
Questions were raised over the disclosure to the Board of pricing on in-
dividual loans (it was accepted that specific pricing should not be disclosed), 
and whether the EBRD policy of price differentiation among state-sector 
loans on the basis of a country risk margin should be exchanged for a uni-
form margin across countries, as used by the World Bank and the EIB. 
Although a seemingly small issue, this provoked considerable internal de-
bate between the two banking departments and at Board level. Some argued 
that poorer countries needed access to cheap finance and thus supranational 
borrowers such as the EBRD should pass on to them the benefits of being able 
to borrow at below-Libor rates. A counter argument was that it was unfair to 
cross-subsidise countries in the region through those which were less poor (such 
as the CSFR, Slovenia or Hungary) by adopting a uniform pricing approach. 
The private-sector differentiated approach prevailed at first, but eventu-
ally a fixed 1 per cent pricing margin was applied to sovereign loans on the 
basis that it would be difficult to obtain co-financing with the World Bank 
and other IFIs if a higher margin was applied. As the aim of the EBRD was 
primarily to finance the private sector, this was not a fundamental barrier, 
nor was it unduly disadvantageous from an income-generating perspective. 
Maintaining the principle of price differentiation according to risk, howev-
er, turned out to be important in relation to lending to sub-sovereign state 
entities such as municipalities.
Environment 
The EBRD was the first IFI to be given a clear operational mandate on en-
vironmental protection and restoration in its founding charter. This reflect-
16 The initial funding programme was set at ECU 800 million (later revised to ECU 900 billion) to the end 
of 1992. 
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ed the increased global awareness of the environmental costs of economic 
growth and the importance of the environmental integrity of international 
institutions. It was obvious that ecological degradation in central and east-
ern Europe had damaged the fabric of society. Its origins lay in the distorted 
and inappropriate economic policies of the communist regimes. A combina-
tion of market-based signals supplemented by structural reforms was seen as 
the way forward, with the EBRD able to spearhead this approach through 
investment and policy advice. 
The policy approach agreed by the Bank rested on four components. The 
first of these was the provision of technical assistance to help countries de-
velop effective legal, regulatory and economic instruments, including ade-
quate emissions and effluents standards, and the institutional capacity to 
monitor and enforce them. Important principles to be adopted included 
preventative action, the establishment of primary responsibility for environ-
mental damage (the “polluter-pays” principle), and the involvement of local 
authorities and the general public. 
Second, there was a desire to use the EBRD’s financing to develop an en-
vironmental goods and services industry in its countries of operations. This 
could involve pollution-control technologies, technical and managerial con-
sulting services, and environmental infrastructure with private-sector par-
ticipation. 
Third, special studies and programmes, including education and train-
ing, were seen as appropriate to address regional and national environmen-
tal challenges. This was partly prompted by the fact that many environmen-
tal problems in the region were transnational and affected western Europe 
as well as the former Communist Bloc. These included air pollution, acid 
rain, and pollution to the Danube River and Baltic Sea drainage basins.
The fourth, and operationally important, component was the adoption 
of thorough environmental assessment and monitoring procedures in the 
EBRD’s own activities. Here a strong screening, review and evaluation pro-
cess was advocated, based on a three-way categorisation of projects. Cate-
gory ‘A’ projects were defined as those with diverse and significant impacts, 
and required a full environmental assessment. Category ‘B’ projects, where 
remedial measures could be prescribed relatively easily, required more lim-
ited analysis, while Category ‘C’ applied to projects with insignificant im-
pacts where no assessment was needed (although opportunities to enhance 
environmental benefits were encouraged).
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It was also made clear that local participation was essential to the pro-
cess. The intention was to ensure project sponsors would provide adequate 
information to local communities, governments and NGOs on the environ-
mental impact of projects. In addition, it was agreed to publish an annual 
report on the Bank’s assessment of its environmental performance. Later, 
these assessments were supplemented by policies covering the disclosure of 
information to the public and a project-complaints mechanism.
Political mandate
A unique aspect of the EBRD was its political mandate, as set out in Arti-
cle 1 of the AEB, and the commitment to fundamental principles of mul-
tiparty democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and mar-
ket economics as described in the preamble to the Articles. The first three 
paragraphs of Article 8, which defined the key rules on the use of Bank re-
sources, made the link between finance and adherence to Article 1. Arti-
cle 11 also instructed the Board to conduct an annual review to ensure that 
the Bank’s strategy in each recipient country met the requirements in Ar-
ticles 1 and 2. How to implement these aspects of the AEB, however, re-
mained open to question.
The obvious way to ensure the critical link between economic and po-
litical objectives was to assess progress against these two dimensions in the 
country strategy process. One aspect that was clarified early on related to 
human rights, which were referenced in the Preamble to the AEB, but not 
in the Articles. The intention was to incorporate human rights into the 
EBRD’s mandate, defining them as those rights which were pertinent to 
multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics. Essentially this 
implied a focus on civil and political rights. Accordingly, the list of refer-
ence points for the political aspects of country assessments included free 
elections, representative government, duty to act in accordance with the 
constitution and law, availability of redress against decisions, separation of 
powers, independence of the judiciary, freedom of speech, association and 
peaceful assembly. 
Should a country of operations fall short of the required political commit-
ment, the EBRD’s policy allowed for a variety of responses. It was left to the 
President to decide when to bring the matter to the attention of the Board 
of Directors, who in turn could call a meeting of the Board of Governors to 
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consider their recommendations. These could range from fact-finding mis-
sions and warnings to the postponement of proposed operations in a coun-
try or, in the worst case, its suspension from access to Bank resources. A hi-
erarchical approach was agreed, with public-sector projects to be curtailed 
ahead of private-sector operations and state infrastructure projects before lo-
cal ones, while technical assistance would be continued for as long as possi-
ble. It was expected that any actions of this nature would also influence mem-
bers’ attitudes in other multilateral institutions in which they participated. 
Country strategy
It was clear that the appropriate frame of reference for the EBRD’s work 
should be the country strategy. Close engagement with the authorities was 
an important part of the process, and in the early days the leading mem-
bers of the relevant government were invited to attend the discussion of 
the Bank’s proposed strategy for their country. At that time most recipi-
ent country Governors did indeed do so. Another aspect of the process was 
what subsequently became known as Board Consultation Visits (BCVs). 
Prior to consideration of a strategy for a country of operations, a group of 
Board members would travel to the relevant country to meet representatives 
of the government, commercial banks and enterprises undergoing the pro-
cess of restructuring. This helped deepen understanding on all sides.
Beginning with Hungary in June 1991, the Board had approved country 
strategies for the CSFR, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria by the end of the 
year. The intention had been to cover the Soviet Union and SFRY as well, 
but this proved impossible due to rapidly changing political circumstances 
in those countries. 
5. Advisory Councils
To underpin the EBRD’s early development, three Advisory Councils were 
established covering economics, business and the environment. The inten-
tion was to provide intellectual input, leadership and guidance, and access 
to external expertise in areas which the Bank was unable to provide alone. 
The Economic Advisory Council first met in February 1991, before the 
EBRD was inaugurated, with the second meeting at the Inauguration itself. 
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A third meeting was held in November. The cast list of nine eminent econ-
omists—including three who were already, or would be in the future, No-
bel laureates—was impressive;17 however, its contribution to the work of the 
Bank is unclear. (No records of the discussions appear to have been circulat-
ed or kept.) Some members participated in a conference at the Bank’s head-
quarters on the ‘Economics of Transition’ held just before the London Heads 
Summit on 13 and 14 July. Although the Council failed to continue beyond 
1992, its intellectual legacy lived on in Economics of Transition, an academ-
ic journal sponsored by the EBRD, which was founded the following year.18 
The Business Advisory Council, set up to provide advice on the trans-
fer of private-sector capital, technology and expertise to central and east-
ern Europe, included the heads of a clutch of major industrial and financial 
groups.19 A first meeting with four Board Directors present was held in Sep-
tember 1991 (although no record appears to have been kept); the second was 
scheduled for 1992, and no further meetings took place. However, many of 
the members’ companies were involved with the Bank in subsequent opera-
tions in the region.
The Environment Advisory Council was set up to advise the President 
on all aspects of environmental protection and natural resources manage-
ment. It comprised a group of experts including representatives of NGOs, 
trade unions, and local and regional governments. The last Council to be es-
tablished, it met for the first time in September 1991 and again at the Bank’s 
first Annual Meeting in Budapest in April 1992. The formation of this 
Council was an important development since it presaged a more open inter-
action between the Bank and the public on issues of environmental policy. 
Unlike its two companions, the Environment Advisory Council survived 
and developed in importance, later becoming the Environment and Social 
Advisory Council.
17 The members were: Arrow* (Stanford), Jean-Paul Fitoussi (OFCE), Ryutaro Komiya (MITI), Janos Kornai 
(Budapest), Assar Lindbeck (Stockholm), Ed Phelps* (Columbia), Robert Solow* (MIT), Luigi Spaventa 
(Rome) and Carl Christian von Weizsäcker (Cologne) (*Nobel Laureate).
18 The journal’s editorial team was (and remains) mostly outside the EBRD, to ensure independence and aca-
demic rigour in deciding which articles should be accepted for publication. 
19 On the industrial side, it included Giovanni Agnelli (President of Fiat), Pehr Gyllenhammar (Executive 
Chairman, Volvo), Karlheinz Kaske (President of Siemens), Helmut Maucher (Chairman of Nestle), Taku-
ma Yamamoto (Chairman of Fujitsu), and, on the financial side, Gutfreund of Salomon Brothers, Jean-Yves 
Haberer (President of Credit Lyonnais), Yusuke Kashiwagi (Chairman of Bank of Tokyo), Lord Richard-
son (former Governor of the Bank of England and Managing Director, Morgan Stanley) and Hans-Joerg 
Rudloff (Chairman, Credit Suisse First Boston).
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6. The Bank’s, and Attali’s, Strategy towards the Soviet Union
From his earliest thinking about the EBRD, Attali had included the Sovi-
et Union in his grand vision of a reunited Europe. Its size, natural resources 
and international influence made it central to the future of the region and of 
great strategic importance to the Bank. The Soviet Union thus command-
ed a good deal of attention among the EBRD’s management, especially the 
President and Flemming, the Chief Economist. 
Although the EBRD’s ability to lend to the Soviet Union was initially 
constrained, it was widely assumed that in the longer run the country would 
become the largest source of operations. 
The previous year the Bank had already studied the problems of the 
USSR closely in its work with the IMF and others in the Study of the Sovi-
et Economy20, so preparation of a country strategy proceeded quickly. Ar-
rangements for a Board consultation visit were scheduled for August, short-
ly after the G7 Economic Summit, which on this occasion was to be held in 
London under the auspices of the UK’s Presidency. Attali saw an opportu-
nity to strengthen the Bank’s hand by supporting Gorbachev, who was fac-
ing increasing challenges at home.21 A paper advocating a meeting between 
the G7 and Gorbachev was prepared by the EBRD in June for circulation 
on a confidential basis to the Sherpas.
The Soviet economy, already in poor shape in 1990, had deteriorated 
steadily during early 1991, and the political pressure on Gorbachev was in-
creasing on all fronts. Towards the start of the year the three Baltic States 
and Georgia had held referendums on independence, voting overwhelming-
ly in favour. A referendum on the future of the Soviet Union in March sup-
ported its continuation, but only nine Republics voted in favour, with the 
Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova abstaining. In April, Georgia 
unilaterally declared independence. Nonetheless, the Novo-Ogaryovo pro-
20 IMF et al., A Study of the Soviet Economy, 1991. This three-volume study of the Soviet economy is discussed 
in Chapter 2.
21 In an article published in The Washington Post just ahead of the Summit on 9 July, 1991, Henry Kissing-
er wrote: “A joint study group has been propagating a ‘grand bargain’ according to which the Soviet Union 
over seven years would move toward market economics, democracy and disarmament in return for an aid 
package reported at anywhere from $25 billion to $35 billion a year. The energetic head of the European 
Development Bank, Jacques Attali, triggered a stampede to have Gorbachev invited to the annual meeting 
of the heads of state of the industrial democracies and, in frequent consultation with Gorbachev, is draft-
ing his own version of a long-term aid package.” 
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cess of negotiations with the Republics, and thus some delegation of powers 
ahead of a proposed Union Treaty, led to the signing of the 9+1 Agreement 
in April. The restructuring of the political party systems continued and in 
June came the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the appointment of Boris 
Yeltsin as the first democratically elected President of the Russian Republic. 
Political developments had advanced, making it easier for the Board to be-
gin the country strategy discussion.
It was undeniable though that big uncertainties remained. Major prob-
lems still existed between the centre and the Republics, with some Repub-
lics refusing to sign the Union Treaty. (Issues such as agreeing a federal tax 
to cover defence spending, for example, were unresolved.) The Communist 
Party, still with 14 million members despite mass resignations, was divided 
between the pro-Gorbachev reformers and “Bolshevik conservatives”. The 
allegiances of the armed forces and KGB were unclear. Gorbachev’s rejec-
tion of the radical “500 days” plan a year earlier, in favour of a more gradu-
al approach under the “Guidelines for Stabilisation of the Economy and the 
Transition to a Market System”, had resulted in failure, having been inter-
rupted by the deterioration of the economy and the need for an anti-crisis 
programme. Increasing tension between Gorbachev and Yeltsin complicat-
ed the picture. Many aspects of the way forward—such as trade, curren-
cy and debt relationships between the Republics and the centre—remained 
ambiguous as the country drifted closer towards a breakdown of the Union. 
Reformers such as Yeltsin were pushing for faster change, while the mil-
itary leadership and others were unhappy with the direction of travel. Gor-
bachev was seeking aid from the West to shore up his position. In March 
he had written to Bush to request US$ 1.5 billion in grain credits under US 
agricultural programmes. Bush noted: “While I wanted to help, Soviet be-
haviour over CFE [conventional forces in Europe] and START [the Strate-
gic Arms Reduction Treaty], and the crackdown in the Baltics, made the case 
very difficult. I was also pessimistic about the Soviet economy and the com-
mitment to the reforms needed to foster a market economy.”22 
Other G7 Heads were also wary about the extent of support that should be 
offered. Gorbachev wanted to attend the Summit in July to obtain immediate 
assistance and win support for full membership of the IMF and World Bank 
(and thereby access to significant finance). Large-scale economic aid and IMF 
22 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 503.
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membership for the USSR were unlikely to be agreed at the meeting. At the 
same time, the G7 Heads were aware of the risk of misinterpretation of their 
intentions towards Gorbachev, and the reform process, if they refused him.
Attali highlighted the danger of a breakdown in political order across 
this vast country with its many different states and ethnic populations and, 
above all, the risks associated with the nuclear weapons which were distrib-
uted among them.23 He reiterated his view that the G7 should invite Gor-
bachev to the Summit to help reinforce his authority in the Soviet Union.24 
Given the need to manage expectations carefully ahead of the Summit, 
the suggestion was not welcomed in Washington or London. Attali none-
theless decided to invite Gorbachev to London in his capacity as President of 
the EBRD. “Naturally, I explained to John Major, if the G7 also invite him 
to their summit, in the same city, on the same date, it will be even better.”25 
Gorbachev accepted the invitation. However, Downing Street, Bonn 
and Washington felt that this cut across the delicate handling of a situation 
where Gorbachev’s expectations were likely to be disappointed and which 
could play into the hands of those working against him in Moscow. Accord-
ing to Attali, after a phone conversation with Major, the UK Prime Minis-
ter, Gorbachev’s visit to the Bank was cancelled.
Instead, the G7 invited Gorbachev to meet the heads of government in 
a special session outside the formal Summit discussions. A few days before, 
the Soviet leader sent a remarkably frank letter to Major setting out his re-
form stall. Over 23 pages, it listed ongoing and planned reforms, including 
the introduction of market-friendly legislation, the conversion of defence in-
dustries, preparations for privatisations, an anti-crisis programme and bud-
get-deficit reduction. It even included detailed annexes on the comparative 
advantages of Soviet industries and draft legislation to bring it into line with 
Western standards. Gorbachev wrote:
I am pinning high hopes on the upcoming meeting in London…, it may 
mark a turning point in the efforts to bring about the Soviet Union’s or-
ganic integration into the world economy … [While] through our joint ef-
23 Attali’s plan to exchange Soviet nuclear warheads for a write-off of US$ 60 billion of foreign debt became 
public after relevant documents were released by the UK’s National Archives. See Financial Times, 29 De-
cember 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/c81f433a-e1ac-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce.
24 Attali, Europe(s).
25 Ibid., p. 107.
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forts we have succeeded in making a radical shift away from confrontation 
to understanding … in extinguishing the flash points of a number of inter-
national conflicts and armed clashes [and] the process of disarmament has 
got off to an effective start … the sphere of economic relations has seen no 
noticeable change.26
Major’s reply thanked Gorbachev for his approach to economic change 
and agreed with the objective of working together to integrate the Soviet 
Union into the world economy. This sentiment was echoed by a G7 com-
muniqué at the conclusion of the Summit, which cited the Soviet Study by 
global IFIs as a template for economic success.27 The Chairman’s Press State-
ment, however, made clear the continued reluctance of leaders to provide 
economic aid:
We also agreed that our help would not have a lasting effect unless there 
was a clear political will in the Soviet Union to create the right environ-
ment for change … outside assistance can make a contribution, it can help 
catalyse the process, but it is the Soviet Union itself that must mobilise its 
resources. The primary contribution should come from inward private in-
vestment, the key is to create an environment, legal, political, economic, 
social, in which investment would be attracted and could flourish.28
The G7 agreed, however, to continue the dialogue and grant the Soviet 
Union special association with the IMF and the World Bank that would al-
low both to offer advice, although not funding. International institutions, 
including the EBRD, were encouraged to work closely together and inten-
sify their efforts to support the Soviet Union. This motivated the EBRD 
to push ahead with the development of a country strategy for the USSR. 
Although investment on any scale was ruled out, recommendations for ac-
tion could be made as long as they were couched in terms of technical assis-
tance. These ranged from providing advice on privatisation—an area where 
the Bank was already working with the Moscow authorities—to conversion 
26 Personal Message from President Gorbachev to G7 Heads, 12 July 1991, Munk School, University of Toronto.
27 “This study sets out many of the elements necessary for successful economic reforms, which include fiscal 
and monetary discipline and creating the framework of a market economy.” ‘Economic Declaration: Build-
ing World Partnership’, G7 Heads Economic Summit, 17 July 1991, Munk School (ibid.).
28 John Major’s Press Statement, G7 London Summit, 17 July 1991, ibid.
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of defence establishments to peaceful uses, reorganisation of the banking 
and financial systems, and the rehabilitation of energy production and dis-
tribution. 
7. The Moscow Coup and the Bank’s Revised Approach  
Towards the Soviet Union
The Bank distributed its first country strategy for the Soviet Union on 1 Au-
gust 1991, for discussion by the Board after the summer break early in Sep-
tember. Some Directors had left early for their summer holidays in order to 
return in time to participate in a consultation visit to meet officials in Mos-
cow and Kyiv, scheduled for 4-10 August. The group included five G7 Direc-
tors (USA, Japan, Germany, Italy and Canada), the Director for the EC and 
the Director for Finland/Norway, as well as the Director for the USSR. The 
management side was led by the Secretary General, le Blanc, and included 
the Head of Soviet Affairs for Merchant Banking, Boris Fedorov (who two 
years later became Finance Minister of the Russian Federation), two devel-
opment bankers, a lawyer and a political counsellor. 
The team’s report29 of 15 August made clear that the situation was in flux, 
ahead of the planned signing of the Union Treaty on 20 August. In more or 
less every sphere of the reform plans mentioned in the report—including taxa-
tion, external debt, convertibility, conversion of defence industries, and prop-
erty rights—it was obvious that major disagreements existed between the So-
viet leadership and the Republics, and while there was agreement on the need 
for privatisation, there was no common definition or approach. The Directors 
came away convinced that “the need for [technical] assistance is immense” but 
“opportunities for financial operations seem to be limited at this stage”.
Their report was filed four days before an attempted coup by senior Po-
litburo and Soviet army figures on Monday, 19 August. Following a dramat-
ic confrontation outside the White House parliamentary building in Mos-
cow between the military and Yeltsin and his supporters, the constitutional 
government was restored on 21 August. 
Attali, as the EBRD’s President, wrote on 20 August to express support 
to Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and the Mayors of Moscow and Leningrad. A  special 
29 ‘Report on the Information Visit to the Soviet Union on 4-10 August 1991’.
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meeting of the Board was called for 22 August and a press statement was 
issued “welcoming the return to legitimacy in the Soviet Union”. It stat-
ed that the EBRD would “continue to assist the USSR and its Republics in 
their transition to a free market economy” and would consider its strategy 
for the country, as planned, at its next meeting. 
By the time the Board met on 3 September, the break-up of the Soviet 
Union was already well underway. On 20 August, Estonia declared indepen-
dence and Latvia followed suit the next day. Three days later, after Ukraine 
also declared itself an independent country, Gorbachev dissolved the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and 
resigned as the Party’s General Secretary. By the end of the month, Moldo-
va had also declared independence and the CPSU had suspended all activi-
ty in the Soviet Union. 
On 2 September, Gorbachev and the leaders of 10 Republics announced 
their intention to create a federation in which each republic would define its 
participation independently.30 Four days later, the Soviet Union recognised 
the independence of the three Baltic states.
Under the circumstances, it was clear that a full country strategy for the 
USSR could not be endorsed by the Board. Instead, it was agreed to pur-
sue an Action Plan in the short term, which could monitor developments 
and offer support where appropriate. This included a continued search for 
private-sector projects but concentrated on advisory assistance, particular-
ly for privatisation. The Bank was already lead adviser for the Moscow City 
Municipality privatisation programme and was in discussions about a sim-
ilar role in St. Petersburg, as Leningrad had been renamed.31 Other target 
areas included training programmes (particularly in the financial sector), 
mobilising private-sector investment in sectors such as agricultural distri-
bution, and the oil and gas industry, especially the introduction of energy-
efficient and safer technologies. Funds from the EC and Japan were made 
available to help.
The Action Plan noted that the strengthened resolve of some Repub-
lics to seek full independence from the Union meant that the single eco-
nomic space within the USSR could not be assured. Nevertheless the Board 
endorsed the proposed approach and approved the establishment of a resi-
30 EBRD, Annual Report 1991, p. 104.
31 The agreement was signed on 22 October. 
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dent office in Moscow. The President also advised that he had written to the 
heads of the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and the European Com-
mission proposing a coordination meeting within the following two weeks.
Representatives of the heads of the five institutions, including Flemming 
for the EBRD, met with G7 Deputies in Dresden on 14 September. Massi-
mo Russo, the IMF representative, arrived directly from Moscow, where he 
had been negotiating a Special Association Agreement for the Soviet Union. 
This was due to be put to the IMF Board soon, even though there were un-
certainties over whether it might be signed by the Republics and, if so, how 
this might be handled. Russo brought with him copies of a draft treaty pre-
pared by Russian economist Grigory Yavlinsky for a new economic union 
to replace the USSR, which had been endorsed by Yeltsin and Gorbachev. 
The meeting discussed technical assistance (mainly training), coordina-
tion among IFIs (the EBRD was seen as having a clear role on privatisation 
and capital markets), and food aid. The Soviet Union’s grain harvest was ex-
pected to be down by 25 per cent in 1991 and Gorbachev had made an ur-
gent request to the EC for assistance worth US$ 5–6 billion.
Shortly after the coordination meeting, which became known as the 
CORUSS group,32 the agreed text was put to the State Council (an advisory 
body to the Russian head of state) for final approval on 30 September, allow-
ing the Special Association between the USSR and the IMF to be signed by 
Camdessus and Gorbachev on 5 October. This provided the first framework 
for the IMF to offer technical assistance to the Soviet Union and advice 
for the development of a reform plan without economic assistance in the 
form of loans (which would require full membership).33 The formal involve-
ment of the IMF, with which the EBRD had a good relationship,34 helped 
to strengthen the Bank’s efforts on structural reform.
Meanwhile, events in the Soviet Union continued to move fast. Gor-
bachev’s attempts to keep the remaining Republics together were doomed 
32 Coordination USSR.
33 The association idea had been first mooted by Bush some nine months earlier, and was then pursued by the 
Fund after Gorbachev’s formal application for IMF membership at the July Summit. Following the coup, 
France, Germany and Italy became more favourable towards full membership so ‘special association’ status 
became a useful compromise for Bush and Major, who remained reluctant to go the whole distance fearing 
backsliding on reform and with uncertainty over the future of the Union.
34 In particular, John Odling-Smee, head of the IMF division dealing with the Soviet Union/Russia, and 
John Flemming were long-standing close associates from when in the 1980s Odling-Smee was in charge of 
macroeconomic policy at the HM Treasury and Flemming was similarly involved at the Bank of England.
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when, on 1 December 1991, Ukraine held a referendum in which more than 
92 per cent of voters approved the declaration of independence. 
On 8 December, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed to 
the Belovezha Accords, dissolving the Soviet Union and forming the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS). On 21 December, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, and Uzbekistan joined them in signing the Alma-Ata Protocols, which 
constituted the founding declarations and principles of the CIS. Gorbachev 
resigned as President of the Soviet Union four days later, and on 26 Decem-
ber the Supreme Soviet formally dissolved the USSR.
8. Breakdown of Trade Flows
One of the biggest risks posed by the break-up of the Soviet Union was to re-
gional trade, as noted by Attali in a keynote speech to the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs on 22 October. While technical assistance could help, 
he concluded the need for an inter-republic trade and finance clearing sys-
tem was vitally important.
The EBRD’s economists had already spent some time looking into trade 
issues and trade financing in particular. Since 1 January 1991, when Com-
econ members had begun trading on a hard-currency basis rather than in 
(inconvertible) roubles, intra-regional flows had more than halved. The 
new settlement system shifted the terms of trade radically in favour of the 
USSR, relative to its former Comecon partners.35 However, falling oil out-
put, a drop in world oil prices and the fact that around 50 per cent of hard-
currency earnings were required for debt service limited the benefits to the 
USSR of dismantling the previous structure. The impact had been especial-
ly hard on the countries of central Europe, which were heavily dependent on 
the USSR for energy and also as a destination for exports. In Poland, it was 
estimated that some 60 per cent of exports were produced in enterprises spe-
cialised in dealing with the USSR. With most factories obsolete and unable 
to compete with cheaper products now available from south-east Asia, the 
impact was significant. 
35 Comecon was disbanded in September 1991, following the last council session in Budapest in June.
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The combined effect of three simultaneous shocks that resulted—de-
mand (loss of markets), supply (price realignment) and structural (a lack 
of technological substitution to meet the loss of essential imports and the 
dismantling of trade links)—was severe. The EBRD had been working on 
ways to tackle the problem and had been involved in bilateral discussions be-
tween both Hungary and Poland and the USSR concerning trade guarantee 
schemes and other steps that might be taken on a path towards full convert-
ibility (the ability to conduct trade and services in roubles freely). 
In the context of the complex problem of trade, including between the 
Republics, management presented an issues note to the Board, which was 
discussed around the same time as Attali’s speech was delivered. Directors 
agreed that it was important for the EBRD to continue its public advoca-
cy of freer trade among its countries of operations and that it should be in-
volved in research efforts on trade issues to underpin this stance. 
 
9. Dealing with New Members: Albania and the Baltic States
The dissolution of the Soviet Union raised the prospect of a rapid expansion 
of the EBRD’s membership. Fortunately, the Bank already had experience 
of approving a new recipient country member. In July 1991, Albania’s appli-
cation to become a member of the Bank had been accepted.
The process helped clarify the conditions for membership. It required first 
of all an assessment by staff of the readiness of the country for EBRD opera-
tions. This was based on a review of economic and political conditions, notably 
the extent of reform and progress on constitutional change, elections and legis-
lation enabling market-based activities. In principle, this allowed the exclusion 
of countries that would be unable to make the required political commitments 
or make use of the EBRD’s capacity to leverage private-sector finance. 
Consideration had been given to including Albania among the original 
central and eastern European members identified in 1990, but the coun-
try was judged not to meet the political standards for membership. By the 
end of the year, however, the Communist Party government was starting 
to relax its 45-year grip on power, as well as its isolationist stance. In March 
1991, Albania held its first multiparty elections and in June, after a four-
week general strike, a coalition government took power under the leader-
ship of Ylli Bufi. 
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A Bank fact-finding mission to the country in the early summer of 1991 
reported an improvement in conditions, and in September Directors rec-
ommended that Albania be admitted as a member. Shares for new mem-
bers were to be taken from the unallocated portion. This amounted to only 
125 shares under the AEB, but the absorption of the GDR into a larger Ger-
many had allowed its 15,500 shares to be added to the unallocated pool. Al-
bania was thus allocated 1,000 shares, based roughly on the size of its GDP 
and population, and Poland and Bulgaria took it into their constituency at 
the Board of Directors. 
The Board of Governors supported Albania’s membership unanimously 
in October. There was little doubt that the country was in need of assistance. 
Albania was one of the poorest countries in Europe, with a GDP per capita 
(not adjusted for purchasing power parity) of just US$ 346.36
An initial strategy had therefore been prepared on an accelerated timetable. 
The Board decided to proceed with the strategy and was able to endorse it at 
their last meeting of the year on 16–18 December, conditional on Albania ful-
filling the membership procedures (which were completed on 18 December).
The main focus was technical assistance and support for the Albanian 
government in developing strategies in priority areas. Some Directors felt 
uncertainties facing Albania meant that the initial strategy should be re-
visited in a year’s time. Recognising the limited value in the extra work, the 
President suggested regular updates might be given on all strategies (three 
or four times a year was suggested) and revisions made if major changes were 
required. This met with the Board’s approval. 
The decision on membership of the three Baltic states, following shortly 
after the decision on Albania, was again agreed unanimously by the Board 
of Governors, in this case in November. The three countries—Estonia, Lat-
via and Lithuania—had applied for membership in September, immediate-
ly after the recognition of independence by the Soviet Union. They became 
members of the EBRD early in 1992, subscribing to 1,000 shares each. 
In approving the applications, the Governors emphasised the fact that 
the Baltic states’ independence had been restored. This ensured decisions on 
membership could proceed without creating a precedent for future applica-
tions, notably from other former Soviet territories. 
36 EBRD, Transition Report 1999.
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10.  The Implications for the Bank of the Dissolution of the USSR 
By the end of 1991, the USSR had broken up into 15 independent succes-
sor states. It would not be long before the CSFR too would lose its feder-
al status. Meanwhile Yugoslavia was in the throes of a bloody break-up. The 
speed of change and disintegration of the old world order was remarkable. 
The path to the East’s integration into the new world order was far less obvi-
ous and its likely pace was orders of magnitude different.
For the EBRD there were immediate consequences. A decision had to be 
made as to the legal status of successor states and it was rapidly agreed with 
the Board that the imperative was to ensure operations were not unneces-
sarily halted or hindered by membership issues. There was also no desire to 
reopen the matter of the Bank’s capital, so the 6 per cent of shares held by 
the former USSR remained unchanged. The question was how to distribute 
them among its successor states. It was decided that all such states should be 
eligible to access the Bank’s ordinary resources on two conditions: that the 
relevant governments confirm they wished to be a member of the Bank, and 
would meet the financial and institutional conditions of membership; and 
that they would adhere to the AEB and be committed to the Bank’s pur-
pose, as defined in Article 1. 
A further important consideration involved Article 8, paragraph 4, and 
Article 13 (iv). The former defined the restriction on borrowing by the So-
viet Union; the latter was a more general rule on avoiding disproportion-
ate use of resources by any one member. The General Counsel opined that 
since the USSR no longer existed the letter from Gerashchenko attached 
to the AEB, which in effect activated Article 8, paragraph 4, was otiose. 
The general limitation on the disproportionate allocation of Bank resourc-
es was reaffirmed. 
It was also agreed that for the purposes of the AEB the remaining rel-
evant countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan) would each be deemed to be a central and eastern European re-
cipient country. This ensured former Soviet states in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus would not be excluded from the Bank. Under the General Coun-
sel’s guidance the Board agreed there was sufficient flexibility in the Arti-
cles to avoid reopening the AEB, and that a simple Resolution by Governors 
would suffice.
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The 12 newly independent states quickly applied for membership, and 
in early 1992 the Board of Directors agreed that the 60,000 shares in the 
EBRD previously held by the USSR should be divided among them.37 By 
the end of the year, all 12 countries had completed the procedures to make 
their membership in the Bank effective.
The Board also agreed in early 1992 to relax the limitation on the EBRD’s 
operations in the USSR. However, in order to preserve the geographic distri-
bution of the Bank’s activities, the Governors passed a Resolution to ensure 
that during its first three years of operations (until the end of 1994) at least 
60 per cent of commitments would be to 10 countries: Albania, Bulgaria, the 
CSFR, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the SFRY.
11.  The Problem of Yugoslavia
Meanwhile, Yugoslavia had seen steadily worsening civil conflict since the 
independence declarations of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia in June 
1991 despite the efforts of the EC, and then the UN, to mediate. The Ser-
bian province of Kosovo voted overwhelmingly for independence in an un-
official referendum in September 1991. The Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia, which was not directly involved in the conflict, declared independence 
on 25 September. 
The worsening political situation was matched by economic collapse. In-
dustrial production halved in 1991 and inflation soared. The EBRD President 
called a Board meeting on 8 November to discuss the situation. Referring to 
Article 8, he noted that it was not clear who had governmental power in the 
SFRY and thus “to what extent Yugoslavia … can be regarded as implement-
ing policies inconsistent with Article 1 of this Agreement. It is my judgement 
… that force rather than democracy holds sway in parts of Yugoslavia.”38 
The Board strongly endorsed the view that activities should only be con-
ducted with parties able to contribute to “the resolution of the current con-
flict by peaceful means and procedures”.39 Within the scope of that decision, 
37 The initial allocation was: Armenia, 500; Azerbaijan, 1,000; Belarus, 2,000; Georgia, 1,000; Kazakh-
stan, 2,300; Kyrgyz Republic, 1,000; Moldova, 600; Russia, 40,000; Tajikistan, 1,000; Turkmenistan, 100; 
Ukraine, 4,000; Uzbekistan, 2,100; unallocated, 4,400. (Source: EBRD, Annual Report 1992.) 
38 Memo to the Board from the President, 6 November 1991.
39 EBRD press release, 8 November 1991.
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the Bank in 1991 provided technical cooperation to help with privatisation 
plans in Macedonia, and held discussions with Slovenia on future assistance.40
In July 1992, the Board of Directors again reviewed the situation in Yu-
goslavia. They concluded that the SFRY no longer existed and that there was 
no sole successor to its membership in the EBRD. In September, the Board 
recommended that, pending a definitive reallocation of the SFRY’s share-
holding in the Bank by the Board of Governors, each of the countries previ-
ously forming part of Yugoslavia that were admitted to membership should 
be given an initial allocation of 100 shares. 
In October, the Governors agreed—on the recommendation of the Board 
of Directors—to admit Slovenia to membership in the EBRD. Slovenia com-
pleted the procedures to make its membership effective by the end of 1992. In 
December, the Directors recommended that Croatia should also be admitted.41 
Macedonia became a member, as Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in 
April 1993. Bosnia and Herzegovina had to wait a further four years to join the 
EBRD, while the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—comprising Serbia 
and Montenegro—was not approved for membership until December 2000.
12.  The First Annual Meeting
 
The EBRD’s first Annual Meeting took place in Budapest on 13–14 April 
1992 and was well attended by Governors, including representatives from 
the Republics of the former Soviet Union, and by the business communi-
ty. It was the first major event on the territory of the former Eastern Bloc to 
bring together a large number of actors from the international community, 
the West and the East, to discuss market reforms and private-sector devel-
opment. The format of roundtables, workshops and a closed-session discus-
sion for Governors provided a template for future EBRD Annual Meetings. 
The main points of substance that emerged came from the closed-session 
discussion of a paper on privatisation, restructuring and defence conversion. 
The President also suggested that the Bank undertake a Special Restruc-
turing Programme targeting large industrial enterprises, including military 
conversion projects. The programme was launched in 1993.
40 EBRD, Annual Report 1991, p. 112.
41 EBRD, Annual Report 1992, p. 8. 
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As the Annual Meeting in Budapest was underway, an event near the 
EBRD’s London headquarters was recorded in history for very different rea-
sons. On 10 April, the day after the re-election of Major’s Conservative Par-
ty in UK parliamentary elections, the Provisional IRA detonated a mas-
sive (one tonne) car bomb, which largely destroyed the Baltic Exchange at St 
Mary Axe in the heart of the City. Three lives were lost and 91 people were 
injured. The force of the blast was so great that the EBRD’s offices in Lead-
enhall Street were also affected with the windows blown out (no Bank staff 
were injured). As the East recovered from decades under communism, this 
was a reminder that the West had its own battles to fight. 
13.  The Bank’s Nuclear Safety Remit
Attali’s persistence on nuclear safety matters was finally rewarded later in 
1992 at the G7 meeting in Munich under the German Presidency. There the 
G7 Heads, concerned about the varying capacity of Soviet successor states 
to deal with operational and technical safety demands, agreed to set up a 
multilateral fund for nuclear safety, to be established through donor contri-
butions and coordinated by the EBRD in conjunction with the G24.
The President’s press release showed his delight at the EBRD being asked 
to take on this role: “This wise decision is the first step in pulling the world 
back from the potential nuclear catastrophe posed by deadly nuclear reac-
tors scattered within breathing distance of the heart of Europe.”42
It was a significant moment in the history of the EBRD. It led to the final 
safe confinement of Chernobyl, proper management of spent nuclear fuel 
and waste throughout the region, and efforts to shut down high-risk, Sovi-
et-designed nuclear reactors.43 
 
14.  A Permanent Headquarters and the Departure of the First President
In November 1991, the Board of Directors had approved Attali’s proposal 
of One Exchange Square for the EBRD’s new home. Designed by Chicago-
42 EBRD Press Notice, 1992.
43 Nuclear safety is discussed Chapter 9.
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based architects Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, the 12-storey building on 
Bishopsgate covered 38,000 square metres over 12 floors. Attali hired French 
architectural design company Berthet Pochy and a British design compa-
ny, run by Ron Sidell and Paul Gibson, to undertake a lavish redesign of the 
building’s interior. It was formally opened by Prince Charles in late 1992 
and the Bank moved in over the Christmas and New Year break.
The fit-out of One Exchange Square included removing the original trav-
ertine decoration from the entrance hall and replacing it with high-quality 
Carrara marble. The grandiose reliefs, rough on one end and gradually turn-
ing into polished surfaces, were meant to tell the story of eastern Europe’s 
transition. But that was not the story that came out. 
On 13 April 1993, a week before the EBRD’s second Annual Meeting 
was due to be held in London, the Financial Times published a front-page 
piece under the heading: “EBRD spends more on itself than on loans to 
Eastern Europe”. On its inside pages it gave details of the costs of the marble 
and chartered flights, in particular. The story was picked up by other pub-
lications the following day. The Sun reported that the headquarters build-
ing featured “nine dining rooms” with “French chefs serving haute cuisine”. 
A few days later, The Guardian added fuel to the fire by detailing internal 
rifts at the EBRD between the two banking divisions. 
Attali denied any wrongdoing, but his rebuttal in The Times failed to al-
lay concerns. Directors wrote to the President on 15 April requesting that 
steps be taken to strengthen the Bank’s budgetary process. The Audit Com-
mittee was also asked to conduct a special inquiry into the fit-out of One Ex-
change Square and other expenditures. 
At an EBRD press conference on 22 April 1993, Attali said: “With the 
benefit of hindsight it is clear that we should have done certain things differ-
ently. The replacement of some of the original marble clearly falls into this 
category. Our other main concern now is to learn from this experience: we 
intend to put in place new measures to strengthen our internal procedures 
and our cost effectiveness.”44 
The writing was on the wall for Attali, however, from the Bank’s Annu-
al Meeting in April, where key Governors spoke of the need for greater ac-
countability and efficiency. Attali also planned an internal reorganisation to 
 
44 Colin Narbrough, ‘Apologetic Attali will not resign over EBRD costs’. The Times, 23 April 1993.
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deal with the duplication and lack of coordination between the two bank-
ing departments.45 
According to an account in Institutional Investor,46 Attali’s idea of inter-
nal reorganisation was broadly accepted at a G7 Deputies’ meeting in early 
June. However, the new Chair of the Board of Governors, Swedish Finance 
Minister Anne Wibble, was adamant that no reorganisation should take 
place until the Audit Report was completed. 
The crunch came on 24 June, when the Financial Times rang Atta-
li’s office to ask for comment on a story they planned to run the follow-
ing morning concerning a $30,000 payment he had allegedly received for a 
speech in Tokyo and allegations that he had been reimbursed twice for his 
first-class fare.47 
Attali called a Board meeting for the next day, 25 June, and read a short 
resignation statement to the 23 Directors blaming the press. He concluded: 
“I know of no action that I have taken that in any way could be worthy of 
reproach.” He announced his intention to leave the EBRD in the autumn 
once a successor had been found. 
At midnight on 15 July, the Audit Committee presented its findings. The 
Independent newspaper later wrote that the Audit Report did not see any 
evidence of fraud and did not recommend any disciplinary action. Howev-
er, the newspaper pointed out that the report was critical of the marble and 
a number of other expenditures.48 Attali left abruptly on 16 July, saying that 
it was in the best interests of the EBRD. Ron Freeman, his deputy as First 
Vice President, took over as Acting President.
By the following week, when the process closed, four candidates had put 
their names forward to replace Attali, but three of them—former Italian 
Prime Minister Giuliano Amato, former Polish Finance Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz, and top European Community economics official Henning 
Christophersen—withdrew their candidacies before the vote. This left only 
Jacques de Larosière, who was due to step down soon as head of the Banque 
 
45 Various efforts at reorganisation of the banking departments had been made in the course of the previous 
year to improve their functioning, but overlaps and tensions remained.
46 ‘The last days of Jacques Attali’ by Kevin Muehring, Institutional Investor, August 1993. 
47 ‘Attali quits after damning report’ Financial Times, 17 July 1993.
48 ‘Attali makes sudden exit after audit report’, The Independent, 17 July 1993. https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/business/attali-makes-sudden-exit-after-audit-report-ebrd-president-and-board-criticised-
over-spending-1485283.html. 
After the Berlin Wall
108
de France. On 19 August 1993, de Larosière was elected as the EBRD’s sec-
ond President and formally took office in September.
Attali continued to be a writer and a thinker. Many years later, he said 
about the EBRD: 
…the vision was and is to build the first pan-European institution, in order 
to make totally irreversible the end of the split of the European continent 
in two… We could have thought about a confederation, about political in-
stitutions. But today the main problem is finance… The EC was not built 
up through the ideas of European political union—although that was use-
ful—but through the first institutions having money.49





1. A New President Takes the Helm
The EBRD’s second President, Jacques de Larosière, came to the Bank with 
an impeccable pedigree. He had served four years as Director of the French 
Trésor in the 1970s before being appointed to head up the IMF in 1978. 
After two successful terms at the Fund, de Larosière moved back to Paris 
in 1987 to take charge of the Banque de France.1 His time there coincided 
with a succession of currency crises as the ERM, the precursor to monetary 
union, came under speculative attack. After six years in the role, the EBRD 
presented a challenge of a different kind. “When I arrived in Bishopsgate, 
London alone … one day in October 1993, I found a bank in complete disar-
ray,” de Larosière wrote later, “the public perception of the EBRD needed to 
be changed completely and immediately.” 2
EBRD staff were anxiously awaiting the arrival of the new President. Af-
ter the period of internal confusion, the media storm and Attali’s abrupt de-
parture, bankers did not know quite what to expect of their new boss. He did 
not keep them guessing for long. On his first day at the Bank, de Larosière ad-
dressed a full staff meeting in the auditorium. According to one witness:
His opening salvo was along the following lines: “To those of you in this 
room who believe that the issues of this Bank are limited to its marble, let 
me tell you they aren’t. There are three main issues confronting the organ-
isation: a lack of strategy; resources out of control; a terrible public image”.3 
1  De Larosière swapped roles with Michel Camdessus.
2  J. de Larosière, 50 Years of Financial Crises, Odile Jacob, 2018, pp. 174–175.
3  Interview with senior EBRD official.
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On the same day, he signalled his intent by ordering the closure of the 
Bank’s gourmet restaurant and abandoning the huge presidential office “to 
join my colleagues in rooms similar to their own”. 
More substantive cost-cutting measures followed. At the initial meeting 
of all Bank staff, de Larosière announced that flights would henceforth be 
reimbursed only at economy rates, hiring would be frozen and some redun-
dancies would be made. Office space would be freed up to allow the sub-
letting of some floors and provide savings on the expensive rent. Salary in-
creases would be held back and managed within a “zero growth” budget 
for the following year (despite an expected increase in the volume of busi-
ness) and Attali’s cabinet—and with it its “political activities”—would be 
wound up. 
2. Reorganisation
A tough approach to managing costs was not the only measure de Larosière 
took to restore the Bank to a more even keel. Even more important was a re-
organisation and simplification of the management structure. 
The existing structure had serious weaknesses that had become more 
evident as business developed. A key area of concern was the dual system 
whereby public-sector bankers operated independently of private-sector 
bankers, each seeking to build their own portfolios. An organising principle 
was needed that would allow them to work together. De Larosière saw this 
as being the country context, no doubt influenced by his years at the IMF 
where individual country programmes were run by mission chiefs, support-
ed by specialist teams covering areas such as tax administration or monetary 
arrangements. 
The IMF model could not be lifted wholesale for a project-based institu-
tion such as the EBRD, but a country-led approach, focused on clients’ needs, 
could help to align the operations of the public and private-sector sides.4 The 
goal was to create good deals without reliance on ‘soft’ money or sovereign 
guarantees. Sector teams were also rearranged on regional lines. A North-
4  The abolition of the divide between private and public sector teams forced a convergence of thinking and 
appreciation of different approaches. As a result, projects were more easily facilitated through private sec-
tor structures and financial instruments combined with technical advice and policy dialogue.
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South divide was adopted initially, with responsibility for the regions as-
signed to Ron Freeman and Mario Sarcinelli, respectively. Russia was allocat-
ed to the North, and the Caucasus and Central Asia to the South. 
Sarcinelli subsequently left the EBRD in April 1994,5 and the Banking 
Department was consolidated under Freeman as sole First Vice President 
(FVP). The FVP was fully in charge of the Banking Department, chaired 
OpsCom and was the senior executive responsible to the Board for oper-
ational activities. Three deputies and a similar number of advisers formed 
the FVP’s front office. The rest of the FVP’s office essentially looked after 
the running of the Department. As a mark of the importance of operational 
business, and deal-making in particular, the country and sector team leaders 
reported directly to the FVP. All projects needed dual sign-offs by the rel-
evant country and sector team leaders, improving coordination and under-
standing between banking teams.
First announced in November 1993, the country focus and flat matrix or-
ganisation—with sector teams providing transactional expertise while coun-
try teams fronted the handling of the authorities and government contacts—
had bedded in when Freeman reported on the new structure to the Board in 
May 1994. In essence, the changes made then have lasted to the present day. 
At the apex of the project decision-making process was OpsCom. The 
project cycle started with exploratory transactions at the operation-lead-
er level which, if agreed with their team director, would then move to the 
concept stage. This required a written memorandum and appraisal for Ops-
Com, whose members included a full range of senior departmental represen-
tatives. If a project passed Concept Review it would progress to a Structure 
Review and then Final Review before being sent to the Board for approv-
al. The fact of Board approval was no guarantee of a project’s signing, which 
depended on the client and often the speed with which the project was pro-
cessed through the internal cycle of approval.
OpsCom included senior lawyers and risk managers, in line with es-
tablished practice in commercial banks. Membership was extended to the 
EBRD’s Chief Economist to ensure that each project achieved transition 
impact and complied with the notion of additionality. Representatives of 
5  ‘EBRD in line for another round of reorganisation: Bank may abolish regional divisions’. Independent, 21 
February 1994. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/ebrd-in-line-for-another-round-of-reorga-
nisation-bank-may-abolish-regional-divisions-1395565.html.
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the environmental department also attended. Freeman ensured every inter-
ested party was represented around the table: 
The key to success was to get every constituency involved in ensuring the 
various criteria which the Articles set forth were present in each project. 
So I made it a collegial, open forum in which every constituency was equal. 
Everyone had a vote. Unless we had unanimity a project wouldn’t pass 
[though] we’d try to fix what was missing. We ran it openly and collegially 
and on an equal basis. People recognised that and responded to it, as peo-
ple do when treated respectfully. That basically carried forward.6
Intense scrutiny was applied at the concept stage to wean out dud trans-
actions and offer clear guidance on how to structure projects. Early scruti-
ny also provided clients with clarity on what was needed for the project to 
go forward. This contrasted with other development finance institutions 
(DFIs), where the announcement of new requirements in the end stages of a 
transaction (reflecting late interventions by senior officials) caused clients sig-
nificant problems. The EBRD was not immune to this, particularly in big-
ger and more contentious cases, but in general the early input of senior man-
agement helped to smooth the process. Bankers’ presence on the ground, and 
their readiness to listen and adjust to local circumstances, was another pos-
itive factor. As a result, clients’ confidence in dealing with the Bank grew. 
Another advantage of the arrangements was that it was open and gave 
junior staff members direct access to the FVP. At this point, relatively few 
deals were going through the system so they all went to OpsCom, which 
would discuss three or four projects a week at the regular Friday morn-
ing slot. Junior bankers gained exposure to the thinking at the top, either 
through having to defend their projects in front of the Committee or by at-
tending sessions where similar or related operations were being scrutinised. 
This provided a vital training ground on how to develop and manage trans-
actions. It was also good preparation for cross-examination by the Board. 
Freeman and de Larosière were perfect complements for one another in 
their different roles and got on extremely well. As a Salomon-trained US 
banker with a legal background,7 Freeman was an ideal foil for the experi-
6  Conversation with the author.
7  Freeman was a graduate of Columbia Law School and a member of the New York State bar.
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enced French international finance manager and civil servant. It helped that 
Freeman’s mother was French and he had spent several years working in Par-
is. He preferred to converse with de Larosière in French. 
A consummate manager, de Larosière also took care to ensure that the 
roles and responsibilities of the Bank’s senior executives were clear and dis-
tinct. He saw no reason to interfere with the management of the Bank’s op-
erations when it was in the hands of someone with obvious capability in that 
field who commanded the respect of his staff. The EBRD was a bank with a 
focus on the private sector and earnings, and Freeman was the top executive 
of the banking division. This meant de Larosière was able to focus on run-
ning the organisation and acting as Chairman of the Board. (Formally, the 
President of the EBRD is both in charge of the management and chairs the 
Board.) In particular, it left him free to drive the strategic direction of the 
Bank and secure its proper place in the international arena among other IFIs. 
3. The Task Force on Operational Priorities
Shortly after taking up office, in the autumn of 1993, the new President an-
nounced the creation of a Task Force to determine the operational priori-
ties of the Bank. De Larosière wanted to carry on his predecessor’s efforts 
to foster change in the East but within a more precise strategic purview. 
The remit given to the Task Force was quite broad and included the sug-
gestion of soliciting the views of stakeholders to gain an inclusive assess-
ment of the future direction of the Bank. This turned out to be the start 
of a more formal series of planning exercises which lasted well beyond de 
Larosière’s time as President.
The Task Force was led by Nick Stern, whose appointment as EBRD’s 
Chief Economist,8 was announced in June 1993, in anticipation of Flem-
ming’s departure to Wadham College, Oxford, and following Michael Bru-
no’s decision to move to the World Bank.9 The objective was to generate a 
clearer focus for the EBRD and lay the grounds for a medium-term strate-
8  See the list of current and past EBRD Chief Economists at: https://www.ebrd.com/who-we-are/senior-
management/beata-javorcik.
9  Bruno was appointed Chief Economist in March 1993 to take up the position in October that year, but 
he did not do so. Stern acted in an advisory capacity before taking up his appointment as EBRD Chief 
Economist formally in early 1994.
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gy. The setting, as the Report put it, was to ensure that the Bank’s priorities 
matched the process of growth and transition, and leveraged its comparative 
advantage relative to private-sector financial institutions and other IFIs. It 
involved a rapid but comprehensive assessment of the views of stakeholders 
in the Bank’s business, from bankers and clients to shareholders and oth-
er IFIs. Some 250 people were interviewed within a month and a half and 
the Task Force submitted its report to the President in mid-December 1993.
The Board and IFI interviewees believed that the first priority of the Bank, 
and its comparative advantage, was the development of a competitive private 
sector. The EBRD’s ability to participate in private-sector projects was not 
something the World Bank or the EIB were designed for, and the IFC, while 
similar to the EBRD in this respect, was not very visible in central and eastern 
Europe. Further advantages of the EBRD were its relatively fast and flexible 
processes, its ability to combine policy work with projects (“having the IBRD 
and IFC under one roof”), and the range of instruments at its disposal. 
The Board also added some important insights which the Task Force in-
cluded in its final Report. One was that the Bank should ensure that support 
was provided to all of its countries of operations. More than half of Board-
approved projects to that point had been in just three countries: Hungary, 
Poland and Russia. Adding the Czech Republic and Romania brought this 
up to three-quarters of the total. The Bank still had no signed commitments 
in seven of its 25 countries of operations, and no private-sector signings in a 
further three.
Second, the EBRD should be seen as a wholesale rather than a retail or-
ganisation. This meant working much more through financial intermediar-
ies instead of via direct investments, particularly in trying to reach SMEs. 
The SMEs were viewed as the backbone of a successful market economy 
and needed help which could be best leveraged by deploying Bank funds 
through intermediaries. 
Third, there was a desire to see an increased use of equity, which at that 
point comprised 12 per cent of the investment portfolio. This was seen as 
a valuable way of driving improvements in the performance of companies, 
and especially in their corporate governance. 
Fourth, while infrastructure investment to support private-sector devel-
opment remained acceptable, Board members felt it could be more selec-
tive—public infrastructure projects accounted for 44 per cent of the port-
folio—and better designed to address problems facing the private sector. At 
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the same time, the need for a commercially oriented approach with identi-
fication of revenue streams was emphasised. The Board made clear that it 
was for other IFIs to do the majority of large sovereign infrastructure loans. 
The Board also advised selectivity on privatisation and restructuring op-
erations and clarified that the primary focus of technical assistance should 
be project-related. A final recommendation was that the EBRD should 
move towards developing the private sector based on indigenous companies 
and away from joint ventures with foreign sponsors. At that point, foreign 
joint ventures had accounted for 46 out of 52 corporate investments. The 
corollary was a need to move operational staff closer to clients in the coun-
tries and employ more local staff.
Officials, clients and the business community in countries of operations 
agreed with the need for more local input and increased activity in the fi-
nancial sector, including in venture funds. 
The Task Force’s conclusions essentially defined the path for the EBRD 
over the coming years. By February 1994, they had been turned into a pa-
per which fed into the Governors’ discussions at the Bank’s Annual Meet-
ing. After the summer break, the material was used to define the strategic 
priorities for the Bank going forward and how they would be implemented. 
An internal paper on ‘Institutional Priorities and Medium-Term Scenarios’ 
framed the Bank’s operational intentions against the transition backdrop 
and provided for the first time a comprehensive plan for the future which 
was fully costed and budgeted for, including details on planning assump-
tions and upside and downside scenarios. By looking several years ahead, it 
became possible to understand better where management’s priorities stood 
and what resources and reallocations, might be necessary to achieve them.
De Larosière’s approach was beginning to bear fruit. With a comprehen-
sive reorganisation of the core banking department delivered, costs under 
control, and a proper planning and budgeting system in place the EBRD 
was taking shape as a more mature institution.
4. Setting a Path Forward
De Larosière was conscious of the vital task of supporting the still nascent 
private sector in most countries of operations. Creating a competitive and ef-
ficient private sector could only be achieved through increased support for 
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smaller businesses and entrepreneurs, along with improved infrastructure to 
promote private-sector development. The Bank needed to scale up its activ-
ities in these areas and, as laid out by the Board, increase its local presence. 
To do that a number of further changes were needed.
The Task Force and the strategic papers that followed had pulled the 
threads of the organisation together and the internal restructuring had ori-
ented the Bank for the future. A business model was beginning to emerge 
which could be strengthened by scaling up the impact of the Bank’s activi-
ties through greater use of intermediaries and greater local input. 
Chief among the vehicles to be used were financial intermediaries and 
depository banks, in particular. By providing credit lines to these institu-
tions and requiring that the funds be on-lent to SMEs, the multiplier fac-
tor associated with Bank funds could be vastly increased. This would make 
longer-term funds available to a wider range of private businesses and at the 
same time support the performance of commercial banks. There were some 
downsides from potentially smaller margins and less direct control but these 
could be off-set though strict covenants limiting the size and type of loans 
on-lent, and the categories of firms eligible to borrow. As banks began to re-
alise that this new business could be highly profitable, the hope was that 
lending to SMEs would continue to grow without the EBRD’s help.
Strengthening activity in the financial sector through credit lines had 
the additional advantage of helping the EBRD achieve its 60:40 ratio of pri-
vate-to-public financing. Before de Larosière’s appointment, the Board had 
expressed its frustration at the management’s slow progress in bringing the 
portfolio ratio into line with the Article 11 requirement. Fortunately, the 
AEB had been crafted to ensure it was the ultimate beneficiary that provid-
ed the test for a private-sector classification rather than the intermediary 
through which the Bank’s funds passed. This meant that SME credit lines 
to state-owned banks counted as private-sector transactions in relation to 
the 60:40 ratio. (Transactions with state-owned companies being privatised 
or on a path to privatisation were also classified as private-sector deals.)10
Other intermediaries targeted by the EBRD included equity funds. Eq-
uity was in very short supply in the region and provided greater leverage over 
companies than debt financing. The AEB ruled out majority control—an-
other reason why equity funds provided a valuable alternative—but the abil-
10 Article 11, paragraph iii.
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ity to appoint nominee directors to boards and committees gave the Bank 
the opportunity to steer business plans, improve practices and introduce 
good corporate governance. 
A further idea to reap economies of scale was the use of multi-product facil-
ities for western industrial companies looking to invest in several countries in 
the region. Improvement in the mobilisation of additional funds for projects 
through syndication activities and other funding mechanisms, such as parallel 
and club loans, was also seen as a means to extend the Bank’s influence. 
Scaling up, however, meant higher costs, which in turn could delay a 
shift to sustainable profitability. Plans to boost business activity were there-
fore matched by an increased focus on productivity and cost-control. Pro-
ductivity of bankers as measured by average signed commitments per staff 
month had been falling. Credit lines and other ideas being floated had the 
advantage that they could be relatively large in volume, given that the fund-
ing needs of banks were generally greater than those of individual compa-
nies. They also offered economies of scale in processing. It was estimated 
that financial intermediary operations took 30 per cent less staff time to 
reach signing than average operations. Facilities, or frameworks, offered ef-
ficiencies in processing terms.
The second strand of thinking, a greater degree of localisation, had been 
brewing for a while. The number of countries of operations had expand-
ed dramatically since the EBRD’s launch in 1991. The Bank was now ac-
tive in 25 markets, which were very diverse in their degree of development 
and needs. More advanced countries were relatively accessible and could be 
managed through limited interactions with bankers, but countries at an ear-
ly stage of transition needed much closer attention. 
5. Increased Local Presence: Strengthening Regional Offices
The EBRD had been developing a network of regional offices from the out-
set. Both management and the Board saw the advantages of having a local 
presence, while countries welcomed the visibility of the Bank in their capi-
tals and the recognition of their importance to the international community. 
The main benefit, however, was as a focal point for communication. 
Bank officials could explain what the EBRD was designed to do and what it 
could offer, while local companies and entrepreneurs knew where to go for 
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much-needed finance. The Resident Office also provided a reporting link 
with headquarters, so that the latest developments in the country were al-
ways close to decision-makers back in London. In many cases this was essen-
tial given language and media barriers, including state-controlled reporting 
restrictions. 
The first Resident Office was opened in Warsaw in January 1992. By the 
end of the year, a further six had been opened—in Budapest, Sofia, Prague, 
Moscow, Tirana and Kyiv—and by the start of 1994 the total had risen to 
12. Not all had finalised the legal Host Country Agreements necessary to 
ensure the Bank’s rights and immunities would be respected, but the rapid 
pace of deployment indicated the emphasis placed on a local presence. 
In this period, a typical Resident Office was very small, comprising two 
professionals and two support staff. There was a total of 19 expatriate staff in 
Resident Offices by the end of 1993. Few were professional bankers and their 
remit was limited. Essentially, their function was to promote the Bank’s ser-
vices, undertake some reporting duties, and host senior management visits 
and missions. They also provided useful input in the preparation of coun-
try strategies. There was a growing feeling, however, particularly in the Mer-
chant Banking Division, that they could do more to help. 
The 1993 Task Force concurred with the view that Resident Offices were 
an underutilised resource and poorly integrated into the main business ac-
tivities of the Bank. It concluded that much more localisation was appro-
priate for the EBRD to be successful in its transformative mission. Private-
sector development required the input of experienced practitioners on the 
ground and accelerating the Bank’s investment activity would be enhanced 
by able bankers who knew how to find and screen project opportunities. 
The Board paper on guidelines for the medium term, which built on the 
Task Force conclusions, made clear that “stronger local presence was … one 
of the key priorities of the Bank”. Following the reorganisation towards a 
more country-focused structure, Resident Offices became an integral part 
of the Country Teams that now had operational responsibilities within a 
single Banking Department. A paper on “Stronger Local Presence”, circu-
lated in October 1994 following discussions with the Board and Resident 
Offices, noted the management’s view that the EBRD would gain effective-
ness and local profile through strengthening its local presence: “The new 
approach is operationally driven, breaking with the past where offices were 
mainly representational.” 
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The approach was consistent with the Bank’s other efforts to build a lo-
cal presence, particularly through financial intermediaries. Local investors 
were being reached through investment funds, direct loans to banks and for 
on-lending to local companies, and co-financing. Establishing and manag-
ing client relationships effectively, however, whether private or public, re-
quired a professional presence on the ground. Not only would it encour-
age better marketing of the Bank’s services and a stronger flow of projects, 
but also demonstrate the EBRD’s complementarity with other internation-
al banks and IFIs, and reinforce its separate identity. 
There were other good reasons for strengthening the role of Resident Of-
fices. London was too remote to be of much help with smaller projects. As 
markets developed, and with them financial intermediation, the operation-
al emphasis turned towards assisting companies unable to access finance. 
Many were SMEs and local entrepreneurs, dealing with whom involved a 
higher degree of risk and required a greater depth of local knowledge. 
Local presence was important too for managing complex privatisation 
and restructuring cases, which involved extensive preparation and regular 
follow-up. An increasing number of technical cooperation projects required 
more time in situ by relevant experts. As the Bank’s portfolio grew, imple-
mentation and monitoring of the stock of projects was also an increasing 
challenge. Field supervision, explanation and chasing of covenants, watch-
ing financial developments, sitting on company boards and diligence work 
were time-consuming and better performed on location. It was also believed 
that increased investment in the Resident Office network would strengthen 
the corporate culture of the EBRD as a “transition bank”. 
The next few years saw a significant increase in local capacity. By mid-
1999, the Bank had Resident Offices in 30 locations with a total of 255 staff. 
Secondments from headquarters comprised about one-quarter of the pro-
fessional headcount, with the remainder recruited locally. In addition, as 
part of its efforts to strengthen financial intermediaries in less developed 
countries and regions, a number of secondments were made directly to local 
commercial banks and other institutions.
A review in 1999, as part of a medium-term strategic assessment under 
Horst Köhler’s Presidency, concluded that the effort to develop a local pres-
ence was working well but could be reinforced in some areas. Suggestions in-
cluded: providing leadership for the development of business start-ups and 
SMEs; exploring restructuring of large enterprises where close day-to-day in-
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volvement with clients was essential (as had been shown in several complex 
privatisation and restructuring projects in Poland and Hungary); taking an 
active approach to equity investment, where again regular interaction with 
the management and owners of companies was essential for success; and pro-
moting better institutions and a stronger investment climate. The report clar-
ified further Resident Office staff’s membership of project teams and their 
role in originating and screening project opportunities, particularly where 
they were best-placed to understand the nature of the risks faced. The sig-
nificantly increased presence of operational bankers on the ground and the 
linking of the Resident Offices more fully into the Banking Department’s 
operational planning processes strengthened considerably the EBRD’s rela-
tionships with clients, country authorities and business associations, and gave 
it much greater visibility where it was most needed. Frequent visits by heads 
of Resident Offices to London to support and defend projects based in their 
countries helped them understand the wider political context of the Bank’s 
work, and provided Board Directors with a clearer appreciation of the operat-
ing context for the Bank’s investments and its engagements with authorities. 
6. Preparations for a Capital Increase
By 1994, the EBRD was finding its feet in terms of its business operations. 
Annual commitments in the previous year had reached ECU 1.5 billion, 
with the private sector beginning to feature strongly. The portfolio ratio, 
which had been the subject of close attention during the previous two years, 
was still only at 50:50 but the direction of travel was clear. Reaching the 
60:40 private-public goal was now simply a matter of time, at least in aggre-
gate. There remained work to do to achieve this ratio in many markets, no-
tably in early-stage transition countries, but the Board had recognised this 
challenge and allowed some leeway.11
From de Larosière’s perspective, the banking side of business was not the 
key problem, particularly now that it was under one roof and fully in the ca-
pable hands of Freeman. Two different concerns presented themselves. The 
first was that the EBRD had yet to prove it could become a profitable or-
11 A five-year period was set, with provision for a timetable and targets for achieving the ratio to be set at the end 
of the period if necessary. See ‘Portfolio Ratio: Individual Countries of Operations’, EBRD, 1995. 
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ganisation. Two years passed before the Bank started making profit; mean-
while some small losses resulted from the early investments. The Bank start-
ed making money in 1993, but only just. At ECU 4.1 million, profits after 
provisions did not even cover the previous year’s losses.12 With assets of over 
ECU 7 billion and members’ equity of ECU 3 billion, the Bank knew it 
should start earning more. It was still, of course, early days for the new in-
stitution. Productivity, in terms of commitments and income generated rel-
ative to administrative expenses, had to improve markedly over the coming 
years if sustainable profitability was to be achieved. 
De Larosière’s introduction of a tough budgetary regime was part of a fo-
cus on longer-term financial sustainability. General administrative expens-
es had increased almost threefold between 1991 and 1993. Net income was 
growing strongly but an increase in the stock of commitments in higher-risk 
countries meant provisions for loan losses were growing faster still.
The effect of his approach had been immediate, stopping the growth of 
administration expenses in its tracks. So strict was budgetary control during 
de Larosière’s time as President that general administration expenses were 
the same in 1997 as they had been in 1993.13 As he commented in his fare-
well remarks to the Board in 1998:
Keeping a tight rein on the budget is not a mania that I have developed. It 
is indispensable. Look at the figures. Suppose we had, like many institu-
tions do, increased our budget in nominal terms by 5 per cent a year which, 
after all, with an inflation of 2 to 3 per cent and with a portfolio that has 
increased by significantly more than 20 per cent a year, might have been 
envisaged by some. With such a scenario, we would have ended up with 
five consecutive years in the red with losses of over ECU 20 million a year: 
the Bank would be in shambles, our capital would not have been doubled 
and I would not be talking to you today… Experience shows us that the 
best performers in the financial sector are the ones who keep to the cost 
cutting line.14
12 Losses in 1991 and 1992 were ECU 7.1 million and ECU 6.1 million, respectively. 
13 General administration expenses were recorded as ECU 137.3 million in 1993 and ECU 137.1 million in 
1997. Meanwhile operating income grew from ECU 191.3 million to ECU 346 million. A rapid expansion 
in provisions for losses however from ECU 39.4 million to ECU 177.7 million meant that profits only in-
creased by a small amount to ECU 16.1 million by 1997.
14 ‘Letter to Governors – Farewell Statement from the President’, 4 February 1998.
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Losses and weak profitability also restricted the growth of reserves. In 
turn, this constrained the scope for growth of the Bank given the statuto-
ry requirement in Article 12.1, which limited total commitments to the sum 
of unimpaired capital, reserves and surpluses. De Larosière could see a fur-
ther constraint looming in the coming years: the need to pursue more equi-
ty and growth in less advanced countries. This was the right strategy for the 
organisation but it would mean taking greater risks and invoke higher pro-
visions. A greater financial cushion was going to be needed to ensure the 
steady growth of business and its diversification.15
This fed into the question of whether to push for a capital increase. Arti-
cle 5.3 of the AEB required a review of the Bank’s capital stock “at intervals 
of not more than five years”. Following the EBRD’s inauguration in 1991, a 
decision would have to be taken by the 1996 Annual Meeting. 
De Larosière was clear that a capital increase would be required soon-
er rather than later if his plan to expand business was to be realised. With 
commitments increasing at a rate of ECU 1.5 billion to ECU 2 billion a year, 
headroom—the difference between statutory capital and outstanding com-
mitments—would shrink fast. The “trigger” for headroom, which was set 
at 90 per cent of the statutory limit to allow for volatility in exchange rates, 
would be breached before the decade was out at this rate of business growth. 
De Larosière had no desire to alter the gearing ratio. “The financial integrity 
of the Bank does not allow tinkering with this,” he commented. 
From his experience with Quota Reviews at the IMF, de Larosière was 
aware that discussions with shareholders on matters of capital frequently 
took a long time to resolve. He therefore determined that demand assess-
ments, technical scenarios and other material should be developed in time 
for Governors to approve a proposal at their 1995 Annual Meeting for a for-
mal study on capital resources. A draft proposal on a capital increase would 
then be presented by the Board of Directors to Governors as a Resolution to 
be voted on at the 1996 EBRD Annual Meeting in Sofia. 
Success depended on convincing the Board, and Governors, that the 
EBRD was likely to continue to grow fast, was having an impact on the tran-
sition process, and that failure to grant a capital increase would  jeopardise its 
15 This was especially true as the income from the EBRD’s Treasury operations provided critical support to 
the Bank’s financial performance.
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role. It was here that Chief Economist Nick Stern and his team, and  others 
drawn from the Project Evaluation Department and Banking, made a sub-
stantial contribution. They provided a frame of reference through which 
progress in transition could be understood, and with it the challenges ahead 
and how the EBRD could address them through its operational activities, 
business and operational model, financial instruments and business tools, 
delivery capacity and financial situation. 
To help, in 1994 Stern introduced the first Transition Report, which be-
came EBRD’s flagship annual economic publication. Notably, the report in-
troduced a series of transition indicators that measured progress in structural 
reform across countries in areas such as privatisation, enterprise restructur-
ing or trade liberalisation.16 These indicators were backdated to 1989. To-
gether with the effort on operational priorities, which included “guidelines 
for the medium term”, started soon after de Larosière’s arrival, this work set 
the tone for the strategic review ahead. 
Combined with analyses of institutional priorities, medium-term sce-
narios and financial considerations undertaken over the following year, the 
material fed into the final Capital Resources Review in November 1995, 
which set out all the relevant information covering the period ahead (1996–
1999) for Governors at their meeting in Sofia. The approach was repeated 
subsequently at each five-year interval dictated by Article 5.3, with a five-
year (rather than four-year) planning timeframe and the addition of more 
detailed reviews of the Bank’s contribution to transition impact. 
One aspect of the analysis that would become a prominent feature of 
the debate between the Board and the management was the assessment 
of the way the transition process was evolving and its implications for Bank 
resources. More advanced countries such as Hungary and the Czech Re-
public were moving rapidly towards functioning market economies, while 
several CIS countries still had a long way to go. Where reform-mindedness 
was weak, demand for EBRD activities was poor and the risks associated 
with operations were high. Conversely, the Bank could contribute success-
fully where serious reforms were being undertaken. However, in the latter 
case, the EBRD’s additionality and the set of transition targets were likely to 
narrow over time, reducing demand for the Bank’s services. This suggested 
an S-shaped path towards demand for EBRD investment as countries pro-
16 The measurement of transition is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
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gressed along the transition path. It implied weaker demand at early and ad-
vanced stages of transition than at the intermediate stage. In 1995, the Bank 
argued that the majority of countries were in the intermediate zone. De-
mand remained strong even in more advanced countries where, for exam-
ple, an influx of foreign direct investors and increasingly domestic investors 
were keen on obtaining EBRD support. Given the scale of the region’s in-
vestment needs, it was not difficult to construct scenarios even on moderate 
business volume growth—after allowing for efforts to sell-down loans and 
equity, and recirculate capital—which showed a need for more capital by the 
end of the projection period (1999).
On the basis of the main projection, described as a “manageable growth” 
scenario, management argued for a 100 per cent increase in the capital stock. 
With annual business volume assumed to increase steadily from ECU 2 bil-
lion in 199617 to ECU 2.5 billion in 1999 (and 5 per cent per annum in nom-
inal terms thereafter), the projections showed headroom would disappear 
in 1998, forcing an immediate drop in business volume to around 10 per 
cent of its annual level to be consistent with long-term financial sustainabil-
ity. A 50 per cent capital increase would extend the time before a similar ef-
fect occurred to 2000, while a doubling of the capital stock suggested there 
would be no need for “additional capital in the foreseeable future”.18 
Management also argued for the paid-in portion to be 30 per cent, as had 
been applied to the EBRD’s original stock. The chief argument used was the 
intention to increase the proportion of equity in the Bank’s portfolio, but a 
build-up of reserves was also suggested as a reason. Article 12.3 limited equi-
ty commitments to the sum of paid-in capital, reserves and surpluses so this 
acted as a constraint but was not as severe as the overall one, even in higher 
equity growth scenarios. 
At the Annual Meeting in April 1996, the Governors accepted the 
Bank’s analysis and unanimously agreed to a doubling of the Bank’s capital 
from ECU 10 billion to ECU 20 billion. However, for budgetary and oth-
er reasons they restricted the paid-in amount to 22.5 per cent rather than 
the 30 per cent sought by the management. Three countries—Mexico, New 
Zealand and Morocco—decided not subscribe to the increase. 
17 Estimates for 1995 showed ECU 1.9 billion, up from ECU 1.74 billion in 1994 and ECU 1.5 billion in 1993.
18 The projection indicated that the 90 per cent ‘trigger’ threshold would be reached around 2004 though a 
more proactive portfolio turnover could extend this further (just as faster volume growth would bring it 
forward). 
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7. The Matter of ‘Graduation’
EBRD Governors had agreed to secure the Bank’s future and role in foster-
ing the transition of its countries of operations on the basis of management’s 
arguments and the political context of wanting to show continuing support 
for the region’s reorientation towards market democracy. The new capital 
would help some of the more advanced countries accede to the European 
Union, which now loomed on the horizon, and there was work to do to en-
courage less advanced reformist countries in their transition.
It was clear that in granting a doubling of the EBRD’s capital stock Gov-
ernors saw it as a one-off decision. There could be no repeat for the foresee-
able future. Nor would it be appropriate for the Bank to consider any relax-
ation of cost controls. Indeed, a view developed among Board Directors in 
the aftermath of the discussion that a root and branch review of produc-
tivity and operating practices would be appropriate to ensure the best use 
of capital going forward. In response, management introduced a zero-base 
budgeting (ZBB) exercise soon afterwards.19
One issue however, which had become a focal point for debate in the dis-
cussions leading up to the capital increase, was ‘graduation’, shorthand for 
when a country would no longer be in need of EBRD finance and resourc-
es. The AEB had not provided a definition of what was meant by a market 
economy or criteria by which to judge when the transition was complete. 
With fast improvements being seen in the market development of some cen-
tral European countries several Board members felt that the time was right 
to clarify the issue. In their Report to Governors on the Capital Resourc-
es Review, the Directors thus recommended a commitment be made to pre-
pare a policy on graduation before the end of the year, which was agreed by 
Governors at the Sofia meeting. 
Preparatory work20 had made clear that graduation could be considered 
only with reference to the Bank’s own operating principles—additionali-
ty, transition impact and sound banking21—rather than to per capita in-
come levels or other measures of advancement used in most development 
19 Ideas were discussed in 1996 during the debate on the 1997 budget and a ZBB Initiative was launched in 
January 1997.
20 ‘The Bank’s Role in Countries at More Advanced Stages of Transition’, 20 October 1995.
21 Reference to environmental factors was added later in view of Article 2 and the legacy of environmental 
problems in the region.
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banks.22 What mattered was whether there remained profitable operations 
which advanced transition and where similar finance on reasonable terms 
and conditions could not be obtained from elsewhere. The key test was the 
Bank’s additionality. In the limit, the Bank’s finance would be unneces-
sary, or even counterproductive, and the country would manage its own af-
fairs through the presence of effective financial institutions and an effi-
cient capital market. 
As a project-oriented institution, a ‘bottom-up’ test could be applied 
to every project. But this was not sufficient for a complete understanding 
of graduation. The market level, or a ‘top-down’ perspective, was relevant, 
too. Where markets and institutions had reached an advanced stage, that 
is where they were open and competitive and functioning well, the EBRD 
was unlikely to fulfil the additionality criterion. The combination of ‘bot-
tom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches meant there was scope for sectoral anal-
ysis and judgements over which activities and instruments might no longer 
be relevant to the achievement of the Bank’s goals.
As transition advanced, therefore, it was expected that the EBRD would 
move away from certain areas of activity. Analysis of the product mix 
showed this was already happening to some degree. The Bank had for exam-
ple moved away from sovereign infrastructure projects and other state loans 
towards private loans and equity in advanced countries. The pattern of FDI 
and the Bank’s involvement with it was also changing with domestic inves-
tors in the most advanced countries scaling up and foreign investors more 
comfortable with local market conditions.23
The transition indicators too, which had been developed in part to assist 
with the graduation debate, brought the ‘top-down’ perspective into sharp-
er relief by showing that Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were well 
ahead of other countries of operations with the Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and Estonia not far behind.24
22 Graduation from IDA, the fully concessional arm of the World Bank Group, is based on GDP per capita 
for example.
23 In the early years the EBRD had been a significant catalyst for foreign investment in the region, providing 
finance for projects that represented “more than 5 per cent of total investment taking place in the Bank’s 
countries of operations” (Capital Resources Review 1995) with the share of FDI in countries of operations 
“surpass[ing] 15 per cent each year before 1995.” (Capital Resources Review 2001) As the second half of the 
1990s began, these percentages began to diminish.
24 See Table 10.1 in Chapter 10 which shows the relative positions of countries of operations as measured by 
the transition indicators at the time, 1995.
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Management presented their conclusions in a final policy paper on grad-
uation in November 1996:
The Bank will have achieved its objective when it is no longer addition-
al. That will be a measure of the success of the transition and of the Bank.
In countries which are very advanced in transition [graduation] will de fac-
to start to occur … when the areas of Bank additionality have decreased to 
such an extent that demand for EBRD services has withered away. At that 
point a country of operations may indicate a wish to graduate.25
Nonetheless, the paper noted “even the most advanced countries of the 
region are some distance away from meeting the standards of a well-func-
tioning market economy.” 
Among the areas that were expected to continue to develop were the en-
vironment, commercial infrastructure, banking and financial development 
(including for SMEs), enterprise restructuring and investments to help 
countries respond to intensified competition and trade reorientation. There 
was no suggestion that any country of operations was close to the point of 
graduation.
The Board agreed that graduation could not be mechanistic or determin-
istic and cautioned against seeing transition as a linear process. Instead, the 
Bank could shift its product mix according to demand, dropping back from 
areas where it was no longer additional but responding to new demands and 
opportunities, especially in more risky areas, even in the most advanced 
countries. Eventually, countries of operations would rely on their own re-
sources and capital markets to provide finance and risk-taking capacity. But 
in their view that point, the end of the transition, was not yet in sight since 
there was still significant demand for the Bank’s financing in areas in which 
it could be additional and a strong wish on the part of the countries con-
cerned that the EBRD remain active in their markets. Graduation was not 
seen as an imminent prospect.
Shareholders also took the view that geographic shifts in EBRD opera-
tions should take place only gradually to maintain portfolio balance, credit 
quality and profitability.
25 ‘A Policy on Graduation of EBRD Operations’, 11 November 1996.
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As far as the legal position was concerned, the General Counsel, John 
Taylor, reassured the Board that the policy fell squarely within the scope of 
the AEB and Article 29.326, since the policy would result in graduation of 
a country only through the natural consequence of the application of the 
Bank’s basic operating principles and, importantly, only with the concur-
rence of the country itself.27 Alternative routes through numerical scores, 
indicators or force majeure were regarded as legally complex and requiring a 
Board of Governors’ decision.
The agreed policy decision was that the application of the Bank’s princi-
ples throughout the project cycle would determine graduation at the project 
and sub-sector level. At the country level, the transition indicators provided 
guidance but would need to be supplemented at the time in country strategy 
reports with up-to-date information on the availability of domestic and ex-
ternal finance for sovereign and corporate borrowers, credit agency ratings 
and terms and conditions of borrowing.
Conclusion
In line with the Governors’ request at Sofia, the issue of graduation had been 
resolved by the end of the year with a policy clarified and agreed. The con-
clusion that no country of operations was yet ready to embark on a gradua-
tion path was helpful in attenuating the debate and preventing distractions 
when there was clearly still much to do. There was advantage in reaching an 
early policy conclusion in an era when the issue was less contentious than it 
would be a decade or so later.28
The Governors’ decision to go ahead with a capital increase meant de 
Larosière, and his successors, could embark on a programme of rapid expan-
sion to deliver the transition results shareholders hoped for. It was a vote of 
confidence in the EBRD and de Larosière, in particular. His strategy of re-
organising the Bank and focusing on what was needed for steady growth 
had paid off. As he later wrote:
26 With a two-thirds of voting power majority.
27 ‘Memorandum on Legal Aspects of the Proposed Policy on Graduation of EBRD Operations’, 13 Novem-
ber 1996.
28 See Chapter 12.
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[The decision to double the capital was] a significant acknowledgement of 
the fact that the now profitable institution was operating in the interests 
of both the countries of operation and the shareholders … The decision … 
really marked the end of the crisis: the EBRD was no longer a subject of 
debate, mockery and controversy. It had gotten its credibility back. After 
that, no one dared to challenge its usefulness and merits.29 
29  de Larosière, 50 Years of Financial Crises, p. 179. 






Scaling Up through Financial Institutions
Introduction
One key development from the revamp of the EBRD’s strategy under de 
Larosière was an emphasis on the Bank acting as a wholesale institution 
as the most efficient way to leverage its capital, particularly with regard to 
SMEs. There remained plenty of scope for larger-sized transactions aimed 
at significant local companies and strategic players but these took time to 
develop and were not easily scalable. The great majority of resources was 
taken up with small deals in the range ECU 5 million–15 million. Con-
tinuing along this path would make it difficult to expand quickly and 
maximise the potential of the Bank to help as wide a range of clients as 
possible. Utilisation of available capital was low in these early years. De 
Larosière did not see the solution to expanding business volume and the 
Bank’s reach in terms of adding more bankers but rather in terms of in-
creasing their efficiency. 
An obvious way to achieve the desired wider impact was to develop re-
lationships with financial intermediaries and through them expand the 
Bank’s impact. The primary route for this approach was to provide loans 
and equity to depository credit institutions. Non-bank financial institu-
tions, such as insurers, were also targeted but the weakness of local finan-
cial markets and the lack of savings intermediaries such as pension funds 
precluded quick progress in this direction. Here more fundamental efforts 
were made through legal and technical work to improve the functioning of 
capital markets in many countries. However, one area that proved successful 
for leveraging the EBRD’s financing capacity was on the equity side through 
venture capital and private equity funds.
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1. The Role of Financial Institutions
The starting point for the ‘wholesale approach’ was based on the supply of 
credit lines to carefully selected financial institutions which had the capabil-
ity of reaching a broad range of businesses in need of finance. 
This approach was hampered at the beginning, however, by the virtu-
al absence in the EBRD’s region of banks run along the lines of their west-
ern equivalents. In most countries the level of financial sector development 
was very low: financial institutions were largely state-owned and centralised, 
and many were burdened by bad debts. Regulatory and supervisory institu-
tions were also in their infancy and appropriate policy frameworks had yet 
to be developed.
The first strategic document on financial sector operations, issued in 
1991, listed helping to establish market-oriented financial institutions as the 
EBRD’s main objective. This was to be done through the creation of new 
intermediaries (often with the help of strategic investors), and support for 
bank privatisations in advanced transition countries. An additional route 
suggested for the least developed countries was the use of Apex credit lines 
which funnelled EBRD finance through the central bank, with a sovereign 
guarantee, and on to banks which could lend to businesses.
As markets and rudimentary regulatory institutions began to develop 
in the Bank’s countries of operations, and with them a variety of private 
banks, the opportunity to expand business in this area increased. Provision 
of credit lines to banks for on-lending to private businesses became a feasi-
ble stream of EBRD business activity. 
There were several advantages to the approach. The EBRD’s ability to 
provide longer-tenor finance than was available in the market meant part-
ner banks could use the funds to offer a new product to their clients—
three or five-year loans instead of the more typical six to 12-month facilities, 
which required regular reviews and rollovers. The additional finance, to be-
gin with, was provided in foreign currency, which gave new partner banks 
a valuable source of scarce foreign exchange. This was useful for their trea-
sury operations and balance-sheet management. Although some larger cli-
ents of these banks who were involved in external trade were given access to 
foreign currency, the great majority of on-lending was made in local curren-
cy at the Bank’s insistence, as most sub-borrowers were unable to hedge the 
foreign-exchange risk. 
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From a development perspective, it was crucial to ensure that the sub-
loans reached business segments previously underserved by the banks. 
Among the most notable recipients here were small and micro-businesses 
and those outside the main cities or in more remote regions. 
Financial partners were eager to tap the EBRD for funds on a regular 
basis in the absence of longer-term deposits and effective local capital mar-
kets. As well as offering the opportunity to increase business volume, this al-
lowed the EBRD to be selective in choosing local partners and work closely 
with them to improve functionality, which in turn enabled an accurate as-
sessment of the success of their on-lending activities. An additional, crucial 
part of the process involved capacity and institution-building. Alongside 
the loans, technical assistance was provided to support improvements in key 
areas such as credit-risk management, accounting and management infor-
mation systems (MISs). In some cases, comprehensive institution-building 
programmes to upgrade management standards, corporate governance and 
business practices could be introduced.
Board Directors revisited the question of financial institutions in 1995, 
before agreeing on a new operations policy for the sector the following July. 
They endorsed a shift in focus to financing the real sector through interme-
diation and on institution-building at the project level. This meant more 
credit lines, including in the least advanced countries, some of which were 
still backed by sovereign guarantees. The importance of the sector to the 
EBRD’s work and its influence on transition was clear.
The [Financial and Operations Policies] Committee strongly endorsed the 
statement [that] “the financial sector is … essential for the success of the 
transition process” … and the vital role of the Bank’s financial sector oper-
ations in addressing the key strategic priorities of the Bank. These included 
support for the private sector and developing private enterprise; reaching 
and supporting the SME sector; and strengthening local financial institu-
tions in CoOs to encourage the more effective mobilisation of domestic 
savings for investment purposes.1 
1  Report of the Chairman of the Financial and Operations Policies Committee (FOPC) on the Financial 
Sector Operations Policy, 19 July 1996.
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A number of facilities aimed specifically at financial institutions were 
launched around this time. One of them was the EBRD’s very successful 
Trade Facilitation Programme (TFP), which was first piloted in 1994 and, af-
ter a series of country level programmes, promoted as a regional programme 
in 1999. Another was the Russia Small Business Fund (RSBF). Ahead of 
these programmes was one developed with the World Bank, the Financial 
Institutions Development Programme (FIDP).
The Financial Institutions Development Programme 
Shortly after Russia became a member of the World Bank, on 16 June 1992,2 
a World Bank country study3 focused on key problems in the financial sec-
tor. At the time, this was largely unreformed and geared towards a com-
mand rather than a market economy. Loans were being made to enterpris-
es that were not creditworthy. A high proportion of loans were also made to 
the companies and cooperatives that owned the banks. Political pressures 
and public policy incentives exacerbated the problems, as did weak legal, ac-
counting and supervisory arrangements. 
The study suggested a programme with the Russian authorities to devel-
op a separate tier of banks, known as international standard banks (ISBs), 
which met certain conditions, such as greater capitalisation, better practic-
es and closer supervision. Becoming an ISB would be voluntary, so the study 
suggested offering benefits to banks meeting the standards. At the time 
there were more than 1,700 commercial banks in Russia, of which 1,000 had 
been created after 1990. The rest were mainly spin-offs of former Soviet spe-
cialised entities. Most were “pocket banks” designed to finance enterprises 
owned by their shareholders and served to perpetuate the practice of con-
nected and insider lending.
The concept was refined in 1993 to allow for the gradual introduction 
of higher standards. A decision was also taken to focus on 20 to 30 lead-
ing commercial banks with the potential to form relationships with foreign 
banks and integrate into international capital markets. The project became 
known as the FIDP, and the EBRD was invited by the G7 and the Russian 
government to participate. In May 1994, the Bank’s Board approved a US 
2  It became a member of the IFC in April 1993.
3  Russia: The Banking System during Transition. The World Bank. Washington DC, 1993. 
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$100 million participation in an overall US $300 million sovereign loan to 
the Russian government.
The World Bank’s role in the project was to support the Central Bank 
of Russia (CBR) on bank supervision, regulation, accounting and auditing. 
The EBRD’s funding was intended to promote institutional development 
by strengthening the management and operational and strategic processes 
of participating banks, and modernising their IT systems. 
By the end of 1997, 39 banks covering more than 50 per cent of banking 
assets in Russia (excluding the state-owned giant Sberbank) had been ac-
credited under the programme. 
In several areas, however, the FIDP failed to achieve the desired impact. 
An Evaluation Study from 20024 noted that the influence exerted by the 
two IFIs was limited. The CBR, which should have played a significant role, 
showed little commitment and a lack of enthusiasm for systemic reform. 
Many banks used the public nature of the FIDP accreditation as a badge of 
approval for promotion purposes but failed to address the underlying prob-
lems adequately. 
 A Task Force set up to review the programme failed to monitor prog-
ress or take action quickly against banks facing deteriorating performance. 
In 1996, an examination of nine of the accredited banks found that none 
of them was financially sound. The institutional development component 
was also lacking in the majority of the accredited banks, partly due to a re-
luctance to share information. The system modernisation component fared 
better, with 25 banks taking up funds to improve IT systems. 
Disbursements under the FIDP ceased shortly after the Russian bank-
ing crisis erupted in August 1998. The remaining amounts under the pro-
gramme were cancelled at the Russian government’s request in 2000.  
Russia Small Business Fund
In the early years of the Yeltsin administration, the authorities repeated-
ly asked the EBRD for help financing small businesses as these companies 
found it hard to obtain credit from banks. The development of a healthy 
small-business sector was seen as essential to the government’s economic re-
forms. The Bank and its shareholders agreed that this was a key component 
4  ‘Financial Institutions Development Project’, Project Evaluation Department, August 2002.
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of the successful transition to a well-functioning market economy and saw 
political value in creating a new class of entrepreneurs able to represent the 
interests of small business and shareholders.
By 1993, Yeltsin was facing serious domestic pressures from conservative 
opponents and the main players among the G7 realised that he needed sup-
port, lest progress in reform slip away. In early March, President Bill Clin-
ton and François Mitterrand mooted the idea of an emergency G7 meeting 
to discuss aid to Russia and eastern Europe. Fedorov, now the Russian dep-
uty prime minister, was dispatched to a meeting in Hong Kong to brief G7 
Sherpas on the Russian situation and to seek assistance for Yeltsin’s reform 
programme. 
It was Japan’s turn to host that year’s G7 Summit. Japanese Prime Min-
ister Kiichi Miyazawa called an emergency G7 meeting for 14 and 15 April 
(ahead of a key national referendum on Russia’s leadership and reform pro-
gramme on 25 April), and invited Yeltsin to the Tokyo Summit in July.5 
The Summit led to proposals for a package of measures for Russia, some 
of which related to privatisation and enterprise restructuring and called for 
the EBRD’s involvement. Another proposal that involved the Bank explic-
itly concerned the establishment of a facility for micro and small-business fi-
nance, the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Fund. 
The fact that the G7 had turned to the EBRD for help was a vote of con-
fidence in the institution. The challenge for the Bank was that any such fund 
could quickly become depleted at a time of high inflation in Russia and in-
adequate financial infrastructure. It would also take time to develop better 
financial mechanisms, such as risk assessment and collateral requirements, 
and to obtain reliable data on the performance of relevant companies. 
The G7 was keen to get the Fund off the ground, however, and offered 
to match the US $150 million that the EBRD was prepared to finance from 
its own resources. The financing, to which other donors were invited to con-
tribute, together with EBRD’s funds met the US $300 million objective an-
nounced in Tokyo. 
The programme—which later became known as the Russia Small Busi-
ness Fund (RSBF)—had two key aims: to bring previously unbanked micro 
and small enterprises (MSEs) into the formal financial system, and to con-
tribute to institution-building and capacity-strengthening in the banking 
5  See Hugo Dobson, Japan and the G7/8: 1975–2002, Routledge Curzon, 2004, pp. 98–99.
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sector. To this end, the EBRD provided training to partner banks in areas 
including credit analysis for MSE financing. It also helped them expand and 
diversify their client bases.6 RSBF donor contributions were split into two 
Special Funds, one for debt co-financing and the other for technical assis-
tance (mostly consisting of training programmes).
Implementation of the RSBF began in 1994 with a pilot phase conduct-
ed in Tula, Nizhniy Novgorod and Tomsk, which were chosen because they 
had previously been closed or military zones. The idea was to stimulate en-
trepreneurship and provide finance for cities in decline.7 
The RSBF began with the idea of providing loans, small investments in 
equity and business advisory services. Funds provided by G7 countries and 
Switzerland provided support through two windows, one a first loss cover 
for investments, the other for technical assistance. A small enterprise equi-
ty fund was tried out in two regions but the main thrust of the programme 
was bank-to-bank lending for local currency on-lending to small and mi-
cro enterprises and risk-sharing of sub-loans, along with capacity building 
in partner institutions.
After the pilot phase, it was rolled out across Russia and proved to be 
one of the most successful EBRD programmes, bringing new financing op-
portunities to a wide array of small businesses.  By the time it was formally 
wound up at the end of 2017, more than 874,000 loans worth over US$ 17 
billion had been issued to small businesses. More than 40 partner banks re-
ceived institutional support, helping to create the structures that were nec-
essary to support lending to SMEs throughout Russia.
Of equal importance was the wide geographic spread of the loans, with 
more than 90 per cent made outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, including 
strong representation in the Urals and Siberia through regional banks. It 
was a highly visible programme that created a strong brand for the EBRD 
and a lasting legacy, with many alumni of the programme’s training com-
ponent going on to occupy important positions in some of the top banks 
in Russia.8
6  Russian Small Business Fund Strategic Review, 2011, p. 6.
7  The EBRD used consultants from South Shore Bank, Chicago, a specialist institution that had successful-
ly built lending programmes in ghetto districts in the USA.
8  Russian Small Business Fund Strategic Review, 2011, see p. 4, 6, 8, 10–11. The Bank replicated the model in 
Moldova, Kazakhstan and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Trade Finance
Another area that fitted well with de Larosière’s ambitions to scale up op-
erations was the facilitation of trade. In keeping with an intensified focus 
on wholesale activities, from 1994 the EBRD introduced a trade-facilita-
tion product aimed at financial intermediaries rather than individual ex-
porters and importers. This involved providing guarantees to cover the pay-
ment risks of banks in countries of operations which were providing letters 
of credit on behalf of local companies. 
The EBRD had the advantage of being well-known among potential cor-
respondent banks in the West—such as ABN Amro, Raiffeisen Zentral-
bank Österreich (RZB) and Bank of America—which were interested 
in developing relationships with banks in the East.  It could play an 
intermediating role by helping the more reliable and better-managed local fi-
nancial institutions to develop their capacity to conduct trade-finance trans-
actions and build up their reputation in this aspect of bank business. The 
EBRD’s hope was that trade could become more robust and that the lack of 
available finance for this purpose, particularly for smaller or less well-known 
local companies, would no longer be an impediment to growth.
There were, however, initial obstacles to rolling out a trade finance pro-
gramme. The EBRD’s articles stated: “The Bank shall not issue guarantees 
for export credits nor undertake insurance activities.” This was intended to 
prevent the Bank from replicating the work of national export credit agen-
cies. As a result, Directors insisted on a legal opinion before committing to 
offer EBRD guarantees in support of trade. Early in 1994, General Coun-
sel Andre Newburg set out the Bank’s legal position in the context of a pro-
posal for a pilot trade facilitation programme with Komercijalna Banka in 
FYR Macedonia.  
Newburg argued that there was a distinction between guarantees relat-
ing to the payment risks associated with banks facilitating trade and guaran-
tees covering risks to export credits linked to transactions made by export-
ers or importers.  Under this interpretation, the EBRD would guarantee 
that the relevant bank, in this case Komercijalna Banka, would honour its 
financial obligations to the foreign bank. The EBRD would thus assume the 
general credit risk of Komercijalna Banka rather than the credit risk of the 
exporter or importer as in the case of credit guarantees. The Board accepted 
the General Counsel’s reasoning. 
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Mechanisms to support banks and their role in promoting trade in Rus-
sia and eastern Europe at that time were much needed. In the years since the 
late 1980s, after the switch to hard-currency convertibility and internation-
al market prices, external trade had suffered a precipitous drop, particular-
ly among former Comecon partners and between the Republics of the for-
mer Soviet Union (FSU). 
By mid-1994, the EBRD estimated Eastern European9 exports to Russia 
were 32 per cent of their 1988 level,10 with the corresponding figure for in-
tra-Eastern European trade 46 per cent; Russia’s exports to Eastern Europe 
were estimated to be 23 per cent of their 1988 levels. 
Although trade with the West had improved, led by the “fast-reform-
ers” of central Europe, it was insufficient to compensate for the decline 
elsewhere. Moreover, with the downturn in trade came a considerable 
breakdown of commercial links between countries. This had negative con-
sequences for growth in the region and put a spotlight on factors holding 
trade back. Many fundamental obstacles and institutional weaknesses were 
to blame (as well as macroeconomic policies), but the failure of the financial 
sector to intermediate trade also played a significant role.
 Management argued that supporting trade was one of the main objec-
tives of the EBRD and that commercially oriented trade finance, which 
was fundamental to the facilitation of trade in western economies, could 
be developed in countries of operations with the Bank’s help. The aim was 
to stimulate trade by increasing the availability of finance and by lowering 
transaction costs. The Bank was able to do this to good effect by supplying 
funding and through its ability to manage and assume risks and its informa-
tion advantage. It was able to enhance markets and create track records and 
transaction experience. To assist with the latter, institution-building was 
improved through the use of technical co-operation funds, which were also 
used to strengthen local legislation and regulation.
The Board took a while to accept the idea. This was partly due to a feel-
ing that short-term trade finance was not “proper investment” and thus a 
questionable use of the EBRD’s resources.  However, once it was explained 
  9 ‘Regional: Trade Facilitation Strategy’, p. 7. Eastern Europe in this definition included Albania, Bulgaria, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, former Yugoslavia and the German Demo-
cratic Republic through 1990. Data excluded new foreign trade (i.e. trade among the successor states of the 
CSFR and Yugoslavia).
10 Former Soviet Union, rather than Russian Federation.
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how trade finance worked and that each transaction would be signed off by 
Bank staff (with arms, tobacco and other prohibited transactions excluded), 
Directors became more relaxed about the idea and the proposal was final-
ly endorsed.
Once under way, the TFP accelerated quickly. It became one of the larg-
est and longest-running programmes offered by the EBRD and continues to 
this day to help with trade in the least advanced countries. Up until the start 
of 2020 since it became a regional programme in 1999, the TFP had sup-
ported 25,350 transactions for €20.5 billion in trade in partnership with 218 
partner banks across 31 EBRD countries of operations. 
2. Post-Privatisation Programmes and Private Equity
An early effort to create a Special Restructuring Programme (SRP)11 to as-
sist countries that had been slow to implement privatisation programmes 
ran into trouble. The aim had been to provide equity to troubled enterprises 
where it was thought they could be made viable once stabilised and restruc-
tured.12 Part of the attraction was that many were larger state-owned enter-
prises which might ultimately be privatised. However, the scale of potential 
job losses, political factors and misaligned interests between the many par-
ties involved resulted in little visible progress. 
Much more successful—and in keeping with the wholesale ‘leveraged’ 
approach—were efforts to stimulate post-privatisation company improve-
ments with the use of fund managers. A number of Post-Privatisation Funds 
(PPFs) were launched from late 1995 onwards. Similar to SRPs they differed 
in one important respect: the SRPs involved a partnership with sovereign 
states and government agencies (and state-owned banks), whereas the PPFs 
targeted privatised firms whose owners could negotiate more straightfor-
ward shareholder agreements (and realistic entry valuations) with the Bank 
and its fund managers. Their precursor was the Regional Venture Funds 
(RVFs) programme in Russia.
11 SRPs were approved for Poland (1994), Slovenia (1994), Latvia (1996) and Hungary (1996). The concept was 
also used to explore the conversion of a number of military enterprises in Russia in 1992.
12 According to one Bank participant, the programme was partly modelled on the experience of British Steel 
which had been successfully restructured and privatised in the 1980s. 
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Regional Venture Funds
In 1993, the political situation in Russia was hindering the progress of dem-
ocratic and economic reforms. The economic situation was extremely poor, 
with GDP projected to decline by 10–15 per cent after an estimated drop of 
19 per cent in 1992 and a fall of 9 per cent in 1991.13 Progress on privatisation 
was one of the few bright spots, with more than 50,000 small-scale business-
es having been transferred into private hands. The restructuring and privati-
sation of medium-sized enterprises had lagged behind, however, and the sit-
uation with very large state-owned enterprises was even worse. 
The 25 April 1993 referendum, which lent support to Yeltsin’s reform 
policy, and the appointment of well-known reformer Yegor Gaidar as first 
deputy prime minister in September, improved the operating environment 
and gave new impetus to the EBRD’s operations in Russia. It was decided 
that the Bank’s privatisation work should shift from the implementation of 
state asset sales towards the provision of post-privatisation support.14 This 
approach was supported by Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, who 
was in charge of the GKI, Russia’s privatisation ministry. Chubais wanted a 
fund to help finance enterprise post-privatisation restructuring as a princi-
pal means for encouraging and demonstrating the value of privatisation and 
to reinforce the efforts of the reformers.15
It was in the run-up to the Tokyo G7 summit, where support for Yeltsin 
was already on the table, that the EBRD proposed the idea of the RVF Pro-
gramme as its contribution to supporting Russian privatisation.16 This fitted 
well with G7 and EU plans and became incorporated in a new initiative, the 
Special Privatisation and Restructuring Programme (SPRP).17 
13 After later revisions, outturns for 1991 and 1992 respectively were -5.0 per cent and -14.5 per cent. The out-
turn for 1993 was -8.7 per cent (followed by a fall of 12.6 per cent the following year). Source: World Bank.
14 This was a more general conclusion that applied to the EBRD’s countries of operations as a whole and not 
just to Russia. 
15 Mid-Term Review of the Regional Venture Funds Programme (Russian Federation), Appendix 2.
16 The Bank proposed US $125 million equity be invested in Russian privatised enterprises through RVFs, 
provided matching grant finance was available. 
17 The relevant section of the Economic Declaration of 9 July 1993 read: “Recognizing that privatization and 
enterprise reform are at the heart of Russia’s transformation into a market economy, we agree to create a 
Special Privatization and Restructuring Program, in cooperation with international financial institutions, 
consisting of enterprise restructuring support, technical assistance and oblast support, focusing on an ini-
tial period to the end of 1994. In total, this program is expected to mobilize $3 billion. In addition, we are 
ready to encourage our private sectors to assist in this process, sharing with their Russian counterparts 
methods and techniques to increase productivity.”
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The rapid transfer of ownership to the private sector meant that few en-
terprises had had the opportunity prior to privatisation to make the changes 
necessary to adapt to the commercial realities of the private sector. Effective 
corporate governance was largely absent, as were modern management tech-
niques. There was also a severe shortage of risk capital to finance the growth 
of privatised companies. 
When the RVF Programme was being drawn up, the EBRD already had 
some experience of investing in private-equity funds, mostly in central Eu-
rope. Such funds were seen as an effective way for the Bank to supply rela-
tively small amounts of capital and know-how to a wide range of enterpris-
es, with a portfolio approach helping to spread the very high risks involved. 
The private-equity template provided the basis for setting up funds to invest 
proactively in local companies and fitted under the restructuring umbrella 
of the SPRP approach. 
The main objectives of the RVF Programme were to create a demonstra-
tion effect across Russia of the value of private capital and entrepreneurial 
behaviour and to develop an infrastructure for private-equity investments 
in medium-sized private companies in Russian regions. The hope was that 
this would demonstrate the viability of private-equity investing in Russia 
and in the process attract more private-equity investors to the country. The 
dearth of equity in the Bank’s countries of operations, and especially in the 
Russian regions, meant the initiative was warmly welcomed by the Board.18
It was nonetheless a challenging proposition for the Bank, given the risks 
involved in investing in companies that needed considerable financial and 
managerial help, in a market that remained vulnerable to macroeconom-
ic shocks. There was also a lack of private-equity fund managers with early-
stage investing experience in Russian regions, and most owners of compa-
nies had little understanding of the concept of private equity or experience 
of working with the sector. Donor funds were needed to provide cover for 
the extra risks involved and to help with the high cost of the delivery mech-
anism. Technical co-operation finance was used to pay the expenses of the 
fund managers and for due diligence on potential investee companies on the 
one hand and post-investment consulting support on the other. This was ex-
pected to form a high share (40 per cent) of the costs of the programme, split 
18 The first RVF, for Smolensk, was approved by the Board on 25 January 1994. It was seen as an “important 
initiative” and a “particularly innovative instrument”. 
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roughly half and half between the two components.19 The largest donor was 
the EU, followed by Germany, the USA, Japan, the Nordic countries, Ita-
ly and France. 
Between 1994 and 1997, 11 RVFs were set up, each run by a separate fund 
manager. Apart from a pilot project in Smolensk, each received a US $30 mil-
lion capital commitment from the Bank for investing in target companies, 
together with an allocation of US $20 million of donor grants. Investments 
were expected to be in a range of US $300,000 to US $3 million and de-
signed to support the rationalisation, modernisation and expansion of pro-
ductive capacity. At least 75 per cent of the voting shares of a target compa-
ny had to be held by private shareholders prior to the RVF investment. The 
funds covered the sweep of Russia’s regions and, like the SRPs, were managed 
funds with each individual investment by a RVF held on the EBRD’s balance 
sheet.20 Experienced private-equity fund managers were sought to run each 
of the RVFs. In aiming to create an infrastructure for private-equity invest-
ments, the programme sought to establish a successful network of fund man-
agers with strong track records of investing in medium-sized private compa-
nies that would encourage other investors to follow suit. 
Considerable operational difficulties were faced initially, mainly as a re-
sult of the differing degrees of commitment by the various fund managers. 
Progress at the start of the programme was slow. By mid-1997, only 22 in-
vestments had been signed for a total value of US $33 million, accounting 
for just 11 per cent of the capital committed. Donor commitments were also 
lower than expected. Given there was no precedent for such a programme 
in the regions of Russia, it was not wholly surprising that it took time for 
portfolios to build up. A bigger issue was the variation in quality of the fund 
managers, the inefficiency of small deals and the limited size of some funds. 
A review in 1998 led to the consolidation of some funds and the removal of 
several fund managers.21 As a result, with the exception of the two funds 
covering the far east and southern Russia, most funds completed their cap-
19 The external consultant component turned out to be about half as expensive as anticipated, making the 
TC/EBRD capital ratio nearer 30:70 than 40:60 as originally expected.
20 Russian legislative constraints precluded setting up the funds in Russia. There was no apparent benefit in 
incorporating them as offshore venture capital funds given that the EBRD was the sole investor (at least in 
the start-up phase). The managed-account approach also had the advantage of retaining the Bank’s immu-
nities and privileges, including tax exemptions.
21 Some fund managers agreed to take over existing portfolios of underperforming investments which re-
quired intensive workout efforts and detracted from their fund’s overall performance. 
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ital investment within the following five years. Five fund managers proved 
to be particularly successful and only one fund out of the seven remaining 
after consolidation failed to earn a positive return. Moreover, four indepen-
dently created follow-on funds. 
The RVF experience contained some important lessons for the EBRD. 
Some of these were technical, such as ensuring that funds had sufficient cap-
ital to achieve a critical mass of investments and that estimates were made 
of the optimal and minimum deal size for the particular context. Others 
were more general. For example, it became apparent that raising of capital 
for follow-on funds required time and separate resources, which needed to 
be managed in a way that did not detract from maximising the value of ex-
isting investments and exits. 
Most instructive was the realisation that identifying strong and commit-
ted managers was essential. The experience of using “fly-in” senior managers 
supplemented by local staff had not proved effective. Successful managers 
were those who were prepared to commit to the region and devote hands-on 
support to investee companies to help them realise their potential and pre-
pare them for exit and the next stage of their development. This also meant 
the introduction of managers who were not merely financial engineers but 
possessed a range of managerial skills. Typically, these were people who were 
able to motivate multidisciplinary teams of expatriates and local specialists. 
The establishment of management teams based in Russia added to the co-
hesion of the programme and facilitated the monitoring of investments and 
the negotiation and completion of exits.22
The EBRD’s early review of the RVFs, which was made all the more ur-
gent by the 1998 Russian crisis, was instrumental in ensuring the success of 
the programme. While the measures taken did not ensure the success of ev-
ery fund, they allowed many to reach a more efficient size and to be run by 
high-quality management teams. A skills transfer was also evident as expe-
rience grew in the surviving RVFs and as local staff trained in these funds 
moved in due course to other positions in competing funds. Nurturing the 
funds also required a major and time-consuming effort on the part of the 
EBRD’s staff, from active participation on the supervisory boards and in-
vestment committees of the management companies to portfolio monitor-
ing. The managed account approach, which had been deemed necessary in 
22 This section draws on an Evaluation Department Special Study of the RVF Programme (Russia).
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the absence of fund managers with a track record in Russia, was seen in ret-
rospect as overly burdensome. It was far more efficient to rely on fund man-
agers with expertise in equity investing and local contacts to deploy the 
EBRD’s capital at the micro level, rather than have the Bank in effect dupli-
cate the monitoring of individual investments in the sub-portfolios of funds. 
Russian Venture Capital Association
Another notable outcome of the RVF Programme was the setting up of the 
Russian Venture Capital Association (RVCA). The idea came from a semi-
nar for RVF managers held in St. Petersburg in December 1996. The RVCA 
was created the following year, with several Bank funds becoming founder-
members. The aim was to promote best industry practice, with members re-
quired to adhere to the RVCA Code of Conduct. This was modelled on the 
standards of the European Venture Capital Association, which the RVCA 
joined as an associate member in 1997. The founding of the RVCA helped 




The RVF programme was followed by a broader-based Post-Privatisation 
Funds (PPF) initiative, through which the Bank began to invest in medium-
sized enterprises in a range of countries from 1995 onwards. While many 
private investment funds existed by this time focused on the more advanced 
countries in the EBRD’s region, there were few dedicated country funds. 
Most equity funds were regional with a broad focus, with limited invest-
ments in EBRD countries of operation and targeting the best companies 
or, occasionally, start-up situations. The PPFs targeted higher-risk privatised 
and private medium-sized companies (typically with 100 to 2000 employ-
ees) in which other financiers would not invest. This helped to fill a gap and 
assured the Bank’s additionality.
The first PPF was approved for the Slovak Republic23 in November 1995 
and was followed soon after by PPFs for the Baltics24 and Kazakhstan (Feb-
23 Although the fund was approved in November 1995, it was not signed until April 1996 and its first invest-
ment was not made until over a year later. 
24 This began as a PPF in Lithuania and an SRP in Latvia, but the latter attracted no investments and was can-
celled in early 1998. Its capital was transferred to the Lithuanian PPF, which was renamed the Baltic PPF.
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ruary 1996) and Romania (June 1996). PPFs for Ukraine and Bulgaria were 
approved in December 1997.25 The PPFs were designed to provide local pri-
vate-sector financing in the absence of a banking sector able to supply me-
dium-term funds and to instil better management practices in newly priva-
tised enterprises. Many companies had been dependent on state subsidies 
or cheap loans, which were being withdrawn, and needed new sources of 
funds. Few among the new class of shareholders had money to invest, nor 
did they have much idea of how to deliver effective governance for their en-
terprises.  
As with the RVFs, the best-performing PPFs were those with competent 
and committed expatriate managers with stable and dedicated local teams. 
Investments by the funds in terms of deployment of available capital and re-
turns were good in the Baltic, Romanian and Ukrainian funds, while returns 
across the whole set of PPFs were generally satisfactory, even after taking the 
costs of technical co-operation into account. Not only did the EBRD help 
create new sources of equity financing for SMEs in the region but, through 
the fund managers, is was also able to introduce corporate-governance im-
provements, such as the introduction of supervisory boards and improved 
transparency and disclosure (audit and IAS statements for example).
Private Equity Funds
Equity funds also offered a way to deliver the wholesale approach. Placing 
EBRD capital with experienced equity fund managers to help them invest 
in a range of companies multiplied the impact the Bank could have on sup-
porting and driving businesses forward. Moreover, as these funds were able 
to take majority stakes, unlike the Bank, and with their general partners 
having ‘skin in the game’ they could exert control over companies and their 
future direction as well as improve their corporate governance. This sent a 
strong signal to the market about best commercial practices and effective 
management.
EBRD investments in these funds began to accelerate with the expan-
sion of business during de Larosière’s Presidency. Indeed, in the years from 
25 PPFs were also approved for the Czech Republic and Uzbekistan. The Uzbek fund was cancelled before any 
disbursement took place, while the Czech fund was restructured in 1997 as the Czech Direct Equity Fund 
with enhanced sponsorship. 
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1993 to 1997, more than 50 equity fund projects were signed, amounting to 
half the total signed between 1991 and 2007. This matched the desire to in-
crease equity activity that had been identified as an important objective in 
the operations policy review, and was helped by improving economic condi-
tions across much of the region at that time.
A similar pattern was seen in equity investments in banks, with about 
one-third of the total for this period made in 1993 through 1997. This re-
flected the Bank’s efforts on privatisation, including post-privatisation sup-
port. The number of deals involving lending to banks was also around one-
third of the total.
After an initial wave of enthusiasm on the part of foreign sponsors 
seeking equity opportunities in the newly-opened countries of the East, 
many withdrew as they came to realise quick returns would not be forth-
coming and that long-term active support would be needed. Many ma-
jor private equity investors soon designated the region as non-core. This 
allowed the EBRD to assist those more intrepid investors who were pre-
pared to make a longer term commitment. The Bank became a catalyst for 
private equity in the region, in many ways providing the linchpin for its 
development. The EBRD was very widely consulted as new funds emerged 
and as successful funds launched second or third generation funds. The 
Bank was sought after by fund managers for its expertise and understand-
ing of the region and for its consistent ability to supply new capital, includ-
ing through co-investments.26
Within ten years of starting operations the EBRD had committed €1.5 
billion in private equity funds with a joint capital of over €5 billion. Around 
half the commitments were in expansion or buy-out funds which targeted 
larger companies, while just under a fifth (though more in terms of number) 
were venture capital type funds. The rest were donor-supported first gener-
ation funds, mostly in less advanced transition countries, and second gener-
ation funds. Among the most successful were the Polish Private Equity and 
Enterprise Funds and Baring Vostok in Russia. Strong managers with a clear 
strategic focus and direction once again played an important part in success 
in conjunction with the EBRD’s partnership role. 
26 During the 1990s, three single-fund co-investment facilities were established. These were replaced in 2000 
with a region-wide Private Equity Funds Co-Investment Facility, which was a more successful vehicle for 
this activity.
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By the turn of the decade and into the 2000s, the EBRD was the leading 
private equity fund investor in the region—the biggest by far—and mak-
ing good returns from the successful funds it had backed. The use of expe-
rienced fund managers leveraged the Bank’s capacity to improve the perfor-
mance of the corporate sector. The Bank played a unique role in supporting 
an industry that helped to fill a major transition gap—by addressing the lack 
of an equity culture and instilling good corporate governance.
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Supporting Privatisation  
and Restructuring
1. Early Thinking
With its unique ability to work with both the public and private sectors 
using a range of financial instruments, the EBRD was well-placed to sup-
port enterprise restructuring and privatisation in central and eastern Eu-
rope. Its resident Board, which included the relevant countries of operations 
as well as countries with recent experience of privatisation such as the UK 
and Mexico,1 was also able to contribute to the task. The Bank lost no time 
in preparing the ground for this business, which for many was a core task of 
the new institution.
From the outset there was much debate about the speed with which lib-
eralisation should be pursued in former socialist countries. Poland, for ex-
ample, had already embarked on a rapid programme of reform under Fi-
nance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Leszek Balcerowicz.
Academics such as Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University and David Lip-
ton of the World Institute for Development Economics Research2 argued 
that freeing up prices and trade (including currency convertibility) as quick-
ly as possible—combined with reduced restrictions on private economic ac-
tivity, improved discipline in the state sector and macroeconomic stabili-
1  A conference co-sponsored by the Mexican government was held at the Bank in November 1992.
2  See, for example, D. Lipton and J. Sachs, ‘Privatisation in Eastern Europe: the Case of Poland’, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 1990, No. 2; and D. Lipton and J. Sachs, ‘Creating a Market Economy in 
Eastern Europe: the Case of Poland’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 1990, No. 1. Also D. Lip-
ton and J. Sachs, ‘Prospects for Russia’s Economic Reforms’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 
1992, No. 2.
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ty—would start the reallocation of resources and create an environment 
conducive to growth and entrepreneurship. As Sachs explained in an article 
in The Economist in January 1990: 
The economic and political complexities of the transition to a market econ-
omy argue strongly for a decisive and comprehensive approach, such as the 
new Polish economic programme.3
Sachs’ vision for the reform process in eastern Europe extolled the vir-
tues of the Balcerowicz Plan, despite the risks of a political backlash. 
As well as helping to establish a private sector and embed the concept 
of private ownership, privatisation of state enterprises was expected to pro-
vide the opportunity for entrepreneurs to exploit efficiency gains by re-
structuring these companies. Profits would then be invested in new tech-
nology and in industries where latent demand was strong. According to 
this view, “shock therapy” would quickly establish functioning markets, 
force existing enterprises to restructure and create the conditions for new 
business start-ups.4 This in turn would create demand for supportive insti-
tutions that would reinforce the path towards a properly functioning mar-
ket system. 
Others were sceptical of this “big bang” approach, believing that rapid 
liberalisation in politically fluid and weak institutional environments posed 
a number of risks.5 One was that more jobs would be lost through the down-
sizing of inefficient enterprises than were created by new businesses, causing 
unemployment to rise. Another was that pushing through privatisation be-
fore enterprises had been restructured could result in many failures and a 
consequent loss of support for market-based solutions. 
The alternative was a “gradualist approach” to liberalisation and priva-
tisation. In principle, this would allow state enterprises to adjust their op-
erations and workforce more slowly, allow time for the development of new 
business models, and enable new private-sector companies to expand at the 
same rate as the decline of the state sector. The risk with this strategy was 
3  He continued “Poland’s goal is to establish the economic, legal and institutional basis for a private sector 
market economy in just one year.” The Economist, 13 January 1990.
4  EBRD, Transition Report 1999, p. 27.
5  Larry Summers, a future US Treasury Secretary, was one of those who took a less sanguine view on the 
speed of privatisation. See Brookings Papers (1990).
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that a partially reformed economy might allow rent-seeking and vested in-
terests to block further reforms.6
2. The Bank’s Approach
When the EBRD was inaugurated in 1991, there was little doubt among 
its economists of the need for rapid price liberalisation, the introduction of 
competition and the removal of the soft or non-existent budget constraints 
of state enterprises that had bedevilled the socialist economies. In central 
Europe, the process was already underway. Further to the east and south, 
however, it was only just beginning. 
Not all privatisations were challenging or controversial. At the lower end 
of the scale, the process largely involved transferring the ownership of shops, 
hotels and other small businesses to private-sector owners, usually those 
who already ran them. Individual profits, control and impact on the wid-
er economy were limited. Poland, the CSFR and Hungary had scored early 
successes with this type of small-asset privatisation. In the CSFR, for exam-
ple, some 20,000 small enterprises were privatised by the end of 1991.
The privatisation and restructuring of medium-sized and especially larg-
er enterprises presented more of a challenge. Here much bigger issues were 
at stake: the livelihoods of large numbers of workers, the control of monop-
olies, and the management of strategic industries and crucial financial in-
frastructure. In this context, the EBRD was eager to help develop the right 
conditions for successful privatisations, a process that in some countries was 
going to need intensive policy dialogue and technical assistance ahead of in-
vestment.
Management was also aware that privatisation and restructuring were 
closely linked, in that both were designed to enable enterprises to succeed 
in a competitive environment. Restructuring was inevitable: decisions on 
privatisation determined when it should be carried out and by whom. State 
and private actors had very different incentives. The former had to respond 
to voter concerns about job losses and the returns on the sale of state assets, 
while private-sector buyers were responsible to shareholders seeking good fi-
nancial returns. 
6  EBRD, Transition Report 1999, p. 29.
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This tension was reflected in interventions by the EBRD in many privati-
sations and related restructurings, especially in cases where the state wanted to 
retain a stake in the enterprise. The Bank in general took a selective, pragmatic 
case-by-case stance on privatisation. Its position was set out in a paper on ‘The 
Bank’s Policy Approach to Privatisation Advice’, which nevertheless stressed: 
Although it is too early in the overall privatisation process for the Bank 
to endorse a particular doctrine, some conclusions may be drawn … most 
categories of enterprises should be privatised speedily through a fair and 
transparent process, by following simple rules.7
For the majority of state enterprises, privatisation without undue delay 
was the Bank’s recommended route. Simple and transparent administrative 
and commercial rules to effect a rapid wide-scale transfer of assets and enter-
prises to new owners were suggested, with programmes aimed at providing 
equality of opportunity to different classes of investors. 
For larger enterprises, many of which were unviable, the situation was 
more complicated. Significant funding would be required, as well as large-
scale restructuring, and their importance to the economy made the process 
politically sensitive. The state would often seek to maintain a significant 
stake for strategic and other reasons. Sales would require diligent prepara-
tion and marketing and most likely follow a staged approach, which would 
allow the EBRD to deploy a degree of selectivity in its interventions. 
More enlightened local policymakers were aware that the restructuring 
and privatisation of state behemoths was necessary to improve their perfor-
mance and that of the wider economy. They also understood the need for a 
sound legal, financial and institutional framework to exert discipline on en-
terprises that had market clout or close political connections. 
The 1992 paper noted several different techniques for achieving privatisa-
tion, from public offerings to private sales by negotiation or tender to strate-
gic investors (including foreign investors), free mass privatisation  “voucher” 
distribution schemes, management and employee buy-outs, and asset sales 
through liquidations. The method depended on local circumstances—for 
example, initial public offerings (IPOs) would only work in countries where 
capital markets were sufficiently developed. 
7  ‘The Bank’s Policy Approach to Privatisation Advice’, 1992, p. 3.
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For some enterprises, privatisation was not appropriate without the 
adoption of a regulatory framework to protect the public interest. With nat-
ural monopolies such as the supply of water and other utilities, for example, 
and dominant enterprises in a sector or companies able to exploit high bar-
riers to entry, market-oriented outcomes through privatisation required ad-
equate safeguards to be in place to ensure effective competition.
 
Military conversion
One area requiring radical reform and deep restructuring concerned enter-
prises involved in military production. With the Cold War over, there was 
an additional reason to reorient these military-industrial complexes beyond 
the task of developing the private sector. The significant spending on de-
fence of the Soviet era was no longer needed or affordable. This presented a 
formidable challenge. The closure of factories and the break-up of large or-
ganisations as procurement orders declined would have social and regional 
consequences, due to the concentration of many military-related enterpris-
es in specific—and often remote—areas.8 The secretive character of the sec-
tor, combined with its privileged status, lack of cost-consciousness and con-
servative attitudes to change among both management and workers, meant 
defence conversion was expected to be especially challenging. Nevertheless, 
management believed the EBRD could play a role in the process.
Military conversion was not unprecedented: it had taken place on a large 
scale in Japan, Europe and the USA after the Second World War. There, 
however, it had been largely a matter of converting civilian facilities that had 
been requisitioned for the war effort back to their original use. In the former 
Soviet Union, thousands of enterprises had been built specifically for mil-
itary production with no preceding management culture based on civilian 
production. The scale of the problem was significant: the armaments indus-
try in Russia alone involved some 1,500 to 2,000 enterprises and more than 
10 million employees, while up to 50 per cent of industrial output was de-
fence-related.9 
8  The EBRD, based on discussions with western experts, estimated the productivity of the best military es-
tablishments at 30 per cent to 40 per cent of similar foreign ones. 
9  Estimates for the former Soviet Union were 2,000 to 3,000 enterprises, with Ukraine the second-ranked re-
public after Russia. 
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Banks
Another priority for the EBRD was the privatisation of banks. Modernising 
the banking system of transition economies was key to achieving a more effi-
cient allocation of resources and supporting SMEs.
In central and eastern Europe, the state banking systems inherited from 
communist times were problematic. Opportunities for privatisation would 
remain limited until the substantial unrecoverable loans from state enter-
prises on banks’ books had been dealt with and capital injected to permit 
portfolio write-downs. For example, even in Poland it was estimated that 
substandard loans in the banking system amounted to at least 15–20 per 
cent of total assets, while in Bulgaria as much as 60 per cent of banks’ loan 
portfolios were non-performing. Administrative and management skills—
such as credit assessment, loan monitoring and payments systems—were 
also notoriously deficient. 
Large enterprises
Many large enterprises were also unattractive to private-sector, and especial-
ly foreign, investors. Years of non-market pricing, lavish subsidies, lack of 
proper accounting and cosy relationships between managers and their po-
litical masters made assessing the enterprise value of state-owned firms ex-
tremely challenging. In more strategic areas, especially those offering the 
prospect of large profits, local relationships were difficult for outsiders to 
navigate. Restructuring in many cases was needed before private investment 
would be forthcoming.
The Governors’ first roundtable discussion
At the EBRD’s first Annual Meeting in Budapest in April 1992, there was 
general agreement that the Bank’s aim with regard to privatisation was “to 
work sensitively and cooperatively with its members from countries of oper-
ations, to help them make choices… and to help them deal with the conse-
quences of those choices”. In countries just starting on a privatisation path, 
the Bank sought to provide advice based on pilot projects, mostly through 
technical assistance funds. Where the institutional framework was reason-
ably well-developed, it could play a more operational role through lending 
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and equity investments and by supporting enterprises seeking new, especial-
ly foreign, investors.
When it came to the restructuring of large state enterprises, the EBRD 
was prepared to consider the provision of loan financing where long-term 
viability was likely. Equity investment was deemed too risky at the restruc-
turing stage. Defence conversion looked financially unattractive for simi-
lar reasons. Instead, the Bank advocated the provision of enhanced tech-
nical assistance and proposed setting up a Special Restructuring Facility to 
deal with problematic, larger state enterprises. Because financial institutions 
were seen as fundamental to the economic transformation of command 
economies, advising on and participating in the restructuring and eventual 
privatisation of state-owned banks was seen as a priority.10
While agreeing on the importance of speed in the privatisation process, 
the Governors concluded that restructuring should be taken on a case-by-
case basis, depending on the size and nature of the enterprise. They noted 
that, for large enterprises, “operational and financial restructuring will re-
quire enormous resources, innovative approaches and will take much time”.11
3. Advice on Privatisation Programmes
Despite a cautious view on large-scale privatisation, there was agreement on 
the urgent need to find ways to develop the private sector which the Bank 
and the Board could support. Close cooperation with the authorities was an 
important strategic move in this direction. Being aware of transactions in 
the pipeline, as well as gaining a better understanding of the associated po-
litical and financial risks, enabled the Bank to choose which privatisations 
and restructurings to participate in when the time came.
The EBRD provided advice to governments on privatisation pro-
grammes, organising and reviewing key recommendations and discussing 
with authorities. It also advised on specific transactions, helping to identify 
bottlenecks, set precedents and provide “sell-side” expertise. 
10 First Annual Meeting Paper for the Closed Session of the Board of Governors, Privatisation, Restructuring 
and Defence Conversion.
11 Chairman’s Report to Governors, 14 April 1992.
After the Berlin Wall
158
Moscow City
One of the Bank’s first advisory assignments was with Moscow City.12 Here 
three ‘pilot transactions’ were looked at, including a consumer plastics man-
ufacturer, a stone processing factory and a gelatine manufacturer. The expe-
rience of providing advice gave insights into the problems facing investors in 
privatisation in Russia and led to some important conclusions. 
Moscow City owned around 17,000 enterprises of which the vast majori-
ty—more than 95 per cent—had fewer than 200 employees and non-real es-
tate assets of under US$ 20,000. They were over-manned, by factors of up to 
500 per cent, and the general state of their industrial plant and equipment 
was very poor. The technology was mostly obsolete and the cannibalisation 
of machines to keep others working was endemic. Confusingly, there was a 
proliferation of agencies competing for authority over the privatisation pro-
cess. In the case of the Moscow State Property Agency (MKI), which the 
Bank worked with as it was the most obvious lead authority, EBRD bankers 
recalled a lack of administrative capacity and an unwillingness at all levels 
to make judgements and take decisions. Furthermore, while the Russian pri-
vatisation law had imported concepts and approaches developed elsewhere, 
they had not yet been tested in Russia. Workers’ collectives also complicat-
ed the picture. Many claimed historic rights to take over the enterprises, but 
had little knowledge of what was needed to improve performance and sur-
vive in the new market economy. Furthermore, insiders and political con-
nections served to undermine the process.
The Bank concluded that privatisation in Moscow—and in Russia more 
generally—faced three main problems: a huge managerial task of privatising 
a large number of low-value enterprises in a short time with market forces 
likely to bankrupt many, if not most, of them; a unique shortage of entrepre-
neurs and managers willing and capable of transforming privatised entities 
into viable and successful businesses (central Europe had lost two genera-
tions of entrepreneurs, whereas Russia had lost at least four); and widespread 
problems of legal interpretation and corruption. The EBRD concluded: 
“The present setting is not conducive to efficient, fair and transparent priva-
12 The advisory programme ran from 1991. A similar programme was carried out in St. Petersburg where, as 
in Moscow, three pilot transactions—in this case involving a consumer products manufacturer, a confec-
tionery manufacturer and a chain of department stores—were considered for the city’s privatisation pro-
gramme. EBRD, Annual Report 1991, p. 44.
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tisation.” It advised that radical changes to establish a consistent legal basis, 
a single independent professional privatisation agency, standard valuation 
procedures and legal documentation were needed.13
Russia’s Mass Privatisation Programme
Early on under Yeltsin’s Presidency, the Gaidar/Chubais14 government de-
cided to go for rapid privatisation despite the risks in order to create an irre-
versible move towards the private sector. Small enterprises were sold through 
auctions and tenders organised by municipalities, while larger non-strategic 
enterprises were allocated to a Mass Privatisation Programme (MPP). The 
EBRD joined forces with the World Bank in providing advice to the Russian 
government on the Mass Privatisation Programme, which was announced in 
January 1992. The MPP covered around 6,000 large enterprises employing 30 
million workers and involved issuing vouchers free (with a nominal value of 
10,000 roubles, worth approximately US $22 at the time) to every member of 
Russia’s population. Almost 150 million citizens were eligible.
To support the process, a Privatisation Advisory Programme for the Rus-
sian Federation (PAPRF) was discussed with the Russian authorities from 
early 1992 on and came into operation that summer. It built on the EBRD’s 
experience in Moscow and a similar project in St. Petersburg, and was far 
larger in scale than anything the Bank had attempted before. 
The PAPRF gathered momentum throughout 1992 and into 1993. A sig-
nificant part of the initial cost was financed by the EC’s TACIS,15 which 
provided ECU 5.3 million. The technical assistance programme covered de-
sign and project management, the voucher scheme, financial instruments, 
legal advice and accounting. It was jointly prepared by the State Commit-
tee for the Management of State Property (GKI), the World Bank and the 
EBRD using a consortium of consultants. 
The programme was supplemented and expanded through a large sov-
ereign loan in December 1992. The EBRD provided US $44 million, while 
13 ‘Moscow City Privatisation’, Annex 4, ‘Privatisation, Restructuring and Defence Conversion’, 24 March 
1992.
14 Yegor Gaidar, finance minister from November 1991. Anatoly Chubais joined Yeltsin’s cabinet in Novem-
ber 1991 as head of the Committee for the Management of State Property.
15 TACIS, ‘Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States’, was a programme of the Eu-
ropean Community that began in 1991. The EBRD became a significant implementing agency for the EC 
in its countries of operations. 
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the World Bank’s contribution was US $90 million. Although the loan was 
essentially for technical assistance (and thus not remunerated by commer-
cial returns), it had been agreed earlier that this could be allowed.16 
Small company privatisations got underway quickly. By April 1993, the 
State Statistics Committee estimated that more than 60,000 enterprises had 
been privatised, as much as half of all small enterprises.17 The MPP also ac-
celerated through 1993. 
The first example of the effort by the Bank to assist the MPP process was 
a model transaction involving the Bolshevik Biscuit Factory and was carried 
out at a rapid pace.
 
Bolshevik Biscuit Factory 
The EBRD’s role in the privatisation process included preparing state com-
panies for corporatisation and organising and monitoring auctions. In 1993, 
the Bank designed a pilot voucher auction for the Bolshevik Biscuit Factory, 
a medium-sized company of around 2,000 employees. As with many privati-
sations, the assumption had been that strategic investors would take respon-
sibility for improving enterprise performance after privatisation. However, 
while Alpha Capital, an investment fund, acquired just over 25 per cent of 
the company’s shares, some 55 per cent remained in the hands of manage-
ment and employees. When the Bolshevik Biscuit Factory convened its first 
shareholders’ meeting in April 1993, the three to four board seats which had 
been earmarked for external investors were reduced to one, while the other 
six board directorships were given to the factory’s senior management. 
As western press reported at the time, enterprises which were being pri-
vatised were subject to campaigns to “discourage” non-company sharehold-
ers from participating in the elections. The reasons given reflected common 
concerns at the time: external investors would not be familiar with the com-
pany’s problems; their investors’ livelihoods were not directly affected and 
they would not have workers’ interests at heart; and they would have no in-
terest in participating in board meetings.18 This reflected widespread igno-
16 The Bank’s Approach to ‘Technical Assistance, Training and Advisory Services’, 21 July 1991.
17 ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, 4 June 1993 quoted in Appendix 5, OPER on ‘Privatisation Advisory 
Programme in the Russian Federation’, 18 August 1995.
18 The Economist reported growing complaints against highly-paid western consultants funded by EU’s TA-
CIS programme, who were criticised for spending more time on feasibility studies than on capital invest-
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rance of how privatisation was meant to work, as well as the exploitation of 
workers’ fears by insiders. This tendency was compounded by the failure to 
enforce regulations associated with the privatisation process and a lack of 
clarity over valuation stemming from unfamiliarity with proper accounting 
methods, inadequate audits, unharmonised company laws, weak company 
organisational structures and governance, and poor planning and business 
forecasting. The Bolshevik Biscuit Factory exhibited the hallmarks of this 
wider malaise. 
This compendium of problems ultimately created barriers to the EBRD’s 
participation in privatisation of some larger, more strategic and financial-
ly valuable enterprises. However, against the odds and despite its name, the 
Bolshevik Biscuit Factory was ultimately privatised. In late 1994, France’s 
Groupe Danone acquired control of the company through the purchase 
of shares from investors in the 1992 privatisation and injected new equity. 
Three years later, the EBRD took around 30 per cent of the company (re-
named AOOT Bolshevik), under a multi-product facility with Danone to 
support the infusion of new management and capital to assist the company’s 
modernisation, product rationalisation and expansion. Danone later sold its 
stake to Kraft Foods (in 2007) as part of the divestment of its global biscuit 
business and the Bank eventually exited in 2010. 
Some difficulties
The drive for rapid privatisation in Russia through the MPP suffered from 
two key problems. First, external voucher-holders were offered shares for 
“purchase” (that is, in exchange for free vouchers) whose real value could not 
be properly assessed, particularly by ordinary citizens. For small businesses 
with assets of limited value, such as shops, this was not a major concern. For 
larger companies, however, it was more important and many of these were 
significantly undervalued. Unlike in the earlier Czechoslovak mass priva-
tisation programme, which started in November 1991, in Russia vouchers 
could be sold for cash. This created a liquid market on many newly- formed 
“commodity exchanges”, allowing richer Russians to purchase extra vouch-
ers. As a result, former managers gained control of many companies and 
ments. It gave an example of how ex-communists created bureaucratic and other hurdles (such as stealing 
equipment) to prevent a foreign entrant’s success. The Economist, 10 April 1993.
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were subject to little external shareholder pressure. Well-connected owners 
were also able to exploit weak valuations and anomalies between domestic 
and world prices.
An Evaluation Report of the Bank’s Privatisation Advisory Programme 
highlighted several deficiencies in newly privatised entities. Many featured 
unchanged management, administration and production structures. Incon-
sistencies in legal and regulatory frameworks adversely affected day-to-day 
operations, combined with deficiencies in law enforceability. The financial 
status of most of the entities was unclear and underdeveloped capital mar-
ket structures and financial instruments weakened discipline. Although the 
study rated the EBRD’s operation as “generally successful”, it concluded:
Post-privatisation problems are immense, accumulate steadily and hence 
contain considerable political, social and economic tensions that appear 
not to have been fully anticipated and appreciated…19, 20
Ukraine’s Privatisation Advisory Programme
In mid-1992, shortly after Ukraine became a member of the EBRD, its gov-
ernment began formulating a privatisation policy. The Bank launched the 
Ukraine Privatisation Advisory Programme. This was designed to help the 
State Property Fund (SPF) prepare a privatisation strategy, develop appro-
priate procedures and carry out pilot privatisations. Consultants were em-
ployed using almost ECU 3 million technical cooperation funds supplied by 
the EC under TACIS and by Japan. 
The political environment in Ukraine was challenging. A long public de-
bate over privatisation resulted in a temporary moratorium on state asset 
sales following the election of Leonid Kuchma as President in July 1994.21 
Work with the SPF on the privatisation strategy also ran into cultural and 
legislative hurdles. The EBRD instead focused on a handful of pilot projects 
as a way of demonstrating the viability of privatisation in Ukraine.
The Bank’s first mandate was for the sale of Ukrrichflot, a state-owned 
sea and river transportation company. Supported by Japanese funding, sev-
19 OPER on ‘Privatisation Advisory Programme in the Russian Federation’, 18 August 1995.
20 Post-privatisation issues are discussed in Chapter 5.
21 Yuri I. Yekhahurov, ‘The Progress of Privatisation’, Eastern European Economics, Vol. 38, No. 1, Jan–Feb. 
2000. 
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eral consultant firms worked on the identification of assets, valuation is-
sues, and legal complexities. Ukrrichflot was successfully privatised in 1994 
and, after further work to improve accounting and control systems, the 
EBRD supported the company with a post-privatisation loan in 1995. The 
other main pilot privatisation was of Kiev Dairy No. 2, which was also sold 
in 1994. Of the four smaller companies piloted, two—Kispo, a sports shoe 
manufacturer, and Gostomel, a glass container company—were also suc-
cessfully privatised.22 
Poland’s Mass Privatisation Programme
Other countries also found privatisation harder than anticipated. The Polish 
Mass Privatisation Programme (PMPP) was originally conceived in 1991, but 
was delayed for political and other reasons over the following three years. Al-
ternative routes to privatisation, such as strategic trade sales and IPOs on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), also made little progress during this peri-
od. In late 1994, the government therefore sought the EBRD’s help in launch-
ing the PMPP. By engaging with the Bank, the authorities hoped to overcome 
scepticism towards the programme. Former Deputy Prime Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz noted “We wanted … to attract capital from abroad. We welcomed 
the support of projects by the EBRD. The main role was in helping with priva-
tisation. Having the EBRD made it easier and helped legitimise the process.”23 
For its part, the EBRD believed that by making a series of equity invest-
ments during the early stage of the programme it would not only support 
the programme itself, but also provide a valuable demonstration effect to in-
vestors and a riposte to critics of privatisation. 
In May 1995, the Board approved a US $50 million equity facility to sup-
port the PMPP, targeting up to eight investments of US $3 million to US 
$10 million under a delegated procedure to ensure a swift response to oppor-
tunities as they arose. The structure of the programme involved 15 Nation-
al Investment Funds (NIFs)24, each of which would hold a 33 per cent stake 
in 28 out of the total number of 420 companies to be privatised, with the re-
maining 14 NIFs holding a 2 per cent stake each. However, delays and im-
22 The EBRD subsequently provided a loan, part of which was convertible (and was converted) into equity, to 
Gostomel in 2002 and a further loan in 2004.
23 Interview with author, December 2019. 
24 The Bank also provided a sovereign-guaranteed loan to assist with the start-up of the NIFs.
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plementation problems meant that only three EBRD operations had been 
approved by 1997, the last of which involved a fully subscribed IPO on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange in which the Bank did not take any shares (for ad-
ditionality reasons), although it received a fee as a guarantor of the transac-
tion.25 The Bank’s hoped-for demonstration impact through its equity facil-
ity was unfortunately not achieved in the case of the PMPP. More success 
was found in two other areas: participation case-by-case in large-scale priva-
tisations, and developing a private equity industry in the region.26
4. Large-Scale Privatisations and Restructurings
Large-scale privatisations presented specific challenges. Many of the biggest en-
terprises were utilities or dominant players in their sector, which meant proper 
regulatory arrangements needed to be in place, in particular transparent tariff-
setting rules and adequate social safety nets. The path from state ownership to 
a fully functioning private entity was not only complicated technically at the 
enterprise and sector level but also highly political. Many governments found 
the EBRD’s sectoral knowledge, practical experience and independent view-
point of great help in this process. But equally, the Bank often became caught 
between different factions seeking control of significant state assets.
A review of some examples of high-profile privatisations and restructur-
ings in which the EBRD participated illustrates the range of issues and com-
plexities involved, and the Bank’s role in the process. 
Industrial sectors
Among the most commercially attractive areas for early privatisation were 
large chemical and pharmaceutical companies and oil-refining businesses. 
Necessarily large to obtain economies of scale, these enterprises typically 
held a substantial share of the domestic market and were thus of interest to 
strategic investors. In these cases, the EBRD was able to play a significant 
25 Lentex, a manufacturer of PVC floor coverings, non-woven interlinings and waddings, was considered by 
NIF as one of its best assets in its portfolio of companies and a natural choice for the first ever floatation of 
an MPP company on the WSE. Had it not been fully subscribed, the Bank would have taken an up to 12.5 
per cent stake. Poland Mass Privatisation Equity Facility, 18 March 1997. 
26 The Bank’s influence in the development of private equity in the region is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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role in shaping the privatisation process and reassuring private, especially 
foreign, investors. Egis in Hungary, Pliva in Croatia, Sodi in Bulgaria and 
Petrom in Romania are examples of successful interventions by the Bank in 
industrial companies, while Kamaz in Russia illustrates some of the difficul-
ties that could be encountered.
Egis, Hungary
The pharmaceutical industry had been regarded as a key sector for privatisa-
tion in Hungary due to the high local scientific skills base, but early attempts 
at asset sales proved unsuccessful. Shortly after the creation of the Hungarian 
privatisation agency AV Rt in 1992, the EBRD was asked by the authorities 
to evaluate a list of 10 companies that might help break the impasse. Egis was 
selected as the first target for a transaction likely to meet the Bank’s criteria 
as well as furthering the AV Rt’s objectives for privatisation and restructur-
ing. As the first industrial privatisation undertaken by the EBRD with the 
AV Rt, it was a test of the Bank’s ability to assist in the programme.
Egis was a leading pharmaceutical company in central and eastern Eu-
rope. In 1993, it employed around 3,500 workers, most of whom were high-
ly skilled and earned wages some 60 per cent above the Hungarian average. 
It was owned by the Hungarian state (84 per cent), Egis’s employees (around 
10 per cent) and some municipalities (around 6 per cent). 
The AV Rt was initially required by government decree to maintain a 
shareholding of 25 per cent plus one share in any privatised company. In the 
case of Egis’s privatisation, a strategy was agreed whereby the EBRD would 
purchase a 30 per cent stake in the company and within a year the AV Rt 
would sell shares to private investors through a public offering on the Buda-
pest Stock Exchange (BSE), or via private placement such that their holding 
would drop to 44 per cent or less. After that, the company would seek a stra-
tegic partner to further reduce the AV Rt’s holding. 
Like several other Hungarian pharmaceutical companies, Egis had been 
seeking to sell a majority stake to foreign investors for some time. The new 
strategy involving the EBRD envisaged a financial strengthening of the 
company to increase its attractiveness ahead of an IPO or trade sale, as well 
as the provision of support to Egis’s management ahead of a public capital 
market appearance. It was hoped that the presence of the EBRD would re-
assure potential investors that the company was run on a commercial basis, 
while a successful transaction would provide a strong signal to the market 
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on the diminishing level of state control in Hungary and on the growth pos-
sibilities of the pharmaceutical sector.
The EBRD subscribed for 30 per cent of Egis’ shares in December 1993. 
Following the purchase, the Bank had three representatives on the board 
of Egis (two of whom were pharmaceutical experts), and was well-placed to 
help prepare the company for an IPO. The AV Rt held to its side of the bar-
gain by selling a 30 per cent stake in the IPO on the BSE in July 1994. The 
transparent offering was very successful, helping to both legitimise the pri-
vatisation and develop the Hungarian stock market. It introduced a broad 
base of domestic and international shareholders to the company and set the 
course for the search for a strategic investor. 
In 1995, the Privatisation Law was changed to allow the state to reduce 
its holdings to nil if required and Egis was removed from the list of compa-
nies where the state intended to keep a long-term holding. In August that 
year, the government sold its remaining shares to the UK’s NatWest Secu-
rities Ltd via a competitive tender involving a number of financial institu-
tions. The EBRD, NatWest Securities and Egis conducted a search for a stra-
tegic partner. After negotiations with several potential suitors, they settled 
on Servier, a French pharmaceutical company. In December 1995, the Bank 
sold its entire holding of Egis shares to Servier, which in parallel bought a 
21 per cent share from NatWest Securities. Servier thereby acquired 51 per 
cent of Egis shares and control of the company. It also undertook to main-
tain Egis’s research and development (R&D) function and the manufacture 
of generics and other pharmaceuticals in Hungary.
In this case, the role of the EBRD had been to provide a launch pad for 
a large industrial privatisation that had stalled. The Bank’s intervention 
helped in two key ways. First, by strengthening Egis’s financial credentials 
through a sizeable capital increase and preparing it for an IPO; and sec-
ondly, by finding a strong strategic investor, which reassured the authori-
ties that the skilled jobs Egis offered would remain based in Hungary. Pe-
ter Reiniger, an EBRD banker, became Chairman of the Board of Egis in 
1995 and led the successful work with the management team and their ad-
visers in the search for a strategic investor. This took time, extensive mar-
ket knowledge, good contacts and excellent negotiating skills. The trans-
action showed that the Bank could provide vital strategic links to foreign 
investors. The Evaluation Department rated the operation as “highly suc-
cessful”, its top accolade.
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Pliva, Croatia
Another prime candidate for privatisation was Croatia’s Pliva, the largest 
pharmaceutical firm in former Yugoslavia. Based in Zagreb, the company 
had around 5,600 employees, a strong R&D function and a diverse prod-
uct line, while assets included the patent to azithromycin, an important an-
tibiotic. By 1992, however, its export-based business had been badly affected 
by the dissolution of trading agreements within the former Comecon coun-
tries and the war in Yugoslavia. 27 State ownership hampered reform and Pli-
va was losing skilled professionals to private-sector companies. 
In 1993, Pliva was restructured and became a joint stock company. 
At the same time, the Croatian government reduced its shareholding to 
84 per cent and increased the holding of employees and other individu-
als from 11 to 16 per cent. The following year, the company was selected 
for privatisation and the government announced plans to achieve major-
ity private ownership by the end of 1995. A wholesale review of the busi-
ness had emphasised the need to transform Pliva from a production-driven 
organisation to a more demand-led, sales and marketing outfit and to ra-
tionalise the large product mix in order to concentrate on profitable prod-
ucts.28 In mid-1995, the EBRD agreed to provide long-term debt (to be co-
financed by a local bank) to construct a new production plant that would 
more than double the capacity for the production of azithromycin and a 
much larger convertible loan for a set of priority projects to help with re-
structuring ahead of privatisation. 
The privatisation did not meet the timetable originally set but a highly 
successful IPO on the London and Zagreb Stock Exchanges took place in 
April 1996, reducing the government’s holding to 42 per cent. Conversion 
of the EBRD’s loan gave it an 11 per cent stake in the company. Following a 
series of sell-downs, the Bank finally exited in 2006 when a successful take-
over bid was made for Pliva by Barr Pharmaceuticals, a US company. 
The main objective of the operation had been to bring about Pliva’s priva-
tisation. This was very successfully achieved and was beneficial to the com-
pany. It was highly visible in Croatia and, through its London listing, creat-
ed a central and eastern European “blue chip” stock. This gave credibility to 
27 Sales fell by 30 per cent between 1990 and 1992.
28 The review was supported by a study by consultants Arthur D. Little commissioned by the EBRD. 
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Croatia’s first Eurobond issuances in 1997.29 The operation also boosted the 
profile and liquidity of the Zagreb Stock Exchange.
Sodi, Bulgaria 
Poor economic performance, a lack of political support and public distrust 
had delayed structural reforms in the early 1990s in Bulgaria. By the middle 
of the decade, however, the legal and licencing framework for privatisation 
had been completed and in 1996 the state privatisation agency launched the 
first round of mass-voucher privatisation. At the same time, the government 
put up for sale 15 major industrial companies including Sodi, owner of one 
of the world’s largest synthetic soda ash plants. 
Following three rounds of bidding, a tender to acquire 60 per cent of 
Sodi was won in early 1997 by Solvay, a multinational chemical and pharma-
ceutical company headquartered in Belgium. The deal, which was signed in 
April 1997, was the first cash privatisation in Bulgaria. The remaining stakes 
were to be sold to employees (15 per cent) and through mass (voucher) pri-
vatisation (25 per cent). Solvay had sought a strategic tie-up with Şişecam, a 
Turkish regional soda ash producer and global supplier of glass30, in part to 
defray the costs of the acquisition but also to secure an off-take and access to 
a new market. Key for both companies was the prospect of expanding pro-
duction capacity without having to invest in a new plant. For Sodi and the 
Bulgarian government, the deal meant an influx of FDI and expertise, as 
well as an opportunity for renewed export growth after the earlier collapse 
in demand from former Comecon countries.31
The competitive advantages of Sodi were clear: low production costs and 
good proximity to core markets. It was one of the lowest-cost producers in 
Europe and its regional competitors were either too remote (Russia), or still 
state-owned and in dire need of modernisation (Romania). However, Solvay 
had paid a significant cash sum for their share of the company and needed to 
invest in new lines of production. The EBRD refinanced around a quarter 
of the acquisition costs in exchange for a 14.5 per cent stake in Sodi. The key 
29 The pace of follow-on privatisations of large state-owned companies was relatively slow however. 
30 Soda ash is an important ingredient in the manufacture of glass. 
31 Anti-dumping duties had been imposed on cheaper US natural soda ash since 1984, and similarly against 
eastern European (including Bulgarian) soda ash. The lifting of duties meant easier access for soda ash from 
Bulgaria to the European market but also, because it was cost-competitive, made it a valuable source against 
the increased competition now coming from the USA. 
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advantage of bringing the Bank into the transaction, however, was to mit-
igate country and political risks, which were perceived to be very high. The 
presence of the EBRD was also helpful to the government in legitimising 
the process and reassuring the public that the sale was fair. 
This was an example of the third-party “honest broker” role that the 
EBRD played in a number of similar cases. It was not a matter of adding ex-
pertise, or seeking a turnaround and major improvement in performance32, 
but rather of helping to bring together two sides with different goals and ex-
pectations. 
Petrom, Romania 
The government of Romania first tried to privatise Petrom, central and east-
ern Europe’s largest oil company, in 2000. The attempt failed, and the gov-
ernment, which in 2001 owned 93 per cent of the enterprise through the 
ministry of industry and resources, realised that significant organisational 
restructuring and financial improvements were needed before a successful 
privatisation could take place. A revised strategy based on targeting strategic 
investors was devised in 2002 with the help of an international privatisation 
adviser, in consultation with the EBRD and the World Bank. 
In addition to support with the pre-privatisation programme, the EBRD 
organised a pre-privatisation syndicated loan of US $150 million, of which 
US $50 million was lent by the EBRD itself and US $100 million was provid-
ed by a mix of commercial and development banks. The World Bank, mean-
while, provided a structural adjustment loan for Romania in 200233, which 
also supported privatisation of state-owned banks and industrial enterprises. 
In 2004, the Romanian government privatised Petrom by selling a large 
stake alongside a simultaneous capital increase to enable the selected strate-
gic investor, the Austrian integrated oil and gas group OMV, to reach a 51 
per cent majority holding. In the process, the EBRD converted its outstand-
ing pre-privatisation loan into a small equity stake of around 2 per cent, 
which it finally divested in 2013. 
The privatisation of the largest oil company in the region to a strategic 
investor was a landmark transaction and attracted a number of reputable 
32 High returns were not expected from this operation and the IRR was fairly modest. 
33 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/932801468095991902/Romania-Second-Private-Sector-Ad-
justment-Loan-Project.
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international oil and gas investors. The process was successful and gener-
ated wide international interest and praise for its transparent and market-
based approach. The operation also helped create a new financial product 
for the region in the form of a non-sovereign unsecured long-term syndicat-
ed loan. In this case, the EBRD had worked alongside the World Bank and 
the IMF to develop sector conditions conducive to greater commercial suc-
cess for Petrom, enhanced by the Bank’s financial and operational restruc-
turing and corporate governance interventions. 
Kamaz, Russian Federation
The EBRD’s privatisation and restructuring work was not always success-
ful. Large-scale failures included an attempted restructuring of Kamaz in 
Russia.34
Kamaz was one of the largest truck and diesel engine manufacturers in 
the world, a strong brand name in its market segment and one of the first 
industrial companies to be privatised in Russia. Like many Russian enter-
prises of the time, it managed the manufacturing process from beginning 
to end, in this case from foundry and forging to stamping, engine produc-
tion and assembly. Based in the semi-autonomous Republic of Tatarstan, its 
18 plants covered 22 square miles. The company was a major local employer 
with 130,000 direct or indirect employees. 
Kamaz was owned by the governments of Tatarstan and Russia, its em-
ployees and management, and other shareholders including a consortium, 
the Kamaz International Management Company (KIMCO), led by US 
leveraged buyout specialist KKR. KIMCO provided strategic advice by 
acting as a “shadow management” and had options to buy nearly half the 
company. 
The deterioration in the Russian economy had already hit Kamaz hard 
when, in 1993, a fire destroyed its uninsured engine production facility. By 
1995, falling sales and the cost of a partial restoration had created a liquidity 
crisis. At this point, the EBRD offered significant loan funding to help the 
company restructure its finances, rebuild production and increase the level 
of private ownership. 
34 A comprehensive review of the Bank’s experience in privatisations of large state-owned enterprises, includ-
ing other failures such as Slovnaft in the Slovak Republic, can be found in ‘Insights into the Privatisation of 
Large State-Owned Enterprises’, S. Slavova, EBRD, December 2016. 
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The project was approved by the Board but several Directors voiced con-
cerns at the risks involved, given the enterprise’s lack of profitability, the 
absence of a western strategic industrial investor, and the working capital 
and refinancing nature of the loan. Their scepticism proved justified. The 
restructuring plan failed and Kamaz’s debts rose to US $1 billion within 
two years. The company became insolvent and defaulted on its debt obliga-
tions, including the EBRD’s loan, in August 1997. The Tatarstan govern-
ment tried and failed to take control and conflicts arose with the lenders. 
After lengthy negotiations, a financial restructuring plan involving the con-
version of debt into equity was effected in 2001, giving the EBRD a 6.8 per 
cent shareholding. By then, however, the state along with the financial asset 
management company Troika Dialog had majority ownership and control.35 
Although the Bank recovered some money when it sold its equity stake to 
Troika Dialog in 2005, the investment was effectively written off. 
Kamaz had been a painful experience for the EBRD. It learned that a 
highly reputable financial management company was insufficient to tack-
le deep-rooted industrial problems, particularly in a “one company” town 
and was not the right vehicle to lead a turnaround requiring a strong com-
mitment over a long period. Nonetheless, armed with knowledge from this 
experience the Bank did not completely turn its back on the company. In 
2010, another strategic investor, Daimler AG, was found. The EBRD invest-
ed alongside Daimler to facilitate its entry into the Russian (and CIS) mar-
ket and re-doubled efforts to finally implement the environmental and so-
cial mitigation measures identified back in 1995.36
Regulated sectors: Utilities
For some regulated sectors, such as power and energy, privatisation was in-
extricably linked to sector and regulatory reform, and therefore took some 
time to emerge in the EBRD’s countries of operations. Others were more 
easily transferred to the private sector. In telecommunications, for example, 
the move away from fixed-line technology towards mobile and broadband 
communications reduced the state’s ability to maintain control over the sec-
tor. Commercial niches were also found for former state transport entities 
35 Troika Dialog was acquired by Sberbank, Russia’s state-owned and largest bank, in 2011.
36 https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/kamaz-equity.html. 
After the Berlin Wall
172
through unbundling segments such as rail rolling stock and shipping opera-
tions. The Bank played a leading role in many of these transactions. 
Telecoms
HTC, Hungary
One of the Bank’s earliest privatisation projects involved Matav, the Hun-
garian Telecommunications Company (HTC). The company was fully 
owned by the AV Rt, which intended to sell a 30 per cent stake plus man-
agement control to a strategic investor while retaining 50 per cent plus one 
share. The remaining 20 per cent was to go to employees and municipalities 
in exchange for land used for HTC facilities. 
The EBRD had already provided HTC with a large sovereign-guaran-
teed loan in 1992 following the separation of telecommunications from 
Hungary’s postal and broadcasting services. Bankers concluded, however, 
that equity rather than more debt was required for HTC’s next stage of de-
velopment. This chimed with the government’s plans for privatisation, since 
considerable further investment was required to improve the digital back-
bone network and quality of service. 
As HTC was then a monopolistic supplier, reforms to the sector were 
needed prior to privatisation and had been taking place in parallel. A new 
Telecommunications Law establishing the liberalisation of the sector was 
enacted in late 1992 and a Policy Statement on the new regulatory frame-
work, including open tendering for licenses and other concessions, was is-
sued in 1993.
Bids were invited from pre-qualified candidates by the AV Rt, with the 
aim of completing the sale by the end of 1993 and the EBRD subscribed to 
convertible preference shares in November of that year. 
The AV Rt sold its 30 per cent stake in December 1993 to a strategic 
investor, MagyarCom, a consortium comprising Deutsche Telecom and 
Ameritech. The EBRD received close to 2 per cent of ordinary shares on 
conversion. MagyarCom’s holding subsequently increased to 67 per cent in 
1995, when the AV Rt reduced its stake to just over 25 per cent. 
The privatisation of HTC was the largest in central and eastern Europe 
at the time. Careful early preparation by the EBRD, IFC, World Bank and 
EIB, working alongside the authorities to prepare the sector and the com-
pany, was key to its success. A transparent political commitment had been 
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given ahead of the tender and a reasonable degree of “regulatory certainty” 
had been signalled to investors through improvements in the legal and reg-
ulatory environment. Further, in the first phase, the proceeds of privatisa-
tion benefitted the utility. 
The deal again demonstrated the EBRD’s catalytic role in helping the au-
thorities prepare for privatisation. The Bank’s earlier loan helped HTC im-
prove performance in the first phase of its restructuring and modernisation 
programme, while the presence of two commercially oriented IFIs as share-
holders prior to the privatisation gave confidence to potential investors and 
helped the company access international credit markets. 
Power sector 
One of the most important areas of Bank activity on the infrastructure side 
was in providing finance for the development of the power and energy sec-
tor. A reliable supply of power is vital to any business operation and essential 
for industrial production. In Soviet times, large vertically integrated state 
entities fully controlled by ministries were in charge of power and energy 
supply. The technologies used were largely outdated owing to the weak in-
centives to invest in and maintain plant and equipment. Equally significant 
problems lay in the efficiency of supply of energy, its pricing and use for po-
litical ends. 
In many countries of operations, the energy sector was a tool by which 
subsidies and favours could be doled out as part of the system of political 
control. With several countries in possession of plentiful supplies of the 
natural resources used in electricity generation (coal, gas and hydropower), 
the influence of the state in the sector was extensive and hard to change. 
Citizens had become accustomed to cheap electricity and gas and business-
es were able to survive despite using inappropriate and inefficient technol-
ogies. For CIS countries without indigenous supplies of energy resources, 
dependence on external suppliers—especially Russia—also limited power-
sector reform. Even in the more advanced economies, private-sector partic-
ipation took time to build up and required considerable changes to mar-
kets and regulation. 
There were a few privatisation opportunities in the power sector in the 
early 1990s in more advanced countries such as the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Poland. However, in these cases private finance was forthcom-
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ing so the EBRD lacked additionality and did not engage. Outside central 
Europe, moves towards private-sector involvement were slow, hampered by 
the severe and persistent economic downturn in much of the region dur-
ing the 1990s, which interrupted reform progress and reduced the demand 
for energy.37 
Against this backdrop, the Bank was more closely involved in trying to 
create markets and in providing long-term debt facilities to state electrici-
ty utilities for rehabilitation, repair and improvements to power-generation 
plants and transmission systems. Environmental and energy-efficiency ob-
jectives were also important, as was strengthening implementation capac-
ity. Significant involvement with the private sector did not come until the 
2000s. However, the EBRD played a valuable role in supporting the un-
bundling of the sector and the introduction of wholesale, capacity and day-
ahead markets and other market mechanisms.
ZSE, Slovak Republic
One of the first successful cases of privatisation support by the Bank in the 
power sector was for ZSE, one of three regional electricity distribution com-
panies owned by the Slovak Republic. In November 2001, the Slovak govern-
ment tendered 49 per cent of its shares in each of the three companies (at the 
time the state was legally required to maintain a majority stake). The EBRD 
had been advising the Slovak government on the privatisation process and 
was invited to offer support to interested bidders. Three international ener-
gy firms—France’s EDF and Germany’s RWE and E.ON—bought stakes. 
E.ON took up the Bank’s offer and the EBRD paid for a 9 per cent stake 
in ZSE.38 The Bank’s additionality lay in providing a safeguard for E.ON 
against political and regulatory risks in Slovakia. The Evaluation Depart-
ment assessed the performance of the project as “successful”. The partial pri-
vatisation of these assets helped the turnaround process and the presence of 
experienced private-sector strategic investors led in due course to significant 
improvements in the Slovak electricity sector. 
37 Electricity consumption in Russia fell by 25 per cent between 1991 and 1998, p.2. ‘Market Liberalisation 
and decarbonisation of the Russian Electricity Industry’, A. Khokhlov and Y. Melnikov, Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, May 2018, p. 2.
38 The form of the EBRD’s investment was a “portage equity investment”, which meant upside gains were lim-
ited (allowing E.ON to benefit in the event of success), but with a put option to minimise the risks to the 
Bank. 
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RAO UES, OGK-5, Russia 
The power sector in Russia was owned and controlled by the Ministry of 
Power and Electrification (Minenergo) until RAO UES (Unified Energy 
System of Russia) was established as a state holding company and sold as 
part of the voucher privatisation programme in 1992. The state retained a 
52 per cent holding, with the majority state-owned Gazprom owning 12 per 
cent and the remaining shares mainly distributed among various Russian 
groups. RAO UES was effectively a state monopoly39 that controlled two-
thirds of generating capacity and over 95 per cent of transmission and dis-
tribution. 
Liberalisation and privatisation of the power sector was a relatively novel 
concept in the 1990s. Falling demand for energy, a very poor financial perfor-
mance by RAO UES and a fractious political environment stalled reform un-
til Anatoly Chubais became Chairman of the Board of RAO UES in 1998. 
That prompted a push for the break-up of the state electricity monopoly and 
market reform, and the path towards privatisation began in earnest. An en-
ergy-sector reform plan was approved by the early 2000s and was followed 
by the unbundling of RAO UES which separated generation from transmis-
sion and distribution. The Bank engaged with the authorities and established 
a restructuring working group, which was made open to minority sharehold-
ers, and signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with RAO UES. In 
2001, the EBRD provided a €100 million loan to help RAO UES restructure 
its balance sheet and finance priority investments in transmission and des-
patch in preparation for privatisation. The Bank’s involvement helped to con-
vince investors that reform was fully under way. In the following years, sever-
al of the six unbundled large generation companies (OGKs) were privatised, 
as well as the 14 regional generating companies (TGKs). 
The EBRD supported one of the first OGK sales by participating in a 
public offering of its shares in October 2006. OGK-5 was one of the main 
thermal wholesale generating companies with installed capacity of some 
8.7 GW, equivalent to 4 per cent of total generating capacity in Russia. The 
Bank participated to assist the public offering ahead of the sale of a further 
25 per cent of the company to a strategic investor. The proceeds of the public 
offering were allocated to priority investment needs, in particular the reha-
bilitation of OGK-5’s four power stations. The public offering reduced RAO 
39 There were four regions that it did not control, while nuclear power was managed by Rosatom. 
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UES’s stake in the company to around 75 per cent. The Bank’s investment 
was intended to send a signal to the market about the privatisation process, 
as well as offering the opportunity to improve corporate governance stan-
dards and protect the interests of minority shareholders. 
In June 2007, Italian energy company ENEL won an open tender for a 
25 per cent plus one share stake in OGK-5, in the first deal in Russia to in-
volve a major international energy utility. ENEL subsequently increased its 
stake to 37 per cent and triggered a mandatory buyout offer, as a result of 
which it obtained clear majority control. In April 2008, the EBRD bought 
around 4 per cent of OGK-5’s shares from ENEL as part of a strategic part-
nership designed to enhance the firm’s political clout in an evolving but 
uncertain market. From the Bank’s perspective, the main objective was to 
establish a strong presence in the sector from which to advocate for liberal-
isation and reform. 
As a conclusion of the Bank’s policy dialogue on the Russian power sec-
tor throughout the 2000s, the privatisation of OGK-5 was a significant suc-
cess. The goal of initiating transparent, commercially-driven privatisation of 
the generating companies was achieved. Between 2006 and 2008, 19 thermal 
generating companies were sold and RAO UES was replaced by independent 
market participants. However, the only other foreign strategic investors to ob-
tain shares in the generating companies were E.ON and Fortum of Finland, 
and subsequent reversals in energy sector policy led to the resumption of state 
control of the majority of generating capacity in Russia.40, 41
The Bank’s close involvement in the Russian power sector in the 2000s 
through a large number of debt transactions and technical assistance for 
regulatory reform, as well as its support for privatisation and entry of strong 
strategic investors, was largely successful. According to an Evaluation De-
partment report in 2010: “The Bank was closely involved [in the process of 
reform] and played a pivotal role, unmatched by any other IFI, both with 
high level institutional and policy dialogue and with targeted investments 
at critical junctures in the evolution of the reform.”42 
40 Gazprom and InterRAO (majority-owned by state entities) own significant stakes in many of the OGKs 
and TGKs. 
41 Further information, including on privatisation of electricity distribution companies in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, can be found in Stefka Slavova, ‘Privatising Electricity Companies; Insights from the EBRD Expe-
rience’, EBRD, December 2016.
42 Country Level Evaluation: Russia Power and Energy Sector Special Study, July 2010. See also Special Study 
Power and Energy Sector Review, October 2011.
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Banking sector 
The Bank’s ability to act as an intermediary between governments or priva-
tisation agencies and foreign strategic investors proved particularly useful in 
the banking sector, especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s when main-
ly European banks acquired subsidiaries in central Europe in anticipation of 
European Union (EU) expansion. In the earlier part of the 1990s, the priva-
tisation of banks had been hampered by high non-performing loan (NPL) 
levels, opposition from vested interests (mainly managers and employees), 
weak appetite for foreign ownership, and a lack of clarity on sectoral laws 
and regulations. There were also significant gaps in management capabili-
ties and corporate governance after a long period of directed lending. It took 
some time before it was accepted that an infusion of capital and expertise 
was needed to underpin banking systems in central and eastern Europe and 
that an influx of foreign investors was the best way to achieve this goal. The 
Bank’s advice and support during this period, along with particularly the 
IFC, was an important influence on the eventual approach towards privati-
sation in many countries. 
BCR, Romania
The EBRD’s support for the privatisation of Banca Comercială Română 
(BCR) was one of the most successful transactions in the Bank’s history 
and an example of how it turned round the fortunes of a company by tak-
ing a calculated risk.
BCR had been established in 1990 and took on the National Bank of Ro-
mania’s portfolio of corporate loans as a two-tier banking system was creat-
ed. During the 1990s, while under state ownership, it expanded its range of 
customers and acquired the foreign trade activities of Bancorex, the Roma-
nian Bank for Foreign Trade. 
In 2002, the Government of Romania tried to privatise BCR by sell-
ing more than 50 per cent of shares to a strategic investor. Two rounds of 
tendering failed, however, in part because of the significant investment re-
quired. The authorities wanted to continue with the privatisation and re-
vised their approach. They decided to sell 25 per cent plus two shares direct-
ly, and equally, to the EBRD and the IFC as a first step, to be followed by a 
sale of 8 per cent to employees. The sale to a strategic investor was set to be 
completed by the end of 2006. The process was helped by setting the privati-
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sation as a milestone for completion of Romania’s IMF programme and as a 
condition of a World Bank Public Sector Assistance Loan (PSAL 2). 
As part of the shareholders’ agreement with the two IFIs, BCR under-
took an institution-building plan (IBP) to prepare for privatisation. This 
laid the foundations for improvements in corporate governance, organisa-
tional restructuring, risk management, and IT and accounting systems. The 
EBRD and IFC were each represented on the supervisory board and other 
committees, enabling the two institutions to exert strong oversight over de-
velopments, including providing a transparent distinction between share-
holder rights and management powers. Changes in the decision-making 
structure of BCR were also influenced by a new banking law in line with 
EU directives.
The operation was a good example of an investment made in a context 
of considerable uncertainty and designed to facilitate the transfer of a major 
state entity to the private sector. It was backed by strong conditionality and 
prepared BCR for private ownership by reviewing and upgrading its key busi-
ness and control functions through a tailored plan. It signalled confidence 
in the Romanian banking sector ahead of the country’s accession to the EU. 
The EBRD signed a share purchase agreement in late 2003 and sub-
scribed for its 12.5 per cent holding in June 2004. It was a major investment 
for the Bank. The sale to a strategic investor began in May 2005 with a com-
petitive tender for the shares owned by the state, the EBRD and IFC. Sever-
al reputable financial institutions put forward binding offers for the almost 
62 per cent holding on offer. After narrowing down to two final bids, the 
stake was sold to Erste Bank of Austria. The EBRD exited by signing a sale 
agreement in late 2005 and received payment in October 2006. 
Bank Pekao, Poland
Group Pekao was formed in 1996 by the merger of Bank Pekao, historically 
Poland’s foreign currency savings bank, and three regional banks. The merg-
er was undertaken as part of the consolidation of the banking sector and as 
a prelude to privatisation. In June 1998, the Polish government decided to 
start the privatisation process by selling 15 per cent of Pekao via an IPO on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The bank was in need of restructur-
ing and capital support before privatisation, so the EBRD agreed to make a 
large US $100 million equity investment as part of a capital increase at the 
same time as the public offering. The authorities committed to sell a further 
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35 per cent of stock to a strategic investor acceptable to the Bank at a later 
stage. The EBRD thus acquired just over 5 per cent of Pekao in September 
1998 and obtained seats on the Supervisory Council.43 After the IPO and 
sale to a strategic investor, the State Treasury was expected to hold less than 
30 per cent of Pekao.44 
In June 1999, a consortium of UniCredit and Allianz purchased a con-
trolling stake in Pekao of 50 per cent and 2 per cent of shares respectively. 
As part of the deal, the strategic investors agreed to inject Zl 1 billion of cap-
ital within two years. The EBRD subscribed to a capital increase in Octo-
ber 2000 and purchased additional shares from Bank Handlowy, lifting the 
Bank’s stake to more than 6.5 per cent. The EBRD sold most of its shares via 
an accelerated book-build in late 2003 and a block trade in mid-2005, final-
ly exiting in mid-2009.45 By the end of that year, the state treasury’s holding 
was less than 1 per cent and UniCredit, with an almost 60 per cent stake, 
was in full control of the bank. 
The EBRD successfully assisted Pekao in the privatisation process by 
providing senior capital to improve leverage pre-IPO, gave confidence to in-
vestors and to the share placement on the WSE and helped to attract quality 
strategic investors in the full privatisation. It also contributed to strengthen-
ing management and corporate governance in Pekao, providing a demon-
stration effect to other Polish banks. 
CSOB, Czech Republic
Československá Obchodní Banka (CSOB) was originally the CSFR’s foreign 
trade bank. On the dissolution of the CSFR in January 1993, it was divid-
ed between the Czech and Slovak states, with around 66 per cent going to 
Czech government agencies. By the time privatisation was initiated in 1998, 
it was the fourth-largest Czech bank by assets and the largest by equity. 
The EBRD was asked to participate in the privatisation by purchasing 
shares held by the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). The Bank was seen as a 
neutral body that could facilitate resolution of political differences between 
the Czech and Slovak governments, and help assuage the political concerns 
of potential investors. However, elections in 1998 and a breakdown in com-
43 At the start of the process the 11 member Supervisory Council comprised nine state representatives and 
two academics, and was chaired by the Treasury Secretary of State.
44 Other main owners were management and employees at 15 per cent. 
45 The investment returns for the Bank were above average. 
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munications between the two governments meant the transaction did not 
proceed. Instead, the Czech government offered their holding in a privati-
sation tender in June 1999, which resulted in a sale to KBC, a Belgian bank. 
The IFC also took a stake of just over 4 per cent via a sale of treasury shares. 
Prior to the offer, the NBS announced plans to sell its share too. The 
EBRD agreed to participate in the process and did so alongside KBC. By 
the end of 1999, the Bank had acquired around 7.5 per cent of CSOB. In 
due course, CSOB was fully privatised and the EBRD sold its shares to 
KBC in 2006. 
Having been closely involved from the start of the privatisation process, 
the Bank was able to offer comfort to all sides as the privatisation moved for-
ward. It helped normalise CSOB’s governance structure and resolve a long-
standing ownership dispute between the Czech and Slovak national banks, 
removed concerns over the Slovak government’s involvement in the capital 
of the bank, and enabled a foreign sponsor to improve the quality of bank-
ing services and products in both the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
PBZ, Croatia
In December 1999, the Croatian government began the process of priva-
tising Privredna Banka Zagreb (PBZ), the country’s second-largest lend-
er, through its bank rehabilitation agency (DAB). A 66.3 per cent stake 
was sold to Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI), which shortly afterwards 
merged with Banca Intesa to form IntesaBCI (IBCI). IBCI had the option 
of buying the remaining 25 per cent from the government but both sides 
asked the EBRD to participate. Policymakers were keen for the Bank to 
support the privatisation and the development of the Croatian capital mar-
ket, while IBCI saw value in the Bank’s expertise in bank restructuring and 
privatisation and its knowledge of the Croatian financial sector. 
The sale of the government stake in 2002 completed the privatisation, 
with 15 per cent going to the EBRD and 10 per cent to IBCI, and triggered 
a mandatory take-over offer by IBCI for the 8.7 per cent of minority shares. 
The EBRD agreed with IBCI to take shares tendered up to 7 per cent. The 
Bank thus obtained in due course a near 21 per cent holding in PBZ. Tak-
ing into account a participation in a capital increase in 2006, this was one of 
the largest equity investments by the Bank.46 
46 The EBRD invested a total of €167 million.
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As part of the deal, IBCI agreed to sell some of its shares in an IPO with-
in six years, allowing PBZ to raise its profile and tap into a new investor base. 
It also provided a route for the Bank to exit. However, the IPO did not hap-
pen and in 2015 the EBRD exercised a put option to exit, leaving Intesa San-
paolo (the successor to IBCI) holding almost the entire stock. 
The Bank’s involvement supported the full privatisation of PBZ to a stra-
tegic investor and helped with its restructuring from a bank serving state-
owned companies to a universal bank targeting retail, private corporate and 
SME borrowers. It also led to an improvement in corporate governance 
standards.
5. Lessons from the Bank’s Experience of Privatisation  
and Restructuring
At the start of its existence the EBRD embraced privatisation with enthusi-
asm, tempered by the knowledge that the business and policy environment 
in which it was to take place was challenging and volatile. Privatisation was 
already a sensitive subject in the West, with political parties often differing 
on its merits, and this division was reflected in the East. While the Bank’s 
Board covered the full spectrum of these views, it was nonetheless support-
ive of privatisation as a key means to help build the private sector in former 
command economies.
The need for open, transparent processes in privatisation was clear to 
all members and the EBRD made efforts to promote this perspective. The 
Bank was, however, cautious and selective in its approach to privatisation. 
There was little appetite for involvement in small-scale asset sales, which in 
most cases progressed rapidly without the need for external intervention. 
Their size, prospective profitability and costs of assessment also made them 
unappealing for the EBRD. 
Larger privatisations were more appropriate but had their own problems. 
The inefficiency of large state-owned enterprises meant future profits could 
be made but extracting value required effective managers, significant invest-
ment and potentially large-scale redundancies. Many countries had no tra-
dition of or training for modern management practices, while weak finan-
cial sectors and even weaker capital markets meant a dearth of long-term 
financing to support what the EBRD might be able to provide. Strong com-
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mitments to privatisation by the authorities were needed to overcome the 
political risks associated with layoffs and other turnaround measures. Here, 
political changes frequently slowed the evolution of privatisation. The effec-
tiveness of competition, the legal underpinnings of privatisation and the flu-
ency of regulation and related factors such as tariff-setting also varied con-
siderably, making investments something of a lottery without careful prior 
scrutiny. Rudimentary accounting methods and valuation procedures add-
ed to the uncertainties.
The Bank therefore began by advising on privatisation processes and 
sales rather than by making multiple large investments. This also had the 
advantage of giving bankers a better understanding of the preparedness and 
financial soundness of companies to be sold, the attitudes of political par-
ties towards privatisation, the political economy of sales and their methods, 
and the evolving legal and regulatory landscape. When the Bank did par-
ticipate in privatisations, which began to take off from the late 1990s, it was 
well-prepared and made relatively few significant losses from its investments 
in privatised companies. 
When it came to restructurings, the EBRD found more could be 
achieved once enterprises were under private-sector control. The Bank was 
successful in helping privatised companies improve performance by rais-
ing management standards as well as providing financing for much-needed 
capital expenditure programmes through equity injections and long-term 
loans. Persistent efforts to improve corporate governance within privatised 
enterprises by bringing to bear clearer lines of responsibilities between own-
ers and managers and greater scrutiny of performance also paid off. This 
function was enhanced where the Bank had sufficient stakes in a business 
to enable its nominee director to be appointed to company boards and com-
mittees.
Restructuring state-controlled companies in the hope of subsequent pri-
vatisation was more difficult, largely due to the power of vested interests. 
Where the political authorities were clearly committed to a path for pri-
vatisation, the Bank’s interventions were more successful. Sometimes ini-
tial barriers to privatisation were overcome when authorities recognised that 
the cost of maintaining inefficient state enterprises was unsustainable, par-
ticularly when fiscal pressures were prevalent. In other cases, notably in the 
utilities sector, investments aimed at restructuring state enterprises proved 
valuable where undertaken in conjunction with policy dialogue to improve 
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regulation. In the case of banks, efforts to provision for or write off bad 
loans and strengthen capital adequacy towards international standards were 
additionally valuable. Such restructuring efforts helped companies become 
more realistic targets for strategic investors. 
Of great importance was the EBRD’s role as a reliable intermediary be-
tween private sponsors looking to invest in new markets and public authori-
ties seeking to sell assets to improve the performance of their economies and 
raise fiscal revenues. As an “honest broker” between parties with different 
cultural and business backgrounds, as an investor taking “skin in the game” 
and demonstrating the viability of the deal, and as a source of political com-
fort to investors, the Bank was able to act as a conduit for successful priva-
tisation as well as enhance its status as a long-term financier. By supporting 
a number of high-profile western industrial and financial investors making 
their first forays into central and eastern Europe, the EBRD helped to con-







The early post-communist years in central and eastern Europe saw a dra-
matic change in the role of the state. One element countries in the region 
had in common was a desire on the part of their populations for greater lo-
cal autonomy and democratisation. This meant having a say not only in who 
governed the country but also in decisions over local services. As a result, 
all countries began a process of devolution of economic and social decision-
making. While many aspects of the vertical structures of the communist 
economic system were slow to be dismantled, the move towards decentrali-
sation was rapid. The everyday life of citizens depended on local services—
the supply of housing, heat, water and wastewater, local transport—that 
were inefficiently managed from the centre. It made sense to shift the bur-
den towards municipalities and local districts.
The EBRD was established with a political as well as an economic man-
date. The notion of multiparty democracy and pluralism applied to the lo-
cal and regional level as well as the central level. In this respect, the Bank 
had a valid interest in supporting the democratic changes that were emerg-
ing across the region. The wider point, however, was an economic and insti-
tutional one relating to improvements in living standards. Simply put, the 
inefficiencies of central state control meant there were immediate gains to 
be made by organising the provision of local services in a better fashion. De-
cades of underinvestment could begin to be rectified under a properly func-
tioning municipal utilities system. 
The Bank saw the opportunity to bring in new structures and western 
expertise to help remedy the situation and it developed an important mod-
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el early on to meet these needs. The groundbreaking work that followed re-
sulted in the EBRD becoming the front runner among IFIs to develop and 
implement sub-sovereign lending operations, a novel non-sovereign product 
that proved to be highly resilient and well regarded by municipalities in the 
years ahead. This chapter looks at the background to these developments.
1. Early Efforts on Decentralisation in Central and Eastern Europe
In Europe in the 1980s, interest grew in devolution and methods of en-
hancing local democratisation. Near the end of the decade, in September 
1988, the Council of Europe’s European Charter of Local Self-Government, 
which defined the concept of local autonomous self-government as a funda-
mental right, came into force. This was the first international treaty to lay 
down the principle of subsidiarity, which allows for the transfer of power to 
the level closest to the citizen. Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter required that 
local self-government be recognised in domestic legislation and that local 
governments manage public affairs under their own responsibility in the in-
terests of the local population as exercised by councils or assemblies, whose 
members should be freely elected by secret ballot under universal suffrage. 
This legitimised a transfer of competences to local communities and with it 
some transfer of financial resources. The Charter established a number of 
safeguards to protect the rights of local communities, for example that local 
authority boundaries could not be changed without agreement of the com-
munity and that the supervision of the activities of local authorities should 
be defined by law, with the possibility of recourse to a court.1
When Hungary became the first former Eastern Bloc country to join 
the Council of Europe at the end of 1990, many western European coun-
tries had recently ratified the treaty and several others were in the pro-
cess of doing so. The Charter’s principles became important in guiding 
governmental reforms and the establishment of devolved legal and ad-
ministrative structures in central and eastern Europe at the time. Poland, 
which became a member of the Council of Europe in November 1991, be-
came the first former socialist country to ratify the treaty (in November 
1  ‘The Charter of Local Self-Government’, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Eu-
rope, October 2015.
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1993) followed by Hungary in March 1994. By the time Russia ratified the 
agreement in February 1996, all the EBRD’s countries of operations in the 
Baltics and central, south-eastern and eastern Europe had already done 
so, with the exception of Belarus and the country which at the time had 
the provisional name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (now 
North Macedonia). 
Laws introducing decentralisation and local autonomy were set in mo-
tion across the region between 1990 and 1992, with local elections held in 
several central European countries during this time. However, the extent of 
devolution varied considerably, as did the financing arrangements. In most 
cases, greater local responsibility with elected representation was intro-
duced, and with it a weakening of central administration branches at local 
level as elected municipal councils became empowered. At the same time, 
there was a lack of provision at the regional level, where elections were not 
introduced, and the number of local authorities multiplied substantially in 
some countries. The result was a large increase in the number of local gov-
ernment units and considerable fragmentation spatially and institutionally. 
This resulted in a loss of coordination and diseconomies of scale. 
Fragmentation was particularly dramatic in the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics, where respectively some 4,000 and 3,000 elected local authorities 
were created to represent 10 million and five million citizens. In Hungary, 
more than 3,000 local authorities were created for a population of 10 mil-
lion.2 With an average of 2,500 to 3,000 citizens to each local authority (less 
than 2,000 in the Slovak Republic), efficiency was clearly limited, particu-
larly in small rural or suburban contexts where some level of aggregation was 
necessary to provide services and deal with environmental problems effec-
tively. Similarly, district governments with a high degree of autonomy could 
frustrate infrastructure improvement and urban development in major cit-
ies within their jurisdiction. 
Further complications arose over the question of financial support. There 
was a wide range of arrangements in sharing finance between central and lo-
cal governments across the region. Poland, for example, relied heavily on lo-
cal resources (around 40 per cent of funding, with another 40 per cent from 
shared taxes), whereas some 85 per cent of local funds in the Czech Repub-
lic came from transfers from the central government. 
2  Figures quoted in ‘Municipal Development Operations Policy Background Paper’, September 1992.
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There were many arguments about the appropriate balance between rais-
ing local revenues and sharing centrally collected taxes, as well as over the 
degree of transfers for social and other reasons. But the bigger problem for 
most countries in the early transition years was the poor state of the econo-
my, with high inflation rates and chronic fiscal problems. This limited the 
scope and willingness to transfer resources from the centre, and difficulties 
in raising and collecting taxes made changes to this situation unlikely. The 
only realistic solutions were to increase efficiency in the use of existing re-
sources and charge users more realistic rates for services. In other words, 
more market-oriented solutions. It was in this context that a role for the 
EBRD would emerge.
A combination of factors led the Bank to develop a sub-sovereign lend-
ing model built around carefully constructed economic and legal checks and 
balances that applied to the relevant parties: municipalities, their utilities 
and central authorities. The result was that the EBRD early on introduced a 
unique approach to the financing of local services in the context of the wid-
er IFI landscape. 
2. The Bank’s Role 
The thrust of the Bank’s approach was to support the effective decentralisa-
tion of the funding and provision of municipal services and infrastructure. 
Alongside the privatisation of industry and production capital, the decen-
tralisation of public services was regarded as one of the defining character-
istics of the transition process. Decentralisation could improve the efficien-
cy of public-resource allocation and bring investment decisions closer to the 
needs and preferences of users of local services, as well as supporting democ-
ratisation processes. 
The price signal that acted as the mechanism for the efficient matching 
of needs with resources in a competitive market could not immediately be 
adopted to solve the problems facing municipalities, particularly given the 
complex institutional structures surrounding the financing and provision 
of services and the importance of meeting social needs. But the adoption 
of more sustainable funding mechanisms and regulatory procedures, im-
proved institutional structures and new ways of financing would allow price 
signals and a more transparent financial performance to penetrate the sys-
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tem and improve its efficiency and investment capacity. The EBRD saw the 
promotion of “capital efficiency, commercialisation of municipal services, 
involvement of the private sector in the funding and provision of public ser-
vices, municipal credit strengthening, and accountability towards local con-
stituencies” at the heart of its municipal operations.3
The Bank’s engagement with the authorities in its countries of opera-
tions and its presence on the ground in major cities meant it was quickly 
able to establish a dialogue with local and national governments and with 
other organisations involved in urban and municipal development matters. 
A number of EBRD development bankers came from the World Bank and 
had experience of dealing with local infrastructure issues in other regions. 
The EBRD also believed it could add value by supporting the development 
of municipal infrastructure as an important element in the evolution of the 
local private sector—both by making it easier for small enterprises to grow 
and thrive but also potentially by creating direct business opportunities in 
the provision of services—and in environmental improvement. 
Where substantial progress in establishing decentralised local govern-
ment institutional and financial frameworks was feasible, the aim was to 
assist municipalities’ financing, particularly by increasing their borrowing 
capacity. This could lead to project preparation and specific investment proj-
ects in large and small municipalities financed on a sovereign, limited re-
course or even non-recourse basis. In the many cases where local govern-
ment financial frameworks were ill-defined, the EBRD undertook to help 
with design issues, such as effective grant allocation and analysis of local tax-
es and tax bases, while indicating potential investment projects in major cit-
ies once financing issues were settled. Elsewhere, the scope for action beyond 
general policy advice was limited.
In September 1992, after surveying the state of municipal affairs as far 
as it could, management put forward an operations policy paper on munic-
ipal development which described how the EBRD could improve the situa-
tion.4 The underlying analysis showed significant municipal infrastructure 
gaps existed in terms of rehabilitation and extension, as well as a need for 
improvements in efficiency.
3  ‘Policy Issues Arising from the St. Petersburg Municipal Support Project’, 13 June 1997.
4  ‘Municipal Development Operations Policy’, 4 September 1992.
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A number of options were presented on the Bank’s role. Its involvement 
could “directly support on-going political, administrative and economic de-
centralisation and the transition away from central planning”. With urban-
isation rates in most CEE countries above 50 per cent, a focus on the effi-
ciency of urban centres could provide employment opportunities and help 
“national and local economic development”. The transfer of assets from 
central to local levels of government presented privatisation and efficiency 
opportunities as well as in developing new instruments of “public-private 
partnership”. The EBRD also believed it could help with infrastructure re-
quirements necessary to support private and entrepreneurial initiative, pro-
mote environmental improvement and contribute to a “more democratic 
and participatory society” in line with its political mandate.5 
The Bank was in a strong position to address local government and ur-
ban development given the mix of private sector and public management 
issues and the close long-term partnerships involved. Responding to local 
needs in a visible way also presented a good opportunity to build a strong 
image for the EBRD across its countries of operations.
Immediate obstacles to progress
There were nonetheless a large number of obstacles to overcome, even in 
areas where central-local relationships were close to being settled. For one 
thing, there were imbalances between large and small municipalities and 
cities, with many of those most in need being remote, both geographically 
and in understanding, from the main centres. 
More problematic, however, was a lack of clarity over responsibilities 
and financial arrangements, as well as weak capabilities in carrying them 
out. Assets had been transferred to local authorities, but there was limited 
capacity and often only moderate appetite on the part of local managers to 
take over deteriorating assets and the responsibilities of underperforming 
service providers. Many assets involved high maintenance costs and were 
not revenue-earning, yet equivalent budgetary transfers had not been made 
to cover the gaps. The determination of the share of proceeds of sales was 
also often unclear, and in some instances proceedings were complicated by 
 
5  ‘Municipal Development Operations Policy’, 1992.
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issues of restitution. Implementation of local autonomy was also hindered 
by legislative gaps and the lack of clear financial frameworks. 
Local governments faced financial pressure as their ability to raise rev-
enues was low and lagging behind the transfer of responsibilities and ex-
penditure functions. The squeeze on operating budgets left little room for 
investment and the limited creditworthiness of municipalities ruled out 
borrowing, which was in any case difficult given the underdevelopment 
of local financial markets. In contrast to some other sectors, FDI was not 
forthcoming since revenue potential was based on local currency rather 
than foreign exchange. Risks were perceived by foreign investors as being 
exceptionally high except in the most advanced and creditworthy cities. 
Lastly, a lack of stability in local government teams as regular elections re-
sulted in changes of personnel, as well as the difficulties experienced by 
staff in adjusting to the introduction of new concepts and demands un-
der the revised institutional arrangements, made investment a difficult and 
sporadic job. 
In this context, the EBRD saw its role as developing its infrastructure 
lending in parallel with capacity-building activities, particularly to enhance 
local management capacity and authorities’ ability to enforce an appropri-
ate regulatory and tariff framework. Here it could act as a catalyst for invest-
ment and provide technical assistance, for example in training local elected 
officials and managers in budgeting, project preparation and financial man-
agement. It also had the capacity to serve as a promoter of private-sector in-
volvement and a broker of international experience in municipal services, 
with the aim of creating specific showcase operations to strengthen local au-
thorities and generate interest in new approaches.
The Bank chose to focus its main initial operational activities on project 
preparation and the development of environmental infrastructure, particu-
larly water supply and wastewater treatment, the rehabilitation and financ-
ing of urban transport in capitals and large cities, and district-heating sup-
plies. Given the fluidity of the situation relating to the development of local 
autonomy in many countries, the EBRD did not expect to achieve high in-
vestment volumes quickly. It believed that most of its early activities would 
be in central Europe and those parts of eastern Europe where legal, adminis-
trative and financial arrangements at local level were more advanced.
 
After the Berlin Wall
192
3. The Main Starting Point: Romania’s Municipal Utilities  
Development Programme
The EBRD’s operational programme gradually took off. In the first four 
years after the adoption of the municipal operations policy, only five proj-
ects were formally approved. However, by mid-1995 it was clear that mu-
nicipal authorities were emerging as an important client group and that a 
pipeline of viable projects was building. This prompted the creation of a mu-
nicipal and environment infrastructure (MEI) team within the EBRD. Ear-
ly projects in Estonia and particularly in Romania were influential in its de-
velopment. The Romanian Municipal Utilities Development Programme 
(MUDP) is a good illustration of the way in which the EBRD established a 
successful mode of sub-sovereign operations in this field.
The Ceausescu legacy for Romanian infrastructure was especially disas-
trous. In contrast to other Eastern Bloc countries, he had insisted through-
out the 1980s that Romania fully repay its foreign debts. As a result, in-
vestment in public services and infrastructure had been severely curtailed, 
causing major damage to the economy and people’s livelihoods. The post-
communist authorities were therefore desperate to find ways to show genu-
ine progress in raising living standards for their citizens.
Legal reforms in Romania in 1991 had provided for the devolution of in-
frastructure and municipal services to the local level, including autonomy 
of financial management and expenditure decisions. This had not, however, 
been accompanied by a commensurate transfer of financial and human re-
sources. In 1993 the Romanian government asked the EBRD to help with 
the preparation of an investment programme in 12 municipalities as part of 
its efforts to reform public services and their financing. The Bank welcomed 
the opportunity to help and to develop municipal business but it was a risky 
area and one which the finance department was wary of. The focus of activ-
ities under the MUDP—which was described as a pilot—thus became nar-
rowed down to water supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment services 
provided by water utilities. The requirements of the programme suggested a 
two-stage approach was most appropriate. A first stage covering five cities6 
could help inform the second stage for the remaining seven municipalities. 
If successful, the initiative could be extended further. 
6  Brasov, Craiova, Iasi, Timișoara and Tirgu Mures.
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There was no doubt that the system needed a radical overhaul. The quali-
ty and supply of water in Romania was inadequate. Supply was provided for 
only part of the day in many places and was below the government’s own 
health standards.7 Pressure was so low in distribution systems that consum-
ers living on the top floors of apartment blocks frequently received no ser-
vices at all. Wastewater collection and treatment was well below adequate 
effluent standards and sewer collectors leaking into water distribution net-
works presented serious health hazards. Estimates of water losses ranged 
from 40 to 60 per cent of water produced. 
The poor quality of water services and wastewater treatment, which 
were deteriorating in many places, was mostly due to lack of investment and 
chronic long-term underspending on asset maintenance. Expenditure on 
municipal services and infrastructure investments had reached a low of US$ 
3 per capita in 1992 against an estimated requirement of US$ 75 to US$ 100 
per capita to prevent further decline.8 At the same time there was consider-
able inefficiency in the provision of services with a need to improve opera-
tional and financial performance and generate revenues. Cost-recovery and 
a move towards credit and loan-financed capital spending were required to 
move away from the unsustainable practice of funding investment via gov-
ernment grants. Centralisation had put more emphasis on the technical or 
engineering aspects of investments rather than their financial viability. In-
efficient pricing, which in economic terms was too low, combined with an 
absence of effective metering and significant leakage in water distribution 
networks meant water consumption was two to three times higher than in 
western Europe. 
Although provision was now decentralised, the central government re-
tained control over financial operations and tariffs. The approval of capital 
expenditures also remained centralised, meaning that investment by water 
utilities effectively depended on government capital subsidies. In 1993, for 
example, it was estimated that some 70 per cent of capital expenditure on lo-
cal services and infrastructure was funded from the central budget. The gov-
ernment saw the EBRD as a useful ally in helping to implement what was at 
7  One of the first bankers to arrive in Romania to negotiate the programme in Timișoara had to find the way 
to his hotel on the first evening through streets in complete darkness. In the morning, he took a shower be-
fore leaving for a meeting with the Mayor only to find after having soaped himself and shampooed his hair 
that the water stopped. In those days bankers had to be resourceful! 
8  Figures quoted in ‘Romania: Municipal Utilities Development Programme’, 18 November 1994.
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that point a radical shake-up of the sector and providing a model that could 
be used in other cities. 
An audit commissioned by the Bank confirmed major issues with finan-
cial and accounting practices and, more generally, in operational practices 
and the lack of investment. Financial planning, programming and budget-
ing were rudimentary. There was no proper economic appraisal of invest-
ment projects, and internal cash generation for asset rehabilitation and 
renewal was virtually non-existent. Overstaffing, frequent breakdowns re-
quiring yet more additional staff and reliance on cheap electricity—when 
power prices were likely to rise towards world market levels—resulted in 
cost inefficiencies. Meanwhile, low tariffs and charges based on a flat per 
capita rate rather than on the amount consumed meant that revenues bare-
ly met operating costs.
The MUDP, which involved a loan of US$ 28 million, was approved by 
the Board in November 1994 and signed the following year. It involved three 
components: investments in rehabilitation and improvements to the asset 
base; programmes to enhance the operational and financial performance of 
the five water utilities; and technical assistance to strengthen management 
capacities at central and local levels. Investments were chosen on the basis of 
their impact on net cash flows and on the ability of water utilities to service 
their debts. The main investments in water were in meter installations, up-
grading of pipes and pumping equipment, while elsewhere critical parts of 
the sewer network and wastewater treatment plants were upgraded.
To improve productivity and efficiency, the EBRD appointed a team of 
operational and financial managers from a privatised UK water utility to 
work closely with the senior management of the MUDP. Specific measures, 
actions and timetables using performance indicators and project milestones 
were set to improve performance and move towards cost-recovery levels and 
corporatisation of the utilities. Each party to the programme—the munic-
ipalities, the utilities and the ministries of finance and of public works—
was involved before agreement was reached. The novelty for Romania was 
a series of agreements to incentivise each party to work together towards 
the collective goal of a more efficient and productive water sector better de-
signed to meet consumers’ needs.
The EBRD’s finance was a sovereign loan to the government of Romania. 
This was on-lent via a subsidiary loan to the utilities by the ministry of fi-
nance which, together with central government grants and own local funds 
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via the municipalities, financed the investments. The utilities were required 
to repay the interest and principal on the subsidiary loan through opera-
tional income from user charges. The municipalities guaranteed the subsid-
iary loans. 
As well as the loan agreement between Romania and the EBRD there 
were project agreements between the Bank and each of the five utilities and 
their municipalities. These agreements defined the obligations on perfor-
mance and set conditionalities such as achievements to be made before the 
loan could become effective, before procurement could be carried out and 
before loan disbursements. 
The loan agreement between the EBRD and Romania required the bor-
rower to ensure the municipalities and the water utilities complied with the 
terms of the project agreements. This was important as the ministry of fi-
nance had to approve the tariff increases. The agreement also provided for 
the suspension of disbursements should a municipality or water utility fail 
to meet its obligations. 
Disbursements of the Bank’s loan to the ministry of finance and from 
there to the water utilities depended on the actual implementation of tar-
iff increases and satisfactory progress in performance and revenue targets. 
Further financing and a second programme also depended on performance. 
The final part of the contractual structure concerned the subsidiary 
loans, where a subsidiary loan agreement (SLA) tied together the ministry 
of finance as lender, the utilities as borrowers and the municipalities as guar-
antors. It included financial and project covenants and implementation ar-
rangements. 
Agreement was reached to facilitate compliance with debt obligations 
by defining steps by which tariff increases in real terms—of between 80 
per cent and 150 per cent over 16 months—would be made (to enable the 
SLA debt to be serviced) and a set of actions by the utilities to reduce op-
erating costs. The SLA stipulated that the municipality would indemnify 
the water utility for any loss of revenue arising from the local authority fail-
ing to approve tariff increases in a timely manner and as agreed in the proj-
ect agreements. 
The set of measures represented a considerable tightening and advance 
on previous procedures. It anticipated future arrangements across the MEI 
sector whereby public service contract (PSCs) and project support agree-
ments (PSAs) became commonplace tools for effecting reforms and sector 
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progress using EBRD finance and legal expertise. PSCs and PSAs will be ex-
plored in more detail later in this chapter. 
The rationale behind the Bank’s approach was not only to begin to ad-
dress the investment gap in water and wastewater service provision, but also 
to restructure the financing and management of municipal utilities to im-
prove their efficiency and bring them towards self-financing. Higher oper-
ational and financial performance meant that in future, instead of being 
secured by state guarantee, loans could be made directly by the Bank to mu-
nicipalities that were sufficiently creditworthy and, in due course, by com-
mercial lenders in the market. 
The EBRD was uniquely placed to effect direct lending to municipali-
ties and their utilities, and transformation in the creditworthiness of mu-
nicipal service enterprises and municipalities represented a major contribu-
tion to the transition process. Where successful, municipalities would be 
able to assume their responsibilities and be accountable to local electorates 
rather than central bureaucracies, and utilities would provide quality servic-
es to local consumers.
The municipal finance system introduced in Romania with the Bank’s 
help proved to be significant for the five cities involved. After the initial 
success it was followed a few years later by a second programme covering 
a further 10 cities.9 The MUDP introduced the notion of long-term debt 
finance for the provision of municipal services, which was a new concept 
at both central and local levels. It encouraged discipline in investment de-
cisions and financial management, full cost-recovery (including the capi-
tal costs of the loan)—despite local resistance to charging the economic 
costs of services—and the introduction of demand management through 
metering and economic pricing to reduce overconsumption of water. As-
set maintenance improved and development reserves were established in 
each utility. Meanwhile, their corporatisation progressed towards self-fi-
nancing capacity through the improvement of operational and financial 
performance. 
A mid-term review by the Evaluation Department, which was undertak-
en as preparations were being made under the second programme, conclud-
ed that the pilot MUDP had begun very successfully:
9  ‘Romania: Municipal Utilities Development Programme II’, 27 June 1997.
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The Project (in close conjunction with the preparation work for MUDP 
II) can be assessed as already having influenced changes in the legal, fiscal 
and administrative procedures in Romania regarding local government fi-
nances, provision of municipal services and ownership of municipal prop-
erty, assets and land.10
The report also praised other aspects of the project: 
There is clear evidence that the Project has already impacted extensively 
on the water utilities themselves, in all aspects of their financial and oper-
ating performance. Project design effectively institutionalised their corpo-
ratisation … The Project (in conjunction with MUDP II) appears to have 
affected changing perceptions and operating practices of water and waste-
water provision across the entire country … and is clearly much appreciat-
ed by the Romanian authorities at central and local levels.11
MUDP II followed the principles adopted in MUDP I. Given the scale 
of problems to be addressed, it was clear that local governments and munici-
pal utilities could not be forever dependent on IFI financing. There was thus 
increased emphasis on strengthening their underlying creditworthiness and 
rationalising the provision of credit by the central government. The EBRD 
pushed for a Romanian bank to act as administrator of government loans. 
With technical support to raise its capacity, Banca Comercială Română was 
given the task of appraising the creditworthiness of municipal borrowers. 
However, the small size and poor skills of most municipalities (around 70 
per cent had less than 5,000 inhabitants), the large number of regional and 
local utilities (almost 1,000 in the water and wastewater sector) and limited 
regulatory arrangements meant commercial borrowing arrangements were 
slow to materialise. 
In fact, domestic currency loans to local governments were non-existent 
before the 2000s but annual new lending rose from RON 3.6 million (US$ 
1.2 million) in 2001 to RON 1.4 billion by 2006. Domestic currency bonds 
issued by local authorities were similarly limited in 2001 (RON 2.3 million) 
and rose, though only to a very low level, to RON 33 million of new issuance 
10 ‘Mid-Term Review of Municipal Utilities Development Programme, Romania’, March 1999, p. 6.
11 Ibid., p. 7, p. 10.
After the Berlin Wall
198
in 2006. Bonds issued by utilities were rare even at the later date. Most loan 
and bond deals that emerged came from bigger municipalities.12 
4. Developing the Municipal Sector
A number of water and wastewater projects followed the Romanian pro-
gramme, particularly in the Baltic States. Similar multi-city programmes 
were introduced across a number of cities in Croatia13 and Estonia.14 A ma-
jor effort was also made to support the municipality of St. Petersburg, with 
two projects signed in 1997. Gradually the efforts to support decentralisa-
tion and improve local services began to gain traction, with around seven 
projects a year being initiated in the second half of the 1990s, of which well 
over half were in the water sector.15
Initial experience was that the financial and operational improvement 
programmes (FOPIPs) worked well. Corporate partnerships encouraged 
by the Bank through the twinning of water companies with experienced 
western water utilities led to improved practices, and compliance with tar-
iff increases was good. Actual project implementation was more difficult. 
This reflected the lack of experience of local authorities with IFI procure-
ment procedures, the fragmented nature of rehabilitation projects (which 
involved a multitude of sub-projects) and more general weaknesses in prep-
aration capacity. 
Small and challenging projects compared with other sectors
Most projects were small. The average size was around €16 million and 
around half involved less than €10 million of EBRD finance. This was a 
mixed blessing. On the one hand, it meant that the Bank was directly reach-
ing the local level and a wide range of populations across regions and coun-
tries, bringing in new practices from the bottom up and providing unique 
12 Figures from statistical annex of ‘Romania Municipal Finance Policy Note’, World Bank Report 38357-RO, 
3 June 2008.
13 ‘Croatia Municipal Environmental Infrastructure Investment Programme’, 28 October 1996. This covered 
six cities on the Adriatic coast which were important for the tourism industry.
14 ‘Estonia: Small Municipalities Environment Project’, 5 June 1995.
15 About one quarter were district-heating projects.
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(for an IFI) services. On the other hand, it was very labour-intensive, often 
involving long trips with poor communications and due diligence on many 
unknown parties. It was partly for these reasons that the majority of activ-
ity during the early phase of the Bank’s municipal work was in bigger cities 
and in more advanced transition countries. 
The planning and implementation stages of projects often took a long 
time due to changes of national or local governments, revised budgets, land 
disputes, permit and tendering delays, and many other case-specific prob-
lems, with delays in one area feeding delays elsewhere. These issues were par-
ticularly acute early on, when implementation capacity was especially weak 
among local authority clients. As a result disbursements were very slow, with 
well over half of the portfolio undrawn in 2000. This improved over time as 
familiarity with the processes increased, supported by the rise in the num-
ber of Bank projects, related policy dialogue and technical help, and more 
robust systems of local budgetary finance. 
Sub-sovereign lending
The EBRD’s work with municipalities evolved over time. At the beginning, 
projects consisted almost entirely of sovereign or sovereign-guaranteed 
loans. This was less than ideal for a bank designed to promote private-sec-
tor participation, but at the time offered the only viable way of supporting 
decentralisation. Despite overarching pressures from the Board relating to 
the Bank’s 60:40 private-public portfolio requirement, in the early years 
it was clear that the transition goal of supporting local autonomy and ser-
vice-efficiency was of paramount importance. This was emphasised by tak-
ing account of realistic financial returns to the Bank once the full resource 
costs were included. Although returns were low in absolute terms, or pos-
sibly negative in some instances, the principle of “sound banking” could be 
maintained since sovereign lending was remunerated at a fixed margin to 
any country regardless of risk. 
The Bank’s strategy in the sector, however, was to take steps towards sub-
sovereign lending, commercialisation and private-sector involvement. These 
materialised in due course. Although the number of sovereign-guaranteed 
deals remained broadly steady at around three or four a year, their propor-
tion in the total dropped significantly as direct loans to municipalities and 
municipal companies without a sovereign guarantee (and eventually to pri-
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vate entities operating in the sector) increased. From more than 70 per cent 
by number in the portfolio at end-1996, the proportion of sovereign-guaran-
teed projects fell below 40 per cent by the end of 2003 and to around 10 to 
15 per cent of new deals. In value terms, the decline was even faster.
Moving away from sovereign and sovereign-guaranteed lending, how-
ever, changed the risk profile and introduced the need for risk-based pric-
ing consistent with the Bank’s approach to non-sovereign loans elsewhere. 
While a portfolio approach afforded some room for manoeuvre in relation 
to particular projects of high transition and strategic importance, projects 
needed to be soundly financed and properly priced for risk. Persuading mu-
nicipalities and their utilities to take on what they perceived as expensive 
loans was a challenge. It could be mitigated, however, by bringing down the 
risk profile of projects through improvements to financial and operational 
performance, as well as clear and precise contracts between the relevant par-
ties. Working with reform-minded mayors who wanted to effect change in 
their communities also helped. This was why the EBRD’s unique structur-
ing and partnership approach made such an important contribution to al-
tering municipal finance.
Municipal projects in less advanced countries  
and smaller municipalities 
The EBRD moved away from sovereign-guaranteed lending as the introduc-
tion of PSCs and PSAs and the commercialisation of municipal companies 
moved forward. This happened first in the EU accession countries. The ini-
tiative got under way in major cities, such as Belgrade in Serbia and Sofia in 
Bulgaria, but also included Baku in Azerbaijan, Chisinau in Moldova and 
Tashkent in Uzbekistan and, as mentioned earlier, St. Petersburg in Russia. 
In successive MEI strategies the Bank also made efforts to increase the num-
ber of projects in Russia and the early and intermediate transition countries. 
The range of municipalities receiving EBRD advice and finance began to 
expand fairly rapidly. In Russia, projects were signed as far afield as Surgut in 
Western Siberia (2002), Arkhangelsk (2003), Komi (2004) and Sakha (Ya-
kutia, 2006). Early recipients among early transition countries (ETCs) also 
included Tajikistan (2004) and Georgia (2005), while intermediate coun-
tries included Ukraine (1999), FYR Macedonia (now North Macedonia) 
(2000) and Albania (2006).
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The move was consistent with wider efforts by the Bank to move “south 
and east” and tackle more difficult transition challenges. Difficulties with 
ETC projects were legion: distance, unfamiliarity with processes and stan-
dards, the need for extensive dialogue, very limited availability of local fi-
nance, non-creditworthy municipalities and utilities, substantially longer 
project-development times and serious questions of affordability over tariff 
increases and how to compensate losers. The Bank’s local presence helped, 
however, as the bankers in situ were able to make the case for pursuing mu-
nicipal deals on their doorstep and had a good understanding of local polit-
ical conditions and regulatory issues. 
As the EBRD developed its MEI business, more effort was also made to 
reach smaller municipalities. This became a specific objective in the 2004 
MEI operations policy16 and fitted with the more general intention at the 
time to tackle harder transition tasks. One solution was to work with local 
banks to persuade them to provide long-term facilities to more stable local 
municipalities and public utilities. Another approach to the issue was to de-
velop regional and multi-municipality project structures.
Wholesale financing through domestic financial intermediaries could be 
successful and achieve economies of scale where banks had a clear strategic 
focus on the municipal market. It was dependent, however, on those institu-
tions knowing how to choose and monitor projects effectively. Where this 
did not happen, it imposed resource burdens on the EBRD to assist with 
monitoring. This was often the case in the early stages of implementation.17
Opportunities to work with financial intermediaries in the sector turned 
out to be fairly small.18 The EBRD did nonetheless reach many small mu-
nicipalities via direct transactions, either individually or through multi-mu-
nicipality facilities. Some frameworks, like the Municipal Environmental 
Loan Facility (MELF), involved lending to water companies with a local au-
thority guarantee. This allowed the Bank to finance eight companies in sec-
ond-tier cities in Romania. Direct projects in Serbia were signed from 2002 
on in Novi Sad, Nis, Kragujevac and Subotica, whose populations ranged 
16 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 20 October 2004, p. 9.
17 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy Review’ (2010), Evaluation Department, 
Appendix 5, p. 15, 20, 32.
18 One example was a risk-sharing arrangement with Dexia Banka Slovensco in 2004. The EBRD participat-
ed in loans made by Dexia to small and medium-sized municipalities (populations below 100,000) and mu-
nicipal companies in Slovakia, bearing the risk of non-payment by municipalities. 
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from 100,000 to 200,000. Projects in Croatia covered Rijeka, Pula and Du-
brovnik, where populations were smaller (50,000 to 150,000). In Montene-
gro, water-supply projects were successfully implemented in coastal towns 
with even smaller populations. Projects in solid waste management and wa-
ter services lent themselves more easily to economies of scale through the 
connection of several small towns in a region. For example, a project to cre-
ate the first regional operating company providing water and wastewater ser-
vices along a river basin in Romania in 2005 brought together a set of small 
water companies covering one city and seven towns with very small popula-
tions to invest in metering and water pipes in the counties of Cluj and Salaj.19
Demonstration effects: the case of Tajikistan
Another approach that proved effective involved demonstrating the feasibil-
ity of the EBRD’s approach in a more prominent city and then applying it 
to smaller centres. Improvements to tariff-setting processes, which in many 
public services were driven by national authorities with whom the EBRD en-
gaged in policy dialogue, also gave impetus to municipalities to pursue fol-
low-through investments involving the EBRD. In the earliest days the Bank 
focused on the capitals of central European countries before branching out. 
The same approach was taken in Russia. By the 2000s, with national-local 
government arrangements largely settled across the region and with the need 
for improvements to local services especially acute in ETCs, the Bank sought 
to tackle municipality-service reform in more difficult countries and regions. 
A good example of how it worked is provided by Tajikistan.
In 2004, an operation to improve the water supply in Khujand (popula-
tion 160,000) in northern Tajikistan was launched as a demonstration proj-
ect. The initiative was then extended to three much smaller cities in southern 
Tajikistan: Danghara, Kulob and Bokhtar (formerly known as Kurgan-
Tube), with populations of 21,000 to 85,000. Subsequently, several other Ta-
jik cities received EBRD investments targeted at improving water supplies. 
Such projects were already complex in terms of their components—techni-
cal aspects, procurement, tariffs, PSCs and corporatisation—and had to be 
conducted in difficult environments. This required strong resident office in-
put, especially in these relatively inaccessible parts of the world.
19 ‘Romania: Regional Operating Company (ROC) Apa Somes’, 2005.
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Affordability
Municipal projects in the poorer countries had a significant impact on tran-
sition and in improving living standards through better access to clean wa-
ter, lower pollution and better services in such areas as transport, solid waste 
management and energy supply. But conducting projects in poorer areas 
raised the issue of affordability, particularly when increases in tariffs were 
necessary to improve the financial performance of utilities supplying local 
services. In countries such as Tajikistan there were two dimensions to af-
fordability that required donor support. 
First, loans needed to be large enough to ensure that improvements to ser-
vices were significant and effective. Tangible results also helped to encour-
age people to pay the fees (non-payments of municipal tariffs reached very 
high levels in some cases), which helped utility companies move towards fi-
nancial sustainability. However, many smaller cities, especially at the start 
of a programme, had very little borrowing capacity. In the case of highly in-
debted countries with limited earning capacity, such as Tajikistan, non-con-
cessional loans as normally provided by the EBRD via sovereign-guaranteed 
finance were also restricted under IMF programme rules on international 
borrowing and required proportionately large grant co-financing.20 
Second, the EBRD assessed the impact of tariff increases against spe-
cific indicators of affordability. These were based on the proportion of 
household income paid for municipal services and were considered for all 
household deciles, although they were mostly relevant to the most vulner-
able groups. 
For these two reasons, many projects in the municipal sector in less de-
veloped regions required a significant share of grants. Grant funding helped 
make investments more affordable for municipalities and minimised the 
impact on poorer households of tariff increases (“communal tariffs” on ser-
vices like electricity or water were often heavily subsidised, resulting in large 
financial losses for utility companies). The share of grants in the cost of a 
project could reach 50 per cent or even more. Donor funds have remained an 
invaluable tool for municipal financing in the poorer countries. 
20 In such cases a grant element of at least 35 per cent was required. See ‘IDA Countries and Non-Concession-
al Debt’,19 June 2006, World Bank 36563. SECO (Swiss) and SIDA (Swedish) funds were important con-
tributors to these needs.
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As projects in smaller municipalities began to grow, particularly in ETCs—
something the Board encouraged—so too did the need for donor finance. For 
the EBRD, these projects were not especially profitable. While their value to 
the population was unquestionable, low profitability could be an issue, as the 
Bank was still expected to show a return on each investment. This issue was re-
solved when a “portfolio approach”—the balancing of risk, returns and transi-
tion impact across the Bank’s portfolio—was introduced in 1999.
5. Core Sectors
Despite some efforts to extend municipal and environmental lending to in-
clude areas such as housing and business parks, the portfolio during this pe-
riod remained dominated by water supply and wastewater treatment proj-
ects, with some operations in district heating, urban transport and solid 
waste management. The number of urban transport projects rose quickly 
from the 2000s, in part due to growing urban populations and increasing 
congestion and pollution. The following section describes the key challeng-
es in each sub-sector.
Water and wastewater treatment
By the end of the first decade of transition, more than half of the municipal 
projects financed by the EBRD were in the water and wastewater treatment 
sector. The Bank cooperated in the development of projects at the early stag-
es of preparation and helped to structure them in order to reduce operating 
costs and enhance cashflow generation. This also supported commerciali-
sation through strengthened public service contracts, cost-recovery tariffs, 
improved collections, better accounting practices and preparation for out-
sourcing for future private-sector participation. Policy dialogue was focused 
on regulatory reform, and the Bank’s legal transition team was heavily in-
volved in work related to concessions and frameworks for private financing, 
such as PPP legislation in Poland. 
The main parameters of decentralisation had largely been achieved dur-
ing the 1990s (other than in some ETCs). Some public utilities had been pri-
vatised. Nonetheless there was further to go. In Bulgaria, for example, the 
state remained the majority owner in 29 out of 49 water enterprises in the 
205
Part II  Chapter 7
early 2000s.21 Moreover, the quality of water and wastewater treatment ser-
vices was still far from adequate.
Water and wastewater treatment services were mostly organised through-
out the region by municipal departments or municipal enterprises. Private-
sector involvement emerged mainly in advanced countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland and in a few major cities such as Bucharest 
and Sofia. Regulatory arrangements were mostly in the hands of local or re-
gional authorities, who set tariffs on the basis of advice by the water enter-
prises. This created conflicts of interest between cities in their role as regu-
lators and as shareholders in the companies. Independent regulators were 
a long time in coming and service contracts between the local government 
and operators were of variable quality. There was also a need to set service 
targets and monitor performance. 
Pricing reform was much needed in ETCs, where tariffs typically cov-
ered between 30 per cent and 80 per cent of operating costs, with the re-
maining funding provided from the public purse. In Georgia and Armenia, 
the figure was as low as 15 per cent in 2002. Collection was also poor and 
took a long time, averaging 10 to 14 months in Ukraine and Moldova, com-
pared with one to three months in OECD and Baltic states.22 In an EBRD 
survey of utility companies in Russia in 2002, no investment was reported 
during the previous five years. Cross-subsidisation between industrial and 
domestic consumers was common, although attempts were made to phase it 
out. Metering at that time was a long way behind OECD levels of near 100 
per cent, with fewer than 30 per cent of the population having meters in 
Russia, Moldova and Ukraine.23
The quality of services varied across the region. By the early 2000s, the 
proportion of the population with a water connection in some parts of the 
region was still well below western norms. Rural communities in Ukraine 
and Georgia were particularly poorly served, with just 26 per cent and 35 per 
cent connected, respectively. In Romania, only 58 per cent had connectiv-
ity. Sewerage was not much better and wastewater treatment coverage was 
notably low in the Balkans and Lithuania. In the CIS-7 (Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Tajikistan), it 
21 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 2004, Annex 1, p. 6.
22 ‘Urban Water Reform in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia’, OECD, 2003, p. 39. 
23 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 2004, Annex 1, p. 7.
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was estimated that 30 per cent of the population was drinking water be-
low adequate standards. A National Environmental Action Plan for Mol-
dova concluded that between 950 and 1,850 premature deaths arose annual-
ly from unsafe drinking water. Moreover, road accident rates in the region 
were vastly higher than in OECD countries, with between two and 10 ac-
cidents per network kilometre in the CIS-7 against 0.2 to 0.3 per kilometre 
in OECD countries.24
International attention on the water sector was boosted in 2000 with the 
publication of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which includ-
ed a commitment to halve the proportion of people without sustainable ac-
cess to safe drinking water by 2015. At the Johannesburg Earth Summit of 
200225 this was extended to basic sanitation.26 A report led by Camdessus, 
the former IMF managing director, for the World Water Forum in Kyoto 
200327 recommended that donors and MDBs raise investment volumes and 
make use of financing instruments, notably sub-sovereign and private-sec-
tor financing, to improve water governance. The EBRD’s work was already 
in keeping with these aims and unlike other MDBs it had no limitation on 
lending without a sovereign guarantee. The Bank already had considerable 
experience with financing at the sub-sovereign level without such guaran-
tees, as well as in lending to the private sector. 
Urban transport
Urbanisation in the EBRD’s countries of operations, while lower than in 
the EU, was significant and rising. Nearly half of Poland’s population at 
the turn of the millennium lived in 250 towns and cities. In Russia, urban-
isation was even higher at 73 per cent. Car ownership also increased rap-
idly after the end of communism, growing by more than 10 per cent a year 
throughout the 1990s in many cities including Prague, Brno and Budapest. 
This led to traffic congestion and the need for off-street parking. Congestion 
not only increased air and noise pollution, but also lengthened travel times 
and the costs of doing business. 
24 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 2004, Annex 1, p. 3.
25 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002. 
26 UN Millennium Development Goal 7c.
27 ‘Financing Water for All’, report of the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure, M. Camdessus 
and J. Winpenny, March 2003.
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With rapid increases in urban motorisation came falls in usage of pub-
lic transport. With countries starting from a very high base, however, pas-
senger trips by public transport remained significant. In the early 2000s, the 
proportion of journeys by public transport in Bucharest at 51 per cent and 
Prague at 48 per cent were still far higher than in Berlin and Paris (28 per 
cent and 19 per cent, respectively).28
These trends put increasing pressures on cities and municipalities to find 
solutions to urban transport problems. With its deep knowledge of urban 
systems and access to authorities and public transport utilities in OECD 
countries, the EBRD was a natural partner to help. The MEI portfolio be-
gan to show a higher share of urban transport projects from around 2001.
Most cities lacked coherent and sustainable transport strategies and fre-
quent use of “pay-as-you-go” budgetary arrangements detracted from multi-
annual planning and long-term funding methods for investment. Mainte-
nance depots had mostly not been modernised since the 1960s and 1970s 
and ticketing systems were still based on cash and coin. Poor procurement 
practices added to costs and, while decentralisation had taken place, finan-
cial arrangements took a long time to follow suit. Managements had very 
limited business orientation and focused on technical aspects of transport 
rather than the quality of customer service, while large numbers of low-paid 
staff had little incentive to drive improvements. Governments took deci-
sions on investment (but not maintenance) and defined a wide range of low 
or non-paying customers (up to 50 categories in some cases, including war 
heroes, teachers and so forth), but without directly compensating transport 
operators. This had a deleterious effect on the financial situation of opera-
tors, leading to a degradation of service quality.
In a number of countries, the drop in public funding following the col-
lapse of central planning resulted in low-quality, low-capacity minibus-
es (known in the former USSR countries as “marshrutkas”) filling the gap. 
This commercialisation of transport witnessed self-employed entrepre-
neurs building a market for minibus services, helped in part by weak reg-
28 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 2004, Annex 2, p. 2. Eurostat figures for 
passenger kilometres travelled by transport mode (passenger cars, trains, motor coaches, buses and trolley 
buses) in 2001 show more than twice the proportion of journeys by trains, coaches and buses (public trans-
port) in several central European countries compared with their main EU counterparts: the proportion in 
Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria with Czech Republic and Roma-
nia ranged from 28–39 per cent, while for the UK, France, Germany and Italy the range was 12–17 per cent.
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ulation. Although this was a valid response to customers’ needs—especial-
ly for those unable to afford car ownership—it brought with it problems of 
uncontrolled development, as well as health and safety issues. Rather than a 
“competition for the market” in public transport ridership using a system of 
well-regulated concession contracts, competition consisted of minibus ser-
vices literally racing to pick up passengers in an uncontrolled manner. 
Commercialisation of standard bus services, trams and trolleybuses 
occurred relatively slowly, even in advanced transition economies such as 
Hungary and Poland. To some extent this also reflected long-standing so-
cial attitudes to the private sector and its profit-orientation encroaching on 
important social services. In Russia, for example, public transport in the ear-
ly 2000s was provided by some 350 municipal and public operators versus 
more than 1,500 private and 35,000 self-employed operators, yet public en-
terprises reportedly continued to hold around 85 per cent of the market.29 
The EBRD’s interventions were designed to transform the transport en-
tities into modern companies with proper business plans and accounts, ap-
propriate PSCs and tariffs (with payment for non-economic services), full 
responsibility for investment decisions, auditing and recognisable corporate 
governance. Twinning arrangements with experienced operating companies 
with good practices helped to shift attitudes and behaviour towards western 
market norms. 
Solid waste management
The handling of waste arising from consumption (municipal waste) and 
industrial production (mining, metallurgy, fertilisers, glass, cement, etc.) 
was a concern in all EBRD countries of operations, particularly when it 
involved hazardous materials such as household solvents, discarded medi-
cines, asbestos, spent oils and other contaminating substances. Waste man-
agement—which involved storage, collection, transport, processing and 
final disposal—was important most of all from an environmental and sus-
tainable development point of view. This was relevant to the EBRD’s man-
date, and the Bank was well placed to help improve arrangements by which 
waste disposal was managed. The modernisation of the sector accelerated in 
countries seeking EU accession by their adoption and transposition of EU 
29 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 2004, Annex 2, pp. 9–10.
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Directives under the Waste Acquis, in particular the Landfill Directive in-
troduced in 1999. 
Landfill was the major disposal for waste in countries of operations, 
amounting to some 84 per cent of the total in 1999. This was far higher than 
in western Europe, where comparable figures were 45 per cent in 2000. The 
difference was largely accounted for by incineration, energy recovery and re-
cycling. The latter—which involved organics (food waste, etc.), paper and 
cardboard, glass, metals, plastics and textiles—was low in central and east-
ern Europe at 9 per cent, compared with 26 per cent in western Europe. 30 
Waste-to-heat recovery arrangements were similarly a long way behind ma-
jor European countries. 
Some landfills took both municipal and industrial waste, including in 
several cases co-disposal of industrial and hazardous waste. Most sites were 
overloaded and not designed or operated to meet modern public health stan-
dards. Only a very small number of landfill sites met EU standards, for exam-
ple. In less advanced transition countries such as Russia and other CIS coun-
tries there was no system for integrated waste management nor any body of 
law relating to waste (although technical norms and sanitary rules did exist). 
Dumping of waste at unauthorised sites in rural areas was common. 
Tipping fees, where charged, were low and non-compliance charges were 
infrequently applied. When strengthened without proper regulation and 
oversight, this simply encouraged illegal disposals. Nonetheless, the increas-
ing quantities of waste being generated, the requirement for greater invest-
ment and treatment costs (particularly in EU aspirant countries) and ris-
ing public expectations led to more serious consideration of the issue among 
countries of operations and their municipalities. 
In advanced countries following EU environmental policies, a new in-
strument—“extended producer responsibility”—was introduced in the ear-
ly 2000s. This transferred responsibility for the final disposal of products 
after consumption from the public sector (that is, municipalities) to pro-
ducers. This helped municipalities raise revenues to pay for waste treatment 
and disposal infrastructure, for which demand was on a steep rising curve. 
The Slovak Republic was one of the first EBRD countries to apply the pro-
cedure for substances including batteries, waste oils, paper and packaging 
and glass. Compliance demands grew and with them the need for new in-
30 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 2004, Annex 3.
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vestment, which increased the attraction of outsourcing to private provid-
ers. This helped local businesses and competition for contracts became more 
intense, leading to some consolidation. Waste management was also aided 
by the development of regional and inter-municipality arrangements among 
small and medium-sized municipalities (in the Baltic States, for instance). 
All of this helped the EBRD develop this side of its municipal business.
District heating
Urban areas with concentrated populations were common in many coun-
tries of operations as a result of central planning, with heat supplied by dis-
trict-heating systems owned by the state. In Russia and Latvia, the market 
share of district heating in 2003 was 70 per cent, while in the other Baltic 
States, Poland and Belarus it was more than 50 per cent.31 Decentralisation 
had shifted ownership to municipalities but there was little private provi-
sion outside the Czech Republic and Estonia. Low incomes meant that en-
ergy, most of which was used for space heating, took up a high proportion 
of household incomes and made price increases a sensitive and politicised 
topic. Getting the balance right between improved service provision and 
higher district heating charges to pay for better services was a delicate busi-
ness. Nonetheless, gross inefficiencies in most systems meant there were at 
least some easier wins to be made early on. According to the World Energy 
Council, energy losses in generation, transportation, distribution and end-
use ranged from 35 per cent to more than 75 per cent in the EBRD’s coun-
tries of operations due to stretched networks using old and poorly main-
tained equipment and technology. 
Heat tariffs in most countries remained regulated to keep them afford-
able for consumers and rarely took into account the costs of depreciation 
and of financing investment. There was also considerable variation in heat 
tariffs, both within and between countries, in part reflecting different heat 
sources and the condition of distribution systems. On the demand side, con-
sumers had little incentive to rationalise consumption and in large apart-
ment blocks had no control over supplies. Over time there was a trend away 
from district heating towards natural gas distribution networks, allowing 
consumers to install autonomous heating systems. This was particularly the 
31 World Energy Council, 2003.
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case where district heating was not the least-cost option—as in many less 
built-up and rural areas —and where reliability of supply was poor. In Mol-
dova, for example, it was estimated that by 2000 up to 20 per cent of flat-
owners in multi-storey buildings had installed autonomous boilers, while 
demand for district heating in Poland and Hungary had fallen by 15 per 
cent and 30 per cent over the decade. 
These conditions put pressure on district-heating companies to improve 
physical efficiency by reducing heat losses, both to save costs and increase 
reliability, as well as enhancing overall performance to remain competitive 
as alternative sources of supply emerged. The EBRD was able to assist with 
instruments such as FOPIPs, finance for new (and more energy-efficient) 
equipment, technical assistance and and municipal support agreements 
(MSAs). After water and wastewater treatment operations, district-heat-
ing projects were the second-biggest part of MEI business, accounting for 
around one-quarter of volume by the mid-2000s.
6. PSCs and PSAs
The EBRD successfully improved the water and urban transport sectors 
through sub-sovereign direct lending underpinned by solid funding ar-
rangements and financial and institutional instruments designed to im-
prove creditworthiness within an off-balance sheet project funding struc-
ture. Contract incentives were strengthened by PSCs and PSAs or MSAs, 
the latter being used in urban transport projects. 
The non-sovereign nature of the Bank’s business model was in contrast 
to other IFIs, where sovereign lending was the norm. Among its advantag-
es was that greater efficiency and commercialisation were needed before 
the EBRD or commercial co-financiers were prepared to lend. This process 
forced improvements in revenues and greater cost-discipline, allowing com-
panies to leverage finance for higher investment and better service quali-
ty. An analysis of a representative sample of EBRD municipal infrastruc-
ture projects showed that revenues were on average 90 per cent higher in 
real terms 10 years after full implementation.32 The objectives of the Bank 
32 ‘Accelerating Infrastructure Delivery: New Evidence from International Financial Institutions’, paper sub-
mitted to the World Economic Forum, April 2014, p. 9.
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focused on building a sustainable financing and operating model, one that 
would ultimately lead to self-reliance for investments.
The PSC was a key component of this successful approach and used 
widely across the EBRD region. Some 50 per cent of all PSC-based projects 
were carried out in non-EU countries of operations, from Russia to Central 
Asia and the Caucasus and elsewhere, where they were adjusted for local le-
gal and administrative requirements and national budget codes. The PSC 
defined the contractual arrangement between the service provider and the 
municipality as owner. It clarified the commitments, rights and obligations 
of all parties and, properly written, included well-defined long-term opera-
tional, technical and financial performance targets. The owner’s rights cov-
ered approval of business and investment plans and tariff adjustments (with 
agreement not to interfere in short-term operational issues), while the com-
pany’s rights and obligations involved the implementation of the business 
plan, annual statements of progress and delivery of targets such as water sup-
ply, metering, billing and payment collection. 
PSAs (and MSAs) formed the other core component of the EBRD’s ap-
proach in municipal projects. These were contractual agreements between 
the EBRD and the relevant authorities, for example the municipal owners 
of the water companies, who were borrowers from the Bank. Agreements in-
cluded a general commitment to support and cooperate with the project and 
to facilitate key decisions such as tariff adjustments. An important compo-
nent was an obligation to provide financial backing to the company to cover 
all economically justified costs not covered by tariffs. If the tariff was insuf-
ficient to meet the full costs of operations or if the municipality was un-
willing to raise tariffs sufficiently for political or social reasons, the company 
would be compensated. Equally, the owner was not obliged to pay for non-
economically justified costs or, for example, a failure to collect payments 
from users. The PSA discouraged the owners from having to pay for inef-
ficiencies by the company not related to the proper cost of operations. The 
PSA did not entail any guarantee by the municipality to repay the EBRD 
but acted as a strong risk mitigator that helped to lower the risk profile of the 
project. It was an effective and robust credit enhancement tool.
The PSC and PSA approach formed an important new way of managing 
project finance risks in the municipal context. It also helped to persuade the 
Bank’s finance department (and later the risk department) that this type of 
sub-sovereign lending was acceptable when combined with technical sup-
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port and operational and financial reform by the utility companies. Despite 
the high risks involved in dealing with municipal projects, default rates were 
remarkably low, helped by the careful selection of reform-minded cities as 
partners. In fact, the EBRD has never had a payment default on its sub-sov-
ereign portfolio.
The credit enhancement approach also made it easier to attract commer-
cial finance. Several European commercial bank groups—including Dexia 
(Belgian), RZB (Austrian) and Swedbank (Swedish)—became B lenders in 
EBRD-led syndications in water and wastewater treatment operations. They 
also obtained comfort from the EBRD’s preferred creditor status. The finan-
cial multiplier from the successful application of the overall approach was sub-
stantial. In the case of Romania, where the Bank engaged with 20 cities direct-
ly between 1994 and 2011, it was estimated that revenues increased more than 
fourfold in real terms, from US$ 300 million to US$ 1.4 billion.33 A similar 
pattern was seen in urban transport. For example, a project in Kaunas, Lithua-
nia based on the cost control exerted through a PSC reduced real operating ex-
penditures by more than one-third between 2004 and 2010, and increased the 
fare-box recovery ratio34 from 30 per cent to more than 80 per cent.35 
7. Private-Sector Participation
Private-sector solutions
In a number of projects the EBRD sought private-sector solutions and in-
volved international private companies, for example in design, build and op-
erate (DBO) arrangements in wastewater treatment plants (as in Zagreb)36 
or in the privatisation of municipal companies. This was not an easy exercise 
and in more complex cases was very resource-intensive. Foreign investors 
were concerned about the risks involved, for example relating to tendering 
processes (and whether they were open and transparent), the need for clear-
ly specified contracts, the robustness of payment streams (which were linked 
to tariff-setting and fee collection) and the ability to reap economies of scale 
33 ‘Accelerating Infrastructure Delivery’, 2014, p. 12.
34 The proportion of operating costs covered by ticketing revenues. 
35 ‘Accelerating Infrastructure Delivery’, 2014, p. 15.
36 ‘Zagreb Wastewater Treatment Plant’, 3 September 2001.
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(which required larger or multi-city contracts). They also often sought guar-
antees against political risk. 
At the same time, successful private-sector involvement depended on the 
capacity of local administrations and their commitment. For example, the 
role of a local administration as a client in a PPP deal required efficiency in 
planning, tendering, contract negotiations and contract monitoring. Com-
mitment to using the private sector and long contracts for service provision, 
typically up to 10 to 15 years, also required adequate and predictable tariffs 
to attract private-sector operators. 
However, the scale of the tariff increases required to reach economic vi-
ability, combined with the profit element for private companies, frequent-
ly incited controversy and political pressure to avoid making changes. Pri-
vatisation of municipal companies was even more difficult since few were 
prepared to take the risks of restructuring unviable entities, while in cas-
es where companies were economically more efficient, there was less need 
for municipalities to sell them off. A further requirement for successful pri-
vate-sector participation—which was only properly met in advanced coun-
tries towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s—was a stable and effec-
tive regulatory system.37
PPPs were an area in which the private sector engaged with municipal and 
city investments, often in public transport, parking and water and wastewa-
ter treatment projects, and usually in cases where grant funding for public 
investment in infrastructure was unavailable. In some cases, PPP financing 
was related to the construction and management of city infrastructure, as in 
the effort to improve the central section of the St. Petersburg western high-
speed diameter road. Onerous legal structures in environments where the 
institutional setting was weak and volatile and where political interference 
was similarly frequent and unpredictable, however, meant PPPs had a more 
chequered history than the EBRD hoped for. More positively, services out-
sourced to the private sector using performance-based contracts allowed en-
tities to mobilise private-sector expertise and share risk while avoiding the 
legal complexity of fully-fledged concessions and the political hurdles in-
volved in public asset transfers.38
37 This section draws on ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy Review’, Evalua-
tion Department, May 2010.
38 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Sector Strategy’, 28 June 2012, p. 39.
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A number of major international players who had entered the market in 
the 1990s—such as Suez Environment and Veolia (both French-owned) and 
International Water Limited, which was jointly owned by Bechtel’s Italian 
subsidiary and Edison—consolidated and retreated from the region in the 
2000s, preferring developed countries and faster-growing and larger emerg-
ing markets such as Brazil and China.39 Smaller players such as Berlinwasser 
International took up some of the vacant space, but PPPs were limited and 
confined mainly to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Here, there 
were a few PPP district-heating projects but most activity was in the water 
sector and focused on less risky structures such as shorter-term leasing and 
operation and management contracts, which required less capital invest-
ment. The availability of EU pre-accession and post-accession grants served 
to disrupt the private sector participation (PSP) market in advanced tran-
sition countries, while a lack of adequate PPP legislation in less advanced 
countries, as well as the caution of international investors, limited its devel-
opment.40 
In all its work with the private sector the EBRD was keen to ensure that 
high standards were achieved. This was made easier by the use of technical 
cooperation funds but required vigilance to ensure competition, fair con-
tracts and the avoidance of corruption, especially given the lack of experi-
ence of most municipality staff in these areas. Inevitably, compliance with 
best practice and the intensive dialogue required to put in place legal condi-
tions for private-sector participation resulted in long lead times and was bur-
densome financially and in terms of resources.
Although the EBRD had high hopes for eventual private-sector partici-
pation in the MEI sector, expecting it to offer value for money and better al-
location of risk, the outcome was generally disappointing during the Bank’s 
first 15 years. Long-term leases or concessions to private operators (up to 25 
years) in principle offered an appropriate longer-term commercial approach 
to project development and problem-solving, as compared with public-sector 
managers trying to cope with short-term pressures and adapt to pressing po-
litical goals. An EBRD Legal Indicator Survey in 2000, however, found that 
three-quarters of the Bank’s countries of operations had “barely adequate” or 
“detrimental” concession laws. Such arrangements needed legal and regula-
39 ‘Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy’, 2004, Annex 5.
40 See ‘Private Sector Participation in MEI Projects’, Evaluation Department, 2014.
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tory certainty to work well and this was often lacking: seemingly stable regu-
lations were too frequently interrupted by political developments. 
Access to private financial capital markets 
Another area the EBRD supported was increasing access by municipalities 
and municipal companies to commercial finance and capital markets. This 
had been an aspiration from the beginning, albeit a long-term one. The main 
success was seen in the promotion of commercial bank co-financing through 
the Bank’s syndication capacity and in the use of partial guarantees for oth-
er lenders’ exposure to municipalities. In some cases, forms of quasi-equity or 
mezzanine capital were used to expand access of the municipal sector to long-
term capital, while equity finance was provided in a few cases to service pro-
viders. EBRD support for revenue bonds (as in the Bydgoszcz Water Revenue 
Bond Project in Poland in 2005) also promoted the expansion of the market 
for local government investment beyond commercial banks to institutional 
and individual investors looking for long-term investments.
Bringing municipalities’ performance to a level where they were able to 
access private financial capital markets, even with the Bank’s help, was not 
an easy task. Larger and more advanced cities provided the most suitable 
cases but even here local commercial banks’ lack of experience of municipal 
lending made them less interested in participating. They were also often un-
willing to provide waivers, which resulted in significant delays to projects 
and increased wariness on all sides. 
Local currency finance
A particular factor in the municipal sector was that municipalities and pro-
viders of municipal services received the bulk of their revenues in local curren-
cy. The EBRD strove to provide its clients with local currency finance, which 
became easier in later years as sources of funding began to develop with im-
provements in capital markets in more advanced transition countries. In Rus-
sia, after the 1998 financial crisis, restrictions on foreign borrowing by munic-
ipalities also forced the EBRD to source roubles in order to lend, which it did 
through its treasury department via marketable rouble financial instruments.
Providing local currency finance remained difficult in many countries 
where the Bank was active in supporting the development of municipal ser-
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vices. The only realistic alternative was to use risk-sharing mechanisms to 
help local financial institutions provide local currency finance. While local 
currency finance mitigated foreign exchange risks, municipal clients faced 
local interest rate risks. In weak economies, local currency interest rates were 
usually high and volatile, increasing the reluctance of clients to take on such 
loans. Given the variety of risks involved and the EBRD’s commitment to 
sound banking, local currency lending to municipalities took time to devel-
op beyond central Europe. 
Commercial bank and DFI co-finance
Commercial bank financing of the municipal sector began to grow from 
the late 1990s onward and the EBRD successfully syndicated several loans, 
usually in dollars or euros, using its A-loan/B-loan structure. There were 
also projects involving parallel finance by local commercial banks. Several 
municipal transactions in advanced transition countries undertaken by the 
EBRD during the mid-2000s involved co-financing with western European 
banks such as Dexia, RZB and Société Générale. By late 2007, the amount 
of commercial co-finance facilitated by the EBRD had more than doubled 
compared with the early years of the decade. Indeed, commercial financing 
of municipal enterprises in Poland and other advanced countries, and even 
in Romania, was expanding fast with margins falling sharply. Better terms 
were beginning to be offered by the market than by the EBRD. The Bank 
was being priced out of the market and its offer was no longer financially ad-
ditional. In the words of one senior EBRD manager: “We could see the end 
of the line in Romania and Poland already.”41 
This judgement, however, proved to be premature. Commercial finance 
and co-finance for municipalities and municipal companies came to an 
abrupt halt with the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. Pending the reviv-
al of the commercial market, IFI co-financing expanded considerably. This 
involved institutions such as the World Bank, IFC, EIB, ADB and NIB, as 
well as national development financial institutions such as the Agence Fran-
çaise de Développement (AfD), Germany’s KfW, the Millennium Chal-
lenge Corporation (USA) and Vnesheconombank (Russia).
41 Interview with author, January 2020.
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Conclusion
The EBRD’s policy towards municipalities was based consistently on three 
themes: decentralisation, commercialisation and environmental improve-
ment. These were fully in keeping with the objectives from the start of en-
couraging greater autonomy from the state, decentralisation and devolved 
decision-making, and financial self-sustainability. An Evaluation Depart-
ment study in 2010, after consulting a wide range of municipalities and mu-
nicipal companies that worked with the EBRD, concluded that several mu-
nicipal companies had “changed from a weak state with no autonomy and 
poor services that rely on subsidies to be sustained, to a commercialised com-
pany with decision-making powers, high accountability, and providing high 
standards of services”.42
For the Bank’s projects to be successful it was first necessary to ensure 
the city administration was fully committed to improving municipal servic-
es and to build capacity and make the municipalities creditworthy. Use of 
technical cooperation funds was an essential part of the process of commer-
cialisation, as was the development of tariff policies that improved cost-re-
covery and gave more certainty over future revenues and the ability to plan 
investment programmes. Once municipal utilities were able to operate free-
ly within a proper financing structure and manage those activities for which 
they were responsible, progress could be made. Particularly successful proj-
ects tended to be associated with very strong management skills and experi-
ence in municipal companies. 
The development and signing of PSCs and PSAs were a vital part of the 
process of helping municipalities improve institutional structures and ser-
vices. By adding clarity to the relationship between the city administration 
and municipal companies through the specification of roles and responsibil-
ities, tariffs and subsidies, PSCs and PSAs cleared a path towards commer-
cialisation and ultimately private-sector participation. Urban transport—
where private companies in many cases took over the running of metro, bus, 
tram, trolley and light rail routes—was a successful example of the value of 
adopting PSCs (and MSAs). 
The EBRD’s track record in pioneering a sub-sovereign approach to mu-
nicipal finance and implementing a very large number of projects with PSC, 
42 Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Operations Policy Review’, Evaluation Department, 2010, p. 47.
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PSA or MSA structures in many cities, large and small, was unparalleled. To 
implement a novel method without a full default is all the more remarkable 
given the commercial pricing approach and the often very high risk levels 
involved. Longer-term viability was enhanced by targeting reform-orient-
ed municipalities, especially those with supportive mayors and authorities. 
Careful integrity checks and the pursuit of high standards (with support 
from the EU) also helped. 
An improvement that strengthened commercialisation, particular-
ly among local public transport companies, was the increased collection of 
data and its greater reliability. Electronic ticketing systems that could record 
and forecast passenger usage, including for those with subsidised fares such 
as pensioners and students, were valuable for planning routes and tariffs. 
Similarly, metering of water and heating supplies, weighing of solid waste 
landfill deliveries, registration of vehicles for fees, and recording of proper-
ties and the number of residents for tariff-payment purposes brought mod-
ernisation and progress to areas long left behind. Specific fees, charges and 
taxes on citizens by local authorities also brought greater visibility and ac-
countability for service quality and helped to strengthen local democracy.
One area that took longer to bed in was procurement. The EBRD’s pro-
cedures, which were very thorough and designed to eliminate anti-competi-
tive practices and corruption, required competitive and transparent tender-
ing. These were poorly understood at first and disrupted previous practices. 
Once the process resulted in savings of investment costs, however, awareness 
of commercial benefits helped to persuade clients of its value.
Commercialisation brought greater private-sector involvement. A num-
ber of international companies—Veolia in water and solid waste, for exam-
ple—took advantage of concessions available in larger cities and regions to 
develop investment programmes. Usually these were cases where tariff-set-
ting was designed to meet full cost-recovery, political risks were relatively 
low—mitigated by working with the EBRD—and there was room for priva-
tisation. There were some successful PPPs but municipalities were less com-
mitted here and many projects were small and not appropriate for the com-
plexities involved. 
Establishing a successful, broad and enduring municipal lending mod-
el was largely the result of EBRD’s unique approach. Internally, integrated 
project teams – comprising bankers, sector and environmental experts and 
procurement and technical assistance specialists – all reported to a single 
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banking director to work cohesively, creating a clear and consistent direc-
tion in non-sovereign municipal work and its support for decentralisation. 
This was an especially strong feature of the EBRD municipal model. 
The Bank’s efforts in the municipal sector contributed to major environ-
mental improvements. Many cities and towns saw higher-quality water and 
more reliable supplies, with far less wastage from water losses. The applica-
tion of EU standards to wastewater treatment plants prevented further dis-
charges of raw sewerage into local rivers and reduced pollution, improving 
health. Disposal of solid waste came under better control and district heat-
ing supplies were managed more efficiently, saving costs and carbon usage, 
while urban transport advances led to less polluting buses and more reliable 
timetables. 
In short, by the late 2000s, thanks in part to decentralisation, the range 
and quality of local services in many cities had moved closer to their coun-
terparts in western Europe. The EBRD had made a significant contribution 





Thirty years ago, the EBRD’s regions were home to some of the most en-
ergy-intensive and polluting industries in the world. Hushed-up environ-
mental and nuclear catastrophes—most notably the Chernobyl disaster of 
1986—spurred some of the first popular protests against the authorities in 
the USSR. It was clear to the Bank’s founders that the economies of the 
post-communist countries would need to be rebuilt in a sustainable way. 
From the outset the EBRD was charged with promoting environmental-
ly friendly economies, long before “sustainability” became a watchword for 
development organisations. Many of its early investments had dual objec-
tives in targeting desirable environmental results: modernising industries of-
ten meant replacing old equipment with new machinery, which allowed the 
Bank to introduce improvements in energy efficiency. Moving away from 
heavy state subsidies for fossil fuels gave companies and households better 
incentives to save energy. 
The Bank also helped countries gradually shift away from coal-powered 
and nuclear energy generation. This costly process felt frustratingly slow to 
some environmental activists; however, the EBRD successfully pioneered 
energy efficiency programmes, enabled the closure of unsafe nuclear facili-
ties and supported some of the earliest renewable energy projects. This work 
progressed over the decades to become a broader Green Economy Transi-
tion programme, which is explored in the next volume. This chapter de-
scribes the genesis of the EBRD’s green philosophy. 
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1. A Role for the EBRD
The 1980s had brought an increasing awareness of the impact of industrial-
isation on the environment. As concerns grew, the UN took a higher pro-
file in its dealings on the environment and international consensus emerged 
over some pressing issues. The Vienna Protocol of 19851, regulating sub-
stances that harmed the ozone layer, was one of the first examples of vol-
untary international action to protect the global environment. The Brunt-
land Report of 19872 offered the first definition of sustainable development: 
a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Environmental 
NGOs started questioning the environmental impact of several large-scale 
investments in developing countries and their consequences for local popu-
lations, air pollution, water contamination, indigenous peoples, wildlife and 
the quality of the environment. IFIs, notably the World Bank, came under 
increasing scrutiny. It was in this context that the EBRD’s environmental 
mandate was conceived.
The Bank focused on ensuring that the impact of each investment was 
subject to proper environmental assessment and monitoring. This meant 
careful due diligence, especially on projects where environmental concerns 
were high, and the development of effective mitigation strategies to deal 
with any consequences. 
The pursuit of sustainable development was also an important goal. This 
raised questions over what types of activities the EBRD should engage in 
and which activities it should avoid, and thus went beyond simply making 
sure individual projects did not affect the environment or local communi-
ties inappropriately.
The environmental inheritance in the EBRD region was dire. Eastern Eu-
rope and Central Asia faced multiple environmental disasters, from pollu-
tion in the Baltic Sea and the Danube River Basin to the erosion of the Aral 
Sea and contaminated water supplies. It was clear that rectifying the deficien-
cies would take years of painstaking work and substantial investment.
As the EBRD began its operations, governments were preparing for the 
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in Rio de Janeiro, better known as the Earth Summit. With the Cold War 
over there was hope that a truly global approach to environmental problems 
might be possible. 
The event was crucial in raising awareness and building cooperation on a 
global environmental agenda.3 Representing the EBRD in Rio, Attali gave 
his view of the situation facing the region:
The legacy of the totalitarian societies in Eastern Europe is catastrophic. 
In 50 years they have destroyed irreplaceable resources and created untold 
sources of pollution that will threaten the planet for centuries to come 
… If we were to single out one region of the world where all the environ-
mental mistakes of our age have been committed, it would surely be East-
ern Europe.
It is no longer a Cold War but a Green War that is being waged ... with 
two major deadly weapons: the nuclear power stations ... each is a time 
bomb that could go off at any moment; [and] the civilian and military in-
dustries that produce hazardous waste, contaminating the soil and pollut-
ing the air.4
By way of a remedy, he called for an “environmental transition” based on 
greater transparency, use of market mechanisms, international cooperation 
(“solidarity”) and additional funding.
As a new IFI on the doorstep, with a mandate to match, the EBRD was 
ideally placed to help clean up the former Eastern Bloc. At the time, howev-
er, it was unclear how to shape a Bank geared towards both developing the 
private sector, where the pursuit of profit was the ultimate objective, and 
cleaning up the environment. 
Today, there is plenty of evidence—including the EBRD’s own track re-
cord—that green business can be good business, and that environmental-
ly sustainable investment is not only possible but profitable. At the time of 
the Bank’s creation, however, there was no precedent for an organisation 
made up mostly of investment bankers having the capacity or wherewith-
al to tackle environmental problems while its core staff were also creating a 
3  The Conference gave birth to the Climate Change Convention, the precursor to the Kyoto Protocol and 
later Paris Agreement.
4  Statement by the President of the EBRD at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (The Earth Summit), Rio de Janeiro, 10 June 1992. 
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functioning private sector from scratch. How could such activities be prof-
itable enough to justify committing resources, even supposing governments 
laden with debt and facing poor fiscal prospects were able to lend financial 
support for environmental improvements? 
Despite these challenges, it proved possible to make a considerable num-
ber of environmental improvements under the Bank’s guidance and opera-
tions. One of the notable attributes of the EBRD was its ability to mould 
bankers into multitasking operators capable of pursuing other objectives 
alongside the profitability of projects. Another aspect that emerged, par-
ticularly in relation to climate change activities, was the Bank’s success in 
developing profitable segments of sectors incorporating environmental en-
hancements through the adoption of innovative approaches and supportive 
investments. The EBRD found a way of making its environmental opera-
tions commercially feasible and in so doing created new markets and prod-
ucts that demonstrated the value of environmentally friendly business activ-
ities well in advance of many other market participants.
2. Addressing the Environmental Legacy
The collapse of the centrally planned economies and subsequent difficul-
ties in establishing functioning economic and political systems exacerbated 
an already poor environmental landscape. The prevalence of obsolete tech-
nologies, lack of pollution-abatement equipment, poor use of resources and 
weak environmental management did not help matters. Nor did the fact 
that there was little regulation of hazardous materials such as asbestos, or 
of soil and groundwater contamination. Water-quality standards excluded 
pollutants such as chlorinated solvents. Polluters frequently escaped penal-
ties.5 Environmental disasters such as Chernobyl were treated as state secrets 
and there was little or no public participation in decision-making processes. 
There was an urgent need to review unsustainable industrial practices. Seri-
ous fiscal constraints and political volatility in many countries added to the 
complexity of the task. 
5  See ‘Fostering Economic Transition and Sustainable Development on CEE and the CIS’, paper for Euro 
2000, D. Prasek, Head of Operational Support, Environment Department, EBRD, October 2002, Aal-
borg, Denmark. The author is grateful to Dr Prasek for being able to draw on some of his unpublished notes 
for this and the following section of this chapter. 
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Decades of poor maintenance and protection of the environment had 
led to an accumulation of issues to resolve. Investment in modern, clean 
technology had been inadequate, as had incentives to ensure environmen-
tal risks and degradation were minimised. This was true across the energy 
and natural resources sectors. The focus of central planning systems on out-
put targets meant the predominant attitude of managers and workers had 
been to disregard the environmental consequences of production, wheth-
er in relation to the impact of oil and gas extraction in the pristine natural 
landscape of Siberia or at nuclear plants and waste dumps near more dense-
ly populated urban areas.6 
The EBRD, with a clear remit to improve the environment and support 
sustainable development, was able to foster change. It had finance ready to 
invest in the region, a mission to improve standards and clean up sources of 
pollution and other environmental damage, and experts able to advise on 
best practices and their implementation. 
Approach to environmental issues
As the first IFI to be given a proactive environmental mandate, the EBRD 
embedded this into its core activities from the start. These spanned the in-
dustrial spectrum as well as infrastructure, where environmental problems 
abounded. It was natural therefore to apply the Bank’s environmental re-
quirements to its operations. 
Environmental due diligence
The EBRD required that environmental due diligence be carried out on all 
projects under preparation. This was conducted at the same time as financial 
due diligence to reduce the burden on clients. Environmental audits provid-
ed a comprehensive assessment of the state of industrial premises and opera-
tions, compliance or otherwise with regulations, and potential risks and lia-
bilities. In most cases Environmental Action Plans (EAPs) were introduced 
to bring companies’ operations up to a better standard. The standards re-
6  For example, the Metsamor plant was located just over 20 miles from Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and was 
built in an earthquake zone. After the devastating Spitak earthquake nearby in 1988, the plant was closed, al-
though only until 1995. It still provides 40 per cent of Armenia’s energy needs. BBC, Daryl Mersom, 27 May 
2019, https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20190527-the-city-in-the-shadow-of-an-ageing-nuclear-reactor. 
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quired were clarified in a comprehensive paper on the Bank’s Environmen-
tal Policy and Environmental Procedures agreed in 1996.7 This ensured that 
operations met both national standards and those set by the EU at the time. 
In areas where EU standards did not yet exist, the fallback was national or 
World Bank standards. 
A team of specialists, the Environmental Appraisal Unit (EAU), pro-
vided advice and support to project operation leaders (who were typically 
bankers), went with them on visits to industrial sites and participated in 
discussions with clients. OpsCom remained the place where projects were 
examined holistically, including for environmental concerns. In more seri-
ous cases, specific issues were referred to senior management and the Pres-
ident. According to a review of the EBRD’s environmental practices and 
performance by the Evaluation Department in 2001, environmental proce-
dures were “practical and efficiently incorporated in the Bank’s project cy-
cle” and “effective in safeguarding the establishment of environmental ob-
jectives and the covenanting of loans”.8 
Environmental management systems
The EBRD provided technical assistance to its client companies alongside 
financing. It was realised early on that significant support to enterprises in 
the Bank’s regions of operations would be needed in the sphere of environ-
mental management. Here capacity was generally weak, with little history 
of implementation of modern management practices and even less of includ-
ing environmental concerns within them. Responsibility for environmen-
tal matters was usually seen as a niche area and left to poorly trained line 
managers, with little senior management oversight. Operating budgets and 
capital expenditure programmes did not routinely include environmental 
concerns and finance officers did not understand the importance of envi-
ronmental reporting and monitoring. 
To help remedy the situation, the Bank used technical cooperation funds 
alongside its investments to supply experts, such as senior environmental 
managers from counterpart industries in OECD countries, to work with 
clients. Training programmes and materials to spread knowledge of good 
7  ‘Environmental Policy’, 19 November 1996.
8  ‘Special Study: Evaluation of Environmental Performance of EBRD, Volume 1’, April 2001. 
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practices, including for local environmental consultants, supplemented 
these efforts as did practical support to operationalise EAPs and meet the 
Bank’s standards. A separate EBRD programme called Turnaround Man-
agement (TAM), which from 1994 had deployed retired senior executives to 
work as part-time advisors for (mainly) manufacturing companies in east-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union, was extended to include an envi-
ronmental component. 
The need to comply with higher standards and reduce environmental 
risks led to greater interest among the EBRD’s clients in adopting effective 
environmental management systems. Here the EU’s Environmental Man-
agement and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and, after it was finalised in 1996 by 
the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO), the internation-
al environmental standard ISO 14001 were key to assisting the implemen-
tation of higher standards and compliance among the companies the Bank 
dealt with. Environmental management system (EMS) programmes were 
usually based on ISO 14001 (and later the more tightly energy-focused ISO 
50001), which drove improvements in environmental risk management and 
performance. Companies with EMS certification found it easier to promote 
their products in export markets while increased transparency of environ-
mental, health and safety reporting raised public awareness of these issues. 
This led to greater permanency of higher environmental standards and en-
vironmental sustainability.
Financial institutions
During the 1990s, the development of the EBRD’s business with SMEs ex-
panded significantly with the use of credit lines via financial intermediaries 
under the wholesale approach (see Chapter 5). To fulfil its environmental re-
mit there was a need to be sure that the Bank’s financial institution partners 
understood its environmental requirements. Financial institutions were given 
training in environmental due diligence procedures and annual environmen-
tal reporting to the Bank9, and had to adhere to its environmental exclusion 
list. The Bank developed a multilingual manual on environmental risk man-
agement for financial institutions and provided a series of training workshops 
9  A PED review in 1999, ‘Special Study of the Bank’s Environmental Due Diligence of Financial Institu-
tions’, declared that this arrangement was “very useful”. 
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on environment, health and safety for financial institutions and local consul-
tants in Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Russia. 
As the EBRD’s portfolio expanded, the due diligence burden grew, 
prompting an A/B/C categorisation of environmental importance.10 The 
poor state of municipal and industrial infrastructure and significant envi-
ronmental, health and safety concerns meant a large number of projects—
around two-fifths according to the Evaluation Study (and half by value of 
proposed investment)—were regarded as “environmentally sensitive” dur-
ing the 1990s.11 Technical cooperation projects on environmental activities 
connected to investments were also numerous. Nonetheless, the Study con-
cluded that in its first 10 years the Bank had “done well in respect of envi-
ronmental performance and impact in projects with a substantial environ-
mental dimension”.12
3. Environmental Improvements in Industrial Projects
The involvement of the Bank in many projects where environmental issues 
presented serious concerns offered multiple opportunities to make a signifi-
cant impact. These included the introduction of more energy-efficient plant 
and equipment through new capital investments, safer working conditions 
and innovative approaches led by the Bank, as well as the decommissioning 
and upgrading of old and unsafe nuclear facilities. (Nuclear facilities are ex-
plored in the next chapter.) 
Zarafshan-Newmont Joint Venture, Uzbekistan
An example of how the EBRD, together with foreign and local sponsors, 
could turn around an uneconomic situation towards profitability while se-
curing a radical improvement in the health and safety of workers and envi-
ronmental conditions was a project started in 1993 in Uzbekistan.
Zarafshan, a small town located in the Kyzylkum desert some 400 miles 
west of Tashkent, had been purpose-built to supply materials and labour to 
10 See current EBRD categorisation checklist for partner financial institutions. https://www.ebrd.com/
downloads/about/sustainability/ebrd-risk-english.pdf. 
11 ‘Special Study’, Volume 1, 2001, p. viii.
12 ‘Special Study’, Volume 1, 2001, p. 81.
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the nearby Muruntau gold mine—the largest gold mine in the former USSR 
and one of the largest in the world. The mine had been in operation since the 
1960s13 and had amassed a vast stockpile of some 300 million tonnes of ore 
with low levels of gold whose recovery was regarded as uneconomic. 
Engineers from Newmont, a large US-based gold producer, surmised 
that modern heap leaching technology, which they operated successfully 
in their own mines in the Nevada desert, could extract gold from the ore 
much more efficiently than the methods then being used. This led to a joint 
venture between Newmont and the Uzbek state14 to extract the gold. The 
EBRD became involved to help finance the operation and facilitate the pro-
cess. An A/B loan of US$ 105 million (half of which was the EBRD A loan) 
was provided in 1993, and extended to US$ 135 million in 1995. The project 
was the first major FDI, as well as syndication, in Uzbekistan. 
Working conditions were poor at the open-pit mine where annual tem-
peratures ranged from 45° C in summer to -30° C in winter in a windy, dusty 
environment. Particulate emissions were high, made worse by polluting 
trucks and other machines and from the difficulty in controlling dust from 
the crushing process. Care was needed too in the use of chemicals (especial-
ly cyanide compounds) and their storage and disposal. In agreement with the 
EBRD, whose environmental assessments provided the foundations for a se-
ries of improvements and their monitoring, Newmont committed to apply 
the strict environmental standards they deployed in their Nevada operations.
Although it took a long time to bring about the environmental changes, 
which was helped by a further project in 2000, the joint venture delivered 
the highest standards. These were in line with US Environmental Protec-
tion Policy (as Newmont sought), as well as the EBRD’s performance re-
quirements and the applicable laws and regulations in Uzbekistan. A later 
independent evaluation noted “workers’ health and safety has improved sig-
nificantly and continues to be a high priority at the Joint Venture” and con-
cluded that the environmental performance was “excellent” and the extent 
of environmental improvement “substantial”.15
13 According to the CIA, it made use of forced labourers in earlier times. ‘Forced Labour Camps and Prisons 
in the USSR’, CIA/BGI GR 73-1, p.6, December 1972. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/
CIA-RDP84-00825R000300020001-8.pdf 
14 Specifically, the State Committee for Geology and Mineral Resources (Goskomgeologia) and Navoi, a for-
mer part of the USSR Ministry of Machine Building transferred to the Uzbek state. 
15 ‘Zarafshan-Newmont Joint Venture Third Facility’, Evaluation Department, March 2006.
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The overall operation was a success with extracted gold exceeding targets 
and a strong financial performance. At the time, it was seen as a “win-win” 
for all sides. However, in due course a dispute over tax payments led to the 
seizure of assets by Uzbekistan in 2006. This was settled the following year 
with a US$ 80 million payment to Newmont by the Uzbekistan govern-
ment. 16 Full control of the operation was left in Uzbek hands. 
Ispat Karmet Steel Works, Kazakhstan
One of the world’s largest integrated steel complexes, the Karaganda Met-
allurgical Kombinat (Karmet) made use of central Kazakhstan’s rich high-
grade coal deposits and iron-ore from the north. It was the country’s only 
coal-and-steel complex and one of its biggest enterprises, accounting for 
around 5 per cent of GDP and 10 per cent of all non-oil exports. Produc-
tion of ingot steel fell by more than half between the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and privatisation in 1995.
The new owners, JSC Ispat Karmet, requested the EBRD’s help to fi-
nance US$ 633 million of planned capital investments. The aim was to re-
store capacity and improve efficiency in the steel and coal divisions, includ-
ing environmental improvements. In 1997, they agreed a substantial package 
including an A-loan of US$ 100 million from the Bank and a B-loan of $50 
million from participant banks. The IFC approved parallel syndicated fi-
nancing of US$ 115 million for the project.17 
After an initial appraisal by the EBRD, a series of assessments and au-
dits revealed a host of environmental issues, including the prevalence of 
high dust, ammonia, sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions, as well 
as a lack of safety culture. Three environmental action plans were agreed 
with the company covering the iron and steel plant, power generation and 
the coal mines. Each was designed to achieve compliance with domestic, 
EU and World Bank environmental standards. According to the evaluation 
team reviewing the project: “the resulting undertakings went far beyond 
the original [privatisation] environmental agreement between Ispat and the 
government.” 
16 ‘Gold miner Newmont resolves dispute with Uzbekistan’, Reuters, 23 July 2007.
17 The onset of an economic downturn from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the impact of the Russian cri-
sis the following year altered the subsequent financing arrangements. 
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The team assigned a “good” rating to the environmental performance of 
the project and rated the extent of environmental change as “substantial”.
The operation safeguarded dust and other air emission abatement and 
health and safety (H&S) improvements. Air quality improvement in the 
sanitary zone concerned dust in particular [and can be expected to] reduce 
dust emissions by about 80 per cent by 2002. Improvements in the mining 
division were assessed as outstanding, while the main H&S improvements 
included significantly reduced accident rates and acid fumes from pick-
ling. There was also notable improvement in EH&S risk management. Ef-
fluent treatment at the steel plant reached discharges well below regulato-
ry limits and those in the mining division were also compliant.18
Slovalco Aluminium Smelter Project, Slovak Republic
Another industrial project of local and national environmental importance 
in which the EBRD was involved early on was the completion of an alumini-
um smelter project in the Slovak Republic. The Zavod Slovenskeho Narodne-
ho Povstania (ZSNP) aluminium complex had originally been built to serve 
strategic military needs. A new smelter had been commissioned in the 1980s, 
but work was halted in mid-1993 due to a lack of funds from state banks. In 
1994, the EBRD granted senior loan financing of US$ 110 million and equi-
ty financing of US$ 15 million alongside Hydro Aluminium (HAL) of Nor-
way to prepare the company for privatisation through corporate restructur-
ing.19 It was one of the Bank’s largest private-sector operations at the time. 
The 2001 Evaluation Special Study described the situation at the start of 
the EBRD’s engagement:
The environmental, health and safety situation in the Ziar basin near the 
facilities was highly unsatisfactory and air quality was classified in the low-
est category, class 5, because of high fluorine, PAH20, SO2, NOx and dust 
concentrations…21
18 ‘Ispat Karmet Steel Works’, Project Evaluation Department, September 2000.
19 https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors-and-topics/the-new-europe/the-real-economy.html.
20 Polyaromatic hydrocarbons.
21 ‘Special Study’, Volume 1, 2001, p. 17.
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ZSNP established a subsidiary, Slovalco, to complete the smelter as a 
modern, state-of-the-art facility and close down the old, polluting units. The 
EBRD’s financing required the company to include a significant environ-
mental remedial programme. The focal point of the project became environ-
mental improvements and clean-up. 
A public debate emerged at this time on aluminium-industry pollu-
tion and smelter energy use. At the EBRD’s insistence, ZSNP publicly ad-
dressed these concerns. (In 1997, the Bank’s continuing promotion of open 
communication between the authorities, stakeholders and the public led 
to the formation of Slovakia’s first citizen-based monitoring and adviso-
ry group.) 
An Environmental Action Agreement required inefficient and pol-
luting units (primarily the two old smelters and the alumina and anode 
plants) to be closed down prior to the first loan disbursement and for the 
coal-fired heating to be converted to gas. Environmental improvements 
and clean-up responsibilities including for the red mud pile (the biggest 
waste site in the country) were defined in the loan under an Environmental 
Remediation Agreement between ZSNP, Slovalco and the National Prop-
erty Fund, with the Slovak government as the ultimate guarantor of ZS-
NP’s obligations.
The overall environmental benefits of the project were significant. 
Heavily polluting facilities such as the old smelters were closed or refur-
bished, resulting in a marked improvement in the catchment air quality, 
reaching an acceptable level (class 3). Black ash, which had previously been 
present everywhere near the plant, disappeared. The closure of the sinter 
alumina plant reduced dust emissions and burner gases from the calcina-
tion process. Fluoride and other air emissions (including tar from PAH 
compounds, nitrous oxide, dust and sulphur dioxide) dropped dramatical-
ly, despite a 50 per cent increase in aluminium production, as did the vol-
ume of water use and waste. Caustic bleeding and the leaking of other pol-
lutants from the red mud pile into the surrounding soil and groundwater, 
drinking water wells and River Hron were brought under control by the 
introduction of bentonite and hydraulic walls. An analysis by the project 
evaluation team noted:
… [the] considerable environmental remediation progress, not only in 
terms of closed old polluting units but also in areas like facilities for haz-
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ardous waste, protection of groundwater, reduction of air emissions and 
preventive action against damage from past red mud disposal.22
The Special Study concluded:
The improvement of [the] environment in Ziar basin near ZSNP has been 
substantial. The extent of environmental change from highly unsatisfacto-
ry to good environmental performance has been ‘Outstanding’. 
The opinion of the authorities [was] that EBRD’s role … had a very pos-
itive impact in the local environment and in … promoting good relations 
between authorities, ZSNP and Slovalco.23
4. Tackling Cross-Border Pollution
In some cases, pollution from the former Eastern Bloc affected multiple 
countries and needed addressing in a comprehensive way. Two areas deeply 
affected were the Danube River Basin and the Baltic Sea, especially the Gulf 
of Finland near St. Petersburg.
The Danube River Basin
The Danube is the second-longest river in Europe (after the Volga) and flows 
through 10 countries—more than any other river in the world—before 
draining into the Black Sea. The Danube Delta is Europe’s second-largest 
wetland (also after the Volga Delta), of which the greatest part lies in Roma-
nia24, where the Razim-Sinoe lagoon is a World Heritage Site. The remain-
der is in Ukraine. Including its tributaries, the Danube spans 13 countries in 
total, of which 11 were among the EBRD’s original countries of operations.25 
The river’s path also includes several capital cities, notably Vienna, Prague, 
 
22 ‘ZSNP/Slovalco Aluminium Works’, Project Evaluation Department, January 1997.
23 ‘Special Study’, Volume 1, p. 23; Volume 2, p. 60.
24 An area of approximately 5,500 square kilometres.
25 These were the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine. Other countries were Germany and Austria. The co-
operation process also included five further countries—Albania, North Macedonia, Poland, Italy and Swit-
zerland—bringing the total number of countries involved to 18, plus the EU. 
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Budapest and Belgrade, while Ljubljana, Zagreb, Bucharest and Chisinau 
are located on major tributaries. 
In the face of increasing degradation of water quality, efforts had been 
made by the countries most concerned to improve the situation as far back 
as the mid-1980s. The collapse of communism accelerated these efforts, with 
the European Commission taking overall responsibility for coordinating an 
Environmental Programme for the Danube River Basin in 1992. Coopera-
tion was formalised by the signing of the Convention on Cooperation and 
Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River in 1994. The Danube 
River Protection Convention aimed to improve the use and management of 
surface and ground waters and control and reduce pollution from the loads 
of nutrients and hazardous substances discharged into the Black Sea. An In-
ternational Commission established in 1998 sought to bring in internation-
al organisations as well as business groups and NGOs and led to various Ac-
tion Plans and joint programmes.26 
A Danube Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS) was set up in 2001 as a plat-
form of cooperation involving all actors, including the EBRD. Among its 
activities was the drawing up of a list of prioritised projects for the rehabil-
itation of waters in the region. For the period 1999 to 2004, this comprised 
more than 350 projects in EBRD countries with total investment of just 
under €4 billion. More than half were municipal projects and around 30 
per cent involved industrial and agribusiness areas. An updated plan cover-
ing municipal wastewater projects from 2001 to 2005 identified 224 prior-
ity projects worth close to €4.5 billion. Aside from national contributions, 
the EU was the largest source of funding including through the Instrument 
for Structural Funds for Pre-Accession (ISPA). 
The EBRD addressed pollution via its project activities throughout the 
region. In this context, however, its efforts were focused on the water and 
wastewater infrastructure sector and were concentrated in Romania. More 
than 1,000 kilometres of the Danube flows through Romania, which con-
tains the majority of the Danube Delta and a large portion of the proximate 
Black Sea coast. In total, Romania accounts for 30 per cent of the Danube 
River Basin and more than one-quarter of its population. 
The state of water quality in Romania was particularly poor. An estimate 
in 2002 suggested that well over one-half of Romania’s rivers remained below 
26 https://www.icpdr.org/main/icpdr/short-history
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“good” quality due to sewage and industrial and agribusiness pollution. Sim-
ilarly, more than 50 per cent of groundwater exceeded recommended limits 
for noxious and other compounds.27 Supply systems and distribution networks 
were of poor quality and used asbestos, cement and lead without sufficient care. 
Three-quarters of pipes needed replacing and a third were made of iron, while 
up-to-date systems of cleaning were few and far between.28 Analysis of the 
main sources of wastewater in 2004 showed that almost 71 per cent of waste-
water coming from the main pollution sources was discharged into the natu-
ral receiving waters, especially rivers, either untreated or insufficiently treated.29
The EBRD’s approach towards municipal water and wastewater treat-
ment differed from that of other actors in the region in that it focused on 
the governance of municipal finance and municipal entities and on the com-
mercialisation of municipal water utilities. It strove to follow the “user pays” 
principle and to bring utilities closer towards full cost recovery and finan-
cial sustainability. On the environmental front, it was one of the leading in-
ternational organisations active in the Danube River Basin.
The Bank began investing in water and wastewater treatment projects 
in the region in the mid-1990s. In Romania, it helped municipalities un-
derstand how to begin to address their needs and how to adopt measures in 
line with the many EU Directives relating to the water and wastewater sec-
tor, as well as environmental standards more generally. It was also able to 
provide finance blended with EU funds as the accession process accelerated. 
The MUDP (see Chapter 7) in five cities that started in 1995 was followed 
by a regional water and environment programme the following year, an ex-
tension of the MUDP to a further 10 cities and a municipal environmental 
loan facility financed in parallel by the EU’s IPSA, as well as a clutch of oth-
er projects. By the mid-2000s, the EBRD had invested almost €400 million 
in improving Romania’s water and wastewater sector with total financing 
amounting to well over €1 billion. 
By helping local water utilities to become operationally and financially 
viable, which in turn enabled them to borrow commercially, the EBRD was 
instrumental in transforming the sector. According to Volume 2 of the Eval-
uation Department Special Study on the Danube River Basin:
27 Measures of nitrates, ammonia, phosphates and dissolved oxygen. 
28 ‘Special Study: Assessment of the Bank’s Contribution towards Environmental Quality Improvements to 
the Danube Basin’ Vol 2, Evaluation Department, November 2008.
29 ‘Special Study’, Vol 2, p. 16.
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[The EBRD] broke new ground and [had] a profound and enduring im-
pact on the subsequent development of the sector [helping] to improve ba-
sic living conditions for a significant proportion of the urban population 
and to realise significant environmental benefits including:
ǝ A reduction in the pollution entering the River Danube, through the 
upgrading of wastewater treatment facilities.
ǝ Improved water resource use by creating incentives at the household lev-
el (water metering and public information campaigns) and through effi-
cient distribution (water supply network upgrading to reduce leakages).
ǝ Human health gains as a result of improved sanitation.
ǝ Energy efficiency gains through financing of energy-efficient pumping 
and other equipment.30
 
Overall, the 224 projects in the DABLAS database affected 22 million 
inhabitants. EBRD-financed projects amounted to 15 per cent of the to-
tal but affected a higher proportion of the population (five million people), 
thanks to major projects in Brno, Bucharest, Maribor, Zagreb and Sofia. 
These projects also accounted for around 25 per cent of the total estimated 
pollution reduction from the DABLAS portfolio according to estimates cit-
ed by the Evaluation Department.31
St. Petersburg and the Baltic Sea
Increasing concerns over the impact of industrial and other human activi-
ties on the marine environment led to the signing of the Helsinki Conven-
tion by the Baltic Sea countries in 1974.32 A new convention was signed in 
1992 to incorporate coastal countries that were previously part of central and 
eastern Europe, including the USSR. The convention aimed to reduce pollu-
tion in the Baltic Sea and protect the marine environment. The government 
of Finland had also established bilateral relationships with the City of St. Pe-
tersburg, which the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM)—the intergovern-
mental organisation governing the convention—identified as one of the ma-
30 ‘Special Study: Assessment of the Bank’s Contribution towards Environmental Quality Improvements to 
the Danube Basin’ Vol 2, pp. 35–37, Evaluation Department, November 2008.
31 ‘Special Study: Assessment of the Bank’s Contributions towards Environmental Quality Improvements in 
Danube River Basin’, Volume 1, Evaluation Department, November 2008.
32 Signatories were Denmark, Finland, the GDR, the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland and the USSR.
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jor sources of pollution into the Gulf of Finland. This context encouraged the 
EBRD to seek projects which could assist with the reduction of pollution in 
the Neva River and Neva Bay which drained into it. 
Although the geographic area of the EBRD’s environmental interest re-
lated to HELCOM was subsequently extended to include the Barents Sea, 
the main target of its activities was St. Petersburg. The Bank had been work-
ing with the city from the earliest days and a Resident Office was opened 
there in 1995. As the second-largest city in Russia with a population of close 
to five million, and a gateway to western Europe, it was an obvious choice for 
a determined effort to tackle environmental issues. 
A focus of the Bank’s activities in St. Petersburg soon became munici-
pal and environmental infrastructure. As well as improvements to the func-
tioning of the City, the other main goal was to revamp the municipal utili-
ty Vodokanal. The second-largest water and wastewater company in Europe, 
Vodokanal was created in 1992 and fully owned by the City. 
The EBRD, along with a number of donors, began working with Vodo-
kanal in 1994.33 As elsewhere in the Bank’s region, St. Petersburg’s water and 
wastewater systems suffered from a lack of maintenance and investment and 
were in a dilapidated state. Leakages, an unfinished water-treatment plant, 
the need for sewage collectors along the Neva River and upgrades to sewer-
age works were among a host of requirements that fell within Vodokanal’s 
responsibilities. The company had not shaken off the command-and-control 
methods of the past, which badly needed replacing with modern manage-
ment. Tariff and payment systems were also malfunctioning.
Immediate change was not possible. St. Petersburg had a long history of 
poor financial management and an unsustainable fiscal position, while Vo-
dokanal was a large and politically sensitive institution. In 1996, it employed 
around 9,000 people, five times more than comparable western utilities. It 
was not until 1997 that the EBRD managed to gain approval for the first 
projects to improve St. Petersburg’s municipal and environmental situation. 
These operations had a shaky start and went through various restructurings 
owing to the City’s ongoing financial difficulties. Nonetheless, they marked 
the beginning of a change that over the following years achieved significant 
operational and environmental progress. 
33 Donors included DfID (UK), SIDA (Sweden), TACIS (EU) DEPA (Denmark), and French and German 
Environment Ministries. 
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The first operation, the St. Petersburg Municipal Support Project34, of-
fered the city an A/B loan of up to US$ 100 million (of which US$ 50 mil-
lion was for EBRD’s own account), as well as assigning US$ 20 million for 
the purchase of Eurobonds due to be issued by the city as Russia’s first mu-
nicipal Eurobond issue. The Bank aimed to assist the restructuring of the 
city’s finances, which were in a parlous state. Revenues had dropped by al-
most 50 per cent in the three years to 1996 and capital expenditure had fall-
en by 28 per cent in the preceding year alone. 
The EBRD hoped to achieve a comprehensive overhaul of St. Petersburg’s 
municipal financing and had been working towards this with the city over 
the previous two years. The core objective—in line with the Bank’s munic-
ipal policy—was to improve St. Petersburg’s financial standing by cutting 
costs and improving revenues. This would facilitate non-sovereign borrow-
ing (where the EBRD was willing and able to assist) and help the municipal-
ity access international capital markets. The city’s ownership of Vodokanal 
and its key role in tariff-setting processes meant that progress on cleaning up 
the environment could not easily proceed without addressing the broader is-
sue of St. Petersburg’s financial circumstances.
 This proved controversial. There were concerns that the project was tan-
tamount to policy-based lending since without a direct link to an invest-
ment programme the loan appeared to underwrite the city’s finances. None-
theless, the expectation had always been that the Bank’s intervention would 
lead to support for specific investments. To remedy the situation, the in-
tended programme for water and environmental service improvements—
the St. Petersburg Water and Environmental Improvement Programme35—
was swiftly lined up and agreed with the Board.
Regardless of the issue of direct versus indirect linkage of financing to 
specific programmes, the Board’s assessment of the high-risk nature of the 
planned investment proved prophetic. The project was severely affected by 
the onset of Russia’s domestic debt crisis the following year, while the water 
and environmental services programme was slow in delivering the major in-
vestments in pollution control that had been envisaged at the start. Howev-
er, the 1997 operation did succeed in establishing a good working relation-
ship between the EBRD and Vodokanal. Subsequently, the EBRD was able 
34 ‘St. Petersburg Municipal Support Project’, 15 April 1997. 
35 ‘St. Petersburg Water and Environmental Services Improvement Programme’, 12 May 1997. 
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to support wide-ranging reforms in Vodokanal’s management structure, 
cost controls and long-term funding as well as specific projects under its in-
vestment programme. Furthermore, as the first non-sovereign loan in Rus-
sia, it helped demonstrate the concept of non-sovereign guarantees for water 
and wastewater projects, which would be applicable in Russia and ETCs.36 
The series of loans to Vodokanal and the city that followed had a more 
direct impact on the environment and discharges into the Gulf of Finland. 
Among them were:
St. Petersburg Toxic Waste Emergency Clean-up Programme37, a project 
with the city to stabilise a hazardous waste site at Krasny Bor and replace it 
with an alternative waste treatment facility, as well as reducing illegal dump-
ing and the contamination of sources of drinking water (aquifers and sur-
face water). The operation also aimed at improving the institutional frame-
work for hazardous waste collection and disposal.
St. Petersburg South West Wastewater Treatment Plant38, an operation 
with Vodokanal via a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) to complete a half-built 
treatment plant on which construction work had been halted in 1991 when 
funding disappeared as the Soviet Union broke up. The plant was designed 
to take an average daily sewage flow for a population of 700,000 and was one 
of the largest of its kind in Europe. The level of untreated wastewater enter-
ing the Gulf of Finland from St. Petersburg was significantly reduced. Finan-
cial performance also improved with the achievement of full cost recovery. 
St. Petersburg Flood Protection Barrier39, a project to complete an un-
finished (again due to lack of funding) 25-kilometre barrier to protect St. 
Petersburg from destructive tidal-surge floods and prevent the flushing of 
untreated or partially treated industrial and municipal effluents, toxic ma-
terials and nuclear waste into the water-supply network of the City and the 
Neva water system. 
St. Petersburg Northern Wastewater Treatment Plant Incinerator40, a fur-
ther project with Vodokanal to construct a sludge incinerator under a de-
36 See ‘St. Petersburg Water and Environmental Services Improvement Programme’, Project Evaluation De-
partment, 11 April 2005.
37 https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/st-petersburg-toxic-waste-emergency-cleanup-programme.html. 
38 https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/st-petersburg-southwest-waste-water-treatment-plant.html.
39 https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/st-petersburg-flood-protection-barrier.html.  
40 https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/st-petersburg-northern-waste-water-treatment-plant-
incinerat.html. 
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sign-build contract together with a publicly tendered PPP for operation and 
maintenance. The first such project in Russia, this was designed to provide 
a sustainable solution to sludge management (in place of disposal to land-
fill), cut the level of polluting effluent into the Baltic Sea and protect under-
ground drinking-water reservoirs. The amount of disposed material was cut 
by 95 per cent through the plant’s operation. 
St. Petersburg Vodokanal Neva Discharges Closure41, a project original-
ly designed to finance the construction of the Okhta Tunnel. As a result of 
the Russian financial crisis, it was restructured and became focused instead 
on the Northern Tunnel Collector and upgrade of the Northern Waste Wa-
ter Treatment Plant. The environmental benefits were nonetheless similar 
to the original plan, with the closing of 57 direct discharge sewers bring-
ing a further increase (of almost 10 per cent) in municipal wastewater gen-
erated by the city of St. Petersburg being treated in biological wastewater 
treatment plants. The project yielded a significant reduction in discharge of 
pollution loads, especially phosphorus, the most decisive pollutant affecting 
water quality in the Gulf of Finland. As a result, there was a significant de-
crease in phytoplankton biomass in the southern coast of Neva Bay and, to 
a lesser degree, in the rest of the Gulf of Finland. 
The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) 
In several of these projects the NIB played an important role as co-lender. 
The nature of the operations also required significant donor resources and 
the EBRD was able to draw on development funds including the EU’s TA-
CIS and finance from organisations concerned with the Baltic Sea area.42 
Of particular significance was the role of grants from the Northern Dimen-
sion Environmental Partnership (NDEP), which the EBRD helped to set 
up along with the NIB in 2001. 
The Northern Dimension was an EU initiative developed in 1999 to 
strengthen dialogue and cooperation between its member states, the Nor-
dic countries, the Baltic States and Russia. The four founding partners 
were the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia. One of its objectives was “to 
41 https://www.ebrd.com/news/2013/ebrd-hails-success-of-st.-petersburg-clean-river-project.html. 
42 Finance came from the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO), Swedfund International, 
the Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation (Finnfund), Finnish Ministry of Environment, SIDA among 
others as well as co-finance from the EIB in some cases. 
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help build a safe, clean and accessible environment for the people of the 
region”43 and an Action Plan for the Northern Dimension was agreed at 
the Feira European Council in June 2000. In March the following year, 
the NIB invited interested IFIs44 to a regional meeting in Helsinki at-
tended by the President of the EBRD, Jean Lemierre, at which, accord-
ing to internal records: “The EBRD proposed that a Northern Dimension 
Environmental Partnership (NDEP) be established to strengthen and co-
ordinate financing of important environmental projects with cross-bor-
der effects in the Northern Dimension Area. The proposal was adopted 
by all participants.”
The view was that DFI finance and grants should be coordinated not only 
to tackle cross-border pollution in a less disjointed way, but also to leverage ac-
tivities to meet the scale of the problem given the historical legacy, limited avail-
ability of local finance and inadequate management capacity. The area to be 
covered was from north-western Russia to Iceland, including Kaliningrad but 
also the Barents and White Seas. Two funding windows were proposed: one 
for the environment dealing with water, wastewater treatment and improve-
ments in the energy efficiency of district heating systems, the other to man-
age nuclear waste. The EBRD was asked to chair a Steering Group of core IFIs, 
the European Commission and Russia. The NDEP proposal was endorsed by 
Heads of State at the European Council in Goteborg, Sweden in June 2001.
A priority list of 13 environmental projects (including three of those 
mentioned above45), amounting to more than €1 billion in value, was 
drawn up by the EBRD and the NIB for the first Steering Group meeting 
in September that year. Rules on issues such as the blending of loans with 
grants, local financing and leadership roles were also agreed. At least €250 
million in technical assistance and grant support was thought to be needed 
to mitigate risks and externalities and improve governance, in order to en-
sure that the projects (including nuclear-waste proposals) were successful. 
This led to the creation of the NDEP Support Fund. A pledging confer-
ence was hosted by the European Commission in Brussels in early 2002. Af-
ter receiving Board approval in January 2002, the EBRD took on the role 
43 NDEP, https://ndep.org/about/overview/history/, accessed 2019.
44 The EIB, EBRD, World Bank, IFC, Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), NEFCO, European 
Commission and NIB were represented. 
45 St. Petersburg’s South West Waste Water Treatment Plant, Flood Protection Barrier and Northern Waste 
Water Treatment Plant.
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of managing the Fund, which was governed by an Assembly of Contribu-
tors46, and it became operational that July once five contributors (including 
Russia) had pledged at least €100 million. 
5. Two Controversial Cases: Sakhalin II and BTC
Environmental issues were the area of the EBRD’s activities which attracted 
most attention from NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs). As the 
number of operations grew, particularly in sectors such as natural resourc-
es and power and energy, western NGOs also became more vocal. At the 
same time, after decades of repression, local communities began to find their 
voice. The EBRD decided to conduct larger and more frequent public con-
sultations to ensure that all stakeholders, and especially those whose liveli-
hoods were directly affected, would be heard. These issues were also closely 
followed by the Bank’s Board. 
All of the EBRD’s projects were subject to some degree of public dis-
closure and most passed through their lifecycle without much debate with 
NGOs or CSOs on their environmental footprint. Nonetheless, the nature 
of the Bank’s work sometimes attracted controversy. 
Sakhalin II
In 1997 the EBRD provided a US$ 116 million loan47 to Sakhalin Ener-
gy Investment Company, a consortium of US, UK and Japanese oil, trad-
ing and construction companies48 formed to develop the Piltun-Astokhs-
koye and Lunskoye offshore oil and gas fields under a Production Sharing 
Agreement (PSA) with the Russian Government. The EBRD loan, co-fi-
nanced by parallel loans from OPIC and JEXIM49, was to help fund Phase 
46 There are currently 13 contributors: the EU, Russia, France, Canada, Sweden, UK, Germany, Finland, Nor-
way, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belarus and Belgium. France, Canada, the UK, Netherlands and Belgium 
contribute to the Nuclear window; Russia, Sweden and Belarus to the Environmental window; others con-
tribute to both windows. 
47 https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/sakhalin-ii-phase-1-oil-project.html. 
48 The original shareholders were subsidiaries of Marathon/USX, McDermott, Mitsui, Shell and Mitsubishi. 
49 OPIC was the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation. From the end of 2019 it became the US De-
velopment Finance Corporation (DFI). JEXIM was the Japanese Export-Import Bank before it merged to 
become JBIC (Japanese Bank for International Cooperation) in 1999.
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I of the US$ 1 billion project to purchase, refurbish and install onsite a Ca-
nadian mobile offshore oil drilling unit (to be transported from the Beau-
fort Sea north of Alaska), and extract crude oil for export from the Astokh 
feature, an oil and gas accumulation some 2,000 metres below the sea bed in 
the Piltun-Astokhskoye field.
From the Bank’s point of view, supporting the first oil and gas project 
in Russia under a PSA had considerable scope for a demonstration effect, 
namely to show international and Russian oil and gas companies that PSAs 
could be successfully developed and financed in Russia. The hope was that 
this would lead to the introduction of reliable and effective legislation cov-
ering production-sharing and encourage the large upstream oil and gas in-
vestments that were needed to exploit Russia’s vast natural resources and 
support its economic development. The project was also seen as offering an 
opportunity to press for strict environmental conditionality and set prece-
dents in the region and beyond. 
The project’s location was in the Sea of Okhotsk in shallow waters on 
the north-east shelf of Sakhalin Island and close to the shore (20 kilometres 
away). The area is one of high seismic activity50 and extreme climatic condi-
tions with high seas, ice, tsunamis and typhoons. The risk of oil spills from 
Russia’s first offshore oil production attracted attention from the start. Ad-
ditional issues highlighted by environmentalists concerned the impact of 
the project on the livelihoods (mainly fishing) of the indigenous population 
and the danger posed to Western Gray whales, an endangered species whose 
summer feeding grounds were in the area. 
The company, at the insistence and with the help of the EBRD and oth-
er lenders, conducted a wide range of detailed assessments, modelled oil-
spill scenarios, prepared response plans, and launched community pro-
grammes and several public consultations. The project went to the EBRD 
Board twice since Directors wanted to see the results of revised modelling 
and public consultations before approving the project. 
International NGOs led by CEE Bankwatch, Greenpeace and Pacific En-
vironment continued to campaign against the project. A local NGO, Sakha-
lin Environment Watch, also raised a series of issues. The NGOs wrote two 
50 The Okhotsk Plate covers Sakhalin Island and the boundary between the Okhotsk Plate and the Pacific 
Plate is a subduction zone. A major earthquake occurred in Sakhalin in 1995 (moment magnitude greater 
than 7) and the area is a source of megathrust quakes, including among the largest on record (the Kamchat-
ka earthquakes of 1737 and 1952).
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joint letters to the EBRD’s President stating their concerns over fish stocks 
and the potential impact of changes on local Nivkh people, oil-spill risks and 
the danger to the gray whale population.51 The Bank did not agree with the 
criticisms, but continued to hold dialogues with representatives of these or-
ganisations, including dedicated sessions at Annual Meetings.
The Phase I project began to produce oil in 1999, transporting crude by 
tanker in the summer months when the sea was not frozen. An extension 
to the project (Phase II) to develop the Lunskoye field, involving two new 
offshore platforms and pipelines to bring oil and gas onshore to a liquified 
natural gas (LNG) terminal 800 kilometres away, began to be discussed 
with the EBRD in 2002. The Bank undertook a long period of due dili-
gence designed to elicit answers to questions on project decisions and im-
pact assessments of all aspects of the proposals. It was only in December 
2005 that the EBRD’s Board felt the answers were adequate and there were 
sufficient mitigation features in place to allow the project to go to public 
consultation.
Phase II remained controversial for essentially the same reasons as Phase 
I, notably the whale issue (the new platforms were also located near their 
summer feeding grounds) and further impacts on Sakhalin’s indigenous 
Nivkh people. In response to criticisms, the company had already developed 
a Sakhalin Island Minorities Development Plan. The experience of Phase I 
also led to a number of improvements in public disclosure and consultation 
arrangements with NGOs and local populations. Public consultations took 
place in London, Moscow, Sapporo and three locations on Sakhalin Island. 
A summary of the Environmental Impact Assessment was provided in Rus-
sian and English and copies were made available on the island.
 Acting as the arbiter of international standards was important but me-
diating between the company, the Russian authorities, local peoples, cam-
paigners and protestors was a difficult task for the EBRD and absorbed an 
increasingly large amount of senior management time. 
Matters came to a head in September 2006 when the consortium was 
forced to sell a majority stake to Gazprom, the dominant state-owned Rus-
sian energy company. By December, Gazprom owned 50 per cent plus one 
share. This represented a material change to the original project approved by 
the Board, and a significant change in direction, and presented an opportu-
51 Letters dated from 10 December 2001 and November 2003.
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nity for the EBRD to withdraw. On 11 January 2007, the Bank announced 
it would no longer participate in the project as state ownership had under-
mined the transition arguments for proceeding. It concluded, however, that 
from an environmental and social perspective there had been some success 
from the five years of consultation. 
Through its engagement in the development of the project, the EBRD has 
helped to introduce commitments to consultation, transparency and treat-
ment of indigenous people. The EBRD has worked with Sakhalin Ener-
gy on many enhancements during the construction phase: Sakhalin Ener-
gy rerouted pipelines to accommodate the rare Western Gray whale that 
feeds in the region; a panel of recognised whale experts was established to 
monitor and advise on operations; significant improvements were intro-
duced to the strategy for on-land pipeline construction, especially the en-
vironmentally sensitive crossings of some 1000 rivers; and Sakhalin Ener-
gy adopted a standard-setting plan for treatment of indigenous peoples as 
well as transparency and consultation.52
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
A high-profile project which the EBRD began to look at in 2001 also at-
tracted strong NGO and CSO interest. The largest cross-border infrastruc-
ture initiative globally at the time, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
was a US$ 3.6 billion project to construct a 1,760-kilometre pipeline to car-
ry crude oil from the landlocked Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean port of 
Ceyhan in Turkey. The Bank saw its participation as an opportunity to play 
a unique role in fostering regional cooperation between Azerbaijan, Geor-
gia and Turkey, while at the same time ensuring high international environ-
mental and developmental standards were met.   
Other potential benefits were widespread. BP estimated that transit fees 
and royalties accruing to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey would reach US$ 
150 billion between 2005 and 2024. The project was also of regional and 
global significance since it provided a new strategic route for oil exports 
(particularly to EU countries) from the Caspian, bypassing Russian pipe-
52 ‘EBRD no longer considers current financing package for Sakhalin II’, EBRD Press Release, 11 January 
2007. 
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lines and the Middle East and helping to avoid further pressures on supplies 
through the Bosporus. At the same time, its overland route required navi-
gating environmentally, geologically and politically sensitive areas. 
The Board approved a US$ 250 million A/B loan (US$ 125 million for 
the EBRD’s own account and the rest syndicated to commercial banks) to 
BTC Co. in November 2003. The IFC approved an identical loan. The main 
companies involved were BP and AzBTC53, which held 30.1 per cent and 25 
per cent of BTC Co. respectively, with the remainder owned by a group of 
nine oil majors and traders. 
As lead sponsor, BP was well aware of the sensitivities of laying a long 
pipeline through such a complex region and difficult terrain. The company 
took every opportunity to prepare the route carefully, consult affected par-
ties and offer solutions where appropriate. Environmental and human rights 
critics remained vigilant and vocal throughout nonetheless, pointing to al-
leged abuses of land and civil rights in Azerbaijan and Turkey, employment 
and gender issues, earthquake and oil-spill risks, risks to natural parks and 
aquifers (especially in the important Borjomi-Kharagauli national park in 
Georgia) and risks to the export of Borjomi mineral water.54 
As the project progressed, a vast amount of discussion took place. Advice 
was given and many assessments, responses and plans were made to address 
concerns, complaints and grievances.55 Among them were Environmental 
and Social Impact Assessments, Public Consultation and Disclosure Plans, 
Oil Spill Response Plans, Resettlement Action Plans, Right-of-Way Rein-
statement Plans and Environmental and Social Action Plans. In addition, 
the sponsors spent US$ 30 million on various community investments along 
the pipeline corridor under a Community Investment Programme that in-
volved NGOs and a broader Regional Development Initiative to contribute 
to sustainable development was supported by the sponsors, the EBRD and 
the IFC. Over 38 volumes of environmental and social information in five 
languages were disclosed to the public, amounting to more than 11,000 pag-
es. They stood five metres high when stacked! 
53 The name reflected the Azeri interest in BTC. It was owned 70 per cent by the Azerbaijan Republic and 30 
per cent SOCAR.
54 For example, see ‘BTC Pipeline—an IFI Recipe for Increasing Poverty’, M. Kochladze, N. Gujaraidze, K. 
Gujaraidze and V. Titvinidze, CEE Bankwatch and Oxfam GB, Tbilisi, 2005. 
55 The EBRD’s Independent Recourse Mechanism was also available to deal with complaints, as was the IFC’s 
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman.
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The project was successfully completed in 2006 and the target capacity of 
one million barrels a day was reached in 2007. Both the EBRD and the IFC 
assessed that the project fully achieved its environmental objectives and had 
benefited considerably from the extensive consultation process. 
[The project] introduced world class standards in all aspects of crude oil 
production and transportation. The preparation, construction and opera-
tion of the BTC project set new global best-practice standards for future 
pipeline projects.56
56 ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project’, April 2008, p.4. See also ‘Lessons of Experience: Baku-Tbilisi-Cey-





1. Nuclear Power Issues
When it came to nuclear power, concerns about tensions between the 
EBRD’s commercial and environmental remits did not apply. Investments 
in new facilities in the sector were excluded from the Bank’s remit from the 
very beginning. Instead, nuclear safety and the clean-up of former nuclear 
facilities were paramount in the context of eastern Europe and public con-
cerns over legacy issues. Nuclear plants in several countries were in an unsafe 
condition and posed a threat not only to the population and environment, 
but also to economic transition due to the enormous costs involved in bring-
ing them into line with international safety standards. 
The EBRD became heavily involved in tackling nuclear safety in its region 
of operations. In this sector, its activities were driven by environmental con-
siderations rather than a profit-based approach. A host of international donors 
also joined forces with the Bank to finance nuclear safety funds and activities. 
Many of the EBRD’s shareholders were worried about the nuclear legacy 
of the communist period. For the USA and other NATO members, the ma-
jor concern was how to deal with the management of nuclear weapons as the 
Soviet Union broke up. For many in Europe, the primary issue was the safety 
of nuclear power plants. Popular antagonism towards nuclear power remained 
strong in some shareholder countries, notably Austria and Germany.
The Chernobyl catastrophe in Ukraine in 1986 had brought home to 
people in both halves of Europe the enormous risks associated with poorly 
designed and mismanaged ageing Soviet-era nuclear facilities. While Cher-
nobyl was the largest nuclear accident, it was not the first. The industry 
had suffered high-profile accidents before, including Three Mile Island in 
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19791 in the USA. In 1991, official information that had been suppressed for 
years emerged on the earlier Soviet Kyshtym disaster of 1957,2 which added 
to the popular angst over nuclear power. 
The proximity of dangerous nuclear power plants to much of mainland 
Europe could not be ignored. Yet at the same time, many countries in the 
former Eastern Bloc depended heavily on nuclear power for electricity pro-
duction. 
Energy supply was an issue in its own right, especially for countries reli-
ant on imported energy, most of which came from Russia. A lack of reliable 
capacity to supply energy needs was a political problem. Continuing use of 
nuclear power plants provided one solution. To meet rising demand there 
was even a readiness to build new nuclear plants, often based on old tech-
nology, which was more affordable than plants with the latest specifications. 
The choice between interrupted electricity and frequent blackouts (and dis-
rupted industrial production) on the one hand and running risks with un-
safe nuclear power plants on the other was a genuine dilemma. In many 
countries, the politics pointed to supplying adequate and reliable power so 
continuing to use existing nuclear reactors looked attractive.
 From the EBRD’s point of view, the immediate concern was the safety of 
existing nuclear plants; in parallel, countries would develop alternative sourc-
es of energy supply. International expertise would be essential to make this 
work, as well as safety upgrades to nuclear power plants and investment in non-
nuclear power generation. It was here that the EBRD was well-placed to help.
2. Tackling the Soviet Legacy
International Action
Not all of the newly independent countries among the EBRD’s countries 
of operations had nuclear-power plants and related facilities but the total 
was nonetheless substantial.3 One estimate of installed nuclear capacity in 
1  At the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (TMI-2) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on 28 March 
1979, classified as category five on a seven-point International Nuclear Event Scale. The Chernobyl accident 
was a category seven event, as was the more recent Fukushima Daiichi case in 2011. 
2  https://www.britannica.com/event/Kyshtym-disaster 
3  The only nuclear-power plant in former Yugoslavia was at Krsko in Slovenia.
251
Part II  Chapter 9
1991 in CEE suggested it amounted to more than 40 Gigawatts or 12 per 
cent of total electricity generation (and 13 per cent of the world’s nuclear 
capacity).4 Close to half (19 Gigawatts) was supplied by high-risk reactors. 
These were the RBMK and VVER 440/230 types.5 International special-
ists considered that upgrades to bring them to acceptable levels of safety 
would be uneconomic. Nuclear power plants in Armenia, Lithuania and 
the North West and Centre power regions of Russia (the area of highest 
population density)6 were solely of this type while in Bulgaria and Slova-
kia around half were. 
It was obvious that successful reform of the nuclear energy sector, includ-
ing safety improvements and the environmental rehabilitation of the nucle-
ar industry, would involve many facets: the safety of operating reactors; the 
closure of high-risk reactors; strengthening of the energy regulatory system, 
and in particular nuclear regulators and waste management administration; 
and the safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel and waste.
Given the difficult economic environment the former communist coun-
tries faced at the time, an early and full clean-up of the nuclear legacy in the 
region would require substantial support from the West. Intensive work on 
the issue had been put in train by the G7 and the EC as the Soviet Union be-
gan to collapse. Knowing this, Attali appealed to delegates at the Rio Earth 
Summit to develop a plan. 
A few weeks later, at the G7 Heads Summit in Munich, agreement was 
reached to seek the shutdown of Soviet-designed high-risk reactors.7 The 
communiqué stated:
… the safety of Soviet-design nuclear power plants gives us cause for great 
concern … We offer the States concerned our support within the frame-
work of a multilateral programme of action … and support the setting up 
4  As a share of electricity generation nuclear power was particularly significant in Hungary (48 per cent), Bul-
garia (34 per cent) and the Czech and Slovak Republics (29 per cent). Source: B. A. Semenov, P. Dastidar 
and L. L. Bennett, IAEA Bulletin, 1/1993.
5  Other VVER types were judged capable of being made safe with sufficient upgrades. ‘Progress Report on 
Nuclear Safety’, EBRD, 1992.
6  These units supplied some 17 per cent of electricity for these regions where some three quarters of the Rus-
sian population lived. See ‘Nuclear Safety and Electric Power in Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia and 
Slovakia’, a joint World Bank, International Energy Agency and EBRD Report, June 1993. 
7  The full text of the communiqué section ‘Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the New Independent States 
of the Former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe’ is available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/
summit/1992munich/communique/. 
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of a supplementary multilateral mechanism … to address immediate oper-
ational safety and technical safety improvement measures…
It concluded that the international fund to be set up to deal with the is-
sue should be coordinated with and assisted by the G24 and the EBRD, 
with a steering group of donors overseeing the fund administration. 
Attali reported to the Board the same day (8 July 1992) that he would 
contact the Chair of the G7 Deputies to establish the fund. Five days later, 
after consulting Horst Köhler—at the time the German Sherpa and G7D 
Chair—the Board was presented with a worked-up proposal for a Multilat-
eral Nuclear Safety Fund to be established within the EBRD as a coopera-
tion fund8 under a steering committee of national donors and the Europe-
an Commission. Further work was needed, as was the agreement of the G7. 
This was achieved early the following year.
The Nuclear Safety Account
By March 1993 the rules of the fund, now known as the Nuclear Safety Ac-
count (NSA), had been agreed. It was to be managed by the EBRD9 on be-
half of 14 donor countries and the EC, collectively known as the Assem-
bly of Contributors. Commitments from donors enabled it to begin work 
in April, with more than US$ 100 million of financing secured by May that 
year.10 Priority was given to those reactors that presented the highest levels 
of risk and where cost-effective safety improvements could be made. These 
were the design-deficient RBMK and VVER 440/230 reactors11, where 
there was a lack of containment and insufficient control, fire protection or 
capacity of emergency core-cooling systems. Other serious weaknesses in-
8  Under Article 20. Paragraph 1 (viii).
9  Under the arrangements, the EBRD acted as the secretariat of the NSA and liaised with the European 
Commission in its capacity as the G24 secretariat.
10 The Rules required a minimum of ECU 60 million to have been committed before the NSA could become 
operational.
11 RBMK reactors were water-cooled, graphite-moderated “channel-type” reactors whose technology and 
safety features were not well understood by western experts at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
compared with the VVER pressurised water reactors. The latter comprised three types, of which the 
230/440 model was considered too dangerous to be kept in operation (not economically upgradable to ac-
ceptable safety levels). Ten were in operation at the time. More modern VVER types, the 213/440 model (14 
in operation) and VVER 320/1000 (18 in operation) were regarded as upgradeable over time. The RBMK 
reactors, one of which was involved in the Chernobyl accident, were not considered upgradeable to ade-
quate international standards. 
253
Part II  Chapter 9
cluded cracks in the piping of RBMK reactors. Recognising that it would 
not be possible to close plants immediately, the NSA provided funding for 
emergency upgrades to address the worst risks. The hope was that, in the 
meantime, plans could be made for alternative energy sources and that the 
countries would profit from knowledge-transfer and adopt safety standards 
similar to those in the West. 
Ahead of the G7 Tokyo Summit in 1993, a joint World Bank, Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA) and EBRD report looked into alternatives to 
the continuing use of unsafe nuclear reactors. The EBRD explored the op-
tions going forward, principally to evaluate the pros and cons of more rap-
id closure of high-risk plants. A fast route, leading to closure of higher-risk 
plants within three to five years, suggested an investment cost of more than 
US$20 billion by 2000 (of which the greatest part would come from an in-
crease in conventional-power capacity to compensate for the loss of nucle-
ar power). Some countries, facing large import bills from a switch to gas-
fired technology (and increased dependence on Russian gas supplies), did 
not favour the scenario. Others, including Russia, believed the risks asso-
ciated with their reactors were not excessive and that old, highly polluting 
thermal plants should be closed first. The alternative, a much slower closure 
programme over 15 to 20 years, involved greater risks and an even greater 
cost. Although there was no formal recommendation, the joint study leant 
towards the faster strategy to address nuclear-safety risks. 
The Tokyo Summit endorsed the work and recommended a country by 
country approach to nuclear safety and power sector development under a 
framework of coordinated multilateral action led by the World Bank, the 
IEA, the EBRD and the EIB.
A follow-up report to the G7 Naples Summit a year later showed that 
slow progress was being made with “no chance” of achieving the fastest path 
described in the earlier report and very little likelihood of success for an in-
termediate scenario. 
There were three main reasons for the slow response. Macroeconom-
ic and energy-sector reforms, including on nuclear safety, were falling be-
hind in most of the countries concerned. Other hindering factors includ-
ed the disruption of energy supplies in areas affected by regional conflict, a 
lack of political will towards reform and weak nuclear regulatory agencies. 
There were also difficulties in agreeing sector strategies and investment pro-
grammes and in preparing projects effectively. Additional technical studies 
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were often commissioned. Finally, uncertainties over the availability of fi-
nance and the level of available concessionality affected planning.
Despite the difficulties of reforming the electricity and power sectors, 
the early years of the NSA were successful. By the end of 1996, pledges to the 
account of almost ECU 260 million had been made by the EU and 14 donor 
countries and the EBRD had made some progress in deploying the funds. 
An ECU 24 million project to start the closure of Kozloduy Units 1 
to 4 in Bulgaria (four VVER 440/230 reactors) had been signed in 1993 
and was underway, while an ECU 33 million project in Lithuania to tackle 
safety at the Ignalina nuclear power plant (involving two RBMK reactors) 
was signed in 1994. Ignalina was a particularly sensitive plant as it account-
ed for around 90 per cent of Lithuania’s electricity production. Agreements 
amounting to ECU 75 million related to nuclear power plants in St. Pe-
tersburg (four RBMK reactors) and Novovoronezh and Kola (four VVER 
230/440 reactors) were reached with Russia in 1995.
The emergency safety upgrades were delivered quickly. The programmes 
also helped recipients adopt western safety methodological approaches such 
as plant-specific in-depth safety assessments, which had important long-
term effects in improving nuclear safety. 
Originally, both the timetable for the NSA (1993–1996) and the range of 
projects it could cover were limited in scope. The fund’s initial agreements 
did not contain firm closure commitments but rather an understanding that 
plants should not be operated beyond certain technical trigger points. It was 
hoped that safety and economic assessments would convince recipients that 
it would be in their interests to close plants sooner rather than later. It was 
many years, however, before those reactor units were actually shut down. 
One of the early lessons from the NSA experience was that it would take 
massive assistance programmes to achieve plant closures. Nevertheless, the 
programme did lay the ground for the closure of reactors in Ignalina, Ko-
zloduy 1-4, Bohunice V112 and Chernobyl 1-3. 
In due course, closure commitments of first-generation, Soviet-designed 
nuclear power plants were achieved in EU accession negotiations with Bul-
garia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic. In turn, the EU committed to as-
sist with decommissioning programmes and energy sector projects. At the 
request of the European Commission and a number of European countries, 
12 In the Slovak Republic.
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in 2001 the EBRD set up support funds for each of the three countries to 
finance infrastructure decommissioning as well as a wide range of energy 
projects such as renewables, conventional power supply and grid modifi-
cations. The aim was to decommission old reactors and make changes to 
countries’ energy sectors to accommodate the closure of nuclear capacity. 
The long and difficult process of dealing with the safety of nuclear 
power plants was in retrospect unsurprising given the size of the problem, 
the differences in approach to nuclear issues between the East and West 
and the specific local issues raised by shutting down significant sources of 
electricity generation. The EBRD was able to help by channelling funds 
and providing expert independent advice through the NSA (which was 
renewed every three years for the subsequent period), as well as address-
ing the pressing safety issues and laying the groundwork for the eventu-
al closures of these plants. This was supplemented by large investments 
by the Bank in non-nuclear power generation capacity in the region. Al-
though some countries decided to extend the lives of nuclear power plants, 
the EBRD was never a party to such a decision, supporting only safety up-
grades of existing units.
3. Managing the Consequences of a Nuclear Disaster: Chernobyl
The most significant nuclear power legacy was of course Chernobyl. The 
exclusion zone around the site and the neighbouring town of Pripyat was 
a constant reminder of the implications of nuclear failure.13 The EBRD 
recognised that dealing with Chernobyl would remain a huge burden for 
Ukraine. At the time of the Bank’s launch in 1991, however, Ukraine was 
still part of the Soviet Union so financing was restricted under the AEB. 
It was also not clear that the authorities were seeking to shut down the re-
maining reactors. 
With the NSA in place, however, the Bank was in a position to play a role 
in this critical nuclear safety legacy case. De Larosière, realising the oppor-
tunity and the importance of Chernobyl for the international community, 
13 It is perhaps ironic that Chernobyl was called the ‘Vladimir Ilyich Lenin Nuclear Power Plant’. Some con-
tend that the meltdown and its consequences were a factor that contributed to the ultimate collapse of the 
Soviet Union itself.
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acted early in his tenure as President to address the issue. Writing in June 
1994 to G7 Governors ahead of the Naples Heads’ Summit, which was due 
to review progress on nuclear safety, he put forward a proposal.
I am convinced that the Nuclear Safety Account can play … a major role in 
promoting and implementing strategies decided by its Assembly and the 
G7 … Other safety measures need to be considered urgently … the closure 
of Chernobyl … deserve[s] Western assistance … The most recent decisions 
taken in Ukraine (to continue operation at Chernobyl) … go in the wrong 
direction … It seems to me to be absolutely crucial that the G7 … announce 
their willingness to support Ukraine with the appropriate level of conces-
sional funds in order to speed up Chernobyl’s closure.
The G7 Heads agreed at Naples to develop a plan to close the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant as a priority. This was to be done in the context of devel-
oping a comprehensive energy reform plan for Ukraine. The Heads pledged 
to provide up to US$ 200 million in grants, including a replenishment of 
the NSA for this purpose, and to allow loans by IFIs. This led to an NSA 
programme for Ukraine focused initially on short-term safety and security 
projects at Chernobyl’s Unit 3, the last reactor operating by the time of the 
programme, with the aim of shutting it down.14 
It was clear that dealing with the consequences of Chernobyl would be 
an enormous undertaking requiring the closing of operations, the decom-
missioning of facilities and the conversion of the site into an environmen-
tally less dangerous area. There was also the need to develop an effective in-
dependent energy strategy for Ukraine, a task made more challenging by 
the appalling economic situation in the country, where output had fallen 
by more than 50 per cent over the previous five years. This prompted the 
suggestion of a conference on Partnership on Economic Transformation in 
Ukraine to take place before the next Heads meeting in Canada in 1995. 
The Ukrainian overall power system was in very poor shape, frequently 
coming close to complete shutdown.15 Ukrainian citizens experienced reg-
ular blackouts and reform of the energy sector had become a political pri-
ority. The targeted Chernobyl reactors, which continued to work after the 
14 Unit 2 closed after a fire in 1991; Unit 1 closed in 1996.
15 See The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1996.
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meltdown of the fourth reactor in 1986, supplied some 5 to 7 per cent of 
Ukraine’s total electricity.16 Local policymakers were concerned that closing 
them for safety reasons would mean increased reliance on inefficient low-
grade coal and gas-fired power plants, which were themselves suffering from 
decades of poor maintenance and dependent on expensive supplies from 
Russia or Turkmenistan.17 
The communiqué by G7 Heads at the Halifax Summit on 16 June 1995 
returned to the nuclear safety issue and the replenishment of the NSA in 
particular. This time the G7 recognised more fully the need to support 
Ukraine in developing its energy strategy, an area where the EBRD was al-
ready closely engaged with the World Bank. The G7 statement read: 
Recognizing the economic and social burden that the closure of Cherno-
byl will place on Ukraine, we [will continue] efforts to mobilize interna-
tional support for appropriate energy production, energy efficiency and 
nuclear safety projects for Ukraine … We call upon the World Bank and 
the EBRD to continue their cooperation with Ukraine in devising a real-
istic long-term energy strategy, based on the results of the EBRD-funded 
least-cost investment study, and to increase their financial contribution in 
support of appropriate energy sector reform and investment.
In April 1995, under pressure from the international community, 
Ukraine’s newly elected President, Leonid Kuchma, had pledged to close 
the remaining Chernobyl reactors by 2000 subject to the proviso that suffi-
cient funds be made available. It took further effort and protracted negoti-
ations, culminating in a Memorandum of Understanding agreed in Otta-
wa between the G7, the European Commission and Ukraine in December 
1995, before closure of Chernobyl’s legacy reactors by 2000 became a con-
crete proposal with a comprehensive programme of cooperation laid out 
along with an agreed action plan. This allowed the EBRD to start working 
actively with donors and Ukraine to establish a mechanism to finance the 
remediation plan.
16 Ibid.
17 Nur Nigmatullin, the acting Chairman of the State Committee for Utilisation of Atomic Energy, was 
quoted as saying to the G7 in December 1995: “Of course we want Chernobyl shut down … But you must 
understand that in the midst of our current economic crisis we cannot do so quickly, inexpensively, and as 
simply as your governments would like to believe.” Cited in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists above. 
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It was not until November 1996 that an ECU 118 million project for 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was signed under the NSA, allowing for 
the construction of a Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant (LRTP) 
to handle 35,000 cubic metres of low and intermediate-level radioactive liq-
uid waste. In addition to funding difficulties, the delay in reaching an agree-
ment was due to ongoing discussions between Ukraine and the EC about 
integrating the former into the European electricity network. 
Consideration was also given to the decommissioning of the Cherno byl 
units once they had been closed. Improving safety at the site required the 
decommissioning of the original fuel-storage facilities, which meant mov-
ing the spent fuel into a safer environment. Again, the NSA was seen as the 
best mechanism to achieve this. To facilitate the decommissioning an Inter-
im Spent Fuel Facility (ISF-2) was set up to process, dry and cut more than 
21,000 fuel assemblies from the Chernobyl Units 1 to 3, which were then to 
be placed in double-walled canisters and stored in concrete modules on site. 
The spent fuel would be stored safely and securely for a minimum period of 
100 years. Once all fuel was transferred to the new ISF-2 facility, the exist-
ing fuel-storage facilities could be decommissioned. 
In parallel, the LRTP was created to retrieve the highly active liquids 
from their storage tanks, process them into a solid state and move them into 
containers for long-term storage. Both facilities were financed by the NSA, 
with €235 million provided by the EBRD alone for ISF-2.
The 1986 Chernobyl accident destroyed Reactor 4. At the time of the ex-
plosion, it held 192 tonnes of uranium nuclear fuel. According to estimates, 
less than 5 per cent was released after the explosion. After extinguishing the 
fire, covering the reactor core became the most important task to prevent 
the further expulsion of radioactive materials. Between May and November 
1986, a steel and concrete structure—the so-called sarcophagus—was built 
around the destroyed reactor building to act as a radiation shield.
The shelter had been designed as an emergency measure with a lifespan 
of 20-30 years. The main challenge in Chernobyl was thus finding a long-
term solution for the temporary building that would stabilise the shelter, 
protect workers from high radiation levels, prevent the release of contami-
nated material and allow the orderly deconstruction of the remains of the 
destroyed reactor and the removal of its fuel-containing materials. 
A major summit between the G7 and Russia in Moscow in April 1997 
on nuclear safety and security reaffirmed the commitment by all sides to 
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deal carefully with the nuclear safety legacy, and Chernobyl in particular. 
The commitment by Kuchma to close the whole Chernobyl plant by 200018 
was welcomed again two months later by G7 Heads and then by the EC at 
their Summit in Lyon. 
In Denver in June 1997, the G7 Heads committed to further key work 
on the Chernobyl legacy. The communiqué stated: 
To date, projects have been agreed totaling over $1 billion … We agreed on 
the importance of securing the environmental safety of the sarcophagus 
covering the remains of the destroyed Chernobyl reactor. This task is in-
evitably beyond the resources of Ukraine alone. This is a major challenge 
for the international community. We have decided to add to the commit-
ments we undertook in the MOU with Ukraine. We endorse the setting 
up of a multilateral funding mechanism and have agreed that the G-7 will 
contribute $300 million over the lifetime of the project…
As a result of the Summit the G7, the European Commission and oth-
er donors invited the EBRD to set up a Chernobyl Shelter Fund and man-
age the “Chernobyl Unit 4 Shelter Implementation Plan”. The plan provid-
ed a step-by-step strategy for decisions required to develop a programme to 
make the accident site safe. 
The Chernobyl Shelter Fund, the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) and 
the New Safe Confinement project began in 1997. It was managed for the 
next 20 years by the EBRD on behalf of 45 donors and other contributors 
and was a remarkable success story. It produced one of the world’s most sig-
nificant engineering feats and was undertaken in a highly contaminated 
area. The exercise required extreme care in the handling of nuclear materials 
and protecting workers from radiation and was conducted in a country be-
set with serious financial and administrative problems. 
The first phase of the SIP, which was sponsored by the USA and the EC 
under its TACIS programme, was prepared by Ukrainian and internation-
al experts in 1997. It focused on conceptual solutions to define the engineer-
ing work needed for confinement and stabilisation and on a strategy for fu-
el-containing materials in the shelter. Critical early stabilisation work inside 
18 The last reactor in Chernobyl was closed down in 2000, as per Kuchma’s commitment. https://www.new-
scientist.com/article/dn257-chernobyl-closes/ 
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and outside the structure took place amid high radiation and the risk of col-
lapse and required very careful planning and implementation. The Cher-
nobyl Shelter Fund became operational in December 1997 with contribu-
tion agreements totalling ECU 263 million. 
In February 1998, a Framework Agreement between Ukraine and the 
EBRD was ratified by the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament), which allowed 
four grant agreements to be drawn up with Energoatom and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority of Ukraine for ECU 154 million as the first phase of 
the SIP. Major contracts were awarded in the following months based on 
open tendering rules in line with the Bank’s procurement policies. The re-
sulting consortia comprised a mix of international and Ukrainian compa-
nies. A joint Ukraine-EBRD committee dealt with the policy issues needed 
for project implementation. 
The two decades of EBRD work on Chernobyl gave rise to a plethora 
of press reports and films by the world’s most prominent media channels. 
Some bankers achieved moments of TV fame unparalleled in the world 
of international development. Progress has also been documented on the 
Bank’s own website.19
The New Safe Confinement—the largest movable land structure in the 
world—was moved into its final position in 2017.20 The arch-shaped struc-
ture stands 108 metres high and 162 metres long and has a span of 257 me-
tres. It has an expected lifetime of a minimum of 100 years. 
To minimise the risk of workers’ exposure to radiation, it was assembled 
in the vicinity of the site and then slid 327 metres on pads using hydraulic 
pistons into position above the Unit 4 reactor site in November 2016. Af-
ter connecting various sub-systems and fully testing its operations, it was 
declared complete on 26 April 2019, exactly 33 years after the original ac-
cident.
The keys from the New Safe Confinement were symbolically handed 
over to the authorities of Ukraine in July 2019. It cost €1.5 billion and was 
financed by 45 donor countries and institutions. The EBRD served as the 
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4. Other Nuclear Safety Interventions
K2R4
A prerequisite for Ukraine joining the European Energy Community21 was 
that two Soviet-designed VVER 1000 reactors be brought up to interna-
tionally acceptable safety standards. The two reactors, Khmelnytsky 2 and 
Rivne 4 (known as K2R4), were to undergo a safety upgrade through loan 
finance rather than grants. The Chair of the G7, President Jacques Chi-
rac, wrote to de Larosière in January 1996 to request that the EBRD con-
sider financing the K2R4 project, along with the EC and the World Bank. 
The total package proposed was well over US $1 billion. De Larosière had 
doubts about the economics of the proposal but accepted the suggestion in 
principle.22 
The Board considered a loan for safety upgrades to K2R4 soon after, and 
again in 2000, but the project turned out to be both technically challenging 
and controversial with civil society. It underwent a transformation in 200423 
and was completed by 2009. 
As a condition of providing support for K2R4, the EBRD required 
Ukraine to assess the safety of its other 15 nuclear units. This led to a compre-
hensive safety upgrade programme, which was later updated to take account 
of post-Fukushima stress-testing. The Bank provided a €300 million loan to 
support this programme, matched by another €300 million from Euratom. 
The programme, scheduled for completion in 2017, is still ongoing.24 
International Decommissioning Funds
The EBRD also managed international funds for the decommissioning of 
Soviet-era reactors in Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic, follow-
21 Ukraine ultimately acceded to the European Energy Community Treaty in 2011.
22 De Larosière commented: “French President Jacques Chirac, along with Larry Summers, who was then 
American Treasury Secretary, [were] trying to influence me. I told them that the EBRD could consider 
looking at the project and even financing it, provided that the financial risk was borne by the G7. At the 
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ing those countries’ decision to close down these facilities as part of their 
progress towards EU accession. 
In Bulgaria, the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support 
Fund (KIDSF) was established in June 2001 as an assistance programme 
of the European Commission and other European contributors to help the 
Bulgarian government cope with the early closure and decommissioning of 
four (out of six) VVER-type reactors of the Kozloduy power plant. Units 1 
and 2 were shut down in 2002 and Units 3 and 4 in 2006. 
In Lithuania, the Ignalina International Decommissioning Support 
Fund (IIDSF) was set up in 2001 at the EBRD by the European Commis-
sion and 14 European governments for the decommissioning of the coun-
try’s only nuclear power plant with two RBMK 1500 reactors. Unit 1 of the 
Ignalina plant was closed at the end of 2004 and Unit 2 at the end of 2009. 
The process led to a spent-fuel storage facility starting operation in Septem-
ber 2016 and a radioactive-waste facility followed in 2017.25
In the Slovak Republic, the European Commission together with eight 
European governments established the Bohunice International Decommis-
sioning Support Fund (BIDSF) at the EBRD in 2001. The fund financed 
projects to support the decommissioning of Units 1 and 2 of the plant in 
a safe, secure and cost-effective manner and to introduce new measures in 
the Slovak energy sector to minimise the impact of the closure through im-
provements in the efficiency of energy supply and use.26
Barents Sea
In the Barents Sea a major environmental challenge was presented by the 
threat of pollution from old nuclear submarines and poorly stored nuclear 
waste. Spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste generated through the opera-
tion of Russia’s Northern Fleet were distributed among various military bases 
along the coast of the Barents Sea and were present on its surface and sea bed. 
The heaviest concentrations were in Andreeva Bay, just 45 kilometres from the 
Norwegian border, where radioactivity was estimated to reach several million 
Curies, a concentration level of the same order of magnitude as at Chernobyl.27 
25 A photo gallery on EBRD.com is at https://www.ebrd.com/ignalina-photo-gallery.
26 Read more about Bohunice at https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/nuclear-safety/bohunice.html.
27 Referred to in ‘Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership Support Fund’, p. 65, 2002.
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 In 2003 the Nuclear Window was established within the NDEP28 to de-
liver environmental improvements and a reduction of risks associated with 
the nuclear legacy in north-west Russia. The focus areas of concern were An-
dreeva Bay,29 Lepse and Soviet-era Papa-class nuclear-powered vessels and 
submarine reactors.
The Nuclear Window complemented Russian and bilaterally funded 
programmes aimed at the decommissioning of nuclear-powered vessels, the 
provision of safe and secure infrastructure for nuclear materials and the safe 
removal of spent nuclear fuel from the region. This dimension of the NDEP 
has continued to this day, illustrating the scale of the challenge in cleaning 
up sources of nuclear pollution and making waters safe in the Northern Di-
mension Area. Contributors have so far provided €165 million to the Nu-
clear Window.
Uranium Mining in Central Asia 
Central Asia served as an important source of uranium in the Soviet Union 
and remains so today, with Kazakhstan being the world’s leading export-
er of the metal. In the late Soviet era, uranium ore was also imported from 
other countries for processing. A large amount of radioactively contami-
nated material was placed in mining waste dumps and tailing sites but very 
little remediation was done prior to or after closure of the mining and mill-
ing operations.
An Environmental Remediation Account for Central Asia (ERA) was 
established in 201530 at the initiative of the European Commission and be-
came operational in 2016. The aim of the account was to pool donor funds 
to assist the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to clean up some 
of the most dangerous sites left by uranium production in these countries.
28 Read more about NDEP Nuclear Window at https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/nuclear-safety/
nuclear-window.html
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Conclusion 
The rigorous pursuit of high environmental and social standards brought 
new ideas and a better understanding of their importance to a region where 
neglect, inefficiency and cover-up had been the norm in such matters. Care-
ful project preparation conducted with thorough due diligence enabled the 
EBRD to provide sound advice on environmental and social issues to a wide 
range of companies, large and small. This was especially important in the 
most polluting sectors. 
The introduction of new finance and expert assistance and learning-by-
doing helped clients improve conditions for workers, safeguard local and in-
digenous populations and bring about a cleaner environment, supporting 
the transition towards more sustainable economies. 
There is no parallel elsewhere to the EBRD’s interventions on nuclear 
safety. The threats posed in the earlier period from Chernobyl-type risks 
were brought under control through the international efforts—by west and 
east—orchestrated under the aegis of the Bank. At the site of the Chernob-
yl plant itself, contaminated material is finally housed safely under the mas-
sive physical structure financed with the EBRD’s help. 
The EBRD’s role in cleaning up the Soviet environmental legacy, which 
was established early on, formed a unique dimension of its support to the 
transition of countries of operations. The importance of the environment to 
the EBRD’s business, however, championed enthusiastically by senior man-
agement throughout, provided a solid basis for the next stage in the Bank’s 
“green” journey. We return to this theme in the next volume.
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Chapter 10
Embedding Impact  
in the Business Model
Introduction
By the mid-1990s, the stars had begun to move in the EBRD’s favour. The 
triumvirate at the top were in many ways the ideal combination to stabilise 
the Bank and set it on a path for success. De Larosière, the internationally 
respected grand-homme of international finance, a man of great foresight 
and an astute manager; Ron Freeman, an investment banker with a strong 
pedigree who understood continental European concerns as well as Anglo-
Saxon foibles; and Nick Stern, a well-connected and respected professor of 
economics with strategic vision who was able to combine theory with prac-
tice and get ideas across effectively to a wide range of audiences. Improve-
ments in the economic circumstances of most countries in the region from 
now on also meant that the timing for a concerted effort to expand and in-
fluence the path of transition was auspicious.
As the Bank moved forward, a new methodology to define and measure 
transition impact was devised over several years, which helped everyone in 
the institution understand and explain to clients how the EBRD differed 
from commercial banks. The methodology allowed the Bank to present its 
activities—from projects and country and sector strategies to strategic and 
business plans—to shareholders and others in an intellectually consistent 
and coherent way, and provided a unity of purpose to staff and external ob-
servers alike.
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1. Defining and Operationalising the Bank’s Purpose:  
Transition Impact
The banking side of the EBRD, reorganised under a tough but respected 
taskmaster with free rein to drive the business forward at pace, was clear on 
its remit. The wider organisation needed a similar clarity of purpose. It was 
here that Stern had a great impact. 
Now almost three years old, the EBRD did not yet have a coherent or-
ganising philosophy within which to develop and focus its activities. The 
transition mandate had always been the guiding principle but was not em-
bedded within the Bank in a systematic way. Board project documents did 
refer to transition impact—mentioning, for example, potential benefits of 
an operation to market development—but there was no means of assessing 
it. To the extent that economic tests of validity were used in project analy-
sis, they focused sometimes on the costs of protection1 but mostly on more 
general economic rates of return (in line with other development organ-
isations), although often only in a cursory way. The Project Evaluation De-
partment (PED) took a similar economic return approach to ex post eval-
uations.2
While such exercises were useful up to a point, they failed to address 
the dynamic nature of the context—notably that the EBRD was trying to 
put markets in place rather than adding incrementally to them—and were 
expensive to carry out when done properly. Methodological improvements 
were needed to deal with the particular situation of the transition econo-
mies and the Bank’s operations. 
This was a task Stern was eminently well-placed to carry out. In doing 
so, he was supported early on by a number of EBRD colleagues: Hans Peter 
Lankes, a recent Harvard PhD graduate, who took on the task of defining 
how projects should be assessed, and Robin Burgess and Mark Schanker-
man who were hired to provide more theoretical underpinnings to Stern’s 
thinking. Like Stern, Schankerman was a professor of economics at the 
LSE and was seconded to the EBRD as Director of Policy Studies. Burgess 
was a recent Oxford doctoral graduate interested in development econom-
1  For some big corporate investments at the time such as in Hungary and the CSFR, especially in the auto-
mobile sector, this was an important aspect to consider. The EBRD always paid close attention to protec-
tion issues, in line with its focus on supporting effective market competition. 
2  See for example, ‘Project Evaluation: The Bank’s Policy Approach’, 3 February 1992.
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ics who joined the Bank as a consultant. In a paper on ‘Investment Proj-
ects and the Transition Process’ they set out a new and radically different 
approach to project appraisal which emphasised the broader, dynamic im-
pact of investments rather than relying on the comparative static analysis 
adopted by others.3
Stern was an expert in public-sector economics and had already writ-
ten prominently on many aspects of cost-benefit analysis.4 However, in the 
context of the rapidly changing economic systems and structures of coun-
tries moving from central planning to market economies, he realised that 
the limitations of cost-benefit analysis were severe and reduced its value as 
a decision-making tool. For example, two similar new road projects might 
have the same effects in reducing journey times and improving safety (which 
could be costed on suitable assumptions), but if one, say, was designed as a 
public-private partnership, it might result in capacity building and demon-
stration effects going beyond quicker and safer access to yield valuable effi-
ciencies in future infrastructure investments. Similarly, if it opened up link-
ages between an isolated region and a port with international access, over 
time it could draw in previously cut-off businesses, expand markets and im-
prove growth to generate higher returns than envisaged in a simple mod-
el. Cost-benefit analyses tended to shy away from such issues because of the 
uncertainties involved and the difficulties in producing reliable quantita-
tive estimates of their value. Ignoring these dynamic effects in the transition 
context would, however, be potentially misleading as to the absolute and rel-
ative benefits of different projects.
In the Lankes, Burgess, Schankerman and Stern view of the world it was 
the systemic impact of projects that mattered, not simply their immediate fi-
nancial or even economic returns (as conventionally measured). This was es-
pecially important for an international institution such as the EBRD which 
sought to play a role in influencing outcomes beyond the companies and fi-
nancial institutions in which it invested. The provision of finance alongside 
other investors was important, but choosing to support projects that had 
impact beyond the investment itself was even more so. Hence, the idea was 
to concentrate on the effects of projects “which may induce important reac-
3  R. Burgess, M. Schankerman and N. Stern, ‘Investment Projects and the Transition Process’, Mimeo, 
EBRD, 1995.
4  See for example J. Dreze and N. Stern, ‘The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis’, in A.J. Auerbach and M. Feld-
stein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 2, Elsevier, 1987, Chapter 14.
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tions outside the boundaries of the project but which may not easily be cap-
tured by the comparison of equilibriums ‘with and without the project’”.5 
It was also relevant from another angle. The amount of capital available 
for the EBRD to deploy fell far short of the needs of the region. Careful 
project selection was essential to maximise the Bank’s impact.
The underlying basis for this viewpoint had its origins in central Europe. 
The Austrian School, dominated by the ideas of Ludwig von Mises and his pu-
pil Frederich von Hayek and later, from a different perspective, those of Joseph 
Schumpeter, was a key influence. The important aspects that underpinned their 
thinking were born of the uncertainties associated with the social, economic 
and political upheavals of the first half of the 20th century: the shocks imparted 
by two World Wars and the Great Depression. There were parallels in the col-
lapse of central planning and efforts to replace it with market capitalism.
Von Mises and von Hayek emphasised the dynamic aspects of change, 
with “markets as a process”, and the learning and discovery that takes place 
through competitive mechanisms and in particular through competitive 
prices. Competitive market interactions between the myriad independent 
actors dispersed information and knowledge which could be mobilised to 
drive economies. In Schumpeter’s view, this provided the vehicle for the dis-
covery and innovation of new products and processes which would overtake 
the status quo (“creative destruction”). The market was seen as a dynamic 
and creative phenomenon. 
This suggested an alternative approach to the appraisal of projects in the 
transition context, one based on the nature and dynamic aspects of markets. 
It could take account of backward and forward linkages (effectively supply 
chains), which influenced the scale and pace of development and the behav-
iours of markets, driving participants to keep up with competitors and de-
velop skills and innovations to surpass them. A key addition by the EBRD’s 
economists, compared with their Austrian antecedents, was the inclusion of 
institutions and policies that could influence markets. In the fluid world of 
transition, the rule of law, level of openness and transparency, and strength 
and fairness of regulation were important influences on market outcomes 
and could not be ignored.
5  R. Burgess et al., cited in J. Carbajo, ‘Assessing the contribution of investment projects to building a mar-
ket economy: beyond cost-benefit analysis?’, in M. Florio (ed.), Cost Benefit Analysis and Incentives in Eval-
uation, Edward Elgar, 2007, Chapter 4.
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The team began to build, over a series of iterations, an analytical system 
which suited the Bank’s needs. Starting with a set of indicators of transition 
progress presented to the Board in 1994 and progressing to a project-level 
approach after considerable discussion with the banking and evaluation de-
partments, the main elements of the new “transition impact” methodology 
emerged gradually over several years. The effort to move from the intuitive 
notion of transition impact of earlier times towards a more structured ap-
proach was welcomed by Directors. 
The starting point was a thorough assessment of the state of transition 
in the EBRD’s countries of operations in a new publication, the Transition 
Report, issued by the Bank in November 1994. This was the first of what be-
came an annual and much admired series, each of which was the sole re-
sponsibility of the Chief Economist.6 The Transition Report 1994, produced 
by the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) under the editorial direction 
of Kasper Bartholdy,7 was almost 200 pages long and mirrored the World 
Bank’s flagship World Development Report. It covered many aspects of tran-
sition, from the macroeconomic situation of the region and its individual 
countries to the pace of institutional change, FDI and trade-policy reform. 
It was a remarkable achievement for such a small office. 
A key consideration, set out at the start of the publication, was the mean-
ing of transition and its measurement. Written by Stern and his predecessor, 
Flemming, it explained:
Transition is not only an intermediate goal contributing to economic de-
velopment … The market economy, in contrast to central planning, gives, 
in principle, the individual the right to basic choices over aspects of his or 
her life … The right to these choices may be seen as a basic liberty … Thus 
the transition is also an end in itself …8 
The transition concerns institutional change. It is the institutional ar-
rangements for the allocation and generation of goods and resources, and the 
ownership incentive and reward structures that institutions embody, that 
characterise the differences between a market and a command economy.9
6  Although all interested parties are consulted, Transition Reports do not necessarily represent the views of 
the EBRD’s senior management or those of its shareholders.
7  Flemming helped lead the editorial team in which Andrew Tyrie also played a substantial role.
8  Transition Report 1994, p. 3, EBRD, 1994.
9  Ibid., p. 4.
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Citing the contrasts between Japan, Germany and the USA, however, 
Stern and Flemming cautioned:
… it must be remembered that there are many varieties of market econo-
my which may be viewed as the ‘end point’ or ‘target’ of the transition … 
[there] is not a simple, linear, one-dimensional progression to a ‘standard’ 
market economy.10
 
The key elements of a market economy in their characterisation were: en-
terprises and households making decisions over production and consump-
tion in response to incentive structures embodied in markets; markets them-
selves, which were the means by which goods and resources were exchanged; 
and financial institutions, which allowed the channelling of savings, invest-
ments and payments and supported financial discipline.
The state was seen as playing an important role, albeit a very different one 
from under a command economy, namely as the source of legal and regula-
tory structures concerning the behaviour of enterprises and financial institu-
tions, property rights, contracts and market functioning, as well as the pro-
vider of public goods, taxation, safety nets and protection against poverty.11
2. A Set of Transition Indicators
This thinking led to a first set of transition indicators designed to mea-
sure the state of transition in the EBRD’s countries of operations. Over the 
course of 1995, they were refined and published in that year’s Transition Re-
port. Four categories were used to represent the components of the market 
economy described above: enterprises, markets and trade, financial insti-
tutions and legal reform. Each category was sub-divided into discrete di-
mensions of transition, from large-scale privatisation to price liberalisation, 
banking reform and effectiveness of legal rules on investment. A classifica-
tion system was then applied to each indicator to express the extent to which 
progress had been made against a hypothetical yardstick of the standards ex-
pected to be seen in an advanced industrial economy. Scores ranged from 1, 
10 Ibid., p. 4.
11 Ibid., p. 4.
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indicating little or no progress, to 4*, representing the level of an advanced 
industrial nation. Table 10.1 below shows the structure of the indicators as 
they appeared in the Transition Report 1995.
 
Table 10.1  Transition Indicators, 199512








Level of  
Advancement
Albania 2.7 2.7 1.5 2.0 2.2 B
Armenia 2.3 2.3 1.5 2.0 2.0 B
Azerbaijan 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 C
Belarus 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 B
Bulgaria 2.3 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.6 B
Croatia 3.2 2.7 2.5 3.0 2.9 B
Czech Rep. 3.8 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.6 A
Estonia 3.7 3.3 2.5 3.0 3.1 A
FYR Macedonia 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.4 B
Georgia 2.3 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 B
Hungary 3.8 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.6 A
Kazakhstan 1.7 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.1 B
Kyrgyzstan 3.3 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.6 B
Latvia 2.7 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.6 B
Lithuania 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.6 B
Moldova 2.7 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 B
Poland 3.5 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 A
Romania 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.4 B
Russian Fed. 3.0 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.4 B
Slovak Rep. 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.3 A
Slovenia 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.2 A
Tajikistan 1.7 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 C
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 C
Uzbekistan 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.3 B
12 For simplified presentation purposes sub-indicators have been aggregated and averaged; similarly for the 
overall average score. Level of Advancement categories: A, average score 3 and above; B, between 2 and 3; 
C, score less than 2. 4* cases were treated as having a value of 4.5. There were 12 such scores out of a total of 
225. For a more complete picture, see Transition Report 1995, Table 2.1, p. 11. 
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The application of the system to the EBRD’s countries of operations pro-
vided a helpful picture of the region’s progress and highlighted the consider-
able differences between countries. Some, like Turkmenistan, scored most-
ly ‘1’ across the set of indicators, while more advanced economies such as 
Hungary and the Czech Republic scored in a range between ‘3’ and ‘4*’. The 
system provided a set of development indicators from a transition perspec-
tive and a means of calibrating progress against increasingly objective evi-
dence. Intellectually, it was very appealing and offered the prospect of a reg-
ular snapshot, as well as opportunities for academic researchers and others 
to assess and track progress across central and eastern Europe, Russia and 
beyond. But there was a desire internally to see if the approach could be ap-
plied more directly to the Bank’s operations and to the strategies that were 
developed for each of the EBRD’s countries of operations.
 To spearhead the effort of applying transition impact criteria more wide-
ly to Bank activities, an interdepartmental working group consisting of the 
OCE, Banking and PED was formed early in 1995. This followed a success-
ful Board retreat where the transition indicators had been discussed as a re-
sponse to questions about the Bank’s overall impact on transition. The aim 
of the group was to take forward the qualitative aspects of the transition in-
dicators presented in the Transition Report and turn them into a checklist 
that could assist operations staff in focusing on the key dimensions of transi-
tion impact in project selection, design and appraisal. If successful, the set of 
criteria developed could be used to examine the transition impact of EBRD 
projects at each stage of their development, from first appraisal to the port-
folio and their evaluation post-completion.
In order to gauge the usefulness of the idea, Stern proposed to apply the 
draft project-level indicators of transition impact to the stock of signed proj-
ects, which then stood at around 200. To help with the exercise, Professor 
Paul Hare of Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, was employed as a con-
sultant. One of the reasons for inviting his participation was that the proj-
ect had an underlying research purpose, namely to determine the extent to 
which the “contribution to transition” criteria differed from conventional 
financial and economic return indicators. Bankers from eight teams were 
also invited to score some of their own projects using 14 indicators, three of 
which related to enterprises, three to financial institutions and eight to mar-
kets and trade, with some overlaps. The scoring range for each indicator was 
from ‘-1’ (negative effect) to ‘3’ (very significant positive effect). 
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At a workshop at the EBRD in 1995, Hare and Tanya Normak (an econ-
omist in OCE) presented preliminary ideas on the transition impact criteria 
and their research proposal. It was followed by a presentation of their find-
ings at an EBRD research conference in April 1996.13 Based on an econo-
metric analysis of the Bank’s projects using the 14 transition indicators and 
other project features, the paper concluded:
that the set of transition indicators is both conceptually and statistically co-
herent, that there is little evidence to suggest that one or other indicator or 
subset of indicators can usefully be replaced by a single, composite or syn-
thetic indicator, and that these indicators do not merely replicate informa-
tion already contained in standard project-based financial indicators [FRR 
and ERR]. Hence the measures of ‘contribution to transition’ proposed … 
could usefully be incorporated in the Bank’s project appraisal procedures.14
This provided valuable support for the approach. A follow-up report on 
implementation issues15 considered the questions of aggregating indicators 
and the responsibility for the assessment of transition impact. The first ques-
tion arose in part because the PED, which had adopted the indicators in its 
work, had gone further in its analysis by aggregating individual scores into 
a single numeric measure. Views differed on the value of a single measure of 
transition impact. The Hare and Normak paper concluded:
It would seem preferable to use project-level indicators as a checklist of issues 
needing to be explored from an early stage of project design rather than to reduce 
them to a single numeric benchmark, especially if the latter was merely summa-
rising a set of not very carefully analysed ‘impressions’ about the project.16
 
The authors did, however, recognise that differences in thinking about 
implementation could be overcome by seeing the matter as the start of a pro-
cess of discussion amongst the relevant departments. 
13 ‘Estimating the Transition Impact of EBRD Projects”, by Hare and Normak, internal paper presented to 
an EBRD research conference, London, 26 and 27 April 1996, EBRD.
14 Ibid., p. 20.
15 ‘Estimating the Transition Impact of EBRD Projects: Implementation Issues’, by Hare and Normak, inter-
nal memo, July 1996, EBRD.
16 Ibid., p. 5.
After the Berlin Wall
274
On the issue of the responsibility for assessing the transition impact of 
projects, they advocated avoiding increasing the burden on the appraisal 
process. “The main responsibility must obviously lie with the department 
that already analyses projects and guides them through the selection and ap-
praisal process, namely Banking.”17 
The involvement of OCE, though in an advisory capacity, was seen as 
important, as was the contribution ex post of PED. This meant a heavy reli-
ance on quantifiable (or testable) indicators of transition for which bankers 
could be subsequently held accountable. It also placed a premium on learn-
ing. The economists had to be willing and able to explain the transition im-
pact system to bankers and train them on its attributes and interpretation.
3. The Introduction of a Formal “Transition Impact”  
Measurement System
By 1997, the system of project-level indicators had been tested and improved 
with the help of the working group and the many bankers involved. Reac-
tions among the bankers had been broadly positive. Project leaders found 
the indicators and the economists’ advice on their interpretation of projects 
helpful for document write-ups for Board approval. Shareholders were also 
interested to hear management’s answers to the question of measurement of 
development impact, a matter that pervaded debate in other MDBs. This 
too encouraged the EBRD to identify its impact better. As a way of satisfy-
ing this demand a summary paper on the conclusions of the work of the pre-
vious years and the latest interpretation of the system was prepared. 
Stern and Lankes presented their paper to the Board as a formal intro-
duction of the new conceptual framework at the FOPC in February 1997.18 
Here, the rejection of cost-benefit analysis for project appraisal at the EBRD 
was made explicit. 
Cost-benefit analysis is not well-equipped to handle two sets of issues 
which are central to the transition process: radical structural change and 
learning of market-oriented methods and behaviour. The reason is that the 
17 Ibid., p. 5.
18 ‘Transition Impact of Projects’, 10 February 1997. 
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approach … requires an explicit model of economic structures and behav-
iour [and] such changes often pose insuperable challenges to the model. 
The transition, however, is concerned precisely with changing structures 
and behaviour. Thus the spotlight in the analysis of transition falls pre-
cisely where cost-benefit analysis is weakest. Transition focuses on process-
es rather than outcomes … the particular problem for the EBRD in this 
context is that the kind of effects that cost-benefit analysis conventionally 
leaves out are, in fact, central to the impact of the project on the transition. 
And further … the value of the processes may go beyond simply the mate-
rial outcomes they produce.19
The process of evaluating the project-level indicators had allowed Stern 
and Lankes to identify three broad dimensions that described the process of 
transition to a market economy: the creation, expansion and improvement 
of markets; the establishment and strengthening of institutions, laws and 
policies that support markets (including private ownership); and the adop-
tion of behaviour patterns and skills with a market perspective. They argued 
that the transition impact of projects and related activities could be assessed 
in a qualitative fashion by way of “checkable stories” based on this approach, 
which was further broken down into seven components to form a final tran-
sition checklist, as shown in Table 10.2 below.
Table 10.2. Project Transition Checklist, from 1997 onwards
1. Contributions to the structure and 
extent of markets
1.1 Greater competition in the project 
sector
1.2 Expansion of competitive market 
interactions in other sectors
2. Contributions to the institutions and 
policies that support markets
2.1 More widespread private ownership 
and entrepreneurship
2.2 Institutions, laws and policies that pro-
mote market functioning and efficiency
3. Contributions to market-based behav-
iour patterns, skills and innovation
3.1 Transfer and dispersion of skills
3.2 Demonstration of new replicable 
behaviours and activities
3.3 Setting standards for corporate gover-
nance and business conduct
19 Ibid., pp. 3–4
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The methodology introduced in the Stern-Lankes paper was a landmark 
among DFIs. No other institution paid such attention to the wider, system-
ic effects of their interventions on market processes, preferring instead to 
focus on the direct impact of the project itself (and some indirect outcomes 
like job creation). To a large degree, the approach reflected the unique cir-
cumstances facing the EBRD and its region of operations, where markets 
were only just forming and the focus was on the private sector rather than 
the large public-sector projects pursued by most DFIs. But it had a more uni-
versal applicability to private-sector development.
A further reason for the EBRD approach was the sheer number of proj-
ects the Bank pursued, mostly of small size, compared with other institu-
tions. This, as well as the large number of equity and corporate finance deals, 
made sophisticated numerical calculations of costs and benefits difficult to 
assess for every project and of limited value, especially with a very small 
team of economists and limited resources for hiring consultants. 
In the case of larger projects such as public-sector infrastructure, eco-
nomic rates of return were calculated along with an assessment of transition 
impact. Stern-Lankes noted:
The close conceptual relationship between economic rate of return, tran-
sition impact and environmental impact implies that the three should al-
ways be viewed in conjunction when assessing the benefits of a project in 
relation to the transition.20
They also recognised that transition impact was a function of time and con-
text. In other words, some impacts—demonstration effects for example—may 
require time to take full effect, while a project in a more advanced country may 
have a much weaker impact on the transition than a similar one in a country 
at an earlier stage of the transition process. Nonetheless, in the authors’ view:
A qualitative assessment of the strength of a project’s contribution to 
market expansion and learning can be made in a way which is systemat-
ically structured to inform the appraisal process [through the use of the 
checklist].21 
20 Ibid., p. 4.
21 Ibid., p. 6.
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Now there was not only financial leverage to take into account in proj-
ect assessment (the ability of the EBRD to provide finance on its own ac-
count and leverage other sources of funds, including through the mobili-
sation of co-financing), but also transition impact (the project’s ability to 
drive additional investment and change in the economy as market enhance-
ments occurred). Talk of the Bank’s multiplier effect, which had so far been 
described in terms of total project finance catalysed by EBRD investment, 
now extended to the notion of a transition impact multiplier. In principle, 
the latter could be seen through progress in the country and sector context.
The new approach was complemented by a paper which applied the an-
alytical tools to an assessment of transition impact trends in the portfo-
lio.22 This covered countries at different stages of transition and an analy-
sis of projects in the Russian portfolio (127 at the time), measured against 
the seven transition checklist criteria (as shown in Table 10.2).23 The analy-
sis showed advanced transition economies tended to be dominated by direct 
corporate and private infrastructure investments, and early transition coun-
tries mainly by public infrastructure and sovereign lines of credit. Private-
sector projects focused on “greater competition” and demonstration effects 
such as “new products and processes”, whereas state projects showed high-
er frequencies of achieving “greater competition in other sectors” and “im-
proved market efficiency via institutions, laws and policies”. 
This was the first time the Board was presented with an attempt at pro-
viding comprehensive information on ex ante, ex post and “on-the-go” as-
sessments of transition impact. Complementing the OCE work on each 
project’s likely impact on transition was the Evaluation Department’s per-
spective on ex post and “on-the-go” contributions of projects in the portfo-
lio though their evaluations of operations nearing or beyond completion.24 
Banking teams completed the picture by providing commentary and exam-
ples of transition impacts relevant to their particular sector under each of 
the checklist criteria.25
22 ‘Transition Impact: Assessment of Trends in the Portfolio and Pipeline’, 14 March 1997.
23 The two most prominent transition impact criteria were identified for each project and then aggregated to 
show the dispersion of the criteria among private and state projects, respectively. 
24 Given the relatively early stage of many projects in the portfolio in 1996, the sample was small and weight-
ed towards “in flight” projects. 
25 Sectors covered included financial institutions, property, early stage equity, transport, telecommunications, 
natural resources, power and energy, energy efficiency, municipal and environmental infrastructure, and 
agribusiness.
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It had taken a considerable effort to prepare the material—the original 
request from FOPC for some analysis had been made almost 12 months ear-
lier—and it was something of a “pick’n’mix” collection of insights drawn 
from project documents, evaluations and observations based on bankers’ 
experiences. Nonetheless, the Board, through the FOPC, which had been 
closely involved throughout and had pushed for clarity of purpose from the 
start, thanked management for the “significant amount of work which had 
gone into the preparation of the paper”. 
The episode had demonstrated three important lessons. Internally, there 
was a clear recognition of the importance of conducting a proper assessment 
of the contributions of projects to the transition process. Second, the exer-
cise had shown a genuine willingness to collaborate between key Bank de-
partments to achieve this goal and reach a consensus of interpretation as far 
as possible. Third, the extensive discussions helped to foster a corporate cul-
ture based on a mutual understanding of the twin purposes of the EBRD: 
to pursue commercial deals but also those which had a clear impact on mov-
ing the transition process forward. 
4. Strengthening Risk Analysis in Parallel
Like most commercial banks the EBRD considered the financial risks 
surrounding its investments. This was particularly challenging given the 
many unknowns in the region. Early efforts to improve the assessment of 
project-level transition impact were matched by a similar strengthening of 
the evaluation of financial risks associated with projects. Hitherto, while 
working level credit analysis was good, the system was structurally weak, 
with an optional and consultative process on credit matters and no ded-
icated process to make specific recommendations. Fortunately, there had 
been good protection from the strong skills of Freeman in identifying key 
weaknesses and risks in the projects coming to OpsCom. 
During the interregnum between Attali’s departure and de Larosière’s 
arrival at the EBRD, Noreen Doyle, an American banker who had been re-
cruited from Bankers Trust and was in charge of the Bank’s loan syndica-
tion activities, approached Freeman, then acting President, with a proposal 
to improve risk assessment and give it a more formal role in the project-ap-
praisal procedure akin to that used in commercial banks. 
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Doyle had some influence not only as a serious banker respected by Free-
man but also as one of the three people managing OpsCom.26 Freeman ac-
cepted her suggestion. According to Doyle, he asked her to become Head of 
Credit, and to establish the Credit Department in the Finance vice presi-
dency in order to avoid any conflict of interest. This meant credit risk assess-
ment would no longer be “an optional stop for the bankers” but a truly in-
dependent function able to input advice to bankers on the structuring and 
design of projects.27 In this respect, the economists and credit analysts be-
came aligned, each with a different perspective.
Doyle moved across to Finance, taking loan syndications with her, and 
began by setting up a credit review process in line with commercial prac-
tice. The new arrangements were soon up and running. A first step was to 
develop for the EBRD’s countries of operations a set of country risk rat-
ings—which did not then exist—in line with the general approach adopted 
by credit rating agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s.28 It was followed by 
the creation of a group to analyse credit risks faced within the growing port-
folio, and was complemented in 1996 with a workout segment that was be-
coming a more urgent need. 
Under Doyle’s leadership several experienced and tough-minded risk ex-
perts with backgrounds in commercial banks, big corporates and IFIs were 
able to challenge many aspects of bankers’ deals and make ‘yes/no’ recom-
mendations. Bob Harada, a Chase Manhattan US executive with a wealth 
of financial analytical skills, who had been involved from the beginning, 
managed the credit analysis side while Mike Williams, a deceptively soft-
spoken Brit, joined a little later to deal with the portfolio. The Anglo-Amer-
ican group was completed by the appointment of David Klingensmith, an-
other American from Chase, this time with experience of Asian developing 
country markets. All were heavily committed to establishing the credentials 
of the new credit risk department and helping bankers improve the quality 
of their deals from a risk management perspective. Freeman and Doyle also 
realised that for the process to work well it would need to be open and col-
legiate throughout, a doctrine that Freeman had established in OpsCom 
26 The others making up the OpsCom Secretariat were Gavin Anderson and Jean-Francois Maquet, both se-
nior advisers in the FVP’s front office.
27 Conversation with Noreen Doyle, March 2020.
28 Credit rating agencies provided country risk ratings for the larger advanced countries, such as the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, in due course. 
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and which Doyle carried through when she later took on the FVP role and 
Chair of OpsCom, and which has continued since. The new arrangements 
provided a solid base for ensuring that the EBRD followed its principle of 
“sound banking” to the letter.
The strengthening of the financial risk process was an important parallel 
effort to advances in the assessment of transition impact during this time. 
Collectively, the improvements helped to embed a balanced business mod-
el in the EBRD, while the key personalities involved ensured the corporate 
culture reflected the substance in an open and supportive way that could de-
liver transition impact while maintaining financial sustainability.29
5. Operationalising the Transition Impact System:  
Introducing Ratings
Having won support for the Stern-Lankes approach on transition impact, 
the next step was to apply the methodology more formally to the EBRD’s 
operations. This was not a simple matter and went beyond debates by aca-
demic economists over erudite theories of impact measurement. It trod on 
evaluation turf but, far more important, it impacted the Banking Depart-
ment directly. If the economists got their way, they would be able to define 
what was a “good” project and what was not. If a formal rating system was 
introduced, bankers might find their hard-fought deals sacrificed on the al-
tar of transition impact as decided by economists in their conclave. 
Stern well understood the risks. Since his arrival he had carefully built 
up the language of transition by making sure the transition context was al-
ways present in documents going to the Board, whether on projects or on 
policy. An articulate and smooth operator as well as a powerful intellect, he 
had already taken a prominent role in the Executive Committee and had the 
full confidence of the President. Nonetheless, keeping the Banking Depart-
ment onside still represented a major task.
The trick was not to push too hard or too quickly. Stern was in any case 
not keen on a formal rating system believing that institutional learning takes 
29 No similar formal process to test for additionality was developed at the time, although it featured in proj-
ect documents and was challenged by economists in OpsCom when the need arose. It became a more rele-
vant criterion as countries progressed along the transition path and featured prominently in the debate on 
graduation. See Chapter 12. 
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time and persistence. Achieving a deep understanding of the importance of 
transition impact and building that into the corporate culture could not be 
done overnight. In this context, a formal rating system ran the risk of put-
ting an undue focus on the score and could distract attention from the un-
derlying substance behind the assessment. Just as cost-benefit analysis could 
be overplayed in the transition context, it was also important not to take the 
transition impact analysis beyond its limits. Besides, there was much for the 
EBRD to do in the region, so ruthless prioritising of projects was not yet 
called for. What was needed was a clear understanding of what the Bank 
was trying to achieve through its projects and other work from a public pur-
pose perspective. 
It was a fair concern that a summary characterisation of transition impact 
or a label might imply over-precision. There were risks in trying to compare 
the incomparable and measure the immeasurable. A project’s impact depend-
ed heavily on the context and many qualitative factors that were difficult to 
compare across sectors and countries. On the other hand, a summary over-
view of a project’s impact might be more acceptable if risks to the delivery of 
that impact were added to the picture. This could help to pin down the de-
gree of uncertainty over the assessment of the likely outcomes. Recognition 
could be given, for example, that the impact on transition of the Bank’s inter-
ventions was likely to be greater where reforms were underway than in cases 
where they were not. Conceptually, the system thus evolved to consider both 
the potential impact of a project on transition (using the checklist) and the 
risks associated with the delivery of the specific impacts identified.
On the Banking side, there had been a general awareness for some time 
that there was no real coherence in describing how projects were aligned 
with the EBRD’s mandate and that more discipline was needed. The indi-
cators helped and the idea that transition impact should fit into a consistent 
and verifiable framework (described at the time as “checkable stories”) was 
regarded as useful.
Some felt that the use of a summary label for a project’s impact could be 
helpful depending on how it might be used. Aggregating the indicators to 
provide an overall assessment was a way of cutting through the many dimen-
sions behind a project and would force those involved to think through their 
case and justify their position. A more prominent focus, which a summary 
rating would surely bring in the view of some OpsCom members, could help 
pose the right questions and elicit more clarity from bankers. 
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Senior managers were aware that a labelling or rating system might 
lead to disputes. On the other hand, it would flush out disagreements and 
 OpsCom was there to resolve any problems. It was particularly important 
for management to resolve these issues before projects went to Directors 
for approval. There should be no risk of public disagreement in the Board-
room. For this reason, a move towards ratings had some management value. 
If some sort of ordinal ranking was introduced with fairly wide boundaries 
and undue weight was not placed on it—then, the thinking went, why not?
Moving in the direction of an overall classification system based on the 
indicators was hard to resist. Transition indicators were already being used 
to justify projects, so a rating was not a huge step to take. There were rea-
sons too why a rating system could prove useful from a Banking perspec-
tive. For one thing, it could make it easier to allocate resources to more dif-
ficult transition regions, which management was under constant pressure 
from the Board to do. These areas were labour-intensive and less attractive 
to bankers since they were time-consuming to travel to, often involved small 
deals and were more troublesome when it came to conducting business. Rec-
ognition of the higher transition impact potential (albeit with higher risks) 
in these areas would encourage bankers and be a useful signal to the Board 
of the seriousness of the EBRD’s intent when pursuing such projects, espe-
cially when combined with a mantra of seeking to pursue transition with 
full vigour.
Ratings also helped to indicate the quality of projects and thus added 
a different dimension from volume, again something Directors were keen 
to understand better and for the Bank to improve upon. From the Bank’s 
perspective, ratings also helped—seemingly paradoxically—in central Eu-
rope. While weaker transition impact projects were at risk of criticism here 
(although often saved by lower financial risks and more attractive returns), 
projects classified above average (“good” or “excellent”) offered a way to 
demonstrate that transition “gaps” remained even in more advanced coun-
tries and that the Bank’s investments could make a difference.
Although in its initial form the transition impact methodology had es-
chewed making comparisons between projects in favour of qualitative assess-
ments and “checkable stories”, the Board also saw value in pushing further 
towards ratings, including as a means of holding management to account for 
the Bank’s contribution to the transition process. The heavy concentration 
of EBRD business volume in central European countries which were more 
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advanced than other EBRD regions had begun to draw adverse attention 
from Directors. Some form of differentiation between projects thus had ad-
vantages for those Directors advocating that the Bank shift resources away 
from central Europe towards more difficult activities and countries where 
transition was weakest. Further yardsticks to help prioritise activities were 
seen as useful and a project rating system fitted the bill.
Around the time these matters were being discussed, Freeman left the 
EBRD to return to Salomon Brothers. His successor, Charles Frank, took 
over as FVP in September 1997 and became acting President following de 
Larosière’s departure in January 1998. His arrival coincided with the emerg-
ing conclusions of the Zero Base Budgeting (ZBB) exercise designed to look 
at the Bank’s operational model, simplify its systems and processes and raise 
productivity.30 The initiative had begun during Freeman’s tenure as FVP 
but he had not taken much notice. Frank was more familiar with and inter-
ested in business management systems than his predecessor and saw scope 
to speed up decision-making and strengthen the operational mechanics. A 
project transition impact classification and rating system fitted this gener-
al philosophy, so in 1998 the economists tested with Banking, informally at 
first, a light classification system for concept reviews which involved sum-
mary categories on transition impact potential and risks to that impact.31 
As part of the process the OpsCom system was tightened further, in-
cluding dividing the agendas between important or difficult projects and 
the rest.32 Members were encouraged early on under Frank’s chairing of 
 OpsCom to concentrate on their own specialisms. There was a push to make 
project documents more succinct and tighter procedures were developed, 
whereby the key non-Banking parties around the table—the credit analysts, 
economists, lawyers and Treasury/syndications representatives—would sub-
mit fully articulated notes of their positions on bankers’ project proposals 
ahead of the OpsCom meeting. Frank took issue with the lawyers having a 
say in approving projects as opposed to simply fulfilling a compliance func-
tion in relation to the Articles. Freeman had been very happy to have law-
yers present at OpsCom to discuss transactions (partly due to his own legal 
30 ‘Zero Base Budgeting Initiative’, 29 January 1997.
31 Labels of “high”, “medium” and “low” transition impact were used at this stage. 
32 This was an A/B list in which only A projects were fully discussed with the relevant banking team in front 
of the Committee. ‘President’s briefing to the Board of Directors on Zero Base Budgeting’, 18 September 
1997.
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training), but Frank came from GE Capital where, as was normal in such in-
vestment banks, external counsel were hired by bankers to assist with their 
transactions. A battle over the role of EBRD’s legal staff in the Bank’s oper-
ations ensued, which was eventually settled with the General Counsel and 
his representatives remaining active participants at OpsCom, and they re-
mained in charge of all instructions of outside counsel. 
Further changes to EBRD procedures were on the cards when Horst 
Köhler, a former State Secretary at the German Federal Finance Ministry 
and a G7 deputy, arrived as President of the EBRD in September 1998. Like 
his predecessor, he began by asking staff to review the Bank’s operational 
priorities. This was all the more necessary since Köhler’s arrival coincided 
with the Russian debt crisis (see Chapter 11). 
Stern was once again in the driving seat but this time with less freedom 
of manoeuvre and it was not long before his interest turned to finding a new 
role outside the Bank.33 
 Following a discussion at a Board retreat in January 1999, the review 
of priorities was issued as a short paper.34 It reaffirmed much of the previ-
ous approach, including strengthening local presence and encouraging start-
ups and SMEs, but laid a new emphasis on a strategic approach to portfolio 
management. This recognised the need to balance transition impact, finan-
cial returns and risk, and led to a tightening of procedures all round. 
As part of the response to the portfolio-management approach, Stern 
announced in May that OCE would in future formally provide its ratings 
of transition impact potential and risks in its notes to OpsCom.35 He ex-
plained that transition impact potential would be defined through reference 
to the checklist categories and the sector-relevant versions. Ratings were to 
be based on an ordinal scale with broad categories ranging from “unsatisfac-
tory” to “excellent”.36 A similar approach applied to risks, with a range from 
“excessive” to “low”.37 Here risks to transition impact depended both on the 
33 Stern first moved to an economic consultancy in 1999 before becoming Chief Economist at the World 
Bank in 2000.
34 ‘Moving Transition Forward: Refocused Operational Priorities for the Medium Term’, 19 February 1999.
35 ‘Transition Impact Rating of Projects’, memo by Stern to the Operations Committee, 24 May 1999.
36 The Evaluation Department had been using a classification system, albeit a different one, for some time for 
completed projects (unsuccessful to generally successful) so the introduction of a similar one for ex ante as-
sessments was not altogether alien. 
37 The categories used for transition impact potential were “unsatisfactory”, “marginal”, “satisfactory”, “good”, 
“excellent” and for risks were “negligible”, “low”, “medium”, “high” and “excessive”. 
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likelihood that the transition impact potential would not be realised and 
on the risk of negative impact deriving from certain attributes of a project 
(inappropriate subsidies or protection for example). Stern pointed out that, 
while financial risks could be relevant to transition impact results, transi-
tion impact risks were generally separate and different in nature, pertaining 
to whether the impact argued for—such as higher standards, demonstration 
effects and so on—would likely occur. 
From then on, assessment was made using ratings and the transition im-
pact methodology (that is, based on the checklist and transition context), 
with typically two of the seven criteria to describe the impact of the project. 
Once OpsCom had become familiar and happy with the system, it was ex-
tended to project documents presented to the Board from mid-2000. This 
gave Directors a basis of comparison and a view of management’s thinking 
on the (relative) transition value of the operation.
6. Tensions Build
Early misgivings on a “hard” rating system by the well-respected Chief 
Economist were tempered by a feeling that greater clarity of purpose to proj-
ects under a rating system was a reasonable objective. Banking had thus not 
viewed the introduction of a project classification system and ratings as a 
source of internal complications. They knew in any case that “satisfactory” 
projects would still go to the Board for approval and were highly unlikely to 
be rejected there. Lower-classified projects (“unsatisfactory” or “marginal”) 
rarely made it as far as OpsCom.
Over time the pattern changed. The increased prominence of transition 
impact in projects and its calibration throughout each stage of their devel-
opment meant the economists’ role in OpsCom became much more sig-
nificant. Originally, the Chief Economist had not been a member of the 
Committee but this changed after Stern’s arrival. From now on, OCE repre-
sentatives were a focal point for opinions on transition impact value.
Although “satisfactory” projects were eligible for presentation to the 
Board, they inevitably invited increased scrutiny and questions from Direc-
tors as to whether they really were up to the mark or whether some fudge 
had been applied to get them “over the line”. Team directors and operation 
leaders who faced Board scrutiny naturally preferred to avoid such ques-
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tioning if possible, so these pressures fed back through the system to de-
bates with economists over the transition merits of the project. OpsCom 
was the place where the most serious disagreements were resolved (except in 
the most strategically significant disputed cases where ExCom was needed). 
Hence the Chief Economist and representatives from OCE had a critical in-
fluence in steering the direction of the EBRD’s operations.
Other factors strengthened this development. Turnover in the Board was 
rapid so earlier discussions were quickly forgotten, while changing personal-
ities here, in OCE and elsewhere led to different emphases. A big influence 
was the progress of some countries, which led to a more serious questioning 
of the validity of projects’ incremental impact and additionality. The rapid 
build-up of new projects, several of which repeated earlier transactions—ei-
ther the same type of project or with the same client—also caused contro-
versy. And in this context some in OCE were keener than their predeces-
sors to exert greater control over projects coming to the Board for approval. 
The issue of what new systemic impact projects provided became more 
difficult to explain for the more advanced countries, particularly in repeat 
projects. Such operations were increasingly common and the ratings provid-
ed by the economists often fell below bankers’ expectations. As bankers saw 
it, their operations fostered the transition process in various ways, mainly 
by helping a client to make competitive changes in difficult circumstances 
where reasonable financing terms were unavailable and local entrepreneurs 
still few and far between. Meanwhile, the economists wanted to see innova-
tive products and processes introduced and path-breaking market improve-
ments from changed behaviours and strengthened institutions. A wedge be-
gan to appear between the two perspectives, made worse by the fact that 
bankers used to writing their own scripts were subject to an ex ante indepen-
dent assessment of their efforts (and not simply one ex post from the Evalu-
ation Department). 
The new Chief Economist, Willem Buiter, an eminent Dutch-born 
Cambridge professor of international macroeconomics, participated regu-
larly in OpsCom following his arrival at the EBRD in 2000. Buiter was a 
formidable intellectual economist and combative character, unique in style, 
insightful and highly entertaining. He was regarded as something of a mav-
erick.38 His views on projects were often very direct or amusing. In one in-
38 Indeed, after leaving the EBRD he wrote a blog for the Financial Times entitled ‘Maverecon’.
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stance, according to EBRD economists present at the OpsCom meeting, he 
questioned a “nice” project, likening it to a “nice” chocolate pudding which 
nonetheless did not have any transition impact. Such metaphors clashed 
with bankers’ views on projects. The economists, however, were pleased that 
OCE’s position was represented with exceptional clarity and in a “no non-
sense” demeanour. 
When Lankes left the Bank for the IMF later in 2000, several months 
after Köhler’s rapid departure to become the new IMF Managing Direc-
tor, José Carbajo became the OCE director in charge of project assessment 
and submissions to OpsCom. As part of the work that had been set in train 
across the Bank on the portfolio approach, he developed a transition impact 
monitoring system (TIMS)39 with Buiter’s support to cover the transition 
dimensions of the stock of projects.40 
It was now possible to trace the path of a project’s transition impact per-
formance from beginning to end. The rating at the start, based on the con-
text, the project’s contribution and specific performance benchmarks—
say, “good” potential with “high” risks to delivery—could now be tracked 
through to a final result. If, say, after two years the project was on track, the 
transition risk rating might be adjusted down to “medium”, while if at the 
end some but not all objectives were met, the final impact rating might be 
recorded as “satisfactory”. (Risks at this stage would be “negligible”.) This 
meant it was possible to see both the position of transition impact ratings 
for new projects and how the existing stock of projects was faring, thus pro-
viding an overview of the whole of the EBRD’s activities under this dimen-
sion. There was now a metric for transition impact that could be discussed 
in a similar vein to profitability and risk, as targeted under the strategic ap-
proach to portfolio management. 
It was not long before a further change was made that had a signifi-
cant effect on behaviours and interactions between bankers and econo-
mists. This was the introduction of a corporate scorecard41 in 2001, which 
included among a number of targets a category for transition impact based 
on project scores. Initially, two-thirds of projects were required to be rated 
“good” or better. The target became more precise in due course—although 
39 Kjetl Tvedt, an economist in OCE, was also closely involved.
40 A full account of the system can be found in J. Carbajo and Z. Kominek, ‘Managing for Results: A decade 
of project-level impact assessment at the EBRD’, EBRD, 2010.
41 Thinking along the lines of a scorecard had been under consideration for a while. See Chapter 12. 
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never so tight that the EBRD was unable to meet it—and was integrated 
into bankers’ individual objectives and incentives. Over time, various refine-
ments were made to the scoring system, including the addition of a risk-
based version, expected transition impact, and a related target for progress 
in the portfolio. The principle of targeting transition impact as a core com-
ponent of the Bank’s performance (with a high weighting in the scorecard), 
and that of its bankers, has survived to the present day.
There still remained the question of how to achieve a suitable balance be-
tween transition impact, financial returns and risks as envisaged under the 
strategic approach to portfolio management. The potential conflict between 
transition impact, as espoused by economists, and financial returns, as sought 
by bankers, and risk, as focused on by credit officers, needed addressing. 
This was the job of OpsCom. The balance between financial risk and re-
turn was resolved very much in the same way as in commercial credit com-
mittees, namely through a process of negotiation to find a suitable tolerance 
level. On transition impact and returns, the picture was a little different. In 
most private-sector projects, there was little conflict between the objectives: 
restructuring a company to become profitable, for example, normally went 
hand-in-hand with strengthening its competitiveness or improving its cor-
porate governance (both of which were acceptable from a risk perspective). 
The exceptions were when subsidies, protection or exploiting monopo-
listic aspects of markets came into play and profitability (or the reduction 
of financial risk) was achieved by supporting market distortions. In pub-
lic-sector projects there would typically be alignment over tariff-setting im-
provements and similar conditions, but not when state market power was 
abused, where there was a lack of reform or when profits were made from 
supporting an unreformed state entity. 
Of course, at the margin a little more push for transition impact (for ex-
ample, via an extra covenant) might be traded for a little less risk-adjusted fi-
nancial return (the client might argue for reduced pricing). But the reality 
of most projects is that discrete elements apply and negotiations take place 
over many aspects, so such fine trade-offs were difficult to find. Where they 
were more likely to be found was at the early selection stage when projects 
chosen for their best commercial profile need not match those selected on 
transition grounds.
As the transition impact rating system bedded in, the competitive na-
ture of private-sector bankers inevitably began to permeate the system. 
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“Excellent” ratings were sought from the arbiters of transition impact, the 
economists, while “satisfactory” ones were often disputed. The indepen-
dent role of the Chief Economist meant the view on transition impact, like 
a legal opinion, could be challenged. Once a judgement was given, however, 
it could not be overturned. The “creative tension” between bankers seeking 
sign-off on their deals and economists eager to ensure they served the tran-
sition process well and were additional meant focused debates took place 
on nearly every project.
The practical needs and detailed project and local knowledge of the 
bankers became pitted against the wider, more conceptual perspective and 
methodologically consistent approach of the economists. Some bankers 
cynically complained that the economists were the “high priests of tran-
sition” while the economists saw the bankers as volume and deal-driven to 
the exclusion of anything else. The truth was different, as less excitable ob-
servers acknowledged. 
Bankers realised that the nature of the EBRD meant it was different 
from a purely commercial organisation and that they could not ignore the 
mandate. Close involvement with the sector economists on projects was the 
simplest way of understanding the transition dimensions better and getting 
help and buy-in. The economists for their part accepted that being based 
in EBRD’s London headquarters limited their understanding of require-
ments on the ground, the reality of trying to persuade clients to accept tran-
sition-related covenants (clients had far less understanding or patience on 
such matters than even the bankers), and the true difficulties of overcoming 
local constraints and making progress with the authorities.
Gradually, the economists became more embedded with Banking 
teams. The process of discussion of projects from their initiation to final re-
view between the two departments, and its evolution and learning by do-
ing, helped to form a real understanding of the nuts and bolts of transition 
impact and the ways in which the Bank could influence the process. As a 
result, a “transition impact culture” was fostered within the institution—
something that became apparent to new recruits within moments of their 
arrival.
The Board offered its own view on the transition impact judgement in 
projects and more often than not took the Chief Economist’s decision on 
this dimension as the correct interpretation—although this did not prevent 
Directors arguing with the ratings given to particular projects.
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7. A Coherent Business Model for a Private Sector-Driven  
Public Institution
Both the OpsCom exposure and that at the Board meant the language and 
sources of transition quickly became assimilated into bankers’ thinking. 
The consensus-driven nature of the OpsCom and Board discussions helped 
to avoid undue stand-offs and led to a better internal understanding of tran-
sition impact than might have been expected (notwithstanding many lively 
discussions and hotly contested arguments). For new bankers, used to diffi-
cult discussions at credit committees over the pricing and structure of their 
projects, it was a shock to be confronted with a similar committee question-
ing the value of their deal on the basis of whether it added anything from the 
transition impact point of view. They had to learn fast, and by and large did.
The establishment of “transition impact” as a core feature of the Bank 
and its activities took some time to become firmly embedded in the institu-
tion. Like many aspects of the EBRD’s persona, it evolved through a compet-
itive process within a collaborative context as the Bank grew and matured 
and sought to place itself among its IFI peers. The EBRD’s methodological 
approach reflected the fact that the Bank was serving a different purpose: 
establishing the transition to functioning markets as a commercially orient-
ed bank with limited donor funds, as opposed to improving social outcomes 
with donor support, guarantees and repeated capital replenishments. 
The debate about transition impact was largely an internal matter (al-
though discussed in publications such as the Transition Report). Nonethe-
less, its operationalisation was of significance, not only to the EBRD in 
driving it forward in a more focused and relevant way, but also because the 
institutional mechanism for incorporating this alternative currency to fi-
nancial returns carried wider implications, including for other organisa-
tions seeking to achieve multiple targets. The Bank found an effective way 
of squaring the two key purposes of the institution and embedding them on 
an equal footing in the conduct of its operations: on the one hand optimis-
ing its resources to deliver its mandate on transition, while on the other en-
suring it remained a financially sustainable enterprise. Assessment of transi-
tion impact implicitly provided a means to measure the rate of return to the 
public purse—its development capital—while profits after provisions could 
help to deliver an adequate rate of return on its financial capital.







On 17 August 1998, the Russian authorities announced a devaluation of the 
rouble, default on domestic debt obligations and a moratorium on the ser-
vicing of some hard-currency debt. A substantial acceleration of inflation, 
a breakdown in the payments system and a run on deposits followed. The 
stock market fell sharply, bond yields rose and financial markets became in-
operative. Confidence in Russia’s economy, markets and outlook suffered a 
severe blow. The macroeconomic situation was in danger of spiralling out of 
control, but the most immediate problem was the prospect of a collapse of 
the banking system.
As a major investor in Russia, and an advocate of reform, the EBRD was 
badly affected. Along with other IFIs active in Russia—principally the IMF, 
World Bank and IFC—and the European Commission, the EBRD set to 
work to find a solution. The IMF had only a month earlier approved new fi-
nancing of more than US$ 11 billion for Russia as part of an internation-
al bailout package, along with an additional US$ 4 billion from the World 
Bank, and had already disbursed a first tranche of US$ 4.8 billion.1 
Like many financial crises before and after, including the global financial 
meltdown 10 years later, the proximate cause—in this case heavy short-term 
government borrowing and a loss of investor confidence in the Russian gov-
ernment’s repayment capacity and ability to defend a fixed exchange rate—
was not the real reason for the failure. There had been inadequate structural 
1  US$ 0.8 billion was subsequently withheld after the Duma failed to pass critical reform measures. Interna-
tional Trade Reporter, 29 July 1998, p. 1328 cited in ‘The Russian Financial Crisis of 1998’, Congressional 
Research Service, 18 February 1999.
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reform in Russia, which both the EBRD and the IMF had made efforts to 
address, but in the run-up to the crash of 1998 the full extent of the problem 
was masked by market buoyancy. The real picture only really became clear 
to investors, including the EBRD, in the aftermath. 
2. Background to the Crisis
In the early years of Yeltsin’s presidency, high levels of inflation were fuelled 
by a substantial expansion of credit by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), 
which in turn financed the federal government’s persistently high budget 
deficit and supported inefficient enterprises. The situation was exacerbated 
by a widespread belief that credit expansion was needed to stimulate output 
following a sharp decline in production,2 as well as by an ongoing conflict 
between reformers seeking tight fiscal policies and their political opponents, 
and by interest groups and weak enterprises obtaining credits and subsidies. 
A stabilisation programme in 1995, backed by an IMF stand-by arrange-
ment (SBA) of around US$ 6.5 billion, brought the fiscal deficit down from 
more than 10 per cent of GDP to around 5 per cent. Monetary financing of 
the deficit was replaced by borrowing on international capital markets and 
via a newly created treasury bill market. Demand for this market’s prod-
ucts—short-term rouble notes (GKOs), and longer-dated bonds (OFZs)—
began to grow. The fiscal improvement resulted in upward nominal ex-
change rate pressure. Fearing a loss of competitiveness and possible sharp 
reversals in the rouble, the authorities introduced an exchange-rate band. 
Although in 1995 the government maintained its commitment to tight 
fiscal constraints, with budget deficits within prescribed parameters, it re-
mained short of money. Revenues were below projections, partly because 
enterprises with connections to the political elite received exemptions from 
tax payments. The hard-pressed government delayed expenditures by allow-
ing pension and wage arrears to build up and by failing to pay bills for goods 
and services. Compounding the problem, taxpayers, many of whom were 
owed money by the government, then withheld tax payments while well-
connected enterprises reduced their tax liabilities through exemptions and 
informal arrangements. 
2  John Odling-Smee, ‘The MF and Russia in the 1990s’, IMF Working Paper WP/04/155 2004, p. 7 and p. 35.
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A shortfall in revenues was also a factor behind the government’s deci-
sion in late 1995 to launch a loans-for-shares scheme, whereby banks con-
trolled by oligarchs made loans to the government using the security of un-
dervalued state assets and subsequently took possession of the assets when 
the government failed to repay the loans. These transactions, and the sup-
port given by the oligarch beneficiaries for Yeltsin’s campaign to be re-elect-
ed President in June 1996, extended the influence of a wealthy few on the 
banking sector, the economy and Russian public life. A non-transparent 
economy increasingly based on collusion, corruption and asset-stripping was 
poorly placed to handle the subsequent crisis. 
On the face of it, prospects improved in 1996 following Yeltsin’s re-elec-
tion. The monthly rate of inflation dropped to low single figures and the fall 
in output was finally slowing. (Output rose for the first time in eight years in 
1997.) Nevertheless the fiscal situation was not healthy. Spending commit-
ments had increased in the run-up to the election and interest rates had to 
be raised to keep the exchange rate within its band, adding to government 
interest payments. Revenues also suffered from the erosion of tax discipline 
as government payment arrears built up, reaching 3 per cent of GDP by the 
end of the year, and as politically influential oligarchs and those who had 
helped with Yeltsin’s re-election withheld tax payments. Significant inter-
governmental transfers, subsidies and devolution of revenue to regional gov-
ernments made matters worse.
 Investors had been reassured, however, by international financial arrange-
ments made in the run-up to the 1996 election: the approval of a three-year IMF 
Extended Financing Facility for Russia of more than US$ 10 billion in March 
1996 and an agreement with Paris Club creditors on Soviet debt a month later.3 
They were also comforted, after the election, by Yeltsin’s appointment of well-
known reformers Anatoly Chubais to run the Presidential Administration of-
fice and later Boris Nemtsov as first deputy prime minister. Combined with 
an improving economic outlook, this encouraged financial markets to believe 
a turning point had been reached in Russia’s transition similar to those seen in 
central European countries a few years earlier. The world had also been experi-
encing a boom in financial markets on the back of deregulation and emerging 
markets, including Russia, had been caught up in the exuberance. 
3  The Paris Club group of creditors reached an agreement on the treatment of US$ 40 billion former Soviet 
Union debt on 29 April 1996. 
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In the year following Yeltsin’s election the dollar-denominated RTS stock 
index, which had been established in September 1995, more than tripled in 
value.4 The euphoria was also seen in the Russian domestic government bond 
market, where yields fell sharply and whose market value rose from around 
3.5 per cent of GDP to 8.2 per cent during the course of 1996. In November, 
the government issued its first US$ 1 billion eurobond. Encouraged by the 
easing of capital controls, foreign investors snapped up both foreign currency 
and rouble-denominated Russian debt. By the end of 1997, foreigners held an 
estimated 33 per cent of the stock of GKOs and OFZs.5 Towards the end of 
the year the stock of GKOs and OFZs exceeded rouble deposits in the bank-
ing system. Both of these indicators should have been a warning sign.
Global investors’ enthusiasm for emerging markets came to a halt, how-
ever, in the second half of 1997 following widespread devaluations and falls 
in stock market indices in Asia and subsequent sharp declines in output. 
Fears of contagion to other markets spread rapidly and prompted a flight to 
quality. Russia was caught up in the mayhem as nervous investors reassessed 
the scale of fiscal risks, the weaknesses in the banking system and the di-
minishing prospects of structural reform. The shock to financial confidence 
around the world also hit commodity prices. Oil prices, which formed the 
backbone of the Russian economy, crashed between 1997 and 19986, add-
ing to Russia’s woes. In March 1998, veteran Prime Minister Victor Cher-
nomyrdin was replaced by 35-year-old Sergei Kiriyenko, a reformer who had 
less clout in the conservative administration. 
One of the first casualties of investors’ loss of confidence was the Rus-
sian stock market. The RTS index fell from a high of 672 on 6 October 1997 
to a low of 39 exactly a year later. By May 1998, yields on GKOs had risen 
to over 50 per cent, more than double the level seen in 1997, and were on a 
steep upward trajectory, while the central bank’s refinancing rate hit 150 per 
cent later that month. Foreign banks became increasingly reluctant to refi-
nance maturing loans to Russian banks. With their substantial share and 
treasury bill portfolios plunging in value, local banks were forced to make 
4  The RTS index rose from sound 150 in July 1996 to just above 500 in July 1997.
5  Annex 1.1 on The Russian Crisis by Rory MacFarquhar from Transition Report 1998. 
6  See Robert Mabro, ‘The Oil Price Crisis of 1998’. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1998. https://www.
oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/SP10-TheOilPriceCrisisof1998-RMabro-1998. 
The price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) fell from a high of US$ 39.0 per barrel in January 1997 to 
US$ 17.6 per barrel by November 1998.
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margin calls. The government struggled to find buyers for weekly auctions 
of around US$ 1 billion in treasury bills, while foreign reserves diminished 
rapidly as capital flight accelerated. Wage and payment arrears increased and 
rising interest rates began to hit enterprises and production. 
By July 1998, an emergency package of new loans worth around US$ 17 
billion had been agreed with the IMF and the World Bank, with additional 
funding provided by Japan. Despite the rapid deployment of US$ 4.8 billion 
of IMF funds to bolster foreign exchange reserves, however, the situation 
continued to deteriorate. In late August, the CBR announced it had spent 
almost US$ 9 billion of reserves to protect the exchange rate, and almost 
US$ 2 billion in the first two weeks of August alone.7 Several banks were 
close to default and the CBR pumped liquidity into the system to keep them 
afloat, but the funds quickly found their way onto the currency markets.8
The crunch came on 17 August, when the government announced dras-
tic measures to try to stabilise the situation. The existing exchange rate re-
gime was replaced with a floating rate within an expanded corridor from 
6.0 to 9.5 roubles to the dollar.9 All GKOs and OFZs maturing in 1998 and 
1999 were to be restructured, and a 90-day moratorium was imposed on 
payments by commercial banks to foreign creditors. Within two days of the 
default, the rouble had fallen by well over 10 per cent and the stock market 
by even more. On 2 September, the government moved to a fully floating ex-
change rate and by the end of the month the rouble had lost more than 60 
per cent of its value against the dollar. 
3. Tokobank: a Case Study
Like the markets, the EBRD had been slow to appreciate the extent of the 
problems building in the Russian economy. Its country portfolio had been 
growing rapidly, rising more than threefold between 1994 and 1997 to close 
to €2.5 billion. Annual business volume peaked in 1996 at €840 million, but 
even in 1997 reached €730 million. The pace of equity investment was also 
maintained during this period, including purchases of stakes in banks. A sig-
7  Congressional Research Service, 1999, p. 4. 
8  Annex 1.1, Transition Report 1998.
9  From its previous corridor of 5.27 to 7.13 roubles to the dollar.
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nificant investment in Avtobank in early 1997 was followed by a subscription 
to a capital increase in October. The following month, the Bank continued to 
pursue a stake in Inkombank, then Russia’s second largest private bank, even 
though the principal strategic western investor had dropped out.10 
The EBRD also had a significant holding in Tokobank, in which it had 
invested in 1994. The transaction was the first major foreign equity invest-
ment in a Russian bank and was aimed at supporting the development of the 
sector. The Bank had initially discussed providing a credit line to Tokobank, 
but in 1993 proposed instead to take an equity stake of 10–15 per cent. The 
purchase took place the following year as part of the Financial Institutions 
Development Programme (FIDP), an initiative launched by the EBRD and 
World Bank to strengthen a core group of Russian commercial banks.
With relatively few commercially-oriented banks with scalable lending 
capacity and plausible management in Russia at the time, Tokobank was a 
logical target. It was the country’s fourteenth-largest bank by total assets, 
relatively new but growing fast and well-capitalised. It was also widely rec-
ognised for the strength of its senior management team, most of whom were 
in their forties, professionally trained abroad and professed commitment to 
achieving Western banking standards. 
Behind the veneer, however, were some less attractive features. The bank 
was a predominantly wholesale foreign-currency operation whose rouble 
business was limited and weak. It provided short-term loans and foreign 
currency services mostly to medium and large-sized companies in the en-
ergy sector. Loan portfolio concentration and related-party lending were 
high. Eleven borrowers accounted for around 80 per cent of Tokobank’s for-
eign-currency loans while 46 per cent of total lending was to the bank’s own 
shareholders, who received preferential pricing on their loans. Capitalisa-
tion was strong, with equity amounting to 37.5 per cent of end-1993 assets, 
but strong competition for deposits led to an increasing reliance on the in-
terbank market and medium-sized banks for funding. 
In the nascent Russian banking system, Tokobank’s financial situation 
was not unusual. Nonetheless, when the project came to the Board in Septem-
ber 1994, questions were raised over the size of the equity investment and the 
fact that Tokobank had paid a dividend the previous year despite making a 
10 The hope was to find a new strategic investor that the EBRD could support so the investment was scaled 
back with a larger amount made contingent on this outcome.
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loss. These concerns were mitigated by the proposed exit arrangements, which 
included a put option. The equity participation was approved by the Board. 
Despite Tokobank’s accreditation under the FIDP and rapid growth in 
its loan book over the next two years, its financial situation was weak when 
the EBRD extended a credit line to it in late 1996. The bank was still heav-
ily dependent on foreign-currency lending and funding from the interbank 
market. It was loss-making, in part because of the impact of substantial tax-
es, and continued to conduct much of its business with related parties. 
In 1997, Tokobank’s finances deteriorated further. Oil prices had been 
falling since the start of the year and metals prices followed from the sum-
mer onwards, putting pressure on the earnings of the bank’s main clients. 
Funding foreign-currency activity via the interbank market became more 
difficult as rising concerns over Russian debt prompted foreign banks to 
pull back from the market. By February 1998, Russian banks were refus-
ing to lend to Tokobank and the CBR put it into temporary administration. 
An investigation of Tokobank’s books uncovered “a tangle of insider loans, 
fictive collaterals and suspicious transfers of funds to offshore accounts”. 11 
By July, known bad loans and trading losses topped US$ 500 million. The 
EBRD now decided to exercise a put option and exit Tokobank. 
The EBRD’s response to the evolving situation was being watched close-
ly in Russia and elsewhere. There were also concerns that if the Bank chose 
to exit at a time of stress, its ability to play a catalytic role in support of other 
banks in the future would be damaged. There were suggestions too that cor-
porate governance principles had been compromised by other investors not 
being informed of the existence of the put option.
The strongest feelings stirred up were over the proposition that the 
EBRD had been secretive about writing the put option in in the first place. 
According to one account:
The concealment of the put option by the EBRD left many investors dis-
mayed. One Moscow banker bitterly said of the EBRD, ‘First the EBRD 
gave its stamp of approval but it didn’t do its homework. Then it tried to es-
cape from the sinking ship, letting the others drown.’12
11 Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 94,
12 Filippo Ippolito, ‘The Banking Sector in Russia’, Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, 
BOFIT no. 12, December 2002.
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This was unfair. The Share Purchase Agreement, which included the put 
option, had been approved at an Extraordinary General Meeting of Toko-
bank. Major shareholders were aware the put option was under consider-
ation and that the Bank was working with the CBR to find a strategic inves-
tor to rescue the bank. The EBRD’s advice was that, in the absence of such 
an investor, an orderly and transparent liquidation would be the best solu-
tion. OpsCom decided in February to exercise the put but held off in May 
in response to a request from the CBR. The decision was reconfirmed in July 
should the rescue attempt fail. 
Attempts to find a buyer failed and the CBR revoked Tokobank’s licence 
just before the banking crisis in August. At this point, the EBRD intended 
to play an active role in the liquidation process as a creditor. The first meet-
ing of the Creditors’ Committee took place in October but hopes of an eq-
uitable resolution were quickly dashed. 
The foreign creditors, who were owed more than US$ 300 million, ex-
pected to hold a majority of seats on the Creditors’ Committee and to se-
lect the liquidator. When it came to the vote on the composition of the com-
mittee, however, their ballots were declared invalid and four of the seven 
seats went to a group of Russian companies holding only 20 per cent of To-
kobank’s debt. Among the creditors voting were five offshore companies 
affiliated with Mikhail Zhivilo, the President of ZAO Metal Investment 
Co, which alleged claims of more than US $200 million against Tokobank. 
These were disputed by the bank’s former management and foreign cred-
itors. The liquidator selected had also worked for Mr Zhivilo. Although a 
Moscow arbitration court later ruled the claims invalid, the committee and 
the liquidator were left unchanged. Some foreign members of the commit-
tee—Dresdner Bank, Bank Austria and the IFC—subsequently boycotted 
meetings because their Russian co-members blocked discussion of the off-
shore companies.
In April 1999, Andrew Higgins reported in The Wall Street Journal:
Almost half a year later, a few [creditors] still hope, but many have given up. 
Instead of an orderly liquidation, the test case has become a brawl in which 
some of the West’s premier financial institutions have been muscled aside 
by a cluster of Russian companies linked to a 32-year-old Moscow metals 
trader. The battle has featured bogus credit claims, murky offshore compa-
nies and menacing phone calls. One thing it hasn’t had much of is money.
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The EBRD recovered nothing from either the put option or its loan to 
Tokobank and its stakes were entirely written off in 1999. David Hexter, who 
as EBRD’s head of financial institutions bore the brunt of the onslaught on 
the Russian banking portfolio, described the Tokobank experience as “not a 
happy episode for sure”. The Bank also had to write off its equity investment 
in Inkombank, the third-largest retail bank in Russia, which had its licence 
revoked by the CBR in October 1998. In the case of the Bank’s other large 
equity investment, in Avtobank, a mostly wholesale bank, provisions were 
made when it became illiquid following the debt moratorium on govern-
ment securities. However, it was a large, systemically important bank and 
not insolvent and after restructuring continued to operate. 
4. The Consequences for the EBRD
Investments in the banking sector were not the EBRD’s only concern in 
Russia in 1998. When the crisis erupted in August, it became apparent that 
all the Bank’s projects were potentially in jeopardy. Not only was the bank-
ing sector in crisis but the payments system had broken down, disrupting 
money flows between entities. An immediate full-scale stress-test of the 
Russia portfolio by the Banking and Credit Departments was put in hand. 
Clients were contacted to get a better understanding of their situation and 
a preliminary review of sensitive projects was available by early September. 
At the end of August, the EBRD’s Russian portfolio stood at close to 
ECU 3 billion or around 27 per cent of the total. Disbursements were just 
over half this level, although a similar percentage of the total. About one-
fifth of signed projects by value were sovereign and presumed safe, while al-
most another one-fifth had been classified as impaired prior to the crisis. 
More than 40 per cent of the non-sovereign portfolio, amounting to near-
ly ECU 1 billion, was with banks. Apart from the financial sector, the big-
gest exposures were in the oil and gas and automotive sectors (Sakhalin Oil, 
KomiArctic Oil, Unified Gas, Kamaz and GAZ, amounting to over ECU 
400 million).
When the news broke, on August 17, most people were away on sum-
mer vacation. Fortunately, key staff in the EBRD’s Moscow office were 
not. There was a lot at stake for the Bank, not only the threat to its own 
portfolio but also, as lender of record, to B loan commitments of close to 
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US$ 1 billion. Lawyers and others in the Resident Office, who had been 
working closely with the authorities on withholding tax issues, immediately 
contacted their counterparts in the CBR and relevant ministries to explain 
the consequences facing the Bank and associated investors. The quick ac-
tion resulted in a formal confirmation two days later, signed by the first dep-
uty minister of finance and central bank governor, that the EBRD and com-
mercial participants in its loans would be exempt from the moratorium on 
foreign debt repayments. In effect, this affirmed the EBRD’s preferred cred-
itor status and a recognition by Russia of its role as a member of the insti-
tution. According to Doyle, “This [action] was critical to our survival … we 
were only seven years old. If the Russians had defaulted on us we would have 
been the development bank that failed.” Some days later, a similar statement 
was issued in relation to the World Bank and IFC. 
As the crisis unfolded, the Bank advised that it would suspend further 
disbursements to its clients pending clarification of the situation. The swift-
ly issued exemption suggested the EBRD would be expected to continue 
making disbursements to Russian clients. But in a series of letters and vis-
its by senior officials to Moscow during the following month—including 
Horst Köhler, who took over as President in September—the Bank point-
ed out that the breakdown in the payments system meant many clients were 
unable to access funds held in illiquid banks, in order to make scheduled 
payments to the Bank (of which some US$ 300 million was due within six 
months), and there was no guarantee that any disbursements by the Bank 
would reach the intended beneficiaries.
A further consequence of the financial problems in Russia was the risk of 
contagion to neighbouring countries of operations, either directly through 
trade and financial relationships or through a global economic slowdown. 
This would also have a negative impact on the EBRD’s projects, although it 
would be mitigated by the fact that most of the portfolio in these countries 
was under sovereign guarantee. Economic analysis conducted by the Bank 
showed that Belarus and Moldova were most exposed to the trade chan-
nel, and that the impact could be severe, while Latvia was most at risk from 
its exposure to Russian assets (GKOs represented more than 10 per cent of 
banking system assets). Resident Offices were surveyed for their views and 
generally concurred with the assessment, adding Ukraine to the list of coun-
tries most likely to suffer due to a parallel sharp hryvnia devaluation and 
drying up of liquidity.
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The immediate impact on the Bank’s financial position was severe. Ste-
ven Kaempfer, the EBRD’s Vice President Finance, announced at a press 
conference on 9 September that additional provisions of ECU 180 million 
would be taken in the third quarter, raising provisioning for Russia to ECU 
330 million or almost half the total for the Bank. He estimated that the 
EBRD would show a loss of ECU 150 million for the year. Fortunately, the 
Treasury Department had sold its holdings of GKOs in advance of the cri-
sis. Nevertheless, eventual total losses in 1998 amounted to ECU 261 mil-
lion on the back of provisioning of ECU 553 million, which reduced the 
Bank’s reserves to a negative ECU 160 million. 
With ECU 5 billion of members’ equity and ECU 20 billion of autho-
rised capital, there was no threat to the viability of the Bank. Nor, despite 
the poor results, did the rating agencies downgrade the EBRD’s triple-A 
borrower status. Nonetheless, the situation was worrisome and the Bank 
took steps to address the issues. 
5. Efforts to Assist
The Russian financial crisis coincided with an interregnum between de 
Larosière’s departure in January and Köhler’s arrival on 1 September. Dur-
ing that time, the Bank was in effect run by the banking department, dom-
inated by the financial institutions group, which had grown rapidly in the 
previous years to account for more than one third of the portfolio. The new 
President’s first task was to formulate a strategic response to the Russian fi-
nancial crisis. 
Köhler was in many respects well qualified for the Presidency. A former 
head of the German Federal Ministry of Finance, he had served as a G7 Dep-
uty and Sherpa and played a central role in supervising the Treuhandanstalt, 
the institution responsible for privatising assets in the GDR. He was also the 
first President with direct ties to the former communist bloc, having been 
born in Poland and lived in his early years near Leipzig in Eastern Germany.
One week after his arrival, with the Russian crisis uppermost in every-
one’s mind, Köhler emphasised the need for careful risk management but 
noted there was no need to retreat from activities in Russia since the EBRD, 
through its long-term investment strategy, could contribute to stabilising 
confidence in the country. The approach was broadly accepted, along with 
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concerns to maintain support to SMEs and to continue to coordinate close-
ly with the Russian authorities and the G7, the IMF, the World Bank and 
the European Commission.
Bi-weekly Board meetings over the following two months considered the 
ramifications of the crisis on Russia, the EBRD and its region of operations. 
There was relief that a government had been formed and confidence that the 
authorities were moving in the right direction, even if there was likely to be 
more state intervention going forward. However, progress in tackling insol-
vencies and the restructuring of the banking sector was slow and the legal 
framework for business remained inadequate. A contraction of the econo-
my of 4–6 per cent was now expected.13 Many foreign banks were reducing 
their presence and in some cases considering withdrawal. 
The EBRD’s response to the crisis was to provide emergency support to 
existing clients in the form of working capital, technical assistance and trade 
finance14 during the period when the payments system was impaired. Even 
when this was normalised, however, the operating environment remained 
challenging. The drop in collateral values and an increase in compulsory for-
eign exchange surrender requirements deterred investment. There was little 
the Bank could do to reinvigorate foreign investors’ appetite for Russia. The 
EBRD’s investments in Russia, which had been running at around ECU 54 
million per month before the crisis, dropped abruptly to just over ECU 16 
million and remained at that level until the end of 1999.15 Activities were fo-
cused on managing the RVFs, where 11 small deals averaging ECU 1.6 mil-
lion apiece were signed in the last five months of 1998 and a further eight in 
the first half of 1999. 
The Bank made major efforts to maintain loans to small businesses. At 
the time of the crisis, the RSBF involved 13 partner banks covering 23 re-
gions, 6,500 sub-loans and a US$ 100 million portfolio. With these banks 
insolvent or under threat of failure, the first task was to assign sub-loan port-
folios to a safer home. This was achieved by converting the Russian Project 
13 The outturn for GDP was a fall of 5.3 per cent. The EBRD’s forecast at the time was a fall of 5.0 per cent, 
Transition Report 1998.
14 The Ministry of Finance agreed to divert some of the FIDP funds for a US$ 50 million trade-facilitation 
project deploying revolving short-term credits to selected Russian banks on a non-recourse or sovereign-
guaranteed basis.
15 Business volume in Russia in 1998 totalled ECU 541 million, with ECU 74 million signed between mid-
August and the end of the year. The total for 1999 was ECU 64 million with ECU 99 million signed by the 
end of June. 
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Finance Bank (RPFB), which had been set up by the EBRD in 1992 and in 
which it had a 35 per cent stake, into the Small Business Credit Bank (KMB) 
and assigning the portfolios to this bank. The original Russian shareholders 
of the RPFB were bought out and replaced with international investors—
the Soros Economic Development Fund, DEG and Triodos Bank—while 
the EBRD retained its 35 per cent stake. Credit advisers focused on recov-
eries from the assigned portfolios and the amounts obtained were collected 
by KMB. At the same time, RSBF-trained staff from the failed banks were 
hired by KMB to support new lending. The EBRD also worked with the 
largest bank, Sberbank, which survived the crisis thanks to its state own-
ership, universal coverage and market dominance. Subsequent lending—
which typically consisted of much smaller, micro-level loans than before the 
crisis—was largely shared between these two banks. Three surviving region-
al banks were also involved, although on a very small scale. 
 New lending more or less stopped while the programme was being re-es-
tablished but began to pick up slowly through 1999, gathering speed from 
the summer onwards. However, the EBRD encountered serious problems in 
recovering loans it had accelerated at some major RSBF partner banks and, 
in some cases, the related sub-loan portfolios. 
In the case of the RSBF, the assigned sub-loan portfolio quality proved 
to be high, with sub-borrowers showing greater responsibility than many of 
their larger or less carefully screened peers. By March 2001, the Bank esti-
mated that the repayment rate for the RSBF was close to 99 per cent, with 
losses amounting to just US$ 5 million out of a total of US$ 564 million dis-
bursed to sub-borrowers.16 The same could not be said of the six main part-
ner banks involved. By the same juncture, recoveries amounted to just under 
50 per cent,17 leading to a loss of US$ 37 million on borrowed funds. 
 During this episode, the CBR took little action in the first few months 
of the crisis and had no clear policy on insolvent banks. The opaque na-
ture of its decision-making processes made it difficult to assess default risks 
at partner banks. It had failed to stem the practice of asset-stripping via 
“bridge” banks that had begun even before the crisis. The transfer of valu-
able assets abroad or to other legal entities took place on a vast scale under 
its stewardship. In many cases, entire branches of insolvent banks, includ-
16 The Bank had originally expected recoveries of 50 per cent.
17 In the case of one bank the recovery rate was 100 per cent. 
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ing their customers and employees, were taken over by a new entity run by 
the former management of bankrupt banks. A number of dubious practic-
es were also used against the EBRD during the work-out process. One in-
stance, which led to a series of court cases and appeals, involved a US$ 13.4 
million sub-loan via SBS-Agro to Runicom, a subsidiary of Sibneft, where 
the borrower claimed that the amount had already been repaid. These court 
proceedings were eventually settled in 2018. 
At a higher level, efforts were made by the Bank together with the IMF 
and World Bank to provide advice to the CBR and Russian ministry of fi-
nance on restructuring the banking sector. A joint paper advocated a move 
towards a banking system based on a core group of competitive private 
banks. The IMF and World Bank were also instrumental in setting up the 
Agency for Restructuring Credit Organisations (ARCO)18, 19, which was 
created in 1999 to restructure Russia’s banks. 
Other hurdles included bureaucratic delays, the need for improved leg-
islation (particularly an effective law on the bankruptcy of banks) and poor 
protection of the interests of depositors and creditors. Nonetheless, the Bank 
worked with the European Commission to provide technical assistance to 
the CBR programme on bank restructuring, including support for resolu-
tion teams in individual banks and for upgrading regional central banks. It 
also engaged with the authorities on legislative improvements, again in full 
coordination with the European Commission, IMF and World Bank. 
6. Implications for Business Plans
Following a Board workshop in November 1998, the EBRD set out its near-
term plans in Russia which fed into preparations for a new country strate-
gy.20 The crisis had clearly dampened earlier enthusiasm for Russian projects 
and instilled a significant degree of caution. 
18 ARCO began operations in late March 1999, helping banks requesting assistance on a volunteer basis, and 
obtained legal powers to impose restructurings on banks from mid-July 1999. See ‘Restructuring the Rus-
sian Banking System’, by Marina Chekurova, Chapter 9 in ‘Financial Transition in Europe and Central 
Asia: Challenges of the New Decade’, L. Bokros, A. Flemming and C. Votava, World Bank, 2001.
19 The Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee for Banking Sector Development in Russia (ICC) was also im-
portant in the aftermath of the crisis. 
20 This was eventually issued in 2000 and emphasised the need to restore confidence and credibility in the 
Russian economy, which the Bank’s projects and policy dialogue would support.
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The uncertainties over the economic and financial outlook at the time 
made it easy to decide to reduce activities in Russia substantially. An empha-
sis was placed on selectivity and “quality projects”. Only transactions meet-
ing very high standards for transition (including the integrity of clients) and 
sound banking were to be considered. 
The Bank resolved to pay more attention to the systemic stability and ef-
fective regulation of the banking system when evaluating and monitoring 
financial sector projects. The balance between risk and return was re-eval-
uated, resulting in a shift towards more and better security, shorter maturi-
ties, and more demanding conditions and covenants. Greater attention was 
to be given to projects earning foreign exchange and those replacing imports 
or mainly dependent on domestic inputs. 
Developing effective economic governance at the regional level and sup-
porting reform-minded regions was also identified as a priority. Suggested 
ways to achieve this included the development of municipal and environ-
mental infrastructure designed to encourage decentralisation of the financ-
ing and provision of local services and commercialisation of local utilities. 
The revised approach was supplemented by a joint working group with 
the European Commission to enhance coordination initiatives in areas in-
cluding: institutional strengthening of the CBR (covering supervision, ac-
counting, licencing and bankruptcy) and two systemically important com-
mercial banks; trade and working capital finance; and improvements to the 
investment climate (covering insolvency, standards of corporate governance, 
bankruptcy and capital markets).
7. Lessons Learned
Although the EBRD suffered a serious financial blow as a result of the 1998 fi-
nancial crisis in Russia, it was not long-lasting and the Bank returned to prof-
it the following year. Similarly, the Russian economy confounded expecta-
tions and rebounded strongly and quickly. GDP rose by 6.4 per cent in 1999, 
the current account moved sharply into surplus and foreign exchange reserves 
were rebuilt. The strong macroeconomic performance reflected the impact of 
the large (40 per cent) real rouble depreciation in the fourth quarter of 1998, 
which stimulated import-substitution, but also a recovery in world oil pric-
es. By early 1999, imports were around half their pre-crisis level and non-oil 
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exports were growing strongly. The fiscal position was also transformed and 
moved towards overall balance, showing a primary surplus in 1999. 
 The Russian authorities failed, however, to take advantage of the situa-
tion to advance structural reforms, especially in the moribund banking sec-
tor. Partly this reflected the fact that the financial sector was not truly criti-
cal to the basic functioning of an economy that largely operated on a system 
of barter, arrears and various forms of non-intermediated finance.21 Finan-
cial intermediation in Russia remained very low by international standards,22 
which muted the impact of the crisis, and the distorted structure of an econ-
omy dominated by natural resources and industrial oligopolies meant nor-
mal bank financing of investment was limited. Many banks effectively acted 
as managers of the treasury operations of their large corporate shareholders, 
offering a ready source of liquidity and loans when required. Intermediation 
services to the general public and especially to the real economy via SMEs 
was small. The EBRD had believed it could help redress the balance by sup-
porting the modernisation of financial institutions and lending to the real 
economy via the RSBF. 
The Bank devoted its next Transition Report to a thorough analysis of the 
financial sector in transition23 and a Board workshop in January 1999 also 
looked at some of the lessons. The most important was that, while the Bank 
had been aware of the weakness of institutions throughout its involvement 
and in its investments in Russia, it had insufficiently considered the deeper 
implications of the risks and had underestimated the probabilities of down-
side scenarios. Underpinning these lessons was the realisation that poor cor-
porate governance (particularly in relation to the rights of minority share-
holders, creditors and depositors), inadequate regulation and supervision, 
inadequate laws on bankruptcy and insolvency and an inability to rely on 
the effective application of the rule of law needed much closer attention in 
less-developed transition economies such as Russia. 
While the EBRD had rightly moved since 1993 from being an institu-
tion focused on public-sector operations and foreign-sponsored projects in 
21 Estimates of barter ranged from 50 per cent of sales of medium-sized enterprises to 75 per cent of large com-
panies. See ‘Have Car, Need Briefs? In Russia Barter is back’, by Ellen Barry, New York Times, 7 February 
2009.
22 Domestic credit by banks to GDP was less than 30 per cent compared with around 100 per cent in more 
developed economies, Transition Report 1998, p. 93. Deposits to GDP were around 10 per cent, again very 
low, F. Ippolito (2002).
23 Transition Report 1998, EBRD.
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central Europe to one with a wider portfolio of projects across the whole re-
gion and a predominantly private-sector orientation, including an empha-
sis on financial institutions and local companies, its focus on the specifics of 
projects meant it failed to put sufficient stress on institution-building or the 
investment climate and the systemic risks they entailed.
These ideas were echoed in 2001 by Nick Stern, EBRD’s former Chief 
Economist, in a lecture on the first decade of transition. 
It has … become clear that the political and economic transitions are intri-
cately intertwined and that political support for reforms is vital for their 
success. The Russian crisis of 1998 embodies all these lessons. Before the cri-
sis, Russia had developed into an economy of striking contrasts. Banks trad-
ed sophisticated financial derivatives but were virtually unable to attract or-
dinary household deposits. Trading on the stock market reached volumes 
of over US$ 100 million per day but shareholders were often unable to exer-
cise their most basic rights. Vast financial-industrial groups were created to 
promote synergies between banks and large-scale enterprises, while an ever-
increasing number of firms resorted to barter to stay afloat. The self-styled 
‘oligarchs’ in command of these groups amassed substantial fortunes but 
left their workers and the state with a mushrooming backlog of wage and 
tax arrears … investors in search of quick profits did not think sufficiently 
carefully about the depth of the underlying structural problems.
Stern concluded:
Perhaps the most important lesson from the Russian crisis and the first de-
cade of transition has been that free trade and private ownership will not 
by themselves bring well-functioning markets, and that market-support-
ing institutions are fundamental … Markets, if they are to function well, 
need a state with the strength to regulate responsibly, tax effectively and 
provide its people with basic services, including the rule of law. This much 
should have been obvious to us all.24
24 Nick Stern, ‘Challenges for the Next Decade of Transition’, paper presented at an IMF Conference, 1–3 
February 1999. Reproduced in O. Havrylyshyn and S.M. Nsouli (eds.), A Decade of Transition: Achieve-




Recovery, Growth, and Graduation
Introduction
The impact of the 1998 Russian crisis on the EBRD had been swift and 
dramatic. The slow but steady build-up of operational capacity and business 
volume orchestrated under de Larosière’s leadership had run into problems. 
Barely had the first signs of positive returns on shareholders’ equity emerged 
than the Bank faced a significant loss. It was a rude awakening and a formi-
dable challenge for de Larosière’s successor, Horst Köhler, who arrived at the 
Bank just two weeks after the crisis broke. 
The immediate prospect for business with Russia and many other coun-
tries of operations strongly affected by the crisis was grim. Real output in Rus-
sia fell by more than 6 per cent in the third quarter of 1998 alone, leaving it 
almost 10 per cent lower that at the end of 1997. While the retreat of commer-
cial finance from the region had increased the need for support for transition, 
the EBRD could not ignore the principles of sound banking. The priority for 
Köhler was therefore to stabilise the Bank and take stock of the situation. 
1. Revitalising the Contours of the Bank: ‘Moving Transition Forward’
When the 1998 crisis hit, Russia accounted for more than one-quarter of 
the Bank’s portfolio of more than €10 billion. While below Russia’s share of 
GDP in the EBRD’s region, this indicated the scale of the problem facing 
the Bank. Russia had contributed significantly to the net loss of €261 mil-
lion in 1998. The Board and the new President agreed to hold off on new 
project approvals in Russia and review the Bank’s strategy. 
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A series of discussions with the Board took place, including a retreat in 
January 1999, which resulted in a new paper outlining the path ahead, en-
titled ‘Moving Transition Forward: Operational Priorities for the Medium 
Term’.1 In looking back over the previous period there were many positive 
achievements that could be acknowledged: the support for the private sec-
tor, liberalisation and privatisation, reaching local enterprises, providing eq-
uity, a portfolio of more than €10 billion, and operations and Resident Of-
fices in each of the 26 countries of operations. The paper summarised how 
the Bank saw itself: 
The Operational Priorities of 1994 have stood the test of time and the Bank 
has delivered on them … [The Bank] is recognised in the region and beyond 
as a strong and credible partner and catalyst for the transition process… 
For the region as a whole the achievements in economic and political 
transition have been remarkable. New democratic regimes have shown re-
silience … In most countries, well over half the output is generated in the 
private sector. The prospect of a return to a command economy is now re-
mote. But the experience of countries has differed strongly. Those that have 
shown sustained and effective commitment to reform are seeing the returns 
in terms of growth, investment and new enterprises, whereas those that have 
been unwilling or unable to develop this commitment have been more vul-
nerable to setback and crisis, as occurred in 1998 in parts of the region.
At the same time the lessons from this experience could not be ignored: 
The transition will inevitably be a complex, demanding and lengthy pro-
cess … a key lesson is that the transition requires greater attention and 
commitment to creating strong institutions ... and underpinned by an ac-
ceptable social framework.
Nor could the Russia episode be airbrushed out of the picture: 
With hindsight the probabilities of adverse scenarios were underestimat-
ed. And the Bank should have examined more rigorously how it could 
 
1  ‘Moving Transition Forward: Operational Priorities for the Medium Term’, 22 March 1999. 
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have used its influence and its project activities to help overcome the insti-
tutional problems which were a major factor in generating the crisis.2
The paper highlighted the importance of focusing on project quality 
throughout the Bank’s work and paying closer attention to the quality of 
its project partners. Also highlighted was the need to take a more balanced 
approach to its project portfolio. In particular, projects were to be managed 
to pursue transition impact while balancing risks, returns and costs. Oper-
ational priorities among products, sectors and country activities had to be 
chosen in such a way as to safeguard the financial viability of the EBRD; 
only a financially stable Bank was able to foster transition successfully. 
The Bank needed a quality asset-earning base and to manage its portfolio 
through the full project cycle. 
 The operational priorities were not fundamentally different from those 
in the strategy formulated by de Larosière five years earlier. They emphasised 
the importance of the financial sector (with an increased focus on sound 
regulation), SMEs, restructuring of large industrial enterprises for demon-
stration effects, equity, use of the full range of financial structures for infra-
structure (private, sovereign, non-sovereign and PPPs), and the need for a 
sound investment climate and strengthened institutions.
Recovery from the Russian crisis
In the event, the Russian economy recovered much faster than expected. 
The Transition Report in 19983 had forecast GDP growth of -7.0 per cent for 
1999 and the Bank’s Annual Report published in March 1999 predicted that 
“capital outflows from countries with weaker fundamentals, such as Roma-
nia, Russia and Ukraine, are unlikely to turn around in the near future”. 
Ironically, it was at just this point that conditions were starting to improve. 
In 1999, GDP in Russia increased by a remarkable 6.4 per cent. 
More accurate forecasts would, however, have been unlikely to make 
much difference to operational activity. Around half of the Bank’s indus-
trial projects in Russia were in workout situations, and problematic proj-
ects accounted for 30 per cent of its overall portfolio, despite the decent 
2  Ibid.
3  EBRD Transition Report 1998, ‘Financial sector in transition’, October 1998, p. 68.
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performance of sovereign and sub-sovereign loans. The priority was to pro-
tect and salvage existing projects, and unwind heavy provisions as far as 
possible. 
A further consequence of the crisis, reflecting a change in demand and 
investor perceptions, was the large number of cancellations, amounting to 
more than €900 million in 1998 and 1999. Foreign strategic investors also 
retreated and the EBRD was more wary than ever of joining forces with 
new or unknown domestic Russian clients. Project approvals slumped from 
more than €1 billion in 1997 to around €200 million in 1999. Business vol-
ume, measured by new signings, similarly dropped to one-fifth of pre-cri-
sis levels. Annual business investment in Russia in 1999 was €164 million—
a mere 7.5 per cent of the Bank’s total business, down from 36 per cent and 
32.5 per cent, respectively, in 1996 and 1997.
Despite the setbacks and the lowest overall business volume in four 
years, the EBRD managed to record a small net profit of €43 million in 
1999, while the portfolio crept up to close to €11 billion. Almost as soon as 
prospects started to brighten, Köhler received an invitation to become the 
IMF’s Managing Director. By the spring of 2000, after a tenure of one and 
a half years, he departed for Washington DC and Frank once again stepped 
in as acting President. However, this time it was not long before the EBRD’s 
fourth President was ensconced in Exchange Square. Jean Lemierre, previ-
ously head of the Trésor and a G7 Deputy, was destined to match the ten-
ures of his predecessors as President put together.  
Corporate scorecard
During his brief period in office, Köhler had maintained the austerity re-
gime long in place at the EBRD, as well as backing a zero-base budgeting 
(ZBB) exercise designed to raise efficiency and productivity that had been 
launched before his arrival. A further budget consultation was undertak-
en in 2000, which resulted in the introduction of a corporate scorecard that 
would allow the Board, as the representatives of shareholders, to hold the 
President and his senior staff to account for the Bank’s performance. 
Designed to address concerns about insufficient accountability, the cor-
porate scorecard had been imported from the private sector, where it was 
used to enable companies to balance short and medium-term corporate ob-
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jectives4. It was hoped the scorecard would provide a focus for performance, 
align the organisation along key objectives and improve communication 
with stakeholders. Other IFIs, notably the IFC, were considering similar 
ideas at the time. 
Based on the priorities identified in ‘Moving Transition Forward’, the 
corporate scorecard was built around four areas: transition, operational per-
formance, financial performance and organisational performance. The re-
cently introduced rating system for projects, which measured expected tran-
sition impact and portfolio transition impact, provided the basis for the first 
component, along with related policy, legal and investment climate work. 
Standard metrics of annual business volume, disbursements and level of im-
paired assets covered the operational dimension. Overall profit/loss was the 
measure for financial performance while a range of organisational indica-
tors—client satisfaction, employee motivation, process efficiency or specific 
organisational process targets—was suggested for the last area. 
The corporate scorecard was applied in the 2001 budget-setting exercise 
and formally introduced for the first time that year. It has remained a fea-
ture of the EBRD’s budgeting and incentive system ever since, with the staff 
bonus pool depending on performance against the targets set in the score-
card. Specific targets have changed over time but not the basic structure of 
the four categories.
2. The Second Capital Resources Review, 2001–2005
Agreeing the operational priorities for the forthcoming period was a prelude 
to the bigger exercise of the next capital review, to cover the period 2001 to 
2005, which was due to be agreed by Governors at the EBRD 2001 Annu-
al Meeting. Apart from a failure to build reserves, owing to the 1998 crisis, 
the track record of the previous period was respectable. The Bank’s portfolio 
had doubled between 1995 and 2000 to just over €12 billion,5 while operat-
4  ‘Business schools had moved in this direction, influenced by the seminal publication ‘The Balanced Score-
card: Translating Strategy into Action’ by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, Harvard Business School 
Press, 1996. As a performance management tool it fitted the needs of the Bank well.
5  This was just over €1 billion lower than projected and at the bottom of the 10 per cent range set, mainly due 
to a slowing in the level of new business volume between 1998 and 2000 and a rise in cancellations and re-
payments in 1998 and 1999.
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ing assets had grown in line with projections. As a proportion of the portfo-
lio they now stood at 62 per cent, compared with just 25 per cent at the end 
of 1994, bringing the EBRD more in line with its sister IFIs. This was de-
scribed as the Bank having “reached a mature portfolio stage … within a pe-
riod of less than ten years”.6
A transition impact retrospective exercise showed the EBRD had been 
more effective in achieving transition goals where the environment was re-
ceptive to market-oriented change. A country and sector analysis found that 
it had been particularly successful, after taking into account the limitations 
of local operating environments, in Bulgaria and Romania but also in Po-
land, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also showed 
that, by the end of 2000, the EBRD was associated with almost US$ 12 bil-
lion of FDI in the region, close to 10 per cent of cumulative FDI into tran-
sition economies between 1991 and 2000. The biggest shares were in south-
eastern Europe and southern CIS, where the EBRD was associated with 
nearly 20 per cent and 15 per cent of cumulative FDI, respectively. 
Geographically, there had been a proportionate shift away from advanced 
transition countries. In central Europe and the Baltics, investment contin-
ued to grow from a high level, albeit slowly, while the extent of the shift away 
from advanced countries was moderated by the tailing off of activities in 
Russia towards the end of the decade. The share of business activity going to 
early and intermediate transition countries increased markedly. Equity in-
vestments in these markets had risen to 23 per cent of the total by 2000 from 
15 per cent in 1994. On the cost side, general administration expenses had 
declined in real terms, including three years of zero nominal budget growth. 
Aside from equity valuations and provisions, net income from interest, fees 
and dividends was growing respectably as the portfolio expanded.
This backdrop presented a solid base for the next five years. Business vol-
ume had been growing on average at 4–5 per cent a year. The resources re-
view anticipated a modest ramp-up in the pace of activity to 5–6 per cent 
a year, leading to annual business volume of €3.4 billion by 2005, up from 
€2.7 billion in 2000. Within the total, however, there were some sharp con-
trasts. Little increase in annual volume in advanced countries was expect-
ed, while in early and intermediate countries it was forecast to rise by a 
6  ‘Report of the Board of Directors to the Board of Governors on the Capital Resources Review’, 22 Febru-
ary 2001.
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one-quarter and almost double in Russia, albeit from a low base.7 The shift 
in composition implied the Bank’s portfolio was heading east. By 2005, it 
was anticipated that two-thirds of the portfolio would consist of projects 
in early and intermediate countries plus Russia, in contrast to one-half 10 
years earlier.
The rapid rise in the overall portfolio, which crossed the pre-capital in-
crease statutory capital limit of €10 billion in 1998, justified the earlier in-
crease of the Bank’s capital. Projections to 2005 also showed a healthy rise in 
capital utilisation, but not one that breached the 90 per cent prudential trig-
ger limit. Headroom of 17 per cent at the end of the period, even allowing 
for higher risk scenarios, implied the Bank could continue to grow its busi-
ness without recourse to shareholders for a further capital call. 
The return to profitability was factored in, with a small build-up of re-
serves of around €1 billion forecast by 2005.8 This was well below the 10 per 
cent level of authorised capital stock (now €20 billion) that under Article 36 
of the AEB opened up the possibility of a distribution of net income. The 
Governors agreed to the plan at their meeting in London in May 2001.
3. South and East: Membership Issues in the Western Balkans and Mongolia
 
Western Balkans
Under Lemierre’s leadership, the EBRD sought to move towards the less ad-
vanced countries in the eastern part of its region, from Ukraine and Belar-
us to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
One region where it had been especially difficult to develop operations so far 
was in the south: the Western Balkans.
Following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1991, the region descended into crisis and war. The largest remnant of 
the SFRY, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montene-
gro), was not recognised by the UN or the IMF, and as such could not be-
come a member of the EBRD. While the Bank was able to work with other 
7  Even measured against the previous peak years of 1996 and 1997, the projected increase was around 50 per cent. 
8  The introduction of IAS39, an updated accounting treatment, meant unrealised equity gains from listed eq-
uity investments were incorporated in the figures from 2001 onwards. 
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successor states, especially Croatia and Slovenia, and helped with the recon-
struction of Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1996, the situation on the ground 
precluded most types of normal business involving central Western Balkan 
countries until the later part of the 1990s. 
Kosovo
The crisis in Kosovo in 1999 further complicated matters, particularly for 
the three countries of operations most affected by the crisis: Albania, FYR 
Macedonia9 and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a small portfolio of around 
€300 million had been built up. The EBRD stepped up its engagement with 
efforts to support the region by the European Commission, EIB, World 
Bank and IFC. The EBRD contributed extensively to the political discus-
sions taking place in relation to the Western Balkans, including the Stabili-
ty Pact for South Eastern Europe. 
The crisis prompted the EBRD to put forward a Balkan Region Action 
Plan, as well as one for Kosovo, where the Bank had been one of the first in-
ternational organisations on the ground after the war ended in June 1999 (a 
mission was conducted in July). It was also a platform from which to seek 
donor funds for future investment. The highly risky nature of projects in 
the region (and limits on exposure) implied an extensive need for grants and 
concessionary funds to expand activity. A Special Fund, the Balkan Region 
Action Fund, was advanced as a route towards this goal.
The difficult situation called for unusual measures. Kosovo was still part 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and thus was not a member 
of the EBRD at the time. The Bank’s lawyers10 concluded that the Board, 
through its interpretative powers under Article 57, could in exceptional cir-
cumstances authorise the use of cooperation agreements or funds in non-
member countries, as long as this was broadly compatible with the Bank’s 
core purposes and functions under Articles 1 and 2. Kosovo’s circumstanc-
es clearly matched the transition purposes of the Bank, while the political 
mandate aspects were covered by UN Council Resolution 1244 and the 
presence of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
which held broad powers over the territory.
9  From 2019, FYR Macedonia became North Macedonia.
10 The EBRD’s General Counsel at the time was Emmanuel Maurice. 
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The EBRD thus initially had to adopt indirect measures in Kosovo in-
stead of committing its own resources or Special Funds. It managed this by 
mobilising bilateral funding and extending cross-border projects from near-
by countries, namely the Micro-Enterprise Bank of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina and the Albanian Reconstruction Equity Fund. When FRY succeeded 
in becoming a member of the EBRD in January 2001,11 the Bank was able 
to expand its activities and commit its own resources in Kosovo. A Resident 
Office was officially opened in Pristina in March 2001.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
FRY’s membership also prompted a series of activities under another Ac-
tion Plan, this one being the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—2001 Action 
Plan’. These included three “quick start” operations: the establishment of a 
micro enterprise bank to offer trade finance guarantees and lines of credit to 
private banks; a Yugoslav SME Facility; and a Working Capital Framework 
Facility for export-oriented companies undertaking corporate governance 
reforms. A Resident Office was also opened in Belgrade in 2001. 
FRY changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003. 
Montenegro subsequently declared independence in June 2006 (following 
a referendum in May 2006) and became a member in its own right, after a 
Resolution was passed by the Governors. (The Republic of Serbia became 
the legal continuation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and re-
mained a recipient member of the EBRD.)
Mongolia
Mongolia became interested in joining the EBRD towards the end of 
the 1990s but did not broach the subject formally until September 1999, 
when the Prime Minister wrote to the Chair of the Board of Governors to 
sound out members’ views on a potential application. In anticipation of this 
 
11 FRY applied for membership on 15 November 2000 and a draft Directors’ report and Resolution to Gov-
ernors was submitted to the Board on 16 November 2000 with votes by Governors to be received by 13 De-
cember. FRY received 9,350 shares (4,675 shares of the original capital stock plus 4,675 from the general cap-
ital increase) or 36.52 per cent of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s shareholding. ‘Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia—EBRD Membership’, 16 November 2000.
320
After the Berlin Wall
request, the Bank had in July considered both the question of membership 
and Mongolia’s status as a possible recipient country. 
Membership was relatively straightforward since Mongolia was a mem-
ber of the IMF and qualified as a non-European country under Article 3, 
paragraph 1(i). As a wholly new member, there was potentially a question 
over shares. However, as a small and poor country, Mongolia was expected 
to be allocated 200 shares, less than 0.01 per cent of the total capital stock, 
which carried no implications of any consequence for other members and 
did not affect the EC’s overall majority.
Mongolia formally applied to become a member of the EBRD on 30 
March 2000, with a request that procedures be completed in time for the 
Bank’s Annual Meeting in Riga. Since the voting period for Governors was 
30 days and lead times for circulation of documents to the Board of Direc-
tors were typically long, this was a demanding schedule. Nonetheless, there 
was goodwill to make the effort, and Governors approved the admission of 
Mongolia as a member on 3 May 2000. Unfortunately, Mongolia was un-
able to complete domestic legal procedures in time to meet the conditions 
precedent to membership ahead of the Annual Meeting. A short extension 
was granted and Mongolia satisfied the conditions to become a member on 
9 October 2000. 
The issue of recipient status was more complicated. As Mongolia was nei-
ther a central and eastern European country nor had it previously been part 
of a recipient country of the EBRD, it was not eligible as a country of op-
erations under the existing AEB. The expression “Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries”, cited in Articles 1 and 2, was deemed to cover solely the 
territory of the existing or former socialist republics in central and eastern 
Europe, including the entire Soviet Union.12 This was an important ruling 
since the amendment of Article 1 to include Mongolia in the Bank’s region 
of operations required the unanimous agreement of all members, not sim-
ply a qualified majority.
Although Mongolia had not been part of the Soviet Union, it had been 
a socialist state. It had introduced a multiparty system and a new constitu-
tion in 1992 and moved towards a market economy. As a land-locked coun-
12 Summary Explanation, attached to the draft Resolution in ‘Letter to Governors—Report of the Board of 
Directors and draft Resolution on the acceptance of Mongolia as a country of operations of the Bank’, 19 
December 2003. 
321
Part III  Chapter 12
try in Central Asia bordering Russia, and heavily dependent on it, Mongo-
lia was in many ways a natural fit for the Bank. Directors decided in 2001 
that Mongolia was in the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union and 
faced similar difficulties to other countries of operations in transition. It was 
agreed that technical assistance could be provided through a Mongolia Co-
operation Fund. 
Two years later, on 22 July 2003, the Prime Minister of Mongolia wrote 
to Lemierre asking for help:
We believe that the ‘EBRD country of operations’ status has an impor-
tant role for overcoming difficulties encountered by our people in their 
bid for democracy, development of market economy and promotion of pri-
vate sector.
Although some Directors were concerned with the precedent that a 
change to the AEB might set and wanted the language to be as narrow as 
possible, and others worried about the legal procedures, there was no sub-
stantive disagreement on admitting Mongolia as a recipient country. By De-
cember, the method and language of the change in the AEB had been set-
tled. A simple change was proposed to Article 1, where the geographic reach 
of the EBRD was described in the paragraph on the Bank’s remit. Two sen-
tences were added:
The purpose of the Bank may also be carried out in Mongolia subject to 
the same conditions. Accordingly, any reference in this Agreement and 
its annexes to ‘Central and Eastern European countries’, ‘countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe’, ‘recipient country (or countries)’ or ‘recipient 
member country (or countries)’ shall refer to Mongolia as well.13
Mongolia was recommended as a country of operations to the Board of 
Governors, along with the proposed Resolution language. To proceed to the 
next stage without a Governors’ meeting, votes from at least two-thirds of 
[From before—may sound odd but it requires both two-thirds, i.e. of votes 
and voting-power] Governors representing not less than two-thirds of to-
tal voting power were required, with a deadline set for 30 January 2004. 
13 ‘Letter to Governors’, 2003, p. 2.
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The subsequent procedure, however, required that all members accept the 
proposed agreement and take legal steps to deposit an instrument of accep-
tance executed by a competent person or body with the Bank. This process, 
involving government and in some cases parliamentary approval, was time-
consuming. It took until October 2006 before Mongolia was finally granted 
recipient status and the EBRD was able to begin ordinary operations there.
4. A Troublesome Trio: Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
The early 2000s saw an acceleration of Bank activity in early and interme-
diate transition countries. This group comprised the range of countries 
in Central Asia, eastern Europe, the Caucasus and south-eastern Europe. 
Overall business volume for this group increased from an average of around 
€1 billion a year in the late 1990s to €1.5 billion by 2003. 
There were multiple reasons for the rise of activity in more challenging 
markets. Strategically, the EBRD was intensifying its efforts in these regions 
and was beginning to see some results from its persistence in advocating lib-
eralisation and structural reforms. Rising political stability, supported by 
the peace process in south-eastern Europe and preparatory efforts in rela-
tion to EU accession in Romania and Bulgaria, was a contributing factor, 
as were improvements in the macroeconomic backdrop. Several ETCs were 
experiencing double-digit growth rates, while others experienced high and 
steady growth outside the range of their previous experience. Even Ukraine, 
after a decade of falling output in which the economy more than halved, fi-
nally turned the corner in 2000 with its first year of positive GDP growth 
in the post-Soviet era. 
Against this backdrop, successive Annual Meetings were uplifting af-
fairs. The EBRD was able to point to record business volumes and genuine 
inroads into areas that shareholders had been pressing the Bank to pursue. 
“Eastern Europe outperforms global economy in 2001” declared an EBRD 
press release at the Annual Meeting in Bucharest in 2002.14 In 2003, anoth-
er press release noted that the EBRD region “continues to outperform the 
global economy” and “net capital inflows reached [another high] reflecting 
14 ‘Eastern Europe outperforms global economy in 2001’, Ben Atkins, EBRD Press Release No. 44, 14 May 
2002.
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stability and reform in many of the transition countries”.15 The Business Fo-
rum for the 2003 Meeting was titled “Coming of Age: opportunities of an 
evolving region” and introduced a series of panel sessions with the sentence: 
In the thirteen years since their markets opened and democracy was born, 
the countries of the EBRD region are entering their next phase of develop-
ment, still growing, but striking out in new directions.16 
The new decade offered reasons for optimism that the process of “catch 
up” with western standards and GDP levels might now be spreading outward 
from advanced transition countries. Nevertheless, not all was rosy across the 
EBRD’s region. Troublesome issues persisted on the political front in a num-
ber of countries, notably Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Questions 
arose over their compliance with Article 1, particularly in the eyes of human 
rights organisations and other NGOs and CSOs that monitored political 
and democratic freedoms in the Bank’s countries of operations. These ques-
tions went to the heart of the EBRD’s political mandate.
Belarus
In the case of Belarus, concerns had been raised through the course of the 
1990s over its compliance with Article 1. The Board was required to review 
operations and compliance with the purposes of the Bank annually (under 
Article 11, paragraph 2(i)) for each recipient country. A full strategy for Be-
larus was approved in 1995, but due to increasing concerns over the reform 
process it was replaced with an interim strategy in 1996. The EBRD argued 
that the lack of progress limited its ability to find suitable projects and con-
strained the size of its programme.
The new approach outlined two scenarios, a Base Case and a High Case, 
with both limited to 12 months before review. The High Case, which would 
allow the Bank to be more active, was conditional on the Belarusian gov-
ernment adopting more market-oriented policies. At the same time, de 
Larosière wrote to the Belarusian Prime Minister, Mikhail Chigir, to ex-
15 ‘EBRD region continues to outperform global economy’, Jazz Singh, EBRD Press Release No. 48, 22 April 
2003. 
16 Press briefing pack, Annual Meeting 2003.
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plain Directors’ concerns about the economic and political situation in Be-
larus, the very slow pace of reforms, and the frequency with which decrees 
and proposals inconsistent with market economics were brought forward. 
He rejected the Prime Minister’s request that the EBRD adopt the High 
Case, but left open the possibility of doing so if the environment became 
more conducive to investment.
A controversial national referendum on amendments to the Belarusian 
Constitution in November 1996 led to a substantial redistribution of for-
mal political powers to the Belarusian President, Aleksandr Lukashenko. 
In parallel, there was a serious deterioration in the protection of basic polit-
ical freedoms through restrictions on public assembly and trade union ac-
tivity and control of the media. The reaction of the international communi-
ty was strongly negative. De Larosière wrote to Lukashenko in January 1997 
to register the Bank’s concerns. The strategy was then tightened to accom-
modate three cases: Base, Intermediate and High. The Base Case was re-
stricted solely to those operations which directly promoted the private sec-
tor. The High Case was dependent on satisfactory implementation of IMF 
and World Bank policy conditions and real progress in resolving the polit-
ical concerns.
Renewed strategies in 1999 and 2001 continued to express serious con-
cerns, which were also set out in a further letter from Lemierre to Lukashen-
ko in 2001. Following the Belarusian presidential elections on 9 September 
2001, which were agreed to have been seriously flawed, management held a 
workshop with the Board to review the situation. Some Directors argued on 
the basis of the International Limited Election Observation Mission (IL-
EOM) assessment17 that the EBRD should remain engaged with Belarus to 
lend tangible support to grassroots democratisation and that isolation of the 
country would be counterproductive. Others felt that the Bank’s credibility 
was at stake and the only option was to have recourse to the Governors un-
der Article 8.3. At a further workshop in January 2002, there was agreement 
that it was essential to follow up Lemierre’s letter and that Governors should 
be informed of the Bank’s concerns and approach. 
17 The ILEOM concluded: “The 2001 presidential election process failed to meet the OSCE commitments 
for democratic elections…; welcomes and acknowledges the emergence of a pluralist civil society…; [and 
notes] the isolation of the country is not in the best interest of the Belarus people and is not conducive to 
strengthening democratic development.” Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 2001 Presi-
dential Elections in the Republic of Belarus, ILEOM, 10 September 2001, Minsk, p.3.
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After receiving advice from the General Counsel on Article 8, it was ac-
cepted that the “scenario” approach should continue and a revised strategy 
was prepared. This proposed a Baseline scenario focused on lines of cred-
it to SMEs, trade finance, and limited direct investments in local and for-
eign-owned private companies. It included a set of political and economic 
benchmarks agreed by the international community to determine wheth-
er the EBRD would provide any further support on a project-by-project ba-
sis. A Regular scenario, under which “normal operations” would resume if 
sufficient progress was made in demonstrating commitment to democratic 
principles, replaced the High Case. The President duly wrote to the Gover-
nors explaining the rationale for the Bank’s scenario approach and seeking 
their endorsement. 
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan was another difficult case which became more prominent in 
the early 2000s. De Larosière had written to President Saparmurat Niyazov 
in 1997 to draw attention to the Board’s concerns with the patchy progress 
of economic and political reforms. In 1999, a strategy was sent to the Board 
late in the year for discussion in January. It focused on lending to SMEs and 
microbusinesses, mobilisation of private and foreign investment (including 
in the oil and gas sector), and the only outstanding public-sector project (the 
rehabilitation of the general cargo, dry bulk and ferry terminals at Turk-
menbashi port on the Caspian Sea). The only other public project, a road op-
eration, had been cancelled due to the failure of the government to raise fuel 
duties, which were among the lowest in the world.
Almost before the ink was dry, Niyazov used his firm grip on power to 
announce on 28 December that he would extend his term of office indef-
initely. In response, the Board in April adopted a scenario-based country 
strategy for Turkmenistan, comprising Base, Intermediate and High Cases. 
The Base Case focused exclusively on private-sector development. A follow-
up mission was also arranged to take stock of the situation on the ground 
and convey the underlying message of the strategy to the government.
An EBRD delegation, led by Frank as FVP and including three Board 
Directors, visited Ashgabat on 11 to 13 April 2000. Niyazov, however, can-
celled the scheduled meeting, prompting Frank to comment: “The Presi-
dent’s refusal even to discuss the question of political reform suggests that 
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the Government of Turkmenistan is not committed to one of the basic prin-
ciples upon which the EBRD was founded.”18 The Directors concluded that 
the limited strategy was well-judged and appropriate but that the Bank’s le-
verage in Turkmenistan was limited.
The situation was no better a year later when the strategy once more came 
under review. If anything, it had deteriorated. The Bank had been obliged 
to stop disbursements of its SME credit line because of the government’s in-
creased restrictions on access to foreign exchange. The EBRD decided to fo-
cus on managing its existing projects and urged the Turkmen authorities to 
improve human rights conditions and pluralism and strengthen democratic 
institutions. It also encouraged improvement of the efficiency of the foreign 
exchange reserve fund, the removal of unfair restrictions on sub-borrowers 
of the Bank’s SME line on access to foreign exchange, and increased trans-
parency and availability of statistical data.19 Lemierre wrote once again to 
Niyazov on 16 July 2001, drawing his attention to Directors’ “grave concerns 
about the state of democracy and the lagging pace of political and economic 
transition in Turkmenistan”.20 The letter was copied to Governors, decided 
by the Board with reference to Article 8.3, and was published on the EBRD 
website under the Public Information Policy.
One year later, there was still no evidence of improvement, and the polit-
ical and economic benchmarks that had been set had all been failed, save for 
a small improvement in the availability of economic information. The strat-
egy adopted a graduated response with, as in the case of Belarus, the Base-
line, Intermediate and Regular scenarios.21 The Base Case was seen as the 
best possible outcome, and Lemierre again wrote to Governors explaining 
the situation and the Bank’s approach.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan, like its Central Asian neighbour, suffered from a slow pace of 
reform. A poor, double-landlocked country, it faced challenges from Islam-
ic extremists in the south and drug-trafficking from Afghanistan in the 
18 ‘EBRD registers concern over political and economic developments in Turkmenistan’, EBRD Press Re-
lease, 19 April 2000. 
19 ‘Strategy for Turkmenistan, Update’, 23 July 2001.
20 ‘Letter to Governors - President’s letter to President Niymazov of Turkmenistan’, 1 August 2001.
21 ‘Strategy for Turkmenistan’, 12 July 2002.
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east, and was beset by weak institutions. Nonetheless, some progress on 
transition had been made during the 1990s. By the start of 2002, Uzbeki-
stan was the second-biggest recipient of the Bank’s investment in Central 
Asia after Kazakhstan, with country investments amounting to just over 
€500 million. 
A two-year strategy was produced in March 2003, shortly ahead of the 
EBRD’s Annual Meeting in Tashkent. As with Belarus and Turkmenistan, 
it listed a series of political and economic benchmarks, and was subject to 
a progress review at 12 months. It did not, however, include a “scenario ap-
proach” or rule out projects with the public sector, although it stated that 
the scope for new investments was limited. The need for intensive policy di-
alogue with the Uzbek authorities over the future course of political and 
economic reform was emphasised. The Bank hoped that the Annual Meet-
ing would be a forum for open debate and that, by facilitating a public de-
bate, Uzbek authorities would achieve a better understanding of the costs of 
their policies for their own people and for Central Asia as a whole.22
The strategy drew attention in particular to human rights concerns as 
reported by various organisations, such as “documented cases of torture in 
prisons and places of detention, religious persecution of independent Mus-
lims, cases of persecution of human rights defenders … and violations of the 
freedom of the media”. It also referenced reports of the continuation of the 
Soviet-era practice of compulsory mobilisation of students and schoolchil-
dren to help with the cotton harvest.23 
Appropriate as it was to document and present the situation as accurately 
as possible, it appeared to be a confrontational opening gambit to an Annu-
al Meeting where many hundreds of officials, civil society activists and busi-
ness people from the region and beyond would be gathered. Lemierre and 
several Governors had, however, been under pressure to justify the decision 
to hold the meeting in Uzbekistan. As The Economist reported, in the run-
up to the meeting: 
The EBRD’s choice of venue has been heavily criticised [on the basis that] 
Uzbekistan’s government is one of the most repressive in the region, with 
over 6,500 religious and political prisoners and no opposition or press free-
22 ‘Strategy for Uzbekistan’, 14 March 2003.
23 ‘Strategy for Uzbekistan’, 2003, pp. 44–45.
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dom to speak of. So the EBRD has been at pains to state that holding the 
meeting in Tashkent was not an endorsement of the government’s policies 
… The bank also hoped that holding the meeting in Uzbekistan would re-
sult in more openness.24 
At the Meeting, Uzbek President Islam Karimov took the floor first, as 
host, to address the assembled company, surrounded by the presidents of 
neighbouring Central Asian countries: Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakh-
stan, Askar Akayev of the Kyrgyz Republic, Emomali Rahmon of Tajiki-
stan, as well as Edward Schevernazde, President of Georgia. EBRD Gov-
ernors from many other countries were present. The opening session was 
broadcast live on local television, a novelty negotiated by the Bank as part of 
a campaign for greater openness and transparency, and in keeping with its 
recently upgraded Public Information Policy. 
Karimov’s speech eulogised reforms undertaken by Uzbekistan and its 
“renewal of society”, the importance of the EBRD and its investments to 
the country’s development, the problems facing the region, especially those 
caused by war in Afghanistan and terrorism, and the geopolitical signifi-
cance of resources in Central Asia and the Caucasus. While he spoke of the 
role of NGOs and CSOs in “countering bureaucratic abuse of power and 
corruption”, he made no mention of human rights.
The Chair of Governors, the UK Development Minister Clare Short, 
used her opening speech to deliver a strong and critical message on Uzbeki-
stan’s record:
There are particular concerns regarding Uzbekistan about lack of respect 
for religious freedom, the prevalence of torture and the failure of the judi-
cial system to protect the rights of the citizen ... We are deeply concerned 
by [the Special Rapporteur’s] conclusion that torture is systematic ... Mr 
President, I urge you to take this report very seriously...25
Lemierre, who spoke next, followed suit: 
24 ‘Freedom for a day: a breath of fresh air in a repressive land’, The Economist, 8 May 2003.
25 Opening Statement by Ms Clare Short, Chair of the Board of Governors, Tashkent, 4 May 2003, Proceed-
ings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, p. 21. The UN Special Rapporteur on tor-
ture, Theo van Boven, reported to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in February 2003. 
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We have listened to your statement and to your words, President Karimov, 
with expectation … They were strong words, but some of us may have ex-
pected words on human rights and on economic progress.26
It did not go down well. According to one report at the time:
This amounted to a public scolding of President Karimov’s broken prom-
ise, and it did not go unnoticed. As Lemierre and Short delivered their 
critical speeches, President Karimov removed his headphones and demon-
stratively covered his ears.27
At the conclusion of the meeting, Lemierre and Short again support-
ed the EBRD’s decision to hold the event in Tashkent and argued that an 
open, critical dialogue had been useful. Many Governors too were pleased 
that the Bank and its strategy had challenged Uzbekistan to make more ef-
forts to secure its transition path. Karimov, however, was outraged at what 
he saw as his humiliation in front of his counterparts from Central Asia and 
beyond. EBRD business with Uzbekistan subsequently shuddered to a halt. 
It was not until 2017, almost a decade and a half later, that relations with 
the EBRD were re-established following Karimov’s death the previous year. 
5. The Early Transition Countries Initiative
The 2003 Tashkent Annual Meeting had been a bruising experience for the 
EBRD and especially for Lemierre. The overall message of openness, dia-
logue, investment and change that had lain behind the event was, howev-
er, entirely in keeping with the Bank’s philosophy. Its investment approach 
followed an open and transparent process focused on how to make projects 
work better for the EBRD and its clients. Likewise, the Board and manage-
ment discussions were, in the main, about finding a consensus that worked 
for all. What applied internally was consistently applied externally. 
26 Opening Statement by Mr Jean Lemierre, President of the EBRD, Tashkent, 4 May 2003, Proceedings of 
the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, p. 23.
27 ‘EBRD Meeting in Tashkent Turns into Scrutiny of Host Government’s Abysmal Rights Record’, Human 
Rights Watch, 4-5 May 2003, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/uzbekistan.
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Ultimately, the EBRD was a very pragmatic investment institution able 
to look for long-term, sustainable solutions. It had run into trouble in Uz-
bekistan. But by adopting this approach the Bank had successfully helped 
most countries move up the transition path. Those that opened up and 
sought to learn from best practices, reformed their economic, political and 
governance structures to create a more attractive investment climate, and at-
tracted capital from foreign investors had made the most progress.28 
After more than a decade of transition, the countries of central Europe 
were making especially fast progress in converging with their western neigh-
bours. The gap between the region and the less advanced transition coun-
tries, however, was growing. One broad grouping—Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—were 
among those having the most trouble in making progress. It was felt that 
these ETCs needed extra help and attention. They were also the poorest 
countries of the EBRD region at the time, with a large part of their popula-
tions living below the poverty line.
Annual EBRD investments to ETCs began to decline in the early 
2000s, from some €200 million excluding oil and gas-related projects in 
2000 to around €100 million by 2002, reflecting the difficulty of invest-
ment in these countries. They suffered from political and economic insta-
bility, slow progress in transition, small domestic markets, underdeveloped 
local infrastructure, limited access to global export markets, poor gover-
nance, weak financial intermediation and low levels of foreign investment. 
In addition, they had not attracted the same attention from donors as the 
Western Balkans, where the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was 
helping to garner support.
Concerns with social progress were a preoccupation of some Board mem-
bers. Surveys had shown increasing unhappiness with the results of transition. 
Long years of declining output and lost jobs, even when the position was being 
reversed, had created disappointments and left scars. While some individuals 
in CIS countries had amassed grotesque fortunes, much of the rest of the pop-
ulation had been left behind. Some Directors were therefore raising the ques-
tion of whether the Bank should do more to alleviate poverty in ETCs. The 
28 See for example, ‘Progress and patterns in transition’, Chapter 2 in ‘Ten years of transition’, Transition Re-
port 1999, EBRD; and ‘Progress in transition and the link to growth’, Chapter 1 in ‘Infrastructure’, Tran-
sition Report 2004, EBRD.
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proposed shift to the east brought the issue into a sharper focus as the EBRD 
began to tread the more conventional development ground of MDBs.
The more challenging climate of countries further east meant an intensive 
dialogue was needed to improve the conditions for investment, along with 
considerable capacity-building and work on legal underpinnings by the legal 
transition team. Some ETCs were heavily indebted and required concession-
al finance under IMF rules. Donors recognised that additional support would 
be required for the Bank to tackle these countries’ problems effectively and 
support poverty alleviation. At the same time, the development of low-income 
countries and poverty reduction were much more readily accessible goals for 
development departments and their ministers than the concept of transition. 
This made it easier to drum up donor resources for these countries.
Towards the end of 2003, Michael McCulloch, an experienced senior of-
ficial at the Department for International Development (DfID) and for-
mer UK Director at the EBRD, was invited to conduct an independent re-
view to see what might be done to strengthen the Bank’s engagement with 
ETCs. His conclusion was that the Bank’s model should be adapted and 
supplemented to deal with their particular circumstances. A Bank-wide 
framework was recommended to provide an umbrella under which various 
activities—and implicitly increased donor funding and support from oth-
er IFIs—could be coordinated.29 This would draw more attention to their 
plight and offer a focal point for efforts to improve their situation. 
McCulloch’s report led to the idea of an initiative specifically for ETCs. 
The suggestion, and its timing, also provided a valuable counterpoint to the 
imminent accession to the EU of eight of the EBRD’s countries of opera-
tions. Building a viable business in poorer countries, even if it took time and 
extra donor funds, at a time when business in advanced countries was easing 
off, made sense to some shareholders. With central European countries close 
to completing the transition phase, there would thus still be a future for the 
Bank, albeit a different and potentially a more mainstream development one. 
Some Directors believed that intensified efforts in these countries would not 
only be justified in themselves but would also help to persuade their govern-
ments that the EBRD could be restructured and remain relevant. 
In April 2004, at the Annual Meeting in London, the EBRD launched 
the Early Transition Countries Initiative (ETCI). Its premise was that the 
29 ‘A Revised Approach and Action Plan for Early Transition Countries’, 17 March 2004.
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Bank would take on higher risks and devote more resources and staff in the 
field to the seven countries30—in a context where transition returns for suc-
cessful projects would be substantial—in exchange for increased availability 
and predictability of (additional) donor support. To ensure the full support 
of the Banking Department, the initiative was coordinated via a dedicat-
ed ETCI team with an Advisory Board chaired by the FVP, then Noreen 
Doyle, and a target for the number of ETC deals was set in bankers’ annu-
al performance scorecards. A new multi-donor fund was proposed to sup-
port the initiative.
The aim of the ETCI was to treble the number of operations (excluding 
those in the oil and gas sectors) signed annually in the ETCs within three 
years and to increase the volume of business by at least 50 per cent in that 
time. As well as microlending programmes and other funding to commer-
cial banks and microfinance institutions, the initiative comprised three fa-
cilities: the Direct Investment Facility (DIF), which provided equity-type 
investments; the Direct Lending Facility, which provided direct loans of up 
to €4 million to enterprises unable to access finance through the local bank-
ing sector; and the Medium-sized Co-Finance Facility (MCFF), which pro-
vided co-finance to help local banks fund enterprises requiring larger loans.
After a number of discussions with donors and other IFIs, the ETC 
Multi-Donor Fund was set up and held its first Assembly meeting on 22 
November 2004.31
The success of the initiative exceeded expectations. The number of annual 
projects signed in ETCs quadrupled by the end of 2006 and annual business 
volume increased to almost €300 million. A review and Board discussion in 
2007 concluded that the ETCI (now including Mongolia) was making an 
impact and helping to alleviate poverty in the ETCs and that it should be 
continued for a further three years with equally ambitious targets and an 
added focus on the Asian ETCs. It was also renamed the Emerging Tran-
sition Countries Initiative to take account of sensitivities over the use of the 
term “early”. In due course the initiative morphed into a bigger and broader 
Small Business Initiative (SBI)32, although the Bank maintained a target for 
ETC projects in bankers’ objectives and the corporate scorecard throughout.
30 Thirty professionals were assigned to the initiative in addition to the 24 already working in the area. 
31 More about the Early Transition Countries Fund here: https://www.ebrd.com/who-we-are/our-donors/
multi-donor-funds.html.
32 The SBI was created in 2013.
333
Part III  Chapter 12
6. EU Accession, FDI and Convergence
The prospect of a number of countries of operations joining the EU had been 
on the EBRD’s radar for some time. The Copenhagen European Council of 
1993 had agreed that “countries of Central and Eastern Europe that so de-
sire shall become members of the European Union … as soon as an associ-
ated country is able to … satisf[y] the economic and political conditions re-
quired”. 
These conditions, known as the Copenhagen political and economic cri-
teria, closely matched the preamble and Article 1 of the EBRD’s AEB. The 
Council conclusions stated:
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and re-
spect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning mar-
ket economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union.33
 
For some, this implied that becoming a member state of the EU was 
tantamount to saying there was no longer any fundamental distinction be-
tween West and East among these countries and that the transition towards 
open market-oriented economies had effectively been accomplished. 
The eight central European and Baltic countries plus Bulgaria and Ro-
mania applied to become member states of the EU between 1994 (Hungary 
and Poland) and 1996 (the Czech Republic and Slovenia). Joining required 
alignment with the EU’s acquis communautaire. This was an enormous 
challenge requiring the transposition of some 20,000 legal acts and 80,000 
pages of the Official Journal of the European Communities into national 
legislation. It was clear that the process would be lengthy and far more diffi-
cult for some countries than for others. 
It was widely assumed that accession would be sequenced as countries 
with varying degrees of transition progress took differing amounts of time 
to meet the demanding standards of the acquis. European Council mem-
bers, however, wanted to avoid discriminating between applicants and in 
33 Copenhagen European Council Conclusions, Section 7, ‘Relations with the Countries of Central and East-
ern Europe’, Part A , ‘The Associated Countries’, 21–22 June 1993.
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their conclusions at Luxembourg in December 1997 included all 10 central 
and eastern European countries (plus Cyprus and Malta) in the fifth en-
largement process. 
Membership negotiations for some countries opened in March 1998, fol-
lowing an assessment by the European Commission which concluded that 
five of the more advanced transition countries—the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia34—might be ready to meet the Copen-
hagen criteria by 2002 or 2003.
Accession negotiations with five transition countries (and Cyprus) be-
gan in earnest in Helsinki in December 1999. The European Council also 
decided to open negotiations with the other five EBRD countries—Bulgar-
ia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia—and Malta. It also recognised 
the countries of former Yugoslavia as potential candidates, along with Tur-
key, although without dates for negotiations or accession. 
 As an MDB with majority EU ownership and a European character, the 
EBRD was fully aligned with the process, and its projects and policy work 
in these countries lent support to those seeking to join the EU. The Bank 
worked closely with the European Commission, whose substantial financial 
contribution to technical assistance proved an invaluable complement to the 
EBRD’s investments, and with the EIB in co-financing projects. More fi-
nancial assistance (for environment and transport) became available from 
2000 from the EU’s ISPA. 
By the start of the new millennium there was strong political momen-
tum within the EU to consolidate the progress being achieved in the in-
tegration of central and eastern Europe with its western counterparts. The 
Nice European Council of December 2000 decided to speed up the ne-
gotiation process with the aim of completing it within the following two 
years. Shortly afterwards, the European Parliament called for the prospec-
tive Member States to be allowed to participate in the June 2004 European 
Parliamentary elections. 
In 2001, the Commission proposed that negotiations might be complet-
ed by the end of the following year for those that were ready to enable them 
to participate in the 2004 elections as new Member States. At the Göteborg 
Council in the summer of 2001, the Commission declared that eight central 
European and Baltic countries could be ready on time—as well as Cyprus 
34 Cyprus, at that stage not a recipient of EBRD funds, was also included, making six in all.
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and Malta—but that Bulgaria and Romania needed to make further prog-
ress. Negotiations were completed for the 10 countries at the Copenhagen 
Council in December 2002, leading to the Treaty of Accession, which was 
signed at the foot of the Acropolis in Athens on 16 April 2003 and expected 
to enter into force one year later.
Quickening progress in the negotiations alerted market investors to the 
opportunities ahead and the potential returns from investing in countries 
that would sooner or later join the EU. A wave of FDI and portfolio flows 
swept into central Europe, principally focused on the most advanced coun-
tries. The amounts were significant and the flows, and mood of the times, 
contributed to growth and rising real incomes. Net private capital flows to 
accession countries35 accelerated from an average of around 2 per cent of 
GDP between 1991 and 1997 to around 6 per cent of GDP between 1998 
and 2003, peaking at 7 per cent in 2002. Meanwhile, net FDI doubled to 
some 4 per cent of GDP, peaking at around 6 per cent in 2000.36 The in-
crease in FDI was especially marked in the Czech Republic, Poland and to a 
lesser extent the Slovak Republic.37 
The process was supported by conditions the EBRD had been promot-
ing throughout the period: privatisations that presented merger and acqui-
sition opportunities; the further opening up of these economies, allowing 
them to benefit from the globalisation trend that was now in full swing; and 
an improving regulatory38 and business-friendly investment climate. In par-
ticular, the restructuring of the banking sector was accompanied by a signif-
icant involvement of western banks. By 2004, foreign groups owned more 
than two-thirds of the banking system of accession countries.39 
7. Expectations Surpassed
The improving economic conditions in the first part of the decade were not 
confined to central Europe but were spread widely across the EBRD region. 
35 Including Malta and Cyprus, as well as the 10 EBRD countries of operations.
36 ‘Financial FDI to the EU Accession Countries’, DG-I/MAW/04 78, pp. 6–7, European Central Bank, 19 
March 2004. 
37 A significant wave of FDI to Hungary occurred earlier, in the first half of the 1990s.
38 See Transition Report 2001 for a qualitative assessment of the banking regulatory framework of the eight 
EBRD first wave EU accession countries. 
39 ‘Financial FDI to the EU Accession Countries’, 2004, p. 2. 
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The millennium began with each of the 26 countries of operations experi-
encing positive growth, the first time this had happened in the post-com-
munist era. Despite a slowing in global growth in 2001, EBRD countries 
continued to grow robustly (with the exception of Poland, where growth 
dipped that year), helped by improving commodity prices and a rapid rise 
in world trade and FDI as globalisation accelerated. The so-called “conver-
gence play”—investing in accession countries and their financial instru-
ments in the expectation that interest rates would fall towards EU levels 
and exchange rates appreciate—accelerated the flow of funds towards cen-
tral Europe, boosting growth and incomes. 
Table 12.1 Average Annual GDP Growth EBRD Regions, 2000–2005
Average GDP growth, % pa 2000–2005
Central Europe and the Baltics 4.0
South-eastern Europe 4.8




To begin with, the Bank benefitted from the positive macroeconom-
ic conditions. Annual business volume comfortably exceeded the indica-
tive figures outlined in the second Capital Resources Review (CRR2), with 
advanced countries initially accounting for the majority of this outperfor-
mance but early and intermediate countries catching up by 2005. In 2001, 
annual business volume exceeded the target by more than €600 million and 
annual volumes remained well above the planned CRR2 levels in the fol-
lowing years before coming into line towards the end of the period (2005). 
The benign conditions also helped the Bank to expand investment else-
where, with annual volumes in Russia, early and intermediate transition 
countries all better than expected. Early and intermediate countries did es-
pecially well, exceeding the target by more than €1 billion in 2005.
The plan had been for the EBRD’s annual investments to rise from €2.5 
billion in 2001 to just under €3.5 billion by 2005. In the event, they had ris-
en to more than €4.5 billion, a running rate more than 25 per cent above 
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the agreement with Governors. Faster repayments and prepayments towards 
the end of the period, along with exchange-rate movements, helped keep 
the portfolio broadly in line with projections. As the next capital resourc-
es review approached, however, part of the Board’s concern was not that 
the portfolio was growing nor that the share of advanced countries in the 
total was excessive—it had in fact fallen sharply to less than 20 per cent 
by 2005—but that the approach of the Bank’s management jarred with the 
backdrop of EU accession and the notion that the EBRD should step back 
from some of the most advanced transition countries.
8. Rumblings of Mission Accomplished
The enlargement of the EU on 1 May 2004, including the accession of eight 
former socialist countries, was celebrated with gala concerts in Berlin, War-
saw and Malta, as well as a gathering of heads of state and government of the 
now 25 EU member states in Dublin on “enlargement day”. The vast ma-
jority of the 75 million new EU citizens came from the former communist 
countries. 
In its short existence, the EBRD had made a significant contribution to 
the achievement of bringing the East and West of Europe together again 65 
years after the start of the Second World War. Eight central European and 
Baltic countries of operations were now EU member states and two more, 
Bulgaria and Romania, were not far behind in the process (accession took 
place on 1 January 2007). Success, however, raised the question of the Bank’s 
future role in the region. 
The 2004 Annual Meeting in London, which took place a fortnight ahead 
of “enlargement day”, presented an opportunity for Governors to reflect on 
the situation. British Prime Minister Tony Blair opened the event by point-
ing towards a future role for the EBRD in the south and east of its region:
The Bank, as you know, was not set up to exist for ever. It is there to help 
countries make the transition, to a point where their own domestic insti-
tutions and investors and international business provide the basis for their 
economic growth. The transition is not yet finished in the countries which 
are about to join the EU. The EBRD will still help them complete this pro-
cess. But as they gain a new framework of support as EU members, and as 
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the interest of international investors grows, the EBRD’s role should natu-
rally change and fall away over the years to come. Nevertheless, there is still 
a major role for the Bank in countries further east and south.40
The US representative, Samuel Bodman, also addressed the future role of 
the EBRD. He began with the accession countries:
 
These countries deserve our congratulations for their achievements. For 
the EBRD as well—with its mandate to promote this very type of transi-
tion—this is an opportunity to declare victory.
In this context, it is appropriate that the shareholders take a fresh look 
at the future of this Bank. It has always been our view that transitions are, 
by definition, fleeting … Maintaining the status quo may be the easiest path 
forward, but it is not necessarily the most effective one. In that context, the 
forthcoming Capital Resources Review in 2006 represents a very good, and 
much-needed, opportunity for Governors to reassess the Bank’s graduation 
policy. Moving forward, the EBRD should build on its successes in the ac-
cession countries by focusing on its poorest countries of operations.41
A counter view was presented by the Chair of the Board of Governors, 
the Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker:
I do not believe that the transition process is over for the accession coun-
tries … On the contrary, the ‘last mile’ to a fully functional market econo-
my is usually the hardest, and it takes a specialist institution like the EBRD 
to accompany our new Member States on that final stretch of the road … 
One reason why the future work of the EBRD in the EU accession coun-
tries will surely be additional is the greater risk element inherent in some of 
its future transactions there. This, combined with the push to do more in 
the least advanced transition countries to the south and the east, will result 
in an increasingly risky project portfolio that the Bank has to manage.42
40 ‘Address by Mr Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom’, Annual Meeting, London, 19 April 
2004, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, p. 12.
41 ‘Statement by Mr Samuel Bodman, Head of Delegation for the United States of America’, EBRD Annual 
Meeting, London, 19 April 2004, p. 86. 
42 ‘Opening Statement by Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, Chair of the Board of Governors’, EBRD Annual Meet-
ing, London, 19 April 2004, p.13.
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The scene was set for a tough dialogue over the future of the Bank as 
preparations were made for the next capital resources review covering the 
period 2006 to 2010.
9. The Third Capital Resources Review and Graduation
The pressures facing Lemierre during 2005 as he contemplated the next 
phase of the EBRD’s evolution were immense. To some outsiders—and 
many insiders, especially bankers—it appeared paradoxical to question 
the Bank’s future direction at this juncture. In conventional terms the 
EBRD was performing exceptionally well. Its portfolio, operating assets 
and annual investments were notching up records year after year, transi-
tion progress was being made in all EBRD regions, and profits—for so 
long a weak spot—were on track for another high that year and contrib-
uting to growing reserves, which had reached more than €1.75 billion by 
the end of 2004. 
Yet, a number of key shareholders were advocating a significant change 
in direction. This represented the special nature of the institution as a pub-
lic-sector body set up to build and support a private sector in countries 
where it had been absent. By the mid-2000s, markets were in place more or 
less everywhere in the EBRD region. The issue was how well they worked 
and whether and where further intervention by a multilateral financial in-
stitution such as the Bank was still necessary.
One group—principally the Anglo-Saxon community (the USA, the 
UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), Japan, Switzerland and to some 
extent the Netherlands—felt the time had come for the EBRD to move on 
from its core central European geography. By contrast most EU members, 
including France and the new accession states in central and eastern Europe, 
believed that much more remained to be done in these countries. The debate 
became focused around the need for and timing of “graduation” of the ad-
vanced countries within this group.
The graduation issue was complicated by the fact that the enlargement 
process had to an extent accelerated the entry of countries to the EU rela-
tive to the originally envisaged conditions. In the cases of Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, which became member states later, continuing efforts to align sys-
tems with the acquis after entry into the EU was explicitly allowed for. Thus, 
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while eight—subsequently 10—of the EBRD’s countries of operations had 
become part of one of the most advanced market-oriented systems in the 
world, their transition could not be said to be entirely over. 
Another point of tension Lemierre faced in deciding business priorities 
was over Russia. Annual volumes of investment in Russia had grown rap-
idly between 2001 and 2005. By the end of the period, Russia’s share of the 
portfolio and of annual business volume had recovered to around 25 per 
cent of the total. Nonetheless, the Russian government believed the fig-
ure to be unacceptably low for the EBRD’s largest country of operations. 
At the same time, the rapid increase in business in Russia had raised con-
cerns elsewhere, particularly in the USA where disputes between Russia 
and Ukraine over gas supplies and pricing were souring perceptions of Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin in Washington. There was also an increasing focus on 
integrity issues and questions over the pursuit of large deals and high-vol-
ume activity in general.
In 2005 and early 2006, much of the Board’s time was taken up with try-
ing to find common ground on the issues underpinning the third Capital 
Resources Review. It took eight discussions at the FOPC of the Board of Di-
rectors, other Committee discussions and a Board retreat in 2005, and four 
more FOPC meetings in 2006 before there was sufficient consensus among 
Directors to present their conclusions to Governors for the resource deci-
sion at the 2006 Annual Meeting. 
In the run-up to the middle of the decade, annual EBRD investment vol-
ume had accelerated from around €2.5 billion to more than €4 billion. Man-
agement, and Banking in particular, were ready to accommodate a similar 
increase for the rest of the decade towards an investment rate of €6 billion a 
year. Acceleration of business in advanced transition countries in the run-up 
to accession was expected to drop, however, now that these countries were 
EU members. The preference among several important shareholders was to 
hold annual volume steady at just under €4 billion while adjusting the bal-
ance within it. This would prudently make room for more resource and risk-
intensive activities and would further transition while being consistent with 
continuing administrative restraint and efficiency improvements. The port-
folio was expected to rise steadily to reach €22 billion by 2010.
Within the total, the share of advanced countries was expected to di-
minish sharply, to 13 per cent in portfolio terms and 6 per cent by annual 
volume (falling below 10 per cent in 2008) by 2010. The countries concerned 
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were not happy with this decline or with the proposed closure of some Resi-
dent Offices and the consolidation of the management of local offices in the 
Baltics through a regional hub based in Warsaw. Nonetheless, they accepted 
the proposals. A significant expansion of regionally based professional staff 
in south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia matched 
the rebalancing effort. 
Russia, on the other hand, argued strongly for a better deal than was 
originally on offer. By December 2005, when the first full draft of the Re-
view was circulated to Directors, annual volume in Russia was projected to 
rise from €1.2 billion in 2006 to €1.3 billion by 2010, or 36 per cent of the to-
tal.43 By the time the final document went to Governors, the projection for 
2010 had risen to €1.6 billion (41 per cent of the total). 
The most contentious issue, however, concerned the idea of graduation of 
some advanced countries of operations. Agreement was finally reached that 
the eight new EU member states would graduate by 2010, after which the 
Bank would stop doing new business in those countries.44 
At the 2006 Annual Meeting in London, a number of Governors com-
mented on graduation. Hilary Benn, Secretary of State at DfID, led the way 
on behalf of the UK government: “The EBRD anticipates reduced business 
in these eight [EU] countries over the next five years and it is right that this 
is so. We expect these countries to graduate from EBRD help.” 
Gerrit Zalm, the Dutch Deputy Prime Minister and Chair of the Board 
of Governors echoed these sentiments:
Where do these successes leave us? With a job well done, and with the task 
of refocusing the institution. We are moving away from those countries 
where the job is largely, though perhaps not yet wholly, finished.
Clay Lowery from the US Treasury put forward the strongly held US view: 
With the new CRR strategy, the Bank’s management has the necessary 
policy guidance and tools to complete the task assigned to it 15 years ago. 
… It can lead the way in showing that countries can be successful and grad-
43 ‘Capital Resources Review 3’, 14 December 2005, p. 93, p. 112.
44 ‘Report of the Board of Directors to the Board of Governors on the Capital Resources Review 3’, 11 May 
2006.
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uate. ... And it can lead the way in showing that development institutions 
can be transitional and can be successful, and ultimately can put them-
selves out of business.
Lemierre commented: 
Graduation is a marvellous mark of success. For the eight countries con-
cerned, it is the success of transition, reflecting historic achievements in 
their economic and political transformation. And for the Bank, it marks 
the success of the model—the proof that transition works and the EBRD 
does what it says it will do: withdraw when we are no longer needed.
10. A Graduate Emerges: the Case of the Czech Republic
The 2006 Annual Meeting also saw the Czech Republic take the first clear 
step by a country of operations towards graduation. Zdenek Tuma, Gover-
nor of the Czech central bank and alternate EBRD Governor for the Czech 
Republic, confirmed that his government had given approval for discussions 
to begin with the Bank’s management on the graduation of his country 
from EBRD operations. He suggested a target date of October 2007, when 
the next country strategy for the Czech Republic was due.
Taking pole position on the graduation starting grid among countries of 
operations was a politically astute move and came at a time when investor 
interest in central European countries was close to a peak. It sent a strong 
signal that the Czech Republic had made it across the transition divide and 
helped give the impression that it was the strongest of the pack. This was 
not without foundation. GDP per capita was, along with Slovenia, ahead of 
the other EU-8 by some margin and the Czech Republic was similarly ad-
vanced on many social indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality 
and PISA45 scores. There was no doubt about the progress the Czech Repub-
lic had made since the beginning of the transition process and that it was as 
advanced in democratic and economic terms as many other EU members. 
The proposal that it should graduate was welcomed by the Czech Republic’s 
fellow Governors. 
45 The OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
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Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia also stated in 2006 that they expected to 
graduate before the end of the decade. None, however, followed the Czech 
Republic’s example in setting an explicit date for graduation. Despite a re-
peat of the sentiment by Hungary in relation to its new country strategy in 
2008, no further step was in fact taken by these countries, or any other, to 
activate the formal process of graduation.46 
Following a decision by the Czech Council of Ministers, the country’s 
Minister of Finance, Miroslav Kalousek, wrote to Lemierre on 19 March 
2007 “to convey the desire that EBRD operations in the Czech Republic be 
considered to have ‘graduated’”. Once a country had formally expressed its 
desire to graduate, approval was needed by the Board based on a review of a 
recipient country’s progress on decentralisation, demonopolisation and pri-
vatisation.
The review, which was conducted over the summer of 2007, was relative-
ly straightforward and consistent with the 1996 Policy on Graduation. It 
concluded that the Czech Republic had made significant progress in transi-
tion and was one of the most open and competitive economies in the region, 
as well as in the EU as a whole. A detailed analysis of sector transition chal-
lenges based on the Bank’s indicator system showed few remaining gaps. 
Just five out of 39 sector and institutional areas showed a “medium” gap (in 
transport infrastructure and some aspects of energy efficiency). The rest 
were assessed as “small” or “negligible”. The review found that the structure 
of the Czech economy was “approaching that of an advanced market econ-
omy” with most sectors having reached standards found in mature market 
economies.
The paper recommending graduation of the Czech Republic was pre-
sented to Directors on 23 October. It proposed that, effective 31 Decem-
ber 2007, the EBRD’s operations in the Czech Republic be considered to 
have graduated and that the Bank should no longer consider or approve 
new operations in the country after that date. The Board strongly supported 
the proposal and congratulated the Czech government and people on their 
transition achievements.
46 The subsequent period of the EBRD’s history is covered in Volume 2.
344
After the Berlin Wall
11. Rapid Growth Attracts Foreign Investors 
The EBRD’s countries of operations had been growing fast for more than 
five years by the time the Governors signed off in 2006 on the new strat-
egy period to 2010. The carefully calibrated compromises and restrictions 
agreed, however, were soon to be confronted by unforeseen trends and 
events. 
At the start of the period, macroeconomic conditions across the EBRD’s 
region went into overdrive, even when compared with the recent past. 
Growth in every sub-region accelerated in 2006 and 2007, reaching double-
digit rates in eastern Europe and the Caucasus (see Table 12.2). Per capita 
figures were even higher. 
Table 12.2  Average Annual GDP Growth EBRD regions, 2000–2007
GDP growth, average % pa CEB SEE EEC Russia CA
2000–2005 4.0 4.8 7.6 6.8 9.0
2006–2007 6.3 6.1 11.7 8.3 9.4
Source: EBRD
In areas where financial systems remained weak, and where foreign and 
some domestic investors were less willing to venture without the added com-
fort of the EBRD’s clout and status, the Bank was able to do good business. 
Annual investment volume outside advanced transition countries jumped 
by €1.25 billion, an increase of more than one-third, between 2004–5 and 
2006–7. The biggest contribution was made by Russia, with a rise of more 
than €0.75 billion, or 70 per cent, while for eastern Europe and the Cauca-
sus the figure increased by more than 50 per cent.
In line with the strategy, there was a marked contrast in central Europe 
and the Baltics, where average business volumes dropped by some €370 mil-
lion or almost 30 per cent. With stock markets booming across the world, 
vast flows of funds were making their way into the nascent central Europe-
an financial markets, driving down interest rates and providing substantial 
liquidity to local banks and the many subsidiaries of foreign banks, allow-
ing them to finance smaller enterprises and seek better returns from riski-
er ventures.
345
Part III  Chapter 12
In these countries, the additionality of the EBRD was rapidly being erod-
ed as the private sector began to thrive and commercial banks in the region ex-
tended their reach and increased lending dramatically. The Bank’s special sta-
tus as a hand to hold when venturing into uncharted waters was becoming less 
valuable in many of the more advanced transition countries. Bankers eager to 
find deals in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were 
effectively being priced out of the market. In the Baltics, business ground to a 
halt, with less than €500,000 invested in Estonia and Latvia in total in 2006 
and 2007. The share of advanced transition EU countries in annual business 
volume fell far more steeply than planned in CRR3, hitting a low of under 4 
per cent by the end of 2007. The pace of decline reflected new market realities, 
as much as a strategic decision on the part of the Bank’s management.
12. ‘Supernormal’ Profits and the Call for a Dividend Distribution
Full financial results for 2005 arrived just ahead of the EBRD 2006 Annu-
al Meeting. At €1.5 billion, net profit was more than €1 billion higher than 
in 2003 and 2004. The return on members’ equity for the CRR2 period in-
creased to 7.1 per cent. The impressive result reflected the Bank’s rapidly 
expanding portfolio—which now stood at close to €17 billion—as well as 
healthy margins and a very low level of impairments. The rise in stock mar-
ket valuations had also boosted the equity portfolio and allowed some sales 
of earlier investments at a significant profit.
Many shareholders were pleased that the EBRD was easily outperform-
ing its targets and making enough profit at last to build up its reserves. Re-
serves and retained earnings increased in 2005 by €3 billion. However, as 
was pointed out at the time by many Board members and the President, the 
EBRD was not a commercial bank but a transition bank. It needed earnings 
to be able to cover future risk-taking activities without recourse to share-
holders for more capital. Given that the new strategy called for greater risk-
taking in the form of investments in less advanced transition countries, the 
“super-normal” returns provided a welcome base. 
Article 36, paragraph 1, which dealt with the allocation of net income, 
provided for the possibility of a dividend distribution, as well as allocation 
to surplus or other purposes. However, it also stated: “no distribution [oth-
er than to surplus or other purposes] shall be made until the general reserve 
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amounts to at least ten (10) per cent of the authorized capital stock.” This 
threshold was €2 billion. The Bank had not until this point been in a po-
sition to invoke this clause of the AEB. By the end of 2005, however, un-
restricted general reserves had reached €1.7 billion and CRR3 projections 
indicated the threshold would likely be exceeded the following year. This 
raised the question of whether a dividend should be paid to shareholders.
The debate over a possible dividend payment, which began in 2006, was 
long and divisive. The problem was accentuated towards the end of the year 
as it became clear that profits for 2006 were going to be strong. By the spring 
of 2007, the EBRD was again reporting the highest profits in its history—a 
staggering €2.4 billion for 2006, a 60 per cent increase on the previous year. 
Unrestricted reserves were by now well above the distribution threshold at 
€3.4 billion and were fast moving towards what had been seen as a suitable 
CRR3 end point of €4.2 billion by 2010. Another good year could result in 
this objective being met and leaving room for other options, provided the 
Bank did not expand its portfolio or take on additional risks that might 
threaten the limits of capital utilisation agreed under the CRR3.
The Vice President for Finance, Manfred Scheppers, and the Direc-
tor, Corporate Strategy, Josué Tanaka, had anticipated this situation and 
presented a paper on reserves and the allocation of income to the FOPC 
in January 2007.47 Based on preliminary figures, they showed that unre-
stricted general reserves for 2006 would be €1.4 billion above the threshold. 
They also anticipated a further increase to €1.8 billion by the end of 2007. 
A big contribution to the positive picture came from equity gains, follow-
ing some spectacularly profitable exits in 200648. Impairments also reached 
a record low. 
Scheppers and Tanaka noted that the positive results had been driven 
by the EU accession process as global institutional investors began to in-
clude new member states in their target portfolios and local pension funds 
stepped up investment in their domestic markets. They argued that realisa-
tion of such large equity gains could not be repeated, especially as the stock 
of holdings in central Europe was falling and being replaced by holdings of 
less liquid and more volatile assets in Russia and south-eastern Europe. The 
47 ‘Capital Adequacy, Reserves and Allocation of Net Income’, 17 January 2007.
48 Banca Comercială Română accounted for half the increase. In general, the EBRD benefitted from positive 
valuations and profitable sales of investments it had made early on in the transition process and on which it 
had worked with clients to improve during the subsequent period. It was in many respects a one-off event.
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risk environment that had reduced impairments also seemed unusually be-
nign. Some Directors agreed that the situation and profits of the Bank in 
2006 had been exceptional and were unlikely to be sustained. 
The paper also reviewed the Bank’s capital adequacy and financial via-
bility under a simulated shock event three and a half times greater than the 
1998 crisis (assessed as 0.01 per cent probability), timed for the end of 2008. 
The analysis under a Risk Capital Model for CRR3 showed this could re-
sult in losses of €4.6 billion, for which the Bank had sufficient capital (paid 
in and reserves) to meet capital adequacy and financial viability require-
ments. Scheppers and Tanaka suggested, however, that a proper econom-
ic capital assessment—a framework the Bank did not have at the time but 
was working on—implied this might be optimistic, even taking into ac-
count additional profit above the assumed CRR3 projected level for 2006. 
A cyclical return to a weaker credit environment, increased concentration 
in riskier countries (the Russian portfolio had grown faster than expect-
ed, for example), and a host of other factors were cited as reasons why the 
Bank should continue to take a prudent perspective and allocate the addi-
tional income to reserves “to buffer the impact of a potential future shock, 
to protect the paid-in capital provided by its shareholders, to maintain its 
AAA status and to address effectively the potential impact of the range of 
uncertainties”.49 
Their recommendation was for a full allocation to reserves. They add-
ed, however: “taking account of the exceptional magnitude of realised prof-
its in 2005 and 2006, the Bank could consider … whether funds equiv-
alent to the notional interest to be generated from the reserves could be 
allocated [under ‘other purposes’] ... to an EBRD technical cooperation 
programme.” The idea was for a fund of €50 million be set up with Board 
oversight to support directly some specific technical cooperation activi-
ties, such as TAM-BAS50 and legal transition or nuclear decommissioning 
work, to catalyse additional donor funds and support activities where do-
nor funds were lacking.51 Internalising the funding of technical coopera-
tion would be a first for the EBRD, although it had been introduced by the 
IFC a couple of years earlier. 
49 ‘Capital Adequacy’, p. 15.
50 Turnaround Management and Business Advisory Services. https://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/
factsheets/tambas.pdf. 
51 See ‘Capital Adequacy,’ pp. 19–20.
348
After the Berlin Wall
The presentation of the paper to the FOPC on 25 January led to a live-
ly but inconclusive discussion, with some Directors supporting manage-
ment’s arguments and others calling for more justification of the size of the 
proposed allocation to reserves. It started a discussion that occupied the 
Board and management for much of the next year, as every aspect of allo-
cating income beyond reserves came under scrutiny in an effort to reach a 
consensus. 
Four FOPC meetings, three management papers on the topic and two 
executive Board sessions between January and April ahead of the EBRD 
2007 Annual Meeting led to a holding position to allocate the 2006 surplus 
income to reserves. It was also agreed to consider fully all the options and 
parameters for the allocation of 2007 net income in time for the 2008 Gov-
ernors’ Resolution on the issue. Not all Directors were happy with the out-
come. Some argued strongly for a full discussion of a dividend option and 
this was reflected in Statements by their Governors and Heads of Delega-
tion at the Annual Meeting. 
The Governors passed Resolution 108 at the 2007 Annual Meeting in 
Kazan, which allocated net income to surplus after provisions and possible 
future net losses. The Heads of Delegation for the USA and Australia/New 
Zealand voted against the proposal and made their dissatisfaction with the 
decision clear in their Governors’ statements.
The Polish Governor, Slawomir Skrzypek, also voted against the Resolu-
tion but for wholly different reasons. His statement argued for “the remain-
der of the net income for 2006 [to be allocated] to activities in early transi-
tion countries”. 
In his closing remarks to the Meeting, Lemierre summed up the debate: 
The main view favours the mission-based allocation of income … capital 
and technical assistance … based on prudence, taking risks, but also capac-
ity to increase the delivery of the mission. Some are in favour of a dividend 
and some are not ... we must work through the debate.
Ten papers were prepared for subsequent FOPC discussions, covering 
topics including operational updates, capital adequacy, use of investment 
grants, support for Banking and nuclear safety (under the “other purpos-
es” category of Article 36), and an external review of distribution practices. 
Board papers on wider, related questions of the interpretation of the gear-
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ing ratio and a new strategic operations framework were also issued and dis-
cussed before a conclusion was reached. 
Among the more influential papers was a report by Deloitte which 
looked at other MDB, DFI and commercial practices on dividend pay-
ments. This made clear that development institutions reinvested earnings to 
provide support for their mandates, whereas entities nearer the commercial 
end of the spectrum were more likely to consider a distribution. The hybrid 
nature of the EBRD left the question open. But it was clear that for public-
sector institutions, repayment to shareholders—as opposed to allocations 
to mandate-related funds, such as for technical assistance—was rarely done 
(and only on an exceptional, one-off basis). 
In context, a distribution to shareholders would not be a return on capi-
tal but a return of capital. Many Directors agreed that this would be seen as 
a negative signal of a withdrawal of shareholder support for the institution 
and countries of operations. Another consideration was the mismatch be-
tween shareholder ownership and the perceived contribution of sharehold-
ers representing significant donors or countries of operations where the prof-
its were being generated. 
A Board retreat was called for 4-5 December to try to resolve the out-
standing issues ahead of the 2008 Annual Meeting in Kyiv. By then, more 
concrete proposals for an allocation of funds to support transition purposes 
through technical assistance, and the governance process, had been worked 
out to the satisfaction of many Directors, including those concerned that 
such funds might result in donor displacement. An additional proposal to 
help fill a gap in the Chernobyl nuclear containment funds had also been 
made. This was especially attractive to the G8 and the EU, which had been 
the main source of funds and were being pressed for commitments. How-
ever, perhaps the most critical factor as the debate moved into the new year 
was market volatility and growing awareness that financial conditions were 
weakening globally. The case for prudence began to look unassailable.
The final discussion of the Board of Directors’ Report to Governors took 
place on 15 April 2008. Profits for 2007 were once again very strong at €1.9 
billion. After adjustments, that left an allocation of €1.1 billion to net in-
come. The proposed Resolution 112 for Governors presented a threefold al-
location of this net income: €115 million for a Shareholder Special Fund 
(SSF); €135 million for nuclear safety activities (Chernobyl); and the re-
maining €830 million to a new Strategic Reserve. 
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The SSF supported banking activities, with 40 per cent allocated to ETCs. 
No more than 32 per cent was permitted for incentive payments and invest-
ment grants, which were limited to countries eligible for Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA52) only (other than co-financing of NDEP projects), 
in order to broaden the scope and deepen the intensity of the Bank’s transi-
tion impact. The Chernobyl contribution was split between the ISF-2 (Nu-
clear Safety Account) and the NSC (Chernobyl Shelter Fund), which had 
funding shortfalls of €77 million and €58 million respectively, and made a 
significant contribution to the €300 million required from G8/EU donors.
The Strategic Reserve, created under the Strategic Operations Frame-
work, was to be counted as part of economic capital but would not provide 
additional headroom for operations unless specifically authorised to be allo-
cated to unrestricted general reserves at a later date. By itself, it thus had no 
impact on capital utilisation and operational headroom for the Bank, sat-
isfying those who wanted to limit the immediate scope for new activities.
The Report concluded: 
A number of important factors [have been] taken into account in the dis-
tribution decision, including the capital position of the Bank in relation to 
its medium term strategy and related capital requirements, the signalling 
effect of a distribution across a broad range of stakeholders and the gener-
al environment in the financial markets.
It acknowledged that reserves and capital adequacy at the end of 2007—
when unrestricted general reserves had reached €4.5 billion—could have 
permitted a limited distribution but focused on the “special need” to sup-
port Ukraine in funding the completion of the new shelter for the Chernob-
yl nuclear power plant and the implementation of the nuclear spent fuel fa-
cility and “without prejudice to a possible determination by the Governors 
of a distribution to members” in future.
For the great majority of Governors Resolution 112 was a reasonable out-
come and it was passed. Three Governors voted against. Belarus and Russia 
felt that the large allocation to the Strategic Reserve was unnecessarily re-
strictive, while Australia was in favour of a dividend. Australia also notified 
the meeting that they intended to withdraw from the Bank from 2010 “in 
52 As defined by the OECD.
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the context of a job well done”. Lemierre responded by expressing his sad-
ness that the Bank, as a multilateral institution, would be “losing [Austra-
lia’s] commitment to the region and [its] expertise at a time when challeng-
es are very great.”53
As shareholders and staff packed suitcases to leave and reflected on the 
2008 Annual Meeting, feelings were mixed: the Bank’s mission had been a 
success, but was it so successful that it had put itself out of business? At least 
the May sunshine in Kyiv matched Ukraine’s economic boom—GDP per 
capita had reached new heights, now almost double that of 10 years earlier. 
This was, all the same, still less than 30 per cent of the level of the EBRD’s 
most successful (and only) graduate, the Czech Republic. More graduates 
might reduce the scale of the Bank’s operations ahead but for sure there 
would be work to do in less advanced transition countries. But as delegates 




It was now almost two decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall and more 
than 17 years since the start of EBRD operations. The Bank had matured 
along with many countries of operations. But now, the EBRD was itself in 
transition. 
It faced a new direction: a valid but uncertain one. The issues of gradu-
ation and dividends had prompted a whirlwind of activity and raised ques-
tions about the future of the Bank. 
Fifteen years earlier, it had taken a new French President to clean up the 
debris after the media storm and to put the Bank on an even keel. On this 
occasion, an experienced French President, at the end of his eight-year ten-
ure, was destined to survive the shareholder storm caused by the EBRD’s 
own success in central Europe and preserve the Bank for the future.
But the Bank was about to face further headwinds in the form of glob-
al forces beyond its control. It was to be a major test for the institution. It 
would be a new German President’s turn to take the EBRD on the next 
stage of its journey.




I. Prospective Membership as at 29 May 1990 (signature of the 
Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction  
and Development in Paris) 


















17. Korea, Republic of 
18. Liechtenstein 
19. Luxembourg 

















Members and recipient countries
35. Bulgaria (Recipient) 
36. Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Recipient)
37. German Democratic Republic (Recipient)
38. Hungary (Recipient) 
39. Poland (Recipient) 
40. Romania (Recipient) 
41. USSR (Recipient)
42. Yugoslavia (Recipient) 
II. Membership as at 15 April 1991 (Inaugural Annual Meeting)
40 members (including seven recipient countries) 
Members
1. Australia (30 March 1991)
2. Austria (28 March 1991)
3. Belgium (10 April 1991)
4. Canada (28 March 1991)
5. Cyprus (28 March 1991)
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6. Denmark (28 March 1991)
7. Egypt (28 March 1991- recipient country since 2015)
8. Finland (28 March 1991)
9. France (28 March 1991)
10. Germany (GDR and FRG merged after unification) (28 March 1991)
11. Greece (29 March 1991)
12. Iceland (29 May 1991)
13. Ireland (28 March 1991)
14. Israel (28 March 1991)
15. Italy (28 March 1991)
16. Japan (2 April 1991)
17. Republic of Korea (28 March 1991) 
18. Liechtenstein (28 March 1991)
19. Luxembourg (28 March 1991)
20. Malta (28 March 1991)
21. Mexico (28 March 1991)
22. Morocco (28 March 1991 – recipient country since 2013)
23. Netherlands (28 March 1991)
24. Norway (28 March 1991)
25. Portugal (5 April 1991)
26. Spain (28 March 1991)
27. Sweden (28 March 1991)
28. Switzerland (28 March 1991)
29. Turkey (28 March 1991 – recipient country since 2008)
30. United Kingdom (28 March 1991)
31. USA (28 March 1991)
32. EEC (28 March 1991)
33. EIB (28 March 1991)
Members and recipient countries
34. Bulgaria (28 March 1991)
35. Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (on or before 28 March 1991)
36. Hungary (28 March 1991)
37. Poland (28 March 1991)
38. Romania (28 March 1991)
39. USSR (on or before 28 March 1991) 
40. Yugoslavia (on or before 28 March 1991) 
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III. Members joining between 16 April 1991 and 31 December 1992 
Members
1. New Zealand (19 August 1991)
Members and recipient countries
2. Albania (18 December 1991) 
3. Estonia (28 February 1992) 
4. Latvia (18 March 1992)
5. Lithuania (5 March 1992) 
6. Armenia (7 December 1992) 
7. Azerbaijan (25 September 1992)
8. Belarus (10 June 1992) 
9. Georgia (4 September 1992) 
10. Kazakhstan (27 July 1992) 
11. Kyrgyz Republic (5 June 1992) 
12. Moldova (5 May 1992)
13. Russian Federation (replacing USSR as of 9 April 1992) 
14. Slovenia (23 December 1992 – following the fact that Yugoslavia 
ceased to be a member on 9 October 1992)
15. Tajikistan (16 October 1992) 
16. Turkmenistan (1 June 1992) 
17. Ukraine (13 August 1992) 
18. Uzbekistan (30 April 1992) 
Number of members at the end of 1992: 57.
IV. Members joining between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 1995
1. Croatia (15 April 1993, following the fact that Yugoslavia ceased to 
be a member on 9 October 1992)
2. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (referred to as North Mace-
donia since 14 February 2019)




At the end of 1993, and until the end of 1995 the total number of mem-
bers stood at 59 and the number of countries of operations had risen to 25. 
V. Members joining after 1 January 1996
1. Bosnia Herzegovina (17 June 1996) (60th member)
2. Mongolia (9 October 2000) (61st member) 
3. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (19 January 2001 and referred to as 
Serbia and Montenegro between 2003 and 2006) (62nd member)
4. Montenegro (3 June 2006) (63rd member)
5. Tunisia (29 December 2011) (64th member)
6. Jordan (29 December 2011) (65th member)
7. Kosovo (17 December 2012) (66th member) 
8. China (15 January 2016) (67th member) 
9. Lebanon (15 July 2017) (68th member)
10. India (11 July 2018) (69th member) 
11. San Marino (7 June 2019) (70th member)
12. Libya (16 July 2019) (71st member)
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